Journal of the Pali Text Society
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Primoz Pecenko
1947–2007

Dr Primoz Pecenko died suddenly following a heart attack on the evening of the 1 August 2007 while out walking with his family and dog. This was a few days short of his 60th birthday.

Primoz was Senior Lecturer in Eastern Religions and Co-Director of the Centre for Buddhist Studies at the University of Queensland; he was also an Executive committee member of the Australasian Association of Buddhist Studies (AABS), a friend to many of us, and an important contributor to that organization.

Primoz, who completed a Masters degree at Pune in India and a PhD at the Australian National University, was a major figure in Buddhist studies in Australia and his passing represents a great loss to our discipline. He and his wife, Dr Tamara Ditrich, with whom he shared the positions at the University of Queensland, have worked tirelessly to maintain Buddhist Studies at the University of Queensland and to promote Buddhist Studies in Australia.

Primoz’s specialization was in Pāli commentarial literature, particularly the sub-commentaries (ṭikās), a field that has been little researched. One of his major contributions to this field is his edition of the sub-commentary on the Anguttara-nikāya (Anguttara-nikāya-ṭikā, three volumes to date (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1996, 1997, 1999)). A fourth volume was in progress. This represents only the second critical edition of a Pāli sub-commentary. Primoz also contributed to our understanding of this class of Pāli literature through several important articles, including “Sāriputta and His Works” (Journal of the Pali Text Society, Vol. XXIII (1997), pp. 159–79) and “Linathapakāsini and Sāratthamañjusā: The Purāṇāṭṭikās and the ṭikās on the Four Nikāyas” (Journal of the Pali Text Society, Vol. XXVII, (2002) pp. 61–113).

1Adapted from an obituary first posted on H-Buddhism on 6 August 2007.
Primoz presented a stimulating paper in the AABS seminar series on Pāli commentarial literature, entitled “Pāli Texts and Their Manuscripts: A Case of ‘Lost’ Manuscripts Mentioned in old Pāli Bibliographic Sources,” in April, 2006.

Many of Primoz’s publications are in his native tongue, Slovenian. This includes numerous Slovenian translations of Pāli texts, such as the Dhammapada (2001) and Milindapañha (1989, 1990), plus translations of individual suttas, such as the Mahāsatipāṭhāna-sutta (1988).

At the time of his death, Primoz was engaged in several important and interesting research projects. One entailed editing a Pāli commentarial text that was previously thought to have been lost, but was discovered by him in Burma. Apart from making this text available to scholars in the form of a critical edition, this work promised to throw light on the creation of commentaries, the nature of the commentarial project, and other hitherto little understood aspects of this field. Another research project entailed the study of the Kuthodaw Pagoda Inscriptional Complex in Burma, which would have helped to establish the relationship between this “edition” of the Pāli canon and other versions current in the Theravada Buddhist world. It further promised to contribute towards our understanding of textual authority in Buddhist communities. Primoz was also working on Buddhist meditation in theory and practice and Pāli bibliographic texts.

Much of Primoz’s research was funded by grants from such prestigious bodies as the Pali Text Society, the Australian Research Council, and ANU and University of Queensland research fellowships.

At the University of Queensland Primoz taught Pāli, Sanskrit, and courses on Buddhism, Hinduism, and World Religion, and supervised numerous postgraduate students including many international students. He was well-respected and liked by his students and will be greatly missed.

2The Pali Text Society hopes to publish Dr Pecenko’s edition of the Manorathapūraṇi-purāṇa-ṭikā in 2010.
Primoz’s premature death robs us of a wonderful colleague, an admired teacher, and a great Pāli scholar, who undoubtedly would have gone on to improve our understanding of Pāli texts, specifically Pāli commentarial literature.

Dr Mark Allon  
Department of Indian Sub-continental Studies  
University of Sydney
The History of the Nikāya Subcommentaries (tiṅkās) in Pāli Bibliographic Sources

In this article I will discuss the history of Pāli subcommentaries (tiṅkās) on the first four nikāyas as it is presented in traditional Theravāda bibliographic texts. My investigation will show that there exist two sets of nikāya subcommentaries and not just a single set, which we have in printed form published as a part of the Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition. The works of modern Pāli scholarship, which in this case agree with the Theravāda tradition, also usually mention only one set of subcommentaries. However, according to some Pāli bibliographic sources and catalogues of Pāli manuscripts held in various libraries in Burma and Sri Lanka, there seems to exist another set of the subcommentaries on the four nikāyas which has been ignored or omitted by the Theravāda tradition and considered either “lost” or “non-existent” by modern Pāli scholarship.

My recent discovery of an important Pāli manuscript of one of the “lost” subcommentaries in Burma gives a completely new perspective on the historical development of the two sets of the subcommentaries and, in a wider sense, also on our understanding of the available information about the history of Pāli literature. Here the following important issues which resulted from this discovery will be discussed:

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*This article is a continuation of my earlier research of the subcommentaries on the four nikāyas (nikāya-tiṅkās) (Pecenko 2002), and is part of a larger research of the Pāli tiṅkā literature funded by the Australian Research Council.


2 For example, von Hinüber, 1996b.

3 For bibliographic sources see Table 2.1 below; I mainly used the following two catalogues of Pāli manuscripts: Somadasa, 1959–64, and Piṭ-sim, which is both a bibliographic source and a catalogue (see Part 2, 2.6, and Part 3 below).

4 The manuscript is described in detail in Pecenko, 2002, pp. 82–85.

The existence of the “lost” manuscript proves that the information in some older Pāli bibliographic sources — where such manuscripts are mentioned — is correct and that both the Theravāda tradition as well as modern Pāli scholarship ignored the “lost” texts and the bibliographic information about them.

The analysis of the available printed editions and catalogued manuscripts also indicates that the information about the subcommentaries given in the works of modern Pāli scholarship seems to be influenced by the traditional Theravāda scholarship — both mention only one set — although the information about the “lost” texts was easily available.

My discovery of the above mentioned Pāli manuscript, which is listed in the older Pāli bibliographic texts (e.g. Saddhammasaṅgaha, Pagan inscription), also proves that these bibliographic sources — often considered less reliable by modern Pāli scholarship — seem to be much more reliable than the later bibliographic sources (e.g. Sāsanavamsa) which have been used as the main sources for the modern history of Pāli literature. Therefore the sources for the available history of Pāli literature need to be re-examined in the light of the information given in the older bibliographic texts, catalogues of Pāli manuscripts, inscriptions, and the texts which — although existing in manuscript form — have not been researched yet.

Considering all this, the history of the traditional Theravāda transmission of Pāli texts will have to be re-examined as well.

**Part 1. The aṭṭhakathās and ṭikās on the four nikāyas**

Each of the four nikāyas has a commentary (aṭṭhakathā) compiled by Buddhaghosa in the fifth century C.E. in Sri Lanka (see Table 1.1 below), and the four commentaries have two sets of subcommentaries: the older subcommentaries (purāṇatikā), collectively called Līnattha-pakāsini (see Table 1.2 below), and the later subcommentaries (ṭikā), collectively called Sāratthamañjūśā (see Table 1.3 below).
### Table 1.1. Commentaries (āṭṭhakathā) on the four nikāyas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pāli canon: four nikāyas</th>
<th>Commentaries (āṭṭhakathā)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First written down first cent. B.C.E. in Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Compiled fifth cent. C.E. by Buddhaghosa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dighanikāya (D)</td>
<td>Sumatagalavilāsini (Sv)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majjhimanikāya (M)</td>
<td>Papañcasuḍanī (Ps)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sānyuttanikāya (S)</td>
<td>Sāratthapakāsini (Spk)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anguttaranikāya (A)</td>
<td>Manorathapūraṇī (Mp)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 1.2. The old subcommentaries (purāṇatikā) on the four nikāyas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nikāyas / āṭṭhakathās</th>
<th>Old subcommentaries (purāṇatikā = p†)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compiled sixth–ninth century C.E. by Dhammapāla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dighanikāya / Sumatagalavilāsini</td>
<td>Sumatagalavilāsini purāṇatikā (Sv-p†), Pathamā Linatthapakāsini [I]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majjhimanikāya / Papañcasuḍanī</td>
<td>Papañcasuḍanī purāṇatikā (Ps-p†), Dutiyā Linatthapakāsini [II]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sānyuttanikāya / Sāratthapakāsini</td>
<td>Sāratthapakāsini purāṇatikā (Spk-p†), Tatiyā Linatthapakāsini [III]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anguttaranikāya / Manorathapūraṇī</td>
<td>Manorathapūraṇī purāṇatikā (Mp-p†), Catutthā Linatthapakāsini [IV]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 1.3. The (later) subcommentaries (ṭikā) on the four nikāyas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nikāyas / āṭṭhakathās</th>
<th>(Later) subcommentaries (ṭikā = ṭ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compiled twelfth century C.E. by Sāriputta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dighanikāya / Sumatagalavilāsini</td>
<td>Sumatagalavilāsiniṭikā (Sv-ṭ), Pathamā Śāratthamañjūṣā [I]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majjhimanikāya / Papañcasuḍanī</td>
<td>Papañcasuḍanīṭikā (Ps-ṭ), Dutiyā Śāratthamañjūṣā [II]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sānyuttanikāya / Sāratthapakāsini</td>
<td>Sāratthapakāsiniṭikā (Spk-ṭ), Tatiyā Śāratthamañjūṣā [III]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anguttaranikāya / Manorathapūraṇī</td>
<td>Manorathapūraṇīṭikā (Mp-ṭ), Catutthā Śāratthamañjūṣā [IV]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The authorship of the purāṇatikās (Linatthapakāsini) is usually ascribed to Dhammapāla⁵ and that of the later ṭikās (Śāratthamañjūṣā) is

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ascribed to Sāriputta of Polonnaruva. Although according to some catalogues of Pāli manuscripts held in various libraries in Burma and Sri Lanka, both sets of tīkās exist in manuscript form, only the tīkās belonging to the single combined set (see Table 2.9 below) have been published and the remaining ones (see Tables 2.10–11 below) have not been investigated at all. The only exception is the above mentioned Burmese Pāli manuscript of the old Aṅguttaranīyāṭikā (Catuttha Linathapakāsiṁ).

### Part 2. The tīkās in Pāli bibliographic sources

In Part 2, information about the subcommentaries on the first four nikāyas given in the following bibliographic sources will be analysed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bibliographic source</th>
<th>Authorship</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saddhammasatgaha () Saddhamma-s</td>
<td>Dhammakitti Mahāsāmi</td>
<td>fourteenth century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagan inscription ()</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>1442</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6On Sāriputta of Polonnaruva see Pecenko, 1997; von Hinüber, 19968, pp. 172–73.

7Here I mean the following two catalogues: (1) Somadasa, 1959–64, and (2) a very important Burmese bibliographic work which also refers to the manuscripts held in the National Library, Rangoon: \(\Pi\text{i}\text{t-sm}\. Of course, these two catalogues, although sufficient for the topic of this article, do not list all the Pāli manuscripts that have not been investigated yet. Further research of old inscriptions and Pāli manuscripts is needed here and some work has already been done, see for example: Than Tun, 1998; Blackburn, 2002; von Hinüber, 19968; von Hinüber, 1988.

8A critical edition of this manuscript will be published by the Pali Text Society. Three selected chapters from the manuscript were published in Pecenko, 2002, pp. 87–103.

9Edited by Nedimāle Saddhānanda, \(\text{JPTS} \) 1890, pp. 21–90 (= N° 1961)

2.1. Saddhammasaṅgaha

In Saddhamma-s two sets of āṭṭikās on the four nikāyas are mentioned: Linathapakāsini and Sāratthamañjūsā. According to Saddhamma-s Linathapakāsini was written by the porāṇas15 and was a sub-commentary (athavanṇanā) on the athakathās of the entire canon.16 The second set of āṭṭikās on the first four nikāyas, called Sāratthamañjūsā, was compiled — as a part of the “new” compilation of āṭṭikās on the entire canon — during the reign of Parakkamabāhu I (1153–86) by the convocation of “elders” (therā bhikkhū)17 presided over by Dimbulāgala Mahākassapathera, who was the first saṅgharāja in Ceylon and the

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11Edited by I.P. Minayeff, *JPTS*, 1886, pp. 54–79.
16Saddhamma-s 58.28–29: pitakattayaṭṭhakathāya linathappakāsanaṭṭhaṃ āṭṭhavaṇṇanaṃ puraṇehi [sic] kataṃ. Although in this reference the āṭṭikās on the first four nikāyas are not listed explicitly, it seems probable that they were called *Linathappakāsini*. H. Saddhatissa (“Introduction” in Upās, p. 47, n. 154) explains: “The *Linathavaṇṇanā* is also called *Linathappakāsini*.... The Saddhammasaṅgaha has freely used the word *atthavaṇṇanā* for āṭṭikā and further amplified it as the *Athavanṇanā* for the purpose of elucidating the hidden meanings (*Linathappakāsanaṭṭhaṃ atthavaṇṇanaṃ*).” Cf. the title of *Sv-ṭ*, ed. by Lily de Silva: *Dīghanikāyaṭṭhakathāṭṭikā Linathavaṇṇanā.*
17Cf. Saddhamma-s 59.14–18: atha kho therā bhikkhū ... atthavaṇṇanaṃ phapesaṃ; 62.13: pitakattayaṭṭhikā ca āṭṭikāriyehi bhāṣitā [v. 7].

The date of the assembly “is tentatively fixed at A.D. 1165” (Panditha, 1973, p. 137). See also Mhv LXXII 2 foll.; LXXVIII 1–30; W. Geiger, “Introduction” in Mhv Trsl., pp. 28–29; Geiger, § 31 (literature), n. 4.
most senior monk from Udumbaragiri Vihara. The entire compilation was accomplished within one year.

While the individual tikās of the first set are not explicitly mentioned, Saddhamma-s lists the four tikās of the second set as follows:

Tadanantara sutta ntapitake Dighanikāyatūkakathāya Sumangalavilāsinīya atthavanānanārāhātīvā mulabhāsāya Māgadhikāya niruttīyā paṭhama-Sāratthamañjūsā nāma atthavanānanam ṭhapesuṃ. tathā Majjhima-nikāyatūkakathāya Papiṇcasūdaniya … diutiya-Sāratthamañjūsā nāma atthavanānanam ṭhapesuṃ. tathā Samyuttanikāyatūkakathāya Sāratthapakāsaniyā … tatiya-Sāratthamañjūsā nāma atthavanānanam ṭhapesuṃ. tathā Aṅguttaranikāyatūkakathāya Manorathapūraniyā … catuttha-Sāratthamañjūsā nāma atthavanānanam ṭhapesuṃ.

Table 2.2. Two complete sets in Saddhammasaṅgha (fourteenth cent.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dīghanikāya</td>
<td>Sumangalavilāsinī</td>
<td>Linathapakāsinī</td>
<td>Sāratthamañjūsā I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majjhimanikāya</td>
<td>Papiṇcasūdani</td>
<td>Linathapakāsinī</td>
<td>Sāratthamañjūsā II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samyuttanikāya</td>
<td>Sāratthapakāsinī</td>
<td>Linathapakāsinī</td>
<td>Sāratthamañjūsā III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṅguttaranikāya</td>
<td>Manorathapūraṇī</td>
<td>Linathapakāsinī</td>
<td>Sāratthamañjūsā IV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Saddhamma-s explains that the second set of tikās (Sāratthamañjūsā)

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19Saddhamma-s 60.25–27: ayaṃ piṭakaṭṭha kathāya atthavānanā ekasamvaccaren eva niṭṭhitā.

20Saddhamma-s 59.23–35; cf. Saddhamma-s 61.21–23: piṭakattaya āvānanā ca linathassa pakāsanā, Sāratthadipani nāma Sāratthamañjūsā pi ca [v. 18], Paramathappakāsani mahātherehi bhāsita, sattānaṃ sabbahāsānaṃ sā abhis hitavahā [v. 19].
was written because the existing set (Lañatthapakåsin¥) “did not serve the purpose of bhikkhus residing in different countries”, the reason being that many Gaˆ†hipadas (explanatory works which dealt with difficult expressions and passages) that belonged to the old set were written in Sinhala language and what was written in Mågadh¥ had been mixed and confused with (Påli) translations (bhåsantara) of the Gaˆ†hipadas. The Linatthapakåsin¥ set was nevertheless used as a basis for the new “complete and clear athavånanå”, the mistakes (bhåsantara: “versions, translations”) in the old tıkås were removed but their essence was kept in its entirety.

21Saddhamma-s 58,30–31: tam sabbatu desantaravås¥naµ bhikkhëna atthaµ na sàdhëti; translation Law, 1941, p. 84. Cf. Saddhamma-s 61,9–10: piñkattha karhåyaµnhå lañatthassa pakåsanaµ, na tam sabbatha bhikkhënaµ athamu sàdhëti sabbaµ [v. 12]; also von Hinüber, HPL, pp. 172–173, § 374: “... older works no longer served the purpose of the monks in the 12th century”.

22Saddhamma-s 58,31–59,2: kattha ci anekesyà gañëhipadesu Sihalabhåsåya niruttiyå likhituµ ca kattha ci målabhåsåya Mågadhikåya bhåsantarena samnissmuµ åkulaµ ca katvå likhituµ ca. Law’s translation (1941), p. 84: “Some were written in many terse expressions (gañëhipada) according to the grammar of the Sinhala language, some were written in the dialect of Magadha, which is the basic language, but they have been confused and twisted by translation”; cf. von Hinüber, HPL, p. 173, § 374: “Particularly the Gañëhipadas written in Sinhalese are difficult to understand (Sp-[B² 1960] I 2.5–8) and [were] therefore summarized in Påli”. On Gañëhipadas, see Lily de Silva, “General Introduction” in Sv-p†, pp. xxxii–xxxviii; von Hinüber, HPL, p. 170–71, §§ 367–71.

See also Saddhamma-s 61,9–20 where the details of the Linatthapakåsin¥ set are described in more detail. These two passages from Saddhamma-s (fourteenth century), especially Saddhamma-s 61,9–20, are most probably based on a very similar passage from Sp-[B² 1960] I 2.5–16 ascribed to Såriputta of Polonnaruva who lived about two centuries earlier — at the time of the compilation of the Såratthamañjëså s set.

23Saddhamma-s 59,2–3: mayam bhåsantuµ apanetvaµ paripuññamu anåkulanµ athavaµpanaµnå karëyyanå ti.

24Saddhamma-s 61,19–20 = Sp-[B² 1960] I 2.15–16: bhåsantuµ tato hitvå såraµ ädåya sabbasu, anåkulanµ karissåmì paripuññavinicchayaµ. The intro-
2.2. The Pagan inscription

The second important source of information about the *tikās* on the four *nikāyas* is the Pagan inscription of 1442 (804 B.E.), inscribed at the beginning of the rule of Narapatī (1442–68), less than three centuries after Parakkamabāhu I (1153–86). The inscription gives a list of 299 manuscripts, amongst which the *tikās* on the four *nikāyas* are also mentioned.

The titles of the *tikās* given in this inscription are very similar to the titles given in the *Piṭakat samuṅ:*(see 2.6 below), which in turn are also very similar to the titles of the Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyaṇa editions of these *tikās.*

In the section on A (List 934b45) two different *tikās* are listed: *tīgā anguttāwī kṛ [māhā]* (no. 75) which is translated by G. H. Luce and

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ductory passages in the existing printed editions of Sv-pt E°, Ps-pt B° 1961, Spk-pt B° 1961 and in the recently discovered manuscript of Mp-pt (see Part 3, Table 3.2 below), which all belong to the old Linatthapakāsīṇī set, are, with the exception of minor orthographic differences, practically identical. The introduction in Mp-† E° 1996, which is the fourth (catuttahā) *tikā* of the later Śārathamaṅgāśī set, is considerably different from Sv-† E°, Ps-† B° 1961, Spk-† B° 1961 and the text in the manuscript of Mp-† is much closer to Sp-† B° 1960 and Sv-† B° 1961. See P. Pecenko, “Table of Parallel Passages” in Mp-† I; also H. Saddhatissa, “Introduction” in Upās, p. 47, n. 154.


Also *Piṭakat tō samuṅ: or Piṭakat sum: pun cā tam.:* I consulted the edition published by Tipiṭakaniyā Sāsanā Pru Aphvē in Rangoon, 1989.

The title written on the first folio of the ms of Mp-† held in the British Library (Or 2089) is very similar: *tīkā ekkanipāt anugutra kṛ.* Cf. Piṭ-sm 202–12:
Tin Htway: “Greater Aṅguttara sub-commentary”, and further identified as Sārathamañjūsā, and tiṅga aṅguttuiv hāy [culla] (no. 76)\(^{29}\) which is translated: “Lesser Aṅguttara subcommentary”.

**Table 2.2. The tiṅkās in the Pagan Inscription (1442 C.E.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canon: Four nikāyas first written in the first century B.C.E.</th>
<th>Commentaries fifth century C.E.</th>
<th>Old sub-comment. ((\text{puññatāti}kā = p) t) sixth–ninth cent. C.E. Authorship: unknown B.C.E</th>
<th>Later sub-comment. ((\text{tiṅkā} = 1)) twelfth century C.E. Authorship: unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dīghanikāya</td>
<td>Somaṅgala-viḷāsinī</td>
<td>[Līnatthapakāsini I]: 1. tiṅga silakkhandhavā dīghanikāy, 2. tiṅga mahāvā dīghanikāy, 3. tiṅga padhheyyavā dīghanikāy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majhima-nikāya</td>
<td>Papañcasūdani</td>
<td>[Līnatthapakāsini II]: 1. tiṅkā mūlapaṇṇāsa, 2. tiṅkā majhimapanaṇṇāsa, 3. tiṅkā uparipanṇāsa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sānyutta-nikāya</td>
<td>Sārattha-pakāsini</td>
<td>[Līnatthapakāsini III]: 1. tiṅga saṅghāsavā saṅyut, 2. tiṅga khandhavaggādī saṅyut</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aṅguttara-nikāya</td>
<td>Manoratha-pūraṇi</td>
<td>[Līnatthapakāsini IV]: tiṅga aṅguttuiv nāy [culla]</td>
<td>[Sārathamañjūsā IV]: tiṅga aṅguttuiv krī [mahā]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(\text{Ekāṅguttaraṭṭi-kā-sac, Dukaṅguttaraṭṭi-kā-sac, ..., Dasaṅguttaraṭṭi-kā-sac, Ekādasangaṅguttaraṭṭi-kā-sac; Mp-ṭ B° 1961 I–III: Sārathamañjūsā nāma Aṅguttaraṭṭi-kā. In Burmese sac means “new, revised”, tiṅkā-sac therefore means the “new tiṅkā”, i.e. Mp-ṭ, Catutthā Sārathamañjūsā. In *Pīt-sm* 202 it is also called Mahātiṅkā. (All the Burmese words and sentences from *Pīt-sm* which I quote here were translated into English by Elisabeth Lawrence, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University.)\)
The names of the two sets of ōkās (Linatthapakāsini and Sāratthamañjūsā) are not mentioned in the inscription.

2.3. Gandhavanṣa

Gandhavanṣa (Gv), a much later work written probably in the seventeenth century,30 lists both Linatthapakāsini and Sāratthamañjūsā. The first one is mentioned as:

\[
\text{Dīghanikāyaṭṭhakathādūnaṃ catunnaṃ ṭṭhakathānaṃ Linatthapakāsini nāma ōkā,}\]

and was according to Gv written by Dhammapālācariya.32

Sāratthamañjūsā is mentioned only as Aṅguttaraṭṭhakathāva Sāratthamañjūsā nāma ōkā,33 a work written by Sāriputta.34 Further on this work of Sāriputta, which was written at the request of Parakkama-bāhu, king of Lankā, is also referred to as Aṅguttaraṭṭhakathāva navā ōkāgandho.35

According to Gv, the Linatthapakāsini set consisted of the ōkās on all the four nikāyas and Sāratthamañjūsā was the name of the ōkā on A only. To distinguish it from the older ōkā on A (Catutthā Linatthapakāsini), Sāratthamañjūsā was also classified as a “new subcommentary” (navā ōkā).

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31 Gv 60, 11–12.

32 Gv 69, 30–34: Dīghanikāyaṭṭhakathādūnaṃ catunnaṃ ṭṭhakathānaṃ ōkā-gandho \ldots\ aṭṭhano matiyā Dhammapālācariyena katā.

33 Gv 61, 32–33.


35 Gv 71, 10–14: Sāratthadāpani nāma \ldots\ Aṅguttaraṭṭhakathāva navā ōkā-gandho ti ime cattāro gandhā Parakkamabāhnāmena Lankādipissarena raññā āyācitena Sāriputtācariyena katā. Cf. Piṭ-sm 202 where the later ōkā on Mp (Mp-t) is mentioned as “new greater ōkā” (ōkā sac kri).
Table 2.4. The ūkās in Gandhāvanṣa (seventeenth cent.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canon: Four nikāyas first written in the first century B.C.E.</th>
<th>Commentaries</th>
<th>Old sub-comment. (purāṇaūkā = pt) sixth–ninth century C.E.</th>
<th>Later sub-comment. (ūkā = t) twelfth century C.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dīghanikāya</td>
<td>Sumangulavilāsini</td>
<td>Latthapakāsini</td>
<td>Author: Dhammapāla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majjhimanikāya</td>
<td>Papañcasūlani</td>
<td>Linthapakāsini</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samyuttanikāya</td>
<td>Sāratthapakāsini</td>
<td>Linthapakāsini</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anguttaranikāya</td>
<td>Manorathapūraṇi</td>
<td>Linthapakāsini</td>
<td>Sāratthamañjūsā navā ūkāgandho</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4. Sāsanavamsa

Sāsanavamsa (Sās), a work “written in Burma in 1861 by Paññāsāmi, tutor of King Min-dōn-min who held the fifth council a few years later”, does not give the names of the two sets of ūkās (Linthhapakāsini and Sāratthamañjūsā); it simply states that Dīghanikāyathakathāya ūkā, Majjhima-nikāyathakathāya ūkā and Samyutta-nikāyathakathāya ūkā were written by Ācārya Dhammapāla, and Anguttara-nikāyaūkā was written by Sāriputta Thera at the request of the king Parakkamabāhu.

Table 2.5. The ūkās in Sāsanavamsa (1861)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canon: Four nikāyas first written in the first century B.C.E.</th>
<th>Commentaries</th>
<th>Old sub-comment. (purāṇaūkā = pt) sixth–ninth century C.E.</th>
<th>Later sub-comment. (ūkā = t) twelfth century C.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dīghanikāya</td>
<td>Sumangulavilāsini</td>
<td>Linthapakāsini</td>
<td>Dīghanikāyathakathāya ūkā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Majjhimanikåya</th>
<th>Papañcasådani</th>
<th>[Linatthapakåsini] Majjhimanikåyathakathåya tikkå</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samyuttanikåya</td>
<td>Såratthapakåsini</td>
<td>[Linatthapakåsini] Samyuttanikåyathakathåya tikkå</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ànuttaranikåya</td>
<td>Manorathapåtiåni</td>
<td>[Såratthamañjåså] Ànuttaranikåya-tikkå</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distinction between the two sets of tikkås mentioned in Saddhamma-s, and in the case of A also in the Pagan inscription and Gv, is not made in Sås. The two authors are nevertheless clearly stated and this indicates that in the year 1861, when Sås was compiled, the only known set of tikkås on the four nikåyas consisted of two kinds of tikkås — the older three on D, M, and S written by Dhammapåla, and the later one on A written by Såriputta.

### 2.5. Såsanavamsadåpå

Såsanavamsadåpå (Sås-dåp) was completed in 1879 by Òcariya Vimalasåra Thera and published in 1880 in Colombo. The information about the tikkås on the four nikåyas in Sås-dåp is the same as in Sås. The names of the two sets of tikkås (Linatthapakåsini and Såratthamañjåså) given in Saddhamma-s and Gv are not mentioned at all. Only one set of tikkås is listed and it does not have any special name; the tikkås on D, M, and S

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40 Norman, 1983, p. 182.
are ascribed to Dhammapāla, and a ṭīkā on A is ascribed to Sāriputta.  

Table 2.6. The ṭīkās in Sāsanavaṃsadīpa (1880)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canon: Four nikāyas first written in the first century B.C.E.</th>
<th>Commentaries fifth century C.E.</th>
<th>Old sub-comment. (purāṇaṭīkā = प्र) sixth–ninth century C.E.</th>
<th>Later sub-comment. (ṭīkā = टी) twelfth century C.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dīghanikāya</td>
<td>Sūmaṅgalavilāsini</td>
<td>[Linatthapakāsini] Dīghāgamassa ṭīkā</td>
<td>Dhammapāla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majjhimanikāya</td>
<td>Pāpiṅcasūdāni</td>
<td>[Linatthapakāsini] Majjhimāṭṭhakathā-ṭīkā</td>
<td>Sāriputta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sānyuttanikāya</td>
<td>Sāratthapakāsini</td>
<td>[Linatthapakāsini] Sānyuttathakathā-ṭīkā</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āṅguttaranikāya</td>
<td>Manorathapūraṇī</td>
<td>[Śāratthasaṃjñāṭṭhakathā-ṭīkā] Āṅguttaranikāṭṭhakathā-ṭīkā</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.6. Piṭaka samuīn:
The Piṭaka samuīn: lists the same ṭīkās on the four nikāyas as the Pagan inscription and Gv and, as already mentioned, the titles of the ṭīkās given in all three sources are very similar. The names of the two sets, Linatthapakāsini and Sāratthamañjñā, and the two authors, Dhammapāla and Sāriputta, are mentioned as in Gv.

Piṭ-sm lists two ṭīkās on A: a ṭīkā written by Dhammapāla and a

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41Sās-dip C⁵ 1880, vv. 1251–32: ... ṭīkā Dīghāgamassa ca, Majjhim’-āṭṭhakathāṭīkā Sānyuttathathāṭīkā ca, ... Dhammapālāna dhīmatā racitā therapadāna suttantanyādassānā.
43Cf. 2.2. and 2.3. above.
44The reference numbers of all the ṭīkās on the four nikāyas listed in Piṭ-sm 187–212 are marked with asterisks which means that, according to the 1989 edition of Piṭ-sm, the manuscripts of all these ṭīkās are held in the National Library, Rangoon.
†ıkā written by Sāriputta. The first †ıkā is listed as incomplete and has three entries: Ekaґuttara†ıkā-hon:, Dukaґuttara†ıkā-hon:, and Tikanguttara†ıkā-hon:. Although it is called the “old” (hon:) †ıkā the common name Linatthapakāsini is not mentioned at all.45 According to Piš-sm 199 “the remaining eight parts of the old †ıkā, i.e. the †ıkā on Catukaґuttara, Paıčanguttara, … Ekādasanguttara, cannot be found anywhere in Burma”.46

The second †ıkā on A is mentioned as a “new, revised” †ıkā (sac) and it has the following eleven entries:47 Ekaґuttara†ıkā-sac, Dukaґuttara†ıkā-sac, Tıkaґuttara-†ıkā-sac, … Dasanguttara†ıkā-sac, Ekādasanguttara†ıkā-sac.

**Table 2.7. The †ıkās in Piškat samuııň (1888)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canon: Four nikāyas first written in the first century B.C.E.</th>
<th>Commentaries fifth century C.E.</th>
<th>Old sub-comment. fifth–ninth century C.E. Author: Dhammapāla</th>
<th>Later subcomment. (†ıkā = t) twelfth century C.E. Author: Sāriputta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dīghanikāya</td>
<td>Sumaŋgalavilāsinī</td>
<td>Linatthapakāsini: Sutsilakkhaŋtikā hon:, Sutmahāväŋtikā, Sutpāthèyyaŋtikā.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majjhimanikāya</td>
<td>Panaḥcasūdani</td>
<td>Linatthapakāsini: Mūlapanāsaŋtikā, Majjhimagpanāsa-†ıkā, Uparipanāsaŋtikā.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanyuttanikāya</td>
<td>Sārathapakāsini</td>
<td>Linatthapakāsini: Sagāthavagga-samyut†ıkā, Nidānavagga-… Khandhavagga-… Salāyatanavagga-…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

45Piš-sm 199–201.
46Piš-sm 199 (translated by Elisabeth Lawrence).
47Piš-sm 202–12.
48Piš-sm 187, 189–90. Silakkhandhavaggaŋtikā is listed as the “old”(hon:) †ıkā, i.e. Sv-pt, Pathamā Linatthapakāsini, not to distinguish it from Sv-t, Pathamā Sāratthamaŋjūsā, but to distinguish it from Sādhujanvilāsinıtikā (Sv-nıt) which is in Piš-sm 188 listed as the “new”(sac) †ıkā.
49Piš-sm 191–93.
Although *Piś-sm* gives essentially the same information about the *ṭikās* on the four *nikāyas* as the Pagan inscription and Gv, it is interesting to note that the old *ṭikā on A* written by Dhammapāla is not mentioned as a part of the Linatthapakāsīn set. *Piś-sm* also does not list any of the first three *ṭikās* of the Sāratthamañjūsā set (Sv-ṭ, Ps-ṭ, Spk-ṭ).

### 2.7. Summary

The above analysis of the old and later subcommentaries (*purāṇa-ṭikās* and *ṭikās*, see Tables 1.2 and 1.3 above) in bibliographical sources can be presented as follows:  

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**Table 2.8. The subcommentaries in the Pāli bibliographic sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bib. sources</th>
<th>Digha-nikāya</th>
<th>Majjhima-nikāya</th>
<th>Samyutta-nikāya</th>
<th>Āguttara-nikāya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Saddhammasaṅgaha</em></td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom./</td>
<td>old subcom./</td>
<td>old subcom./</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fourteenth century</td>
<td></td>
<td>later subcom.</td>
<td>later subcom.</td>
<td>later subcom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Pagan inscription</em></td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom./</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1442</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>later subcom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Gandhāvāsa</em></td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom./</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seventeenth century</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>later subcom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sāsanavāsa</em></td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>later subcom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sāsanavāsa-dāpa</em></td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>later subcom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Piśkat samuānī</em></td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom.</td>
<td>old subcom./</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>later subcom.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*PIŚ-sm* 194–98.

*Cf. Pecenko, 2002, p. 76 (Table I).*
The two sets of subcommentaries on the first four nikāyas are mentioned in Pāli bibliographical sources in the following three ways:

(a) as a single set consisting of the first three tikās from the old set, called Līnatthapakāsini, and the fourth tikā from the later set, called Sāratthamañjūsā.

Table 2.9. One combined set of subcommentaries (Sās, Sās-dīp)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pāli Canon: four nikāyas</th>
<th>Commentaries</th>
<th>Old subcomment.</th>
<th>(Later) subcomment.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dīghanikāya</td>
<td>Sumatgalavilāsini</td>
<td>Līnatthapakāsini I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majjhimanikāya</td>
<td>Papannasūdani</td>
<td>Līnatthapakāsini II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanyuttanikāya</td>
<td>Sāratthapakāsini</td>
<td>Līnatthapakāsini III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ānguttaranikāya</td>
<td>Manorathapūrāṇi</td>
<td>Sāratthamañjūsā IV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The set in Table 2.9 above was approved and published by the Sixth Council (Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana) and this is the only set existing in printed form.

(b) as one complete set of the old tikās with an additional later tikā on Ānguttara-nikāya.

Table 2.10. A set of old subcommentaries with a later subcommentary (Pagan inscription, Gv and Piṭ-sūm)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pāli Canon: four nikāyas</th>
<th>Commentaries</th>
<th>Old subcomment.</th>
<th>(Later) subcomment.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dīghanikāya</td>
<td>Sumatgalavilāsini</td>
<td>Līnatthapakāsini I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majjhimanikāya</td>
<td>Papannasūdani</td>
<td>Līnatthapakāsini II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanyuttanikāya</td>
<td>Sāratthapakāsini</td>
<td>Līnatthapakāsini III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ānguttaranikāya</td>
<td>Manorathapūrāṇi</td>
<td>Līnatthapakāsini IV Sāratthamañjūsā IV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here Līnatthapakāsini IV, the old subcommentary on Ānguttara-nikāya, a manuscript of which I discovered in Burma in 1999, is added to the Sixth Council’s set.

(c) as two complete different sets:
Table 2.11. The two complete sets of subcommentaries on four nikāyas (Saddhamma-s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pāli Canon: four nikāyas</th>
<th>Commentaries</th>
<th>Old subcomment. (purāṇāṭikā = pt)</th>
<th>(Later) subcomment. (tikā = ṭ)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dīghānīkāya</td>
<td>Sumatgalavāḷāsīni</td>
<td>Linathapakāsini I</td>
<td>Sāratthamañjūsā I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majjhimaṇīkāya</td>
<td>Papañcasaidani</td>
<td>Linathapakāsini II</td>
<td>Sāratthamañjūsā II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sāmyuttaṇīkāya</td>
<td>Sāratthapakāsini</td>
<td>Linathapakāsini III</td>
<td>Sāratthamañjūsā III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Āṅguttaranīkāya</td>
<td>Manorathapūrapā</td>
<td>Linathapakāsini IV</td>
<td>Sāratthamañjūsā IV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here three later subcommentaries on Dīgha-nikāya, Majjhima-nikāya and Sāmyutta-nikāya (Sāratthamanjūsā I–III), which are still in manuscript form, are added and thus we have two complete sets, a very different situation from the single set approved by the Sixth Council (see Table 2.9. above). In Part 3 below printed editions and manuscripts of the texts given in the Tables 2.9–11 above will be discussed.

Part 3. Printed editions and manuscripts of the tikās

The subcommentaries discussed above can be divided into two groups: those which have been published in printed editions and those which have remained only in manuscript form.52 The printed editions are shown in Table 3.1 below:

Table 3.1. Printed editions of the subcommentaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Two sets</th>
<th>Dīghānīkāya/ Sumatgalavāḷāsīni</th>
<th>Majjhimaṇīkāya/ Papañcasaidani</th>
<th>Sāmyutta-nikāya/ Sāratthapakāsini</th>
<th>Āṅguttaranīkāya/ Manorathapūrapā</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

52 For details, see Pecenko, 2002, pp. 76–86.
Spk in Table 3.1 are listed in Sås and Sås-dip as the only existing set (Tables 2.4–2.5); this set, which has been also approved by the Theravåda tradition, consists of the three “older” Spk (Sv-pt, Ps-pt, Spk-pt) ascribed to Dhammapåla and the fourth “later” Spk (Mp-) ascribed to Såriputta. Besides the Cha††hasanågyana editions there exist several other editions and manuscripts of these Spk. Because


55Mss of Sv-pt are listed in: Lily de Silva, “General Introduction” in Sv-pt E°, pp. xi–xii (7 C° mss; these mss are listed in LPP); LPP, Vol. 1, p. 39 (16 C° mss); Fausbåll 1894–96, p. 28 (1 B ms); Braun et al., 1985, pp. 126–28 (1 B ms); Rhys Davids, 1882, p. 52 (one C ms); Pit-sm 187, 189–90 (1 B ms).

Mss of Ps-pt are listed in: Bangchang, 1981, p. xi (1 K ms, 4 C mss; these 4 C mss are listed in LPP); LPP, Vol. 1, p. 71 (8 C mss), Vol. 2, p. 53 (6 C mss); Rhys Davids 1882, p. 51 (1 C ms); Fausbåll, 1894–96., pp. 28–29 (1 B ms); Rhys Davids 1883, p. 147 (1 B ms); Pit-sm 191–93 (1 B ms).

Mss of Spk-pt are listed in: LPP, Vol. 1, p. 93 (1 B, 11 C mss), Vol. 2, p. 71 (7 C mss); de Silva, 1938, pp. 36–37 (1 C ms); Pit-sm 194–198 (1B ms).
these are the only subcommentaries on the four nikāyas that have printed editions they have been often considered to be the only existing tikās on the four nikāyas.56

In my earlier research I have also investigated the tikās on the four nikāyas which have never been published in a book form; these texts are listed in some catalogues of Pāli manuscripts and are held in various libraries in Burma and Sri Lanka. According to my research a number of these manuscripts still exist (see Table 3.2 below) and one of them — the old tikā on Aṅguttaraniķāya — was recently discovered in Burma.57 This discovery shows that the bibliographic information in earlier texts like Saddhammasangaha is very reliable and needs further investigation.

| Table 3.2. The sub-commentaries existing in manuscript form |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Two sets                         | Dīgha-nikāya/ Samaṅgalavilāsini  |
|                                  | Majjhima-nikāya/ Papańca-sūdānī  |
|                                  | Saṁyutta-nikāya/ Sāratthapakāsinī |
|                                  | Aṅguttara-nikāya/ Manorathapārani |
| Linathapakāsinī set              | Manuscripts: Burm. script: 3     |
|                                  | (1 ms microfilmed, Burma 1999)    |
| Sārattha-mañjūsā set             | Manuscripts:                      |
|                                  | Sinhala script: 7                 |
|                                  | Burm. script: 1                   |
|                                  | Sinh. script: 7                   |
|                                  | Manuscripts: Burmese script: 1    |
|                                  | Sinhala script: 2                 |

The information about the available manuscripts given in Table 3.2

Mss of Mp-† are listed in: LPP, Vol 1, p. 2 (5 C mss), Vol. 2, p. 1 (7 C mss), Vol. 3, p. 164 (1 B ms from British Museum, Or 2089); de Silva, 1938, p. 37 (1 C ms); Pīt-sm 202–212 (1 B ms); Fragile Palm Leaves project, Thailand (4 B mss; Ms ID Nos.: 906, 949, 983, 1645); National Library, Rangoon (3 B mss; Acc. Nos.: 800, 1846, 1937); Universities Central Library, University of Rangoon (2 B Mss; Acc. Nos.: 7691, 9816/10695).

This list is, of course, not exhaustive; it is possible that more manuscripts of the above mentioned tikās can be found in Burma and perhaps also in Thailand.

56 See e.g. O.v. Hinüber, HPL, pp. 167, 173.
57 Pecenko, 2002, pp. 78–86 (the Burmese ms of the old Aṅguttaraţikā is described on pp. 82–85).
above also agrees with some bibliographical texts. In the Pagan inscription, Gv and Pit-sm (Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.7) an additional Ŧikā — not mentioned in Sās and Sās-dip — is mentioned: the old Ŧikā on A (Mp-pt), called Catuthā Linatthapakāsini. Saddhamma-s (Table 2.2) mentions two complete sets of Ŧikās, Linatthapakāsini set (Sv-pt, Ps-pt, Spk-pt, Mp-pt) and Sāratthamañjūsā set (Sv-t, Ps-t, Spk-t, Mp-t). Here three later Ŧikās — not mentioned in any other bibliographic work — are added: a Ŧikā on D (Sv-t) called Paṭhamā Sāratthamañjūsā,58 a Ŧikā on M (Ps-t) called Dutiyā Sāratthamañjūsā and a Ŧikā on S (Spk-t) called Tatiyā Sāratthamañjūsā.

If we combine Tables 3.1 and 3.2 above we get Table 3.3 below in which it is clearly evident that two different sets of nikāyāṭikās were in fact compiled: the older set called Linatthapakāsini and the later set called Sāratthamañjūsā. This leads to important conclusions which will be discussed below.

Table 3.3. Manuscripts and editions of the two sets of subcommentaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Two sets</th>
<th>Dīgha-nikāya/ Sumangala-vilāsini</th>
<th>Majjhima-nikāya/ Papaṭiccā-sūdani</th>
<th>Sāmyutta-nikāya/ Sārattha-pakkāsini</th>
<th>Anguttara-nikāya/ Manoratha-pārāṇi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

58Another manuscript of the later Ŧikā on D (Sv-t) with the title Dīgha-nikāya Dvitiya Ŧikā held in Samgharāja Pansala in Malvatu Vihārāya is mentioned in Blackburn 2002, p. 22 (ms no. 21).
Conclusions

From the above analysis of the nikāya†kās, their manuscripts and printed editions we can conclude that two different sets of nikāya†kās were in fact compiled: the older set called Linatthapakāsini (Sv-pt, Ps-pt, Spk-pt, Mp-pt) and the later set called Sāratthamañjāsā (Sv-†, Ps-†, Spk-†, Mp-†). Although the two complete sets are mentioned only in Saddhanna-s (see Table 2.2 above), all the eight tikās from the two sets seem to still exist either in printed editions or in manuscript form (see Table 3.3 above). Here it is very interesting to note that the manuscripts in Table 3.2 have never been properly investigated and it also seems that they have been neglected by both the Theravāda tradition as well as modern Pāli scholarship.  

It is not made explicit why certain tikās (Sv-†, Ps-†, Spk-†, Mp-†) were ignored by the Theravāda tradition (see e.g. Cha††hasa††gāya editions) and only some (i.e. Sv-pt, Ps-pt, Spk-pt, Mp-†) were published — in spite of the fact that the manuscripts of the unpublished tikās are held in different libraries in Burma and Sri Lanka and according to the introduction in the Cha††hasa††gāya editions “all the existing tikās” were recited. In the Nidånakathå of Mp-† B° 1961 (p. ca) it is clearly stated that all the existing tikās in Burma and outside Burma were edited and published:

evaµ saµgv¥tim åropitassa pana tepi†akassa buddhavacanassa attha- 
samvaµnumåbhåttå yå ca athha-kadåyo saµvijåjåntä yå ca täsaµ  
athappåsånasåvåseså pavåttå tikåyo saµvijåjånti manoramåya  
tantinånarucchåvikåya bhåsåya åcåriyå Ånanda-åcåra†ya-Dhammapålådi†hi  
theravarehi katå,  

tåsam pi athha-kåthå†kånam sades¥yamålehi c‘ eva vides¥yamålehi ca  
såmaµsadåtvå tepi†akåsså viyå buddhavacanåsså visodhånapå††visodha-  
avåseså mahåtherå påvåcanadassåno saµvånumåna-køvidå på†hasodhanåm  
akåmså,  

c‘ eva evaµ athha-kåthå†kåyo pawådaµkåhalå†ådåthåkapå††håthånam  
niråkarancåvasåseÅ visodhåtå c‘ eva på††visodhåtå ca htvå Buddhåsåsåna-  
muddåyåntålayå saptåhu muddåpanåyå.  

This contradicts the information about the manuscripts of the nikāya†kās discussed above (see Table 3.3 above). If the Cha††hasa††gåya edited “all the existing tikås” (yå ca täsam a††happåsånasåvåseså pavåttå tikåyo saµvijåjånti) “originating from Burma and from outside” (sades¥yamålehi c‘
My recent discovery of a manuscript of the old Anguttarañika, Catuthã Linattha-pakãsiní, further proves the existence of two sets of āgamas and also throws new light on the development of the nikāyattikās and their Pāli bibliographic information. According to Saddhamma-s (see 2.1 above) the old nikāyattikās, called Linatthapakãsiní, were “incomplete” (aparipuṇṇa) and had to be replaced by the later set of āgamas, called Sāratthamañjúśā, which were “comprehensive” (pari-puṇṇa) and “clear” (anākula). My comparative research of three parallel chapters from the older (Mp-p) and later (Mp-τ) Anguttarañikās published in the Journal of the Pali Text Society indicates that the description of these two Anguttarañikās in Saddhamma-s is very accurate. This is a further indication that the information about the two different sets of nikāyattikās in Saddhamma-s (see 2.1 above) is most probably correct.

In the light of the above discussion we can further conclude that the information about the nikāyattikās in Saddhamma-s, the oldest Pāli bibliographical text, is more accurate than in all the other, later Pāli bibliographic sources. Although some of these sources (Pagan inscription, Gv, Pīṭ-smi) mention the old Anguttarañikā (Mp-pt), none of them mentions two complete sets of nikāyattikās (cf. Table 2.9). Saddhamma-s seems therefore the most accurate — although it has been usually considered to be one of the least reliable sources.

The information about the āgamas on the four nikāyas in modern Pāli scholarship is mostly based on the Pāli bibliographical works, on the existing printed editions, and rarely also on the catalogues of Pāli

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eva videsiyanūlehi ca samsanditvā), why were the manuscripts of Sv-p, Ps-τ, Spk-τ and Mp-pt omitted? Further research is needed here.

60Modern Pāli scholarship seems to agree to a great extent with the Theravāda tradition (i.e. the Chāṭṭhasaṅgāyana editions) that most probably only one set of nikāyattikās (i.e. Sv-pτ, Ps-pτ, Spk-pτ and Mp-τ) still exists at present. Cf. Table 1.4 above; Hinüber, HPL, p. 167, §357; p. 173, §§375–76; Buddhadatta, 1956, pp. 259–62; Godakumbura, 1980, p. xxvii, n. 1.


62For example, in Geiger §31 (literature), nn. 5–6, Fausbøll 1894–96 is cited.
manuscripts. Since we have, as shown above, printed editions of only one “combined” set of nikāyaṭṭikās (i.e. Sv-ṭ, Ps-ṭ, Spk-ṭ, Mp-ṭ; see Table 2.9 above), it is often assumed that only one set of nikāyaṭṭikās exists at present and that only one complete set was also most probably composed. This approach is also supported by references from the later bibliographic works (e.g. Sās), which are often considered more reliable than the earlier sources (e.g. Saddhamma-s). It also seems clear that this approach has been — perhaps “subconsciously” — influenced by the Theravāda tradition and its Sixth Council (the Chaṭṭhasaṅgīyana) which published exactly the same “combined” set of ṭīkās.

In the case of the two sets of nikāyaṭṭikās discussed above — especially considering Sv-ṭ, Ps-ṭ, Spk-ṭ and Mp-ṭ which are, although still existing in manuscript form (see Table 3.2), often mentioned as “lost” or “a fiction” 63 — the information in the oldest bibliographic source (Saddhamma-s) appears to be the most reliable of all (cf. Table 2.2).

The above analysis of the nikāyaṭṭikās and their manuscripts and printed editions clearly indicates that further research of Pāli sub-commentaries and their bibliographic information needs to be done. It is possible that more manuscripts of the less known nikāyaṭṭikās (i.e. Sv-ṭ, Ps-ṭ, Spk-ṭ, Mp-ṭ) are held in various temple libraries in the Theravāda countries. These ṭīkās are an important link in Pāli textual transmission and their further investigation may give us — among many other things — new information about the development of the ṭīkā literature and about the editions/versions of the canonical and post-canonical Pāli texts used at the time of their compilation. And this is very important for the history of Pāli literature.

Primož Pecenko

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63 Hinüber, HPL, p. 167 (§ 357), see also p. 173 (§ 376).
ABBREVIATIONS


A
Anguttara-nikāya

B
(manuscript) text in Burmese script

B°
Burmese edition

B.E.
Burmese era, (Culla-)Sakkarāj, beginning 638 C.E.

BSOAS
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies

C
(manuscript) text in Sinhala script

C°
Ceylonese edition

CPD
*Critical Pāli Dictionary*. V. Trenckner et al., eds. Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 1924–.

D
Dīgha-nikāya

DPPN
G.P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names*
ed(s).
edition(s)

E°
European (PTS) edition

EncBuddh
*Encyclopædia of Buddhism*. G.P. Malalasekera, ed.

Geiger

Gv
*Gandhavamsa of Nandapaññā*. I.P. Minayeff, ed. *JPTS*, 1886, pp. 54–79. (see 2.3)

von Hinüber, *HPL*

JPTS
*Journal of the Pāli Text Society*

K
(manuscript) text in Cambodian script

M
Majjhima-nikāya

Mhv
The History of the Nikāya Subcommentaries

London: PTS, 1980

Mp  Manorathapūraṇi, Anguttaranikāya-aṭṭhakathā
Mp-pto  Manorathapūraṇipurāṇaṭṭikā, Ānāthaṭṭhakathā
Mp-ṭ  Manorathapūraṇiṭṭikā, Sāratthamañjūsā IV
ms(s)  manuscript(s)
N Edition in Devānāgarī print

Piṭ-sm  Piṭkatamāṃgala. Rangoon: Tipiṭakaniyā Sāsanā Pru Aphv, 1989. (see 2.6)
Ps  Pupācaśūdanī, Mahīmanikāya-aṭṭhakathā
Ps-pto  Pupācaśūdanipurāṇaṭṭikā, Ānāthaṭṭhakathā
Ps-ṭ  Pupācaśūdanīṭṭikā, Sāratthamañjūsā II
pt  purāṇaṭṭikā
PTS  Pāli Text Society
S  Samyuttaniyā
Saddhamma-s  Saddhamaṇḍapāṅkha of Dhammakīti. Nedimāle
Sās  Sāsanāvaṅsapa of Paññāsīmi. C.S. Upasak, ed. Nālandā: Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra, 1961 = E 1897 (see 2.4)
Sās-dip  Sāranavāṇsadhāpa of Vimalasārāthera. Colombo: Satthaloka Press 1880. (see 2.5)
Sp  Samantapāśādikā, Vinaya-aṭṭhakathā
Sp-ṭ  Sāratthadipaniṭṭikā
Spk  Sāratthapakāsini, Samyuttaniyā-aṭṭhakathā
Spk-pto  Sāratthapakāsiniipurāṇaṭṭikā, Ānāthaṭṭhakathā
Spk-ṭ  Sāratthapakāsiniṭṭikā, Sāratthamañjūsā III
Sv  Sumangalavilāsini, Dighanikāya-aṭṭhakathā
Sv-nṭ B  Sumangalavilāsiniinaṇavaṭṭikā, Silakkhandhavagga-abhinava-ṭṭikā, Sādhujanavilāsini of Nānabhivaṃsa
Sv-pto  Sumangalavilāsiniipurāṇaṭṭikā, Ānāthaṭṭhakathā
Sv-ṭ  Sumangalavilāsiniṭṭikā, Sāratthamañjūsā I
T  tīkā
Trsl.  Translation
Primoz Pecenko


ZDMG. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

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Susíma’s Conversation with the Buddha:
A Second Study of the Susíma-sutta

1. Introduction

In my previous paper entitled “The Susíma-sutta and the Wisdom-Liberated Arahant” (*Journal of the Pali Text Society*, XXIX, pp. 51–75), I examined the Páli Susíma-sutta (S 12:70; S II 119–28) in relation to several parallels preserved in the Chinese Tripitaka. This *sutta*, included in the Nidána-samyutta, records the story of an ascetic named Susíma who entered the Buddhist monastic order as a “thief of Dhamma” (*dhammatthenaka*) intent on learning the secret of the Buddha’s success in order to improve the fortunes of his fellow wanderers. After his ordination, he meets a group of monks who had declared “final knowledge” — that is, arahantship — in the Buddha’s presence. Susíma asks them about their other attainments and learns that they lack the supernatural powers and formless emancipations, which he apparently had assumed were intrinsic to the state of final liberation. Thereupon Susíma asks them, “Here now, venerable ones, this answer and the non-attainment of those states: how could this be, friends?” And the monks reply, “We are liberated by wisdom, friend Susíma.”

Susíma then goes to the Buddha to ask for clarification.

I compared this portion of S 12:70 with three versions preserved in Chinese translation. Of these, one is contained in the Mahásánghika Vinaya; the second is found in the Sámyuktágama (no. 347); and the

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*I am thankful to Bhikkhu Análayo for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper which compelled me to sharpen my presentation. I also thank Peter Harvey and Tháinissaro Bhikkhu for reading and commenting on the more recent version.*

1S II 123,22–26: *ettha dâni âyasmanto idâh ca veyyâkaraññâ imesañ ca dhammâniyam asamâpatti, idâm no âvuso katha? paññâvimiññà kho mayam âvuso âvuso Susíma.* Note that in E the line breaks of this passage are faulty.
third is an incomplete version cited in the Abhidharma-vibhāṣā-śāstra.² My paper focused in particular on the light the parallel versions could shed on the question regarding the minimum attainment in samādhi meditation required to become a paññāvimutta or wisdom-liberated arahant. In the Pāli version, the monks consulted only deny possessing the five mundane super-knowledges (commonly known as abhiññā, though the word itself does not occur in this sutta) and the “peaceful formless emancipations transcending forms”.³ Nothing is said about their proficiency in the jhānas and Susima does not even question them on this issue. In M-Vin, the monks deny possessing the divine eye, the recollection of past lives, and the peaceful formless emancipations. Again, though some clarification of the role of the jhānas in their path seems called for, the question whether or not the monks are jhāna-attainers is not raised.

The Nikāyas themselves never explicitly address this question. The texts routinely define the paññāvimutta as “one who does not contact with the body and dwell in those peaceful emancipations that are formless, transcending forms, but whose influxes are exhausted by his seeing with wisdom”.⁴ This means that the paññāvimutta lacks access to the four formless meditative attainments and “the cessation of perception and feeling” (saññāvedayatanirodha). Nothing is said, in this definition, about how the wisdom-liberated one fares with regard to the jhānas. A number of suttas define right concentration of the noble eightfold path with the formula for the four jhānas, and thus, if this definition is taken

²In this paper I will use the same abbreviations for the alternative versions as I used in the earlier paper, that is, respectively M-Vin, SĀ 347, and Vibhāṣā. It is uncertain whether the Vibhāṣā version is a direct quotation from a sutta or a paraphrase.

³S II 121,13–23,17.

⁴M I 477,33–78,96: ekacco puggalo ye te santā vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppe te na kiyena phusitvā viharati, paññāya c’ assa divā āsavā pari-kkhiṇā honti. ayaṁ vuccati, bhikkhave, puggalo paññāvimutto.
as categorical, it would seem that even the *paññāvimutta* must possess the four *jhānas*, or at least the first *jhāna*.

The commentaries, however, introduce into the interpretation of the Susīma-sutta a new exegetical concept, that of the *sukkhavipassaka* or “dry-insight” meditator. Such an individual, in the commentarial system, rides to liberation in the vehicle of “bare insight” (*suddha-vipassanāyānika*), that is, insight meditation (*vipassanābhāvanā*) without the practice of serenity meditation (*samathabhāvanā*). The insight is called “dry” because it lacks the “moistening influence” of the *jhānas* or even “access concentration” (*upacārasamādhi*) to prepare the mind for insight. The figure of the dry-insight meditator is not explicitly found in the Nikāyas but first appears as such in the commentaries and the Visuddhimagga.

I looked into the Chinese parallels (translated from texts in north Indian languages, probably a Prakrit, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, and Sanskrit) with the thought that these versions might shed some light on the position regarding the *jhānas* in the more familiar Pāli recension. Now if we read the Susīma-sutta alongside its commentary and the parallel versions preserved in Chinese translation, we might notice two intriguing facts emerging from the first part of the discourse. The first is that the Sāratthappakāsini, the classical commentary (*aññakathā*) on the Sāmyutta-nikāya, interprets the term *paññāvimutta* as used in the Susīma-sutta in the narrower sense of a dry-insight arahant. Even though this is not stated in the *sutta* itself, the commentary does not take the *paññāvimutta* of the Susīma-sutta to be simply an arahant who lacks the formless meditations, as the definition at M I 477–78, cited above, would lead us to believe; rather, it takes him to be one who does not possess any *jhāna* attainment at all. The second fact is that two

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5 According to the commentarial system, based on the Abhidhamma, all attainments of the noble path and fruit (*magga-phala*) occur at the level of *jhāna*, and thus any arahant would be an attainer of world-transcending (*lokuttara*) *jhāna*. But what is at issue is their possession of “mundane *jhāna*”, which is the meaning of the term “*jhāna*” in the context of the Nikāyas and Āgamas.
parallels to the Susīma-sutta found in the Chinese canon, SĀ 347 and the citation in the Abhidharma-vibhāṣā-śāstra (as well as the larger Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra), endorse the idea that the paññā-vimutta arahant lacks attainment of the jhānas. In these versions, when Susīma questions the monks about their meditative skills, he expressly asks whether they based their realization of arahantship on the jhānas or formless attainments and they reply in the negative.

These two facts, taken in conjunction, naturally give rise to the question whether the position taken in the Sāratthapakāsini had been adopted under the influence of the schools that preserved the Saṃyukta-gama and the Abhidharma-vibhāṣā-śāstra. The question cannot be answered definitively in the affirmative, for there is no evidence of one school influencing the other on this point; it is perfectly conceivable that forces at work independently in both camps gave rise to the concept of an arahant destitute of jhānic attainments. However, given the easy contact between representatives of the various Buddhist schools in early Indian Buddhism, it is possible that such contacts did occur and placed subtle pressures on the adherents of the Pāli school to admit an arahant without jhāna into their gallery of noble ones. Perhaps because of their textual conservatism, and also due to the weight of the canonical formula defining right concentration as the four jhānas, the Theravādins were reluctant to explicitly introduce the dry-insight arahant into their Sutta-piṭaka. But taking an indirect route would have allowed them to legitimize such a figure without ruffling feathers (or ochre robes) in more conservative monastic circles. One method was simply to use the idea of a dry-insight arahant as an explanatory concept in their commentaries, an approach that they did in fact adopt. But it is

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6The former is taken to stem from the Mūlasarvāstivāda and the latter from the Vaibhāṣikas of the main Sarvāstivāda.  
7But we also cannot rule out any influence, for the Pāli commentarial tradition did absorb some important ideas from the Sarvāstivāda. The most notable of these is the use of the concept of svaṁha (Pāli sabhāva) as the defining mark of a truly existent dhamma.
also possible that the idea of the arahant without \textit{jhāna} attainments fed back into the canonical texts and subtly shaped their final formulation.

Whereas the schools that preserved the \textit{Sanyuktāgama} and the \textit{Abhidharma-vibhāṣā-śāstra} boldly introduced arahants lacking \textit{jhāna} attainments into their canonical collections, the custodians of the Pāli Nikāyas may have sought to grant canonical authorization to a type of wisdom-liberated arahant who lacked \textit{jhāna} attainments by resorting to new definitions and the subtle revision of older texts. Though we cannot discount the possibility that such texts stem directly from the Buddha himself, it is also conceivable that they derive from a slightly later period when older stipulations in the most archaic discourses were undergoing revaluation. Several \textit{suttas}, for example, introduce a contrast between two ways of practice: one pleasant (\textit{sukhapaṭipadā}), which leads to arahantship through the four \textit{jhānas}; the other painful or difficult (\textit{dukkhapaṭipadā}), which promotes attainment of the final goal through meditation subjects such as the unattractiveness of the body, the impermanence of all formations, and the perception of death.\footnote{For citations, see “The Susīma-sutta and the Wisdom-Liberated Arahant”, pp. 60–61.} The Putta-sutta defines the \textit{puṇḍarika-samaṇa}, the “white-lotus ascetic”, as an arahant destitute of the eight emancipations (which, it seems, include the four \textit{jhānas} among the first three emancipations).\footnote{A 4:87, at A II 87.7–11. See “The Susīma-sutta and the Wisdom-Liberated Arahant”, pp. 70–71.} The Mahāidāna-sutta mentions nothing about meditative attainments but identifies the wisdom-liberated arahant as one who has understood the origin, passing away, gratification, danger, and escape in regard to the nine abodes of beings.\footnote{D II 70–71.} The Susīma-sutta, too, I would maintain, belongs to this group of \textit{suttas} that indirectly hint at the existence of arahants without \textit{jhānas}. On the basis of such texts, the transmitters of the Pāli Nikāyas could delicately suggest that liberation by wisdom, without the
support of jhānic attainment, is a valid option in the development of the path.\textsuperscript{11}

If these hypotheses are correct — and I must emphasize that the above observations are largely speculative — it then follows that in admitting the dry-insight arahant, the commentaries did not so much introduce a totally new figure into Buddhist soteriological doctrine as merely make explicit an idea lying implicit in texts they regarded as “word of the Buddha”. These texts, in turn, could have taken the form they did for the express purpose of quietly accommodating such a figure. In the absence of any incontrovertible proof for this hypothesis, I can only point to the striking accord between the Pāli commentaries and the Samyuktāgama of the Chinese Tripitaka as indirect evidence that such a development was not unimaginable even in schools that considered themselves textually conservative. Although, in the Pāli school, this development did not culminate in texts explicitly acknowledging dry-insight arahants, it might still have led to the revision of several archaic suttas in ways that made them congenial to the new ideas. Thus when the commentators peered back into the Nikāyas, they were not at a complete loss to support their exegetical concepts. All they had to do was draw out and articulate what the texts themselves implied but did not state openly.

2. Susīma Calls on the Buddha

Up to this point I have been mostly recapitulating the main themes of my earlier paper on the Susīma-sutta. I have been doing so, not merely to refresh the reader’s memory, but because I believe that similar processes underlie the development of the second part of the

\textsuperscript{11}According to the commentarial system, all experiences of the supramundane (lokuttara) states occur at the level of jhāna, and thus, for the commentators, dry-insight meditators still acquire jhāna simultaneously with their attainment of the path and fruit. In this way, even without attaining jhāna prior to their realization, they manage to fulfill the standard definition of the noble eightfold path factor of right concentration (samma-samādhi) as the four jhānas.
Susima-sutta. Now I will resume my examination of the discourse. I will first summarize the narrative of S 12:70 as it continues beyond Susima’s encounter with the wisdom-liberated monks. In the next section I will survey the accounts of the same events presented in the Chinese parallels. Finally, I will call attention to problems emerging from the discourse and try to show how insights into the formation of early Buddhist texts can be generated by comparing different versions of a single sutta.

When Susima leaves the monks, he approaches the Buddha, keen to learn how those monks could claim to be fully liberated without possessing the five super-knowledges and the peaceful formless emancipations. The Buddha first offers Susima a single-sentence explanation: “First, Susima, there is knowledge of the persistence of principles; afterwards, knowledge of nibbāna.” This marks the beginning of what we might consider the second part of the sutta, the purpose of which is to elucidate the meaning of “liberated by wisdom” (paññāvimutta) and thereby resolve the problem posed by the first part.

When Susima asks the Buddha to explain this enigmatic statement, he responds simply by repeating his words: “Whether or not you understand, Susima, first there is knowledge of the persistence of principles; afterwards, knowledge of nibbāna.” He next leads Susima through a catechism on the three characteristics of the five aggregates, exactly as we find it in the well-known Anattalakkhaṇa-sutta, the “Discourse on the Characteristic of Non-Self” (S 22:59). Each of the five aggregates is impermanent; because it is impermanent, it is bound up with suffering; and because it is impermanent, bound up with suffering, and subject to change, it is to be seen as “not mine, not I, not my self”. Seeing that the five aggregates are non-self, the noble disciple becomes disenchanted with them; through disenchantment, he becomes dispassionate; and through dispassion, his mind is liberated. With liberation comes the

\[12^\text{S II 124.10-11: } \text{pubbe kho Susima dhammaṭṭhitiññanā, pacchā nibbāne ūpāpan ti.}\]
knowledge of liberation and he understands: “Birth is finished; the spiritual life has been lived; what had to be done has been done; there is no more coming back to any state of being.”

Then the Buddha questions Susima about the links of dependent origination (paṭicca-samuppāda), first with respect to arising, taken in reverse order from “because of birth, there is aging-and-death” back to “because of ignorance, there are volitional activities”; then with respect to cessation, again in reverse order from “with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death ceases” back to “with the cessation of ignorance, volitional activities cease”. At each step, the Buddha asks Susima whether he sees (Susima passasi) the relationship between the two factors, and the monk always replies, “Yes, lord” (evam bhante).

At this point the Buddha asks Susima whether “knowing and seeing thus” (evam jānanto evam passanto), he possesses the five super-knowledges and the peaceful formless emancipations, and Susima replies, “Not so.” The Buddha then asks Susima, “Here now, Susima, this answer and the non-attainment of those states; how could this be, Susima?” This was the same question that Susima had earlier asked the group of monks, which elicited the reply: “We are liberated by wisdom.” Susima does not answer the question. Instead, he prostrates himself at the Buddha’s feet, confesses that he entered the Buddhist order as a “thief of Dhamma”, and asks the Exalted One to pardon him for his offense. The Buddha tells him that what he did was indeed foolish and unskillful. To underscore the danger, he relates a simile about a criminal who is arrested by the king’s men and beheaded out-

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13 S II 124.18–25.20: evam passaṃ, susima, sutavā arīyasāvako rūpasmiṃ pi nibbindati, vedanāyapi nibbindati, saññāyapi nibbindati, sañkhāresu pi nibbindati, viññāsmapi nibbindati, nibbindaṃ virajjati, virāgā vimuccati, vimuttasmiṃ vimuttiṃ nibbindati, viññā İl jati, vusitaṃ brahmavihariyaṃ, kataṃ karaniyaṃ, nāparāni inhattādī” ti pajānāti.

14 S II 125.29–26.18.

15 S II 127.22–23: ettha dāni Susima idañ ca veyyakaranāṃ imesaṃ ca dhammānaṃ asamāpatti, idañ no Susima kathāṃ? Ēt mistakenlly reads the last word here as kataṃ when kathaṃ is required.
side the city. Though the consequences of “going forth as a thief in the well-expounded Dhamma and discipline” are far graver than the punishment suffered by the criminal, the Buddha pardons Susima because he has seen his transgression for what it is and pledges to exercise future restraint. With this the *sutta* ends.\(^{16}\) It should be noted that, in contrast to the Chinese parallels, this version mentions nothing about Susima obtaining any transcendent realization, neither the dust-free, stainless eye of Dhamma (*virajam vitamalam dhammacakkhuṃ*) nor the exhaustion of the influxes (*āsavakkhaya*).

Nevertheless, though nothing is said about any attainment on the part of Susīma, it seems to me that the discussion about the two kinds of knowledge must serve to clarify the status of the arahant liberated by wisdom. And as I read it, the intent is to suggest that deep attainment in concentration, even the attainment of the first *jhāna*, is not indispensible. This point is made implicitly rather than explicitly, but I believe a keen reader would still detect it. Of course, a critic might object that the *sutta* does not mention the need for maintaining precepts, or sense restraint, or mindfulness and clear comprehension, as prerequisites for liberation, yet we certainly cannot bypass these steps of the path; and, it might be said, if these steps can be implicitly included, certainly the *jhānas* could too. I won’t deny that one can read the Susīma-*sutta* as simply reaffirming, by silence, the need for the *jhānas*. But if that were the case, I would ask, why didn’t the Buddha simply say so instead of drawing upon these two kinds of knowledge to clarify the status of the *paññāvimutta*? I don’t think the place of the *jhānas* in the path is so obvious that the point would need no explanation. After all, Susīma is not a doctrinal expert who could be expected to know the intricacies of the path; he even seems ignorant of its broad outlines. Thus a reference to a stock doctrinal formula would not have been inappropriate in his case. If the Buddha wanted to stress the need for the *jhānas*, it would have been fitting for him to explain the *paññāvimutta* arahant in the way

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\(^{16}\)S II 127.25–28,26.
done elsewhere, as one who has reached the extinction of the influxes without attainment of the formless emancipations. Instead, by calling attention to “knowledge of the persistence of principles” followed by “knowledge of nibbāna” as the requirements for becoming an arahant liberated by wisdom, the text seems to be putting these kinds of knowledge in the place normally occupied by the jhānas.

3. The Chinese Parallels

I now want to take a brief look at how the Chinese parallels to S 12.70 treat the story of Susīma’s meeting with the Buddha. Since the citation in the Abhidharma-vibhāṣā-śāstra is short and incomplete, I will consider this version first. Here, when Susīma tells the Buddha about his discussion with the monks, the Buddha declares, as in the Pāli version, “Susīma, you should know that first there is knowledge of the persistence of principles; afterwards, knowledge of nibbāna.”17 Perplexed, Susīma asks for clarification and the Buddha repeats his statement, again as in the Pāli version. The statement that follows makes use of Sarvāstivādin technical terminology and thus may be, not part of the citation, but a commentator’s elaboration in the idiom of their exegetical system. However, it may also be intended as a quotation being ascribed anachronistically to the Buddha, as is sometimes done in the Pāli commentaries as well: “Those monks, by earlier relying on threshold dhyāna concentration, exhausted the influxes and afterwards aroused the fundamental dhyāna. In this way one can understand that knowledge of the persistence of principles is an ancillary knowledge; knowledge of nibbāna, the fundamental knowledge.”18 The text here is suggesting that

17 T XXVIII 408b6: 蘇摩當知先有法住智後有涅槃智. As in my previous article, for the sake of consistency I will generally use the Pāli forms of Buddhist technical terms, even though the original text may have been composed in another Indian language.

18 T XXVIII 408b8–11: 比丘先依未至禪盡漏，後起根本禪。以是事故，知諸邊中智是法住智，根本中智是涅槃智. The version at T XXVII 572c24–27 reads: 然彼五百 應真苾芻依未至定得漏盡已後，方能起根本等至。由此故知近分地智是法住智，根本地智是涅槃智.
the monks first attained “threshold dhyāna”, on the basis of which they aroused the wisdom that understands the causation of the samsāric process. This wisdom eliminated the influxes and enabled them to attain the wisdom that realizes nibbāna; the latter, apparently, occurs in a state spoken of as “the fundamental meditative absorption” (根本等至 = Skt *mauladhyāna*). This account of attainment roughly corresponds to the process laid out in the Theravāda Abhidhamma system, according to which all path and fruition attainments (*magga-phala*) occur at the level of jhānic concentration and thus can be called “world-transcending jhāna”. At this point the citation of the discourse in Vibhāṣa ends.

In its treatment of the two kinds of knowledge, the Susima story in the Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya turns out to be the dissident version among the parallels. Here the Buddha replies to Susima’s plea for clarification with the words: “First [comes] knowledge of the principle, afterwards inferential knowledge.” The Chinese terms for these two knowledges, 法智 and 比智, are the equivalent of Pāli *dhamme nāṇa* and *anvaye nāṇa*. In the Nikāyas, these two knowledges also play a prominent role in relation to dependent origination. They are explained in S 12:33, which makes it clear that *dhamme nāṇa* and *anvaye nāṇa* are not synonymous with *dhammaṭṭhitthi nāṇa* and *nibbāne nāṇa* of S 12:70. S 12:33 identifies “knowledge of the principle” with the understanding of the chain of dependent origination by way of the “four-truth pattern”. One understands each factor itself, its origination through the preceding factor in the series, its cessation through the ceasing of the preceding factor, and the noble eightfold path as the way to its cessation. Thus, using “aging-and-death” as an example, with knowledge of the principle

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19 未至禅, or 未至定 = Skt *anāgamyadhyāna*. This type of concentration seems to correspond to “access concentration” (*upacārasamādhi*) of the Visuddhi-magga system. As the Skt name indicates, it is a state that has not yet arrived at dhyāna or full concentration, not a full dhyāna that functions as a threshold.


21 T 22 363①⑱-⑱: 先法智後比智。
one knows what is meant by aging-and-death; one knows that birth is the cause of aging-and-death; one knows that when birth ceases, aging-and-death ceases; and one knows that the noble eightfold path is the way to the cessation of aging-and-death.

“Knowledge of the principle” (dhamme ṇāṇa), the sutta makes clear, pertains to the present life and involves the grasp of principles that are directly visible. “Inferential knowledge” (anvaye ṇāṇa), in contrast, is the extension of this knowledge to the past and future:

By means of this principle that is seen, understood, immediately attained, and fathomed, one applies the method by way of the past and the future thus: “Whatever ascetics and brahmans in the past directly knew aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, all these directly knew it in the very same way that I do now. Whatever ascetics and brahmans in the future will directly know aging-and-death, its origin, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation, all these will directly know it in the very same way that I do now.” This is one’s inferential knowledge.22

The same is said about each factor, back to volitional activities, which originate from ignorance and cease with the cessation of ignorance. The Buddha declares that a disciple who has purified these two kinds of knowledge — knowledge of the principle and inferential knowledge — is “accomplished in view, accomplished in vision, one who has arrived at this good Dhamma, who sees this good Dhamma, who possesses a trainee’s knowledge, a trainee’s understanding, who has

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22 S II 58.3-16: so iminā dhammena diṭṭhena viditena akālikena pattena pari-yogāhena attināgatena yam neti: “ye kho keci attamaddhānaṃ samanā vā brhiṅnā vā jarāmaraṇaṃ abbhāññamu, jarāmaraṇasamudayaṃ abbhāññamu, jarāmaruṇanirodhāṃ abbhāññamu, jarāmaruṇanirodhagāminīṃ paṭipadaṃ abbhāññamu, sabbe te evaneva abbhāññamu, seyyathāpāhaṃ etarāhi. ye pi hi keci anāgata-maddhānaṃ samanā vā brhiṅnā vā jarāmaraṇaṃ abhi-jānissanti, jarāmaruṇanirodham abhi-jānissanti, jarāmaruṇanirodhagāminīṃ paṭipadaṃ abhi-jānissanti, sabbe te evaneva abhi-jānissanti, seyyathāpāhaṃ etarāhi” ti. idamassa anvaye ṇāṇaṃ.
entered the stream of the Dhamma, a noble one with penetrative wisdom who stands squarely before the door to the Deathless. 23

M-Vin may have adopted the use of these two knowledges in the present passage from a parallel discourse in the Mahāsāṅghikas’ own Sūtra-piṭaka, a discourse that has not survived. On the other hand, it is also possible that the alteration was made only in the Vinaya version of the discourse and that the corresponding sūtra, if there was one contained in the Mahāsāṅghika Sūtra-piṭaka, may have designated the two knowledges in ways that match the Pāli discourse. We should bear in mind that the Susīma story in M-Vin belongs to a Vinaya text, not to a sūtra, and it is not impossible that in the course of oral transmission the Vinaya account was altered while the Sūtra-piṭaka version (if there was one) preserved a pair of knowledges that correspond to those of S 12:70.

Nevertheless, there are good grounds for insisting that the two knowledges of M-Vin, 法智 and 比智, are intended to correspond to dhamme ना and anvaye ना of S 12:33, and are not an alternative Chinese translation for the two knowledges of S 12:70, dhammatthiti- ना and nibbāne ना. One reason is that the two terms 法智 and 比智 occur in an exact Chinese parallel of S 12:33. The parallel to S 12:33 in the Saṃyuktāgama (SĀ 356, T II 99c19–26) does not say anything about these two types of knowledge; the corresponding paragraphs are strangely missing just where we would expect them. But an Abhidharma treatise, the *Sāriputrābhidharma-śāstra (舍利弗阿毘曇論), cites a sūtra almost identical with S 12:33, where the terms 法智 and 比智 are used with the same meanings that dhamme ना and

23S II 58,17–25: ayam vuccati, bhikkhave, ariyasāvako dīṭhisampanno iti pi, dassanasampanno iti pi, āgato imaṭh saddhammanā iti pi, passati imaṭh saddhammanā iti pi, sekhena hām na samamāgato iti pi, sekhāya vijjāya samamāgato iti pi, dhammasokanā samāpanno iti pi, ariyo nibbedhisappapītā iti pi, amatadhīrāṃ dhucca tiṭṭhati iti pi ti.
anvaye ñāṇa bear in the Pāli sutta. A second reason is that a later work with Mahāsāṅghika affiliations, the *Satyasiddhi-sāstra, also explains these two terms in a way that corresponds with the two knowledges of S 12:33 (see n. 26).

It is particularly important to emphasize that 法智 and 比智 probably mean the same thing as dhamme ñāṇa and anvaye ñāṇa do in S12:33, because the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma adopted the two equivalent Sanskrit terms often translated as 法智 and 比智 — dharma-jñāṇa and anvayajñāṇa — and assigned them new meanings determined by the parameters of their own system. These meanings were quite different from those the two terms bear in the Pāli Nikāyas (and presumably in the Āgamas of other early Buddhist schools). In the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, direct knowledge of the four noble truths occurs as a series of steps in which each truth is individually penetrated in two main phases. In the first phase, which the Sarvāstivādins designated dharmajñāṇa, the meditator penetrates the noble truth as it applies to the sense-desire realm (kāmadhātu). In close succession, the meditator penetrates the truth as it applies to the form and formless realms (rūpa-arūpa-dhātu); this phase the Sarvāstivādins called anvayajñāṇa.26

24At T XXVII 605b12–606a1. The Śāriputrābhīdharmā-sāstra is believed to have been the Abhidharma treatise of the Dharmaguptakas, a school doctrinally close to the Theravāda. If the sūtra it cites came from the Dharma-guptaka Sūtrapitaka, it is quite reasonable to expect that it would closely resemble its Pāli parallel.

25Perhaps this explains why the paragraphs on 法智 and 比智 are missing in the SĀ counterpart of S 12:33. As SĀ belonged to a school with Sarvāstivāda affiliations, its scribes may have removed these paragraphs because they cast doubt on the new definitions of the two knowledges that had emerged in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma.

It would have been tempting for the Sarvāstivādins to insert these two terms into their version of the Susīma-sutta as representing the two kinds of knowledge constitutive of the wisdom-liberated arahant’s attainment. However, in the two accounts of the Susīma story regarded as stemming from schools with Sarvāstivāda affiliation — SĀ 347 and Vibhāṣā — these two knowledges have no place. Like their Pāli counterpart, these versions take the two knowledges to be knowledge of the persistence of principles (法住智) and knowledge of nibbāna (涅槃智). Nevertheless, we cannot discount the possibility that during the classical age of Abhidharma Buddhism in India, when the Sarvāstivāda presentation of the path was widely accepted among the Buddhist schools, scribes or reciters of the Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya, impressed by the prestige of this system, either mistakenly or deliberately replaced the original two knowledges (corresponding to those of S 12:70) with the other pair, which they could support in relation to dependent origination by a sūtra in their own collection that was a parallel to S 12:33.

To return to the M-Vin account: When Susīma tells the Buddha that he does not understand what is meant by the two knowledges, the

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27It is perhaps testimony to the dominance of the Sarvāstivāda presentation of the path that the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (大智度論, at T XXV 232c19–23), the large commentary on the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra, in commenting on 法住智 and 比智 in the sūtra, explains the two knowledges very much as they are explained in the Sarvāstivāda system: as the undefiled knowledge of the dharmas, their cause, their cessation, and the path of dharma in relation respectively to the desire realm and to the form and formless realms. The *Satyasiddhi-sūtra too partly accepts this interpretation of the two knowledges, though it also argues in favor of preserving the meanings propounded in the sūtras (see T XXXII 372a17–28).
Buddha repeats his words and then begins to elucidate his meaning. In contrast to S 12:70, M-Vin shows the Buddha directly question Susima about his understanding of dependent origination without first drilling him on the three characteristics. His questions occur in two stages, which I call respectively “the doctrinal questionnaire” and “the experiential questionnaire”. In the doctrinal questionnaire, the Buddha asks Susima about the links of dependent origination simply as bare facts: “Does aging-and-death occur with birth as condition?” And so on, abridged, back to: “Do volitional activities occur with ignorance as condition?” To each question Susima answers, “Yes.” Then the Buddha guides Susima through the cessation of the chain of conditions, from “with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death ceases” to “with the cessation of ignorance, volitional activities cease”. The text does not correlate the chain of conditions with the two knowledges, knowledge of the principle and inferential knowledge, and we thus have to draw our own conclusions about their relationship.

Following this doctrinal questionnaire, the Buddha asks Susima, “If a monk rightly contemplates and knows this Dhamma (此法 = imāh dhammam), wouldn’t he attain everything that should be attained?”28 Again, Susima answers, “Yes”, apparently signifying that a monk can attain arahantship, the goal of the Buddha’s teaching, by properly understanding dependent origination.

Next, the Buddha takes Susima through the chain of conditions again, first with regard to arising and then with regard to cessation. This time, however, in each case he asks Susima, “Have you understood (汝知) [the link between each pair of factors]?” This is what I call the experiential questionnaire. As expected, Susima answers affirmatively. Next, the Buddha asks, “When you know the Dhamma thus, do you attain the divine eye, the knowledge of past lives, or the peaceful emanations?” And Susima replies, “I do not attain them.” The Buddha then challenges him: “You say that you know things thus but do not

28 T XXII 363b1–2: 若比丘於此法中正觀正知，所應得者，盡皆得不?
attain those excellent qualities: who will believe you?”

This sentence corresponds to the sentence of the Pāli version: ettha dāni Susīma idañ ca veyyākaraṇam īmeseñ ca dhammāṇaṁ asamāpatti, idaṁ no Susīma kathā?

It echoes the question that Susīma himself had posed to the monks when they claimed arahantship without the super-knowledges and formless emancipations. Susīma then admits that his mind had been enveloped by ignorance and wrong views; but, he says, now that he has heard the Dhamma in detail his evil views have vanished. He further states, “I have gained the pure eye of the Dhamma”, which is a claim to the realization of, at minimum, the state of stream-entry, the first of the four stages of liberation. Finally, Susīma confesses his transgression in entering the Saṅgha as a thief. After telling him how much suffering he might have brought upon himself by such a foolish deed, the Buddha pardons him.

In the version of the Saṁyuktāgama, SĀ 347, as in M-Vin, the Buddha moves directly into the questionnaire on dependent origination without any intervening catechism on the three characteristics. The two knowledges here, 法住智 and 湮槃智, are the same as those of Vibhāṣā and correspond exactly to the Pāli version, not to M-Vin. When the Buddha mentions these two kinds of knowledge, Susīma entreats him:

“Please let the Exalted One teach me the Dhamma so that I can come to know knowledge of the persistence of principles, to see knowledge of the persistence of principles.”

The Buddha then guides Susīma through the series on dependent origination, using a somewhat more complex pattern than is used in S 12:70 and M-Vin. I will exemplify this with the first member in each of the two series, on arising and on cessation. The Buddha asks, “Isn’t it true that there is aging-and-death because there is birth, that aging-and-death does not occur in the

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29T XXII 363b8-q: 汝自言知如是諸法而復言不得。是諸功德爾當信者。

30S II 127,22-23: I translate literally: “Here now, Susīma, this answer and the non-attainment of these states: how could this be, Susīma?”

31T XXII 363b11-12: 廣聞正法滅惡邪見，得法眼淨。

32T II 97b14-15: 唯願世尊為我說法。今我得知法住智。得見法住智。
absence of birth? … Isn’t it true that when there is no birth, there is no aging-and-death, that aging-and-death ceases only when birth ceases?”33 Susimaha, of course, answers all these questions in the affirmative.

The questionnaire being over, the Buddha asks Susima about the relationship between his insights and his meditative attainments. The Chinese text is drastically abbreviated: “When you know and see thus, do you, secluded from sensual desires and bad unwholesome states … realize with the body, possess, and dwell in [them]?”34 To all these questions, Susima answers, “No, Exalted One.” Note how the questions here differ markedly from those in both S 12:70 and M-Vin. Despite the abridgment, we can see that the text mentions the first and last phrases of the questions Susima had earlier asked the group of monks.35 The first is the opening clause of the formula for the first jhāna, the last is the final clause of the question on the formless emancipations. Thus, when we fill out the abridgment, we see that the Buddha is actually asking Susima whether he attains each of the four jhānas and the formless emancipations. The monk’s negative reply means that he does not attain them.

The Buddha then applies what Susima has understood to the case of the monks who claimed to be arahants liberated by wisdom: “This is what is meant by saying first one knows the persistence of principles, afterwards one knows nibbāna. Those good men — dwelling alone in a quiet place, earnest, reflective, and heedful — eliminated the view of a self and did not arouse any influxes; their minds were well liberated.”36

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33T II 97b17-22: 有生故有老死，不離生老死滅耶？… 無生故無老死，不離生滅而老死滅耶？
34T II 97c8: 作如是知，如是見者，為有離欲，惡不善法，乃至身作證具足住不？
36T II 97c1-4: 是名先知法住，後知涅槃。彼諸善男子獨一静處，專精思惟，不放逸住。雖於我見，不起諸漏。心善解脫.
The narrator then tells us that when the Buddha spoke this *sutta*, “Venerable Susima gained the pure eye of the Dhamma, dust free and without stain. He saw the Dhamma, attained the Dhamma, awakened to the Dhamma, and crossed over doubt; without depending on faith in others, without needing the aid of others, his mind obtained confidence in the true Dhamma.”\(^{37}\) SĀ 347 thus concurs with M-Vin that Susima’s discussion with the Buddha transformed him from a “Dhamma-thief” into a seer of the Dhamma, one standing at minimum on the level of a stream-enterer.

Following this narrative report, Susima confesses to the Buddha, relating the whole background story about how he became a monk at the request of his fellow wanderers with the intention of stealing the Dhamma. The Buddha then instructs him how to confess for the sake of future restraint, which he does. Next the Buddha speaks the simile, which corresponds to the simile of S 12:63 rather than to the one in S 12:70, about a thief arrested by the king and punished by being struck by a hundred spears three times in a day. From this, the Buddha draws a lesson: “If one goes forth secretly as a thief in this proper Dhamma and discipline with the intention of stealing it, and one takes the Dhamma and expounds it to people, one will undergo pain and suffering vastly exceeding that [of the man struck by the three hundred spears].”\(^{38}\) The text ends with the announcement: “At the time the Buddha spoke this Dhamma, the outside-ascetic Susima’s influxes were exhausted and his mind was liberated”,\(^{39}\) which means that at the end of the discourse Susima reached arahantship.

\(^{37}\) T II 97c4-7: 尊者須深透離垢，得法眼淨。聞時，須深見法得法，覺法度疑。不由他信。不由他度。於正法中心得無畏。

\(^{38}\) T II 98a9-10: 若於正法，律盗密出家。盗受持法，為人宣說。當受苦痛倍過於彼。Note that the Buddha’s closing admonitions in S 12:70 and M-Vin have nothing corresponding to the phrase “expounds it to people” (為人宣說). These versions make the mere act of “stealing the Dhamma” a terrible crime in itself.

\(^{39}\) T II 98a10-11: 佛說是法時，外道須深懄盡解.
We have seen that in the different versions of the Susima story the Buddha refers to two different pairs of knowledge. In M-Vin, the pair is dhamme ūdana and anvaye ūdana; I translate these terms as “knowledge of the principle” and “inferential knowledge”. In S 12:70, the pair is dhammaṭṭhiūdana and nibbāne ūdana, reflected in the Chinese translations of SĀ 347 and Vibhaṣā as 法住智 and 涅槃智; the Pāli and the Chinese can both be translated as “knowledge of the persistence of principles” and “knowledge of nibbāna”.

Both pairs are related to dependent origination, and in each pair the two knowledges occur in sequence.

Although the two pairs are unlikely to be identical, the fact that they are both concerned with dependent origination suggests that it may be possible to establish some correlation between them. The only other place in the Nikāyas where the pair, dhamme ūdana and anvaye ūdana, occurs is in the Saṅgīti-sutta of the Digha-nikāya, as two members of a group of four knowledges that do not occur as a group elsewhere in the Nikāyas. The terms are not explained in the Saṅgīti-sutta itself, but the Abhidhamma treatise, Vibhaṅga, defines dhamme ūdana as the wisdom in the four paths and fruits (concepts drawn from the mature Theravāda Abhidhamma system) and anvaye ūdana simply by quoting S 12:33. Thus an attempt to establish the relationship between the two pairs by

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40It is difficult, indeed impossible, to determine from the expression dhammaṭṭhiūdana alone whether dhamma- here should be understood as the singular “the Dhamma” or as a suppressed plural, dhamma. In my translation of the Saṃyutta-nikāya, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, I rendered the expression “knowledge of the stability of the Dhamma.” The commentary takes dhamma- as the plural dhamma with the meaning “[saṃsāric] phenomena.” I understand the word, in this context, as signifying the principles or laws that underlie the arising of saṃsāric phenomena.

41D III 226,33–34. The other two are “encompassing knowledge” (pariye ūdana, knowledge of the minds of others) and “knowledge of what is conventional” (sammutiye ūdana).
using dhamme āṇāna and anvaye āṇāna as a starting point leads to a blind alley.

It might be more fruitful to begin at the opposite end, by seeking other occurrences in the Nikāyas of the terms dhammaṭṭhitītītāna and nibbāne āṇāna and then try to work out the relationship from there. In the Nidāna-saṅyutta, the Paccaya-sutta (S 12:20) speaks of the conditional relationship between each pair of factors in dependent origination as “the persistence of the principles” (dhammaṭṭhitātā), which remains valid whether or not Buddhas arise in the world. Since there is no essential difference in meaning between dhammaṭṭhitātā and dhammaṭṭhītī, it would thus follow that dhammaṭṭhitītītāna is the knowledge of this conditional relationship.

We explicitly encounter the term dhammaṭṭhitītītāna in S 12:34 (at S II 60,7, 23). In this sutta it is shown how seven kinds of knowledge arise in relation to each of the eleven links of dependent origination. The first six are constituted by three pairs. The fundamental pair is knowing the relationship established by the link to hold positively (“with X as condition, Y comes to be”) and negatively (“in the absence of X, there is no Y”) in the present. Knowing this pair with respect to the other two time periods — the past and the future — gives us the six knowledges. Thus, with respect to the three time periods, one knows that birth is the condition for aging-and-death, and that in the absence of birth there is no aging-and-death; and so on back to: with respect to the three time periods, one knows that ignorance is the condition for volitional activities and that, in the absence of ignorance, there are no volitional activities. The seventh knowledge occurring with respect to each link is “knowledge that this ‘knowledge of the persistence of principles’, too, is subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation”. Thus, as a working hypothesis, we might propose that “knowledge of the persistence of principles” (dhammaṭṭhitītītāna)

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42S II 60,7, 23: yam pi 'issa taṃ dhammaṭṭhitītītāna taṃpi khayadhammaṃ vayadhammaṃ virāgdhammaṃ nirodhdhammaṃ āṇānaṃ.
signifies the above-mentioned six types of knowledge regarding each link.

The Sāratthappakāsīṇī, in commenting on S 12:34, seems to support this with its gloss on “knowledge of the persistence of principles”:

Knowledge of the persistence of principles is knowledge of the principle of conditionality. The principle of conditionality is called “the persistence of principles” because it is the cause for the occurrence [or] persistence of principles. The knowledge of this, [namely] “knowledge of the persistence of principles”, is a designation for these same six kinds of knowledge.43

Since, of the six types of knowledge, one pair refers to the present, one to the past, and one to the future, then according to the explanations of these terms in 12:33, the first should constitute “knowledge of the principle” (dhamme ṅāṇa) and the other two pairs referring to the past and the future should constitute “inferential knowledge” (anvaye ṅāṇa). This gives to “knowledge of the persistence of principles” (dhammatṭhitiṅāṇa) a wider scope than either of the two types of knowledge mentioned in 12:33 — “knowledge of the principle” (dhamme ṅāṇa) and “inferential knowledge” (anvaye ṅāṇa); for the former embraces the latter two as subordinate branches of itself. The knowledge of a principle indeterminate with respect to time must include instances of that knowledge pegged to specific periods of time.

The question remains of how nibbāne ṅāṇa, “knowledge of nibbāna”, is related to these other knowledges. The knowledge of nibbāna is not defined in the Susimma-sutta itself and the expression does not occur elsewhere in the Nikāyas. Thus, while many discourses make it plain that nibbāna is something to be known and experienced, none explicitly and unambiguously enables us to assign “knowledge of nibbāna” to a definite place in the broader doctrinal blueprint of the Nikāyas. Nevertheless, we can still make the attempt.

43Spk II 68: dhammatṭhitiṅāṇa ti paccayākāre ṅāṇaṃ. paccayākāro hi dhammānaṃ paccayākāro hi dhammatṭhiti ti vuccati. ettha ṅāṇaṃ dhammatṭhitiṅaṃ etass’ eva chabbidhassa ṅāṇass’ etas’ adhivacanaṃ.
A feasible solution is to hold that knowledge of nibbāna is expressed by the negative side of each pair of knowledges in S 12:34, that is, the knowledge “when there is no X, there is no Y”. It should be noted that both the positive and negative sides of the formulation used in S 12:34 are contractions of a fuller formula used elsewhere, for instance, in S 12:4. Here we find the positive aspect of dependent origination expressed, with respect to each link, in two ways: “When there is X, Y comes to be; with X as condition, Y [arises/occurs].” For example: “When there is birth, there is aging-and-death; with birth as condition, aging-and-death occurs.” Similarly, the negative side is expressed in two ways: “When there is no X, Y does not come to be; with the cessation of X, Y ceases.” Using the same example: “When there is no birth, there is no aging-and-death; with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death ceases.” From this we can infer that the formulations used in S 12:34 are contractions of the full formulae: the positive portion omits the clause “When there is X, Y comes to be”, retaining only the clause “With X as condition, Y [arises/occurs]”; and the negative portion omits the clause “With the cessation of X, Y ceases”, retaining only the clause “When there is no X, there is no Y”. Whenever we encounter the abridged formulation we can then feel justified in assuming that the full formula is intended. Thus, if the sutta were to be fully expressed, each link would be stated, both with respect to arising and with respect to ceasing, in terms of both manners of expression, as we find in S 12:4 and elsewhere. Knowledge of nibbāna would then be the knowledge: “When there is no X, there is no Y; with the cessation of X, Y ceases.”

It might seem that, because this knowledge occurs both in regard to present phenomena (the domain of dhamme nāma, knowledge of the principle) and in regard to the past and future (the domain of anvaye

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44S II 4,19–20: “jātīyā kho sati jarāmaranaṁ hoti, jātīpaccayā jarāmaranaṁ” ti.
ñāna, inferential knowledge), the knowledge of nibbāna has been subordinated to both knowledge of the principle and inferential knowledge, and thereby subordinated to knowledge of the persistence of principles, which includes both. To me, this would be an undesirable conclusion, but it is not inescapable. Instead of supposing that knowledge of the Dhamma and inferential knowledge are fully nested within knowledge of the persistence of principles, we might instead stipulate that knowledge of the persistence of principles comprehends only the positive or originative aspect of dependent origination.\footnote{This seems to be the way the Paṭisambhidāmagga treats dhammaṁ thitiñāna, which is formulated only in terms of the originative and supportive role of the conditions.} We can then hold that knowledge of nibbāna comprehends the negative or cessation aspect of dependent origination. In such a case, “knowledge of the persistence of principles” and “knowledge of nibbāna” become symmetrical. The former comprises the side of knowledge of the principle and inferential knowledge concerned with the origination of samsāric phenomena from their conditions; the latter comprises the side of knowledge of the principle and inferential knowledge concerned with the cessation of samsāric phenomena through the cessation of their conditions. Despite the manner of expression, we should understand that knowledge of nibbāna is not merely knowledge of a fact, but knowledge by acquaintance. It is, that is to say, present knowledge of nibbāna as the cessation of each term in the chain of dependent origination, knowledge born of a direct experience of nibbāna.

The above hypothesis seems confirmed by both S 12:70 and SĀ 347, the two versions of the Susima story available to us that refer to these two types of knowledge. Although the Buddha does not formally define “knowledge of the persistence of principles” and “knowledge of nibbāna”, when Susima expresses his lack of understanding of the Buddha’s statement, “First there is knowledge of the persistence of principles, afterwards knowledge of nibbāna”, the Buddha guides him through the formula of dependent origination first with respect to aris-
Susima’s Conversation with the Buddha

ing and thereafter with respect to cessation. This manner of presentation thus indirectly supports the interpretation of these two knowledges by way of the two sides of dependent origination.

We saw above that S 12:34 treats knowledge of the persistence of principles as knowledge of the principle of conditionality with respect to both arising and cessation, a meaning made explicit by the commentary on the sutta in the Sāratthappakāśini with its gloss: “‘knowledge of the persistence of principles’ is a designation for these same six kinds of knowledge”. On this basis, one might protest that the distinction I make between “knowledge of the persistence of principles” and “knowledge of nibbāna” in the Susīma-sutta unreasonably cuts S 12:34’s definition of the former knowledge into two halves. One might then argue that if knowledge of the cessation side of dependent origination is assigned to “knowledge of the persistence of principles”, “knowledge of nibbāna” cannot be identified with it but must have some other meaning.

The expression nibbāne nāna is problematic in that it does not occur elsewhere in the four Nikāyas or the oldest parts of the Khuddaka-nikāya; it is found uniquely in the Susīma-sutta. In attempting to understand it, we thus have no alternative but to rely on inference and conjecture. Apart from the interpretation I proposed, I can see two alternative ways that this knowledge might be understood. Both, however, are difficult to reconcile with its function in the Susīma-sutta.

The first is to understand nibbāne nāna in terms of a passage on the destruction of the āsavas that occurs at A 9:36:

Here, bhikkhus, secluded from sensual pleasures ... a bhikkhu enters and dwells in the first jhāna.... He considers whatever phenomena exist there pertaining to form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness as impermanent, suffering, an illness, a tumor, a dart, misery, affliction, alien, disintegrating, empty, and non-self. He turns his mind away from those phenomena and directs it to the deathless element thus: “This is peaceful, this is sublime, that is, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, nibbāna.” If he is firm in this, he attains the destruction of the influxes. But if he does not attain the destruction of the influxes, then,
because of that same passion for the Dhamma, delight in the Dhamma, with the utter destruction of five fetters, he is spontaneously reborn and attains final nibbāna there, not subject to return from that world.47

Here it is shown that insight into the three characteristics (expanded into eleven items) comes first, followed by the fixing of the mind on the “deathless element”, nibbāna. Thus, the knowledge of phenomena as impermanent, suffering, and selfless could be identified as dhamma-thิตīhīna and the fixing of the mind on nibbāna as nibbāne ṇāna. While this interpretation is appealing, its disadvantage, at least with regard to the Susima-sutta, is that these two knowledges here have no clear connection to dependent origination, the theme of the Susima-sutta and the reason for its inclusion in the Nidāna-saµyutta.

The second interpretation would take nibbāne ṇāna to be identical with aihā, the final knowledge that the paññāvimutta monks declare in the presence of the Buddha: “We understand: Birth is finished, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more coming back to any state of being.”48 This certainly has the advantage of relating nibbāne ṇāna to the opening problem of the Susima-sutta, the meaning of paññāvimutta arahantship. A drawback to this interpretation, however, is that this knowledge has its own distinct name, aihā, which had already been used earlier in the sutta. Thus it would have

47A IV 422,22–23,10: idha bhikkhave bhikkhu vivicc’ eva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitaµkkaµ savicāraµ vivekaµ putisukhaµ paµhamaµ jhānaµ upasampuja viharati. so yadeva tattha hoti rārupaµtaµ vedanāµtaµ saµñāµtaµ sankhāraµtaµ viññāµtaµ te dhamme aniccato dukkhaµ rogato gandho sattato aghato abhājo parato palokato suññato anuttato samanuµpasaµtati. so tehi dhammehi cittaµ paµjivāpeti so tehi dhammehi cittaµ paµjivāpetvā amaiµya dhātuµya cittaµ upasaµhāreti. “etam santam etam pannaµ yatidam sabhasaµkhārasamo hoti sabbāpadhipaµsuµnasaggo taµhakkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānan” ti. so tattha phito ñasavoµnaµ khayaµ pāpuµnāti. no ce ñasavoµnaµ khayaµ pāpuµnāti tva’ eva dhammarūpagaµna tiya dhammanandiyā paµcannaµ orambhūygāµnaµ saññojanāµnaµ parikkhayā opapātiko hoti tattha parinibbāyā anāvattidhammo tasmā lokā.

48S II 120,30–32: khīna jāti vusitaµ brahmacariyaµ kataµ karapiyaµ nāparaµ iththattāya tī paµjānāma.
been more economical for the Buddha, in this second part of the *sutta*, to have said, “First comes *dhammaṭṭhitiṇāṇa*, afterwards *añña*,” without having to introduce still another type of knowledge determining the status of the *paññāvimutta* arahant.

Thus I believe the interpretation of *nibbāne ṇāṇa* that I originally proposed remains the most cogent. While there is some degree of tension between S 12:34, which subsumes knowledge of the cessation side of dependent origination under *dhammaṭṭhitiṇāṇa*, and S 12:70, which appears to identify this knowledge with *nibbāne ṇāṇa*, the two are not inherently contradictory. The tension could be resolved by holding that, despite S 12:34, the origination side of *paṭicca-samuppāda* has a more legitimate claim to represent *dhammaṭṭhitiṇāṇa* than the cessation side. This assertion can marshal support from S 12:20, which uses the expression *dhammaṭṭhitiṭā* solely in relation to the origination side. The commentary to S 12:34, too, with its words, “the principle of conditionality is called ‘the persistence of principles’ because it is the cause for the occurrence [or] persistence of principles”, conjoins *pavatti* and ṭhitī, suggesting this knowledge relates to the forward movement of *saṁsāra*. The canonical exegetical work, the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, though stemming from a later period than the old Nikāyas, explains *dhammaṭṭhitiṇāṇa* only in terms of the origination series. These sources can thus justify restricting “knowledge of the persistence of principles” to knowledge of the principle of conditionality with respect to arising. This would then allow us to interpret “knowledge of nibbāna” as knowledge of the cessation side of dependent origination, especially when this knowledge is taken as experiential rather than deductive. In this way, both knowledge of the persistence of principles and knowledge of nibbāna intersect with the other two types of

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49S II 25. It seems that this form of the expression is used here in preference to *dhammaṭṭhiti* simply in order to cast each technical term with the abstract -ṭā termination: *dhammaṭṭhitiṭā* *dhammāniyāmatā* idappaccayatā.

50Paṭis I 49–52.
knowledge: knowledge of the principle and inferential knowledge. The following table illustrates these relationships:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIMARY TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE</th>
<th>APPLIED TO PRESENT TIME</th>
<th>APPLIED TO PAST AND FUTURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dhammaññëñë</td>
<td>dhamme ññë</td>
<td>anve ññë</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nibbëññë</td>
<td>dhamme ññë</td>
<td>anve ññë</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Abhidharma-vibhaññë-såstra, the treatise of the Sarvåstivådins, comments on the two knowledges of the Sus¥ma-sutta in a way that confirms the interpretation that I have proposed here:

**Question:** Herein, what is knowledge of the persistence of principles? What is knowledge of nibbëñ?

**Reply:** Knowledge of the persistence of principles is the knowledge that knows the process of birth and death. Knowledge of nibbëñ is the knowledge that knows the cessation of the process of birth and death. Further, knowledge of the persistence of principles is the knowledge that knows twelfeold dependent origination. Knowledge of nibbëñ is the knowledge that knows the cessation of twelfeold dependent origination. Knowledge of the persistence of principles is the knowledge that knows [the truths of] suffering and its origin. Knowledge of nibbëñ is the knowledge that knows [the truths of] cessation and the path. If one speaks thus, one has well understood [the saying] “First there is knowledge of the persistence of principles; afterwards, knowledge of nibbëñ.” There are some who say that knowledge of the persistence of principles is the knowledge of [the truths of] suffering, its origin, and the path. Knowledge of nibbëñ is the knowledge of [the truth of] cessation…. Knowledge of the persistence of principles is an ancillary knowledge; knowledge of nibbëñ is the fundamental knowledge.51

Both pairs of knowledge connected with the Sus¥ma-sutta are said to be cognitions of a sekha, a trainee, one who has reached the stage of

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51 T XXVIII 407c17–26: 此中何者是法住智，何者是涅槃智耶。答曰。知生死増長智是法住智。知生死長滅智是涅槃智。復次知十二緣起是法住智。知十二緣起滅是涅槃智。知苦集智是法住智。知滅道智是涅槃智。若作是說則為過謬。先有法住智後有涅槃智。復有說者。苦集道智是法住智。滅智是涅槃智。… 復次諸邊中智是法住智。根本中智是涅槃智。
stream-entry or higher but has not yet attained arahantship. This is clear from those suttas in the Nidāna-saṁyutta which state that one with direct knowledge of dependent origination in its aspects of arising and cessation has “a trainee’s knowledge, a trainee’s true knowledge”. In the methodology of archaic Buddhism, even knowledge of nibbāna does not mark the disciple as an arahant. This knowledge, taken as knowledge of the cessation side of dependent origination, is already realized by the stream-enterer, who, with his first breakthrough to the Dhamma (dhammābhīsamaya), gains the Dhamma-eye by which he sees the four noble truths. By seeing the four noble truths, the disciple sees nibbāna as the cessation of aging-and-death, as the cessation of birth, and as the cessation of all the other causal factors of dependent origination back to ignorance. Though such disciples still have to train further to attain realization of nibbāna, they have eliminated the three fetters rooted in cognitive distortions. Their remaining task is to cultivate the path acquired with this breakthrough until they reach the extinction of the influxes, which marks the attainment of arahantship.

5. What Did Susima Attain?

As I mentioned earlier, when we compare the second part of S 12:70 with its counterparts in M-Vin and SĀ 347, two important differences stand out. (1) In S 12:70, when the Buddha sets out to clarify his statement, "First there is knowledge of the persistence of principles; afterwards, knowledge of nibbāna”, he does so by drawing Susima into the stock catechism on the three characteristics: the impermanence, suffering, and selflessness of the five aggregates, culminating in disenchantment, dispassion, and liberation. Only when the Buddha completes this exposition does he begin the questionnaire on dependent origination. The other two versions, in contrast, lack this catechism on the three

52 Sekhena ṭānena samannāgato ātipi, sekhāya vijjāya samannāgato ātipi, at e.g. S II 43:20–21, 45:6–7.
characteristics and depict the Buddha as moving directly into the questionnaire on dependent origination. (2) In S 12:70 Susima does not gain any transcendent attainment, whereas in M-Vin he gains the eye of Dhamma and in SÂ he first gains the eye of Dhamma and finally becomes an arahant.

In my previous paper on the Susima-sutta I stipulated that when a text in one school of the Sthavira camp concurs with its Mahāsiṅghika parallel but the version in another Sthavira school differs from both, we can suspect that the dissident version has undergone modification. While this is a convenient working principle to generate hypotheses, it should not be adopted inflexibly, for other explanations might account for the difference in the dissident Sthavira version. Applying this principle to the present case, in which S 12:70 and SÂ 347 are rooted in schools with a Sthavira orientation, we might suspect S 12:70 to have been altered in both respects: first, by having the “three-characteristics catechism” spliced in; and second, by having any reference to Susima's obtaining the Dhamma-eye excised. However, though such suspicions may be defended, I believe that the two discrepancies in S 12:70 have different grades of credibility. I think that we are on fairly solid ground in supposing that the discussion on the three characteristics in S 12:70 is an interpolation. At the same time, I also believe that there is little reason to suppose that all mention of a transcendent attainment by Susima has been removed.

In support of my first point I would contend that the discussion on the three characteristics does not fit in comfortably with the logical progression of the sutta, but has the net effect of depriving the discussion of dependent origination of a meaningful role in the discourse. In support of my second contention I would point out that M-Vin and SÂ 347 differ between themselves over Susima’s attainment: the former sees him emerge from his discussion with the Buddha only as one who has gained the Dhamma-eye, which makes him a trainee on the path (sekha); the latter sees him ending up as an arahant.
With respect to attainments we can thus posit three possibilities regarding the most archaic form of the Susima story:

1. The original version did not mention any attainment (as in S 12:70) and the statements about attainments in M-Vin and SĀ 347 were inserted later.

2. The original version mentioned the gain of the Dhamma-eye, and only this; S 12:70 removed this ascription while SĀ 347 boosted Susima’s stature by also attributing arahantship to him.

3. The original version mentioned Susima’s successive attainment of both the Dhamma-eye and arahantship; S 12:70 removed both attainments, whereas M-Vin removed the attainment of arahantship but left the gain of the Dhamma-eye.

To help resolve this issue we might note that later Buddhist literature displays a marked tendency to increase the number and status of attainments resulting from the Buddha’s preaching. We find, for example, that at the end of many stories from the Dhammapada commentary and the Jātaka commentary, stories with little or no doctrinal content, many people, numbering even in the thousands, attain the fruit of stream-entry and hundreds of monks attain arahantship. This should arouse our suspicion that the ascription of arahantship to Susima at the end of SĀ 347 is one more instance of this tendency to boost attainments, especially when the attainment takes place not after a formal exposition of Dhamma but after the Buddha describes the suffering that awaits a Dhamma-thief. By eliminating the third of the three alternatives mentioned above, we narrow our options to the first two. Between them, however, it is hard to determine which has a better claim to be the original or more archaic version.

Once we have taken note of these differences, we can also raise the question, “Are these differences merely fortuitous, the by-product of chance variations in the oral process of transmission, or do they result from conscious choices within the schools responsible for the preservation and transmission of the text, choices that might have been governed by underlying doctrinal perceptions?” Although we have no way to
answer this question with any certainty, I submit the opinion that in the case of the Susima story, these differences resulted from conscious choices in part governed by doctrinal perceptions.

The commentary on the Pāli Susima-sutta in the Sāratthappakāsini, the authorized Samyutta commentary, can give us an instructive insight into the motivations that might have resulted in such alterations in S 12:70. Where the sutta itself is silent about any transcendent attainment by Susima, the commentary states that at the conclusion of the Buddha’s exposition of the three characteristics, Susima attained arahantship:

[The Buddha] began the teaching with its three turns, [saying:] “What do you think, Susima, is form permanent or impermanent?” and so forth, because he knew that [Susima] was capable of penetration.... Then, at the conclusion of the teaching with its three turns, the elder attained arahantship.\footnote{Spk 2:127: idañi ssa pañivedhabhabbatam ñatvā teparivaṭṭam dhamma-desanaṁ desento ... teparivaṭṭadesanāvasāne pana theru arahattam patto. By “penetration” (pañivedha) is meant the attainment of a world-transcending (lokuttara) path and fruition. By “three turns” (teparivaṭṭa) is meant the three characteristics.}

It is well known that in writing the Sāratthappakāsini, Ācariya Buddhaghosa did not compose an original work of exegesis but, rather, primarily collated and translated into Pāli material from the ancient Sinhala commentary, no longer extant. On the basis of this fact, we can be almost certain that the view that Susima became an arahant derives from the old commentary, which must have pre-dated Buddhaghosa’s work by several centuries. Now it seems to me that the interpolation of the passage on the three characteristics into S 12:70, which originally lacked this catechism (as in the Susima story in M-Vin and SĀ 347), is closely connected with the commentarial ascription of arahantship to Susima. So close is this connection, in fact, that I would venture the hypothesis that the reciters charged with maintaining the Saṃyutta-nikāya added this passage to the discourse precisely because they
inclined to the opinion that, during the discourse, Susīma did actually attain arahantship. On the one hand, due to textual conservatism and some degree of uncertainty, they might have been reluctant to insert a line of text ascribing arahantship (or even stream-entry) to Susīma; on the other hand, they might have believed that the coherence of the discourse required that Susīma end as an arahant and were willing to relax their conservatism by inserting what they considered a mere standard trope on the three characteristics into the *sutta* to help substantiate this belief.

In support of this conviction, they might well have had a suggestive reason in the archaic text itself. It will be remembered that when Susīma queried the monks who had announced their attainment of arahantship to the Buddha, they denied possessing the super-knowledges and formless emancipations. Susīma thereupon asked them, “Here now, venerable ones, this answer and the non-attainment of those states: how could this be, friends?”⁵⁵ By way of explanation, the monks answered: “We are liberated by wisdom.” Now later in the discourse, Susīma winds up in a position parallel to the monks of this group. The Buddha has questioned Susīma about the arising and cessation aspects of dependent origination and gotten him to affirm that he sees all these links. To see all the links, “to know and see them thus” (*evaµµañanto evaµµ passanto*), is the mark of one who has made the breakthrough to the Dhamma, who is at least a stream-enterer. The Buddha then asks Susīma whether he possesses the super-knowledges and formless emancipations. When Susīma denies having attained them, the Buddha asks him, “Here now, Susīma, this answer and the non-attainment of those states: how could this be, Susīma?”⁵⁶ Based on the analogy between Susīma and the monks in the first part of the *sutta*, we might well expect Susīma to say, “I am liberated by wisdom.” To our disappointment, however, Susīma does not answer; rather, as we have

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⁵⁵See n. 1.

⁵⁶See n. 13.
seen, he prostrates himself before the Buddha and confesses his transgression in taking ordination as a thief of Dhamma.

Despite the silence on this point, the parallelism the text draws between Susīma and the group of wisdom-liberated monks might readily be understood to imply that Susīma himself had become a wisdom-liberated arahant. Nevertheless, this is not stated explicitly, and that is what leaves the stamp of mystery on the discourse. Did Susīma attain anything at all, and if so, what did he attain? Generally, whenever the Nikāyas want to assign the attainment of arahantship to a monk listening to a discourse, they do not hesitate to state, “While this discourse was being expounded, that bhikkhu’s mind was liberated from the influxes by non-clinging.”

Or, in the case of a lower attainment, it is said, “While this discourse was being expounded, in that bhikkhu the dust-free, stainless Dhamma-eye arose.” Since the Susīma-sutta places Susīma in a position analogous to the wisdom-liberated monks, but makes no assertion about him realizing any attainment, his final status is unclear. On the one hand, if nothing is said about an attainment, the general rule would prescribe that we understand the listener had not achieved anything. On the other, if Susīma affirms that he sees the connections between all the links of dependent origination, this suggests that he is at least a stream-enterer. And if, further, he is placed in a position parallel to the wisdom-liberated monks, a position from which

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57 e.g., at S IV 20,26 28, it is said of the thousand bhikkhus who heard the Ādittaparīṭṭha-sutta: imasmiḥ ca pana veyyakaraṇasmiṁ bhāṃhāmāne tassa bhikkhusahassassa anupādaya āsavehi cittāni vimuccīṃsu.

58 e.g., at S V 423,13 16, it is said of Koṇḍañña during the Buddha’s first sermon: imasmiḥ ca pana veyyakaraṇasmiṁ bhāṃhāmāne āyasmato Koṇḍaññassa virajam viṭṭamalaṁ dharmacakkhun adapādi: “yaṁ kiṁci samudaya-dhamman, sabbaṁ taṁ nirodhadhamman” ti. It is interesting to note that in all the Chinese Agamas as well as independent suttas stemming from the early Buddhist schools, no text on the “eye of Dhamma” has a line corresponding to Pāli yaṁ kiṁci samudaya-dhamman, sabbaṁ taṁ nirodhadhamman. This strongly suggests that this line was added by the redactors of the Pāli school after the schools had gone their separate ways.
he can be expected to understand how arahantship is possible without
the super-knowledges and formless meditations (and if we follow the
commentary, even without the jhānas), this seems to suggest that he
himself had reached nothing short of arahantship.

It was thus natural that teachers and commentators, probably
already in the age of oral transmission, should attempt to resolve the
ambiguity by assigning to Susima some transcendent stature, either the
gain of the Dhamma-eye or the realization of arahantship. In the school
that preserved its texts in the language we call Pāli, this originally oral
opinion would then have been set down in writing in the ancient
commentary preserved in Sri Lanka. When Buddhaghosa accepted
the opinion found in this commentary, that Susima attained arahantship,
and planted it into the Pāli commentary that he wrote on the Saññīta-
nikāya, the opinion became hallowed Theravādin orthodoxy.

Now, in my understanding (which, I admit, is purely speculative),
while the transmitters of the Pāli discourse may have been reluctant to
state explicitly, in the text itself, that Susima had attained arahantship,
they did subtly alter the sutta in a way intended to buttress this ascrip-
tion in its commentary. They did so by inserting into the text the
passage on insight into the three characteristics with its concluding
“disenchantment–dispassion–liberation sequence”: “Seeing thus, the
noble disciple becomes disenchanted with form, feeling, perception,
volitional activities, and consciousness. Through disenchantment, he
becomes dispassionate. Through dispassion his mind is liberated.”59

The question might be raised: “How does the inclusion of this
passage support the ascription of arahantship to Susima?” By way of an
answer, we should note an important difference, in the Nikāyas (and
presumably the Āgamas), between the respective roles that dependent
origination and the three characteristics play in the spiritual evolution
of the disciple. Both are domains of “wisdom” (paññā), but they are not
interchangeable. Direct knowledge of dependent origination is the

59S II 24–27. For the Pāli, see n. 11 above.
wisdom specifically assigned to one with the status of a *sekha*, a disciple at one of the lower stages of awakening who must still train further to reach the final stage of arahantship. In contrast, the knowledge of the three characteristics, especially when culminating in the disenchantment-dispassion-liberation sequence, is often presented as a prelude to the realization of arahantship.

If we peruse the Nikāyas, we would not find a single *sutta* in which the wisdom that perceives dependent origination becomes the triggering event for the attainment of arahantship. One might think this happened in the case of the Buddha’s own attainment of enlightenment, as described at S 12.4–10 (S II 5–11). However, the Dīgha-nikāya account of the Buddha Vipassī’s enlightenment makes a subtle but important distinction. Vipassī first attains “the eye, the knowledge, the wisdom, the true knowledge, the light” by which he sees dependent origination, first with respect to arising and then with respect to cessation. Even after contemplating the cessation series, however, he is still a bodhisatta. He has discovered the path to enlightenment, but he has not yet walked the path to its goal; his mind is not yet liberated from the influxes and thus he cannot claim to have reached supreme enlightenment. The *sutta* continues: “Some time later the bodhisatta Vipassī dwelled contemplating rise and vanishing in the five clinging aggregates…. As he dwelled thus, before long, by non-clinging, his mind was liberated from the influxes.” This passage thus makes Vipassī’s

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60 At D II 33.5-8, 35.10–13.
61 D II 35.14 24: atha kho, bhikkhave, Vipassi bodhisatto aparena samayena pañcaśu upādānakkhandhesu udayabbayānapassī vihāsi ... tassa pañcāya upādānakkhandhesu udayabbayānapassino viharato na cīrass’ eva anupādāya āsavehi cittam vimuccī ti. It is interesting to see that the Chinese Tripiṭaka has a parallel to this passage in an independent translation, the Vipāṣyin Buddha Sūtra (毘婆尸佛經). Here, the bodhisattva Vipāṣyin first contemplates dependent origination by way of arising and cessation. Then, at T I 156.b19 22, it is said that he contemplates the five aggregates by way of their arising, cessation, and evanescence, as a result of which “through direct
attainment of complete enlightenment (and by implication the complete enlightenment of all Buddhas) consequent upon insight into the arising and vanishing of the five aggregates; in other words, upon the insight into impermanence, the first of the three characteristics.

In the Nikāyas and Āgamas, dependent origination serves as the portal to the first breakthrough to the Dhamma. We see, for example, that in the story of the enlightenment of the seven Buddhas each makes his initial discovery of the Dhamma through careful consideration (yoniso manasikāra) of dependent origination.62 Again, the wanderer Upatissa, better known as Sāriputta, gained the eye of Dhamma when he heard from the arahant Assaji the famous four-line stanza which states in abstract terms the principle of causal origination.63 Several suttas in the Nidāna-samyutta assert that direct perception of dependent origination is the distinctive knowledge and vision of the trainee (sekha), of one “who has entered the stream of the Dhamma … who stands squarely before the door to the Deathless”.64

In the original version of the Susima-sutta, as I would reconstruct it, the Buddha’s catechism is intended to show how deep understanding of dependent origination in its sequence of arising — “the knowledge of the persistence of principles” — precedes “the knowledge of nibbāna”. This latter is the world-transcending breakthrough to a vision of the cessation of dependent origination which bestows upon the disciple a trainee’s right view of the essential Dhamma, the four noble truths. From this platform of experientially knowing all four truths, the trainee has to develop insight further until he or she reaches “the exhaustion of the influxes”, namely, arahantship. This comes about, not simply by

realization, all his karma, habits, and defilements no longer arose. He attained great liberation and accomplished supreme perfect enlightenment”.

62S II 5–11; see too D II 31–34.
63Vin I 40,28–29.
64S II 58,24–25: dhammasotaṃ samāpanno iti pi … amataadvāraṃ āhacca tiṭṭhati iti pi.
reviewing dependent origination, but by stopping the process of origination through disenchantment (nibbidā) and dispassion (virāga).

Whereas teachings on dependent origination generally culminate in gaining the eye of Dhamma, that is, in one of the three lower stages of awakening, contemplation of the three characteristics leads more incisively to disenchantment and dispassion and thence to the full liberation of arahantship. While a discourse including the sequence of disenchantment, dispassion, and liberation is occasionally shown to terminate in the mere gaining of the Dhamma-eye, more typically it is followed by the attainment of arahantship. Conversely, the attainment of arahantship is generally shown to follow from an exposition of the three characteristics, particularly when this leads into the disenchantment-dispassion-liberation sequence. The disciple at the stage of trainee (sekha) contemplates all dependently arisen phenomena as impermanent, bound up with suffering, and non-self. He then pursues this insight until it brings disenchantment (nibbidā) and dispassion (virāga), as a consequence of which the mind abandons clinging and is liberated from the influxes (anupādāya cittan āsavehi vimuccati).

I would conjecture that the custodians of the Saṅyutta-nikāya, probably during the age of oral transmission, interpolated the catechism on the three characteristics specifically to support the case for imputing the attainment of arahantship to Susīma. In contrast, the versions of the Susīma story in M-Vin and in the earlier part of SĀ 347, up to the final sentence, remain faithful to the exegetical principle underlying the archaic teaching, that direct knowledge of dependent origination is the

65 Using the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana CD, I have done a global search through the Nikāyas on the expressions anupādāya āsavehi cittāni vimucc* and anupādāya āsavehi cittan vimucc*, seeking to find out how they correlate with the attainments reached by listeners to a discourse. A tabulation of my results might be the subject for a separate paper, but I can state briefly that whereas these expressions never occur in conjunction with discourses on dependent origination, they do occur quite often following discourses on the three characteristics, or one of the three characteristics, especially when the teaching culminates in the sequence of nibbidā, virāga, and vimutti.
special domain of a trainee. Hence these two versions, up to the conclusion of SĀ 347, hold that as a result of the Buddha’s questionnaire on dependent origination, Susima gained the eye of Dhamma, the wisdom of a trainee.

These two versions, moreover, seem to uphold the two aspects of dependent origination, the aspects of arising and of cessation, as the key for understanding the two types of knowledge mentioned by the Buddha, no matter whether those knowledges are designated with M Vin as “knowledge of the principle” and “inferential knowledge” or with SĀ 347 as “knowledge of the persistence of principles” and “knowledge of nibbāna”. The Śāratthappakāsini, the Samyutta commentary, further falls in line with this interpretation when, in commenting on the expression dhammaḥthitiḥāna as it occurs in S 12:34, it calls this knowledge of the principle of conditionality.66

When, however, the Śāratthappakāsini comes to S 12:70, the Susima-sutta itself, it proposes an alternative interpretation of these two knowledges that differs markedly from the other versions. The commentary states, “‘Knowledge of the persistence of principles’ is insight knowledge, which arises first. ‘Knowledge of nibbāna’ is path knowledge, which arises at the end of the course of insight.”67 The Samyutta-tīkā, or subcommentary, clarifies the meaning of this: “The ‘persistence of principles’ is the nature of phenomena as impermanent, suffering, and non-self. The knowledge of this is ‘knowledge of the persistence of principles.’ This is what he [the commentator] calls ‘insight knowledge’.”68

66See above, p. 23.

67Spk II 127; dhammaḥthitiḥāna ti vipassanāññāna, taṁ paṭhamataram uppaññati. nibbāne ṇāṇan ti vipassanāya cīṇante pavattamagghānaṁ, taṁ pacchā uppaññati.

68Sp-kpt II 106 (VRI ed.): dhammaṁ naṁ ṭhitat taṁsabhāvataṁ dhammaḥthiti, aniccadukkhānattatā, tattha ṇāṇan dhammaḥthitiḥānaṁ ti aha ‘vipassanāññāna’ ti. The author may have based this explanation on A I 285, which applies the term dhammaḥthitāt to each of the three characteristics.
When the Susīma-sutta states that “the knowledge of the persistence of principles” precedes “the knowledge of nibbāna”, the intention may well have been the same as that of the other versions, namely, that knowledge of the arising sequence of dependent origination precedes knowledge of the cessation sequence. Its commentary, however, takes this to be a statement to the effect that insight knowledge precedes the arising of the transcendent path. In the exegetical scheme of the Pāli commentaries, insight knowledge means direct insight into the five aggregates (or twelve sense bases, or eighteen elements) by way of the three characteristics; path knowledge supervenes on this and takes nibbāna as its object. From the commentarial standpoint, therefore, “the knowledge of the persistence of principles” is to be situated in the catechism on the three characteristics of the five aggregates; the knowledge of nibbāna, presumably, is referred to by the statement about the disciple gaining dispassion (virāga) and liberation (vimutti).

On account of the interpolation of the catechism on the three characteristics, the exact meaning of dhamma††hitiñā in the original text has become obscure. When we read the text in the light of its commentary, which identifies “knowledge of the persistence of principles” with insight into the three characteristics and (presumably) “knowledge of nibbāna” with the culminating events of dispassion (virāga) and liberation (vimutti), the questionnaire on dependent origination seems to be left hanging in limbo. Since the discussion on the three characteristics, culminating in dispassion and liberation, brings the noble disciple to arahantship, the questionnaire becomes almost superfluous, without a determinate purpose. In fact, the Sāratthappakāsini, in

69Elsewhere the commentaries identify dispassion (virāga) with the world-transcending path, and liberation (vimutti) with fruition; both are types of knowledge taking nibbāna as object. For example, Ps II 115: ettha virāgo ti maggo virāgā vimuccati ti ettha virāgena maggena vimuccati ti phalaṃ kathitaṃ. Spk II 53, commenting on virāga and vimutti, says: vimutti ti arahatta phalavimutti,... virāgo ti maggo.
glossing the passage on dependent origination, says that this is brought in as a way of interrogating Susima about his attainment.\textsuperscript{70}

If, however, the three-characteristics catechism is deleted, the questionnaire on dependent origination serves a clear purpose, elucidating the meaning of the two knowledges: the series on dependent origination in its aspect of arising brings out the meaning of dhammas̃ṭhitiiñāna; the series on dependent origination in its aspect of cessation brings out the meaning of nibbāneñā. One first (\textit{pubbe}) arrives at the knowledge of how saṁsāric phenomena originate from their respective conditions. One follows the chain of conditions back to ignorance, just as the Buddha did on the night of his enlightenment, and then \textit{afterwards} (\textit{pacchā}), when this knowledge comes to maturity, one makes the breakthrough to the knowledge of nibbāna. As a consequence of this one sees how, with the cessation of ignorance, all the phenomena linked together in the series are made to cease. This is the dual knowledge of the trainee, which enables him to understand how arahantship is possible without attainment of the super-knowledges and formless emancipations (in S 12:70 and M-Vin) or even without the four \textit{jhānas} (in SĀ 347, Vibhāṣa, and the Saṁyutta commentary).

\textbf{6. Conclusion}

Some of the more speculative views I have advanced in this paper (and its predecessor) are admittedly conjectural and cannot be supported with “hard evidence”. Their appeal is necessarily to intuition, but I believe I have presented enough cogent reasoning to show that these intuitions merit serious consideration. By proffering such views, I do not intend in any way to suggest that all differences between the variant versions of a discourse among the early Buddhist schools reflect differences in doctrine. Many of their differences, probably the great majority, were probably due simply to chance variations in the process

\textsuperscript{70}Spk II 127: \textit{idāni 'ssa anuyogaṁ āropento jātipaccayā jāramaraṇan ti, Susima, passasi ti ādim āha.}
of oral transmission. However, there are several important instances in which the variations in the parallel versions of a discourse preserved by different schools are too pointed to be put down to chance. In my opinion, it makes better sense to see them as reflecting doctrinal pressures — differences in points of emphasis and understanding — that shaped the formulation of the text in the course of its transmission in different early Buddhist communities. To advance our understanding of early Buddhism, particularly in the transitional phase from archaic to

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sectarian Buddhism, it is fruitful to peruse the texts closely for examples of variant versions that reflect different viewpoints shaping the doctrinal agendas of the schools. I believe that the Susima-sutta, read against its counterparts in the other schools, provides a fertile example of this.

To summarize my comparative study of the Susima-sutta and its parallels in both my earlier paper (“The Susima-sutta and the Wisdom-Liberated Arahant”) and this one, I have prepared a table (p. 42) that highlights the differences between the several versions, which are listed in the first column.

The second column refers back to my earlier paper. It lists the attainments that the paññāvimutta arahant lacks, as revealed in the different versions by the questions that Susima asks the monks who declared arahantship to the Buddha. In the Pâli version, S 12:70, Susima asks about the five “mundane” super-knowledges and the peaceful formless emancipations, which the monks deny possessing. M-Vin closely resembles the Pâli version, except that here Susima asks the monks only about the knowledge of the passing away and rebirth of beings, the recollection of their own past lives, and the formless emancipations; again, the monks deny possessing these. In both these versions, Susima does not inquire from these monks whether or not they possess the four jhānas, and it remains perplexing why the sutta does not touch on this question. This is particularly curious in view of several canonical texts (in the Pâli Nikāyas) that contrast a practitioner who takes the “pleasant route” of the four jhānas with one who takes the “painful (or strenuous) route” of such meditations as the unattractive nature of the body, the inevitability of death, discontent with the entire world, and so forth.

The version of the Susima story in SĀ 347, the Chinese translation of the Sanyuktāgama, at once catches our attention with the difference in the questions Susima asks the monks. Here, and in the partial replication of this account in Vibhāṣā, Susima asks the monks whether they
attained the exhaustion of the influxes on the basis of the four jhānas and the formless emancipations, which they all deny attaining. They still claim to be “liberated by wisdom”, and thus in this system to be “liberated by wisdom” means to attain arahantship without achievement of the jhānas. The Mahāvibhāṣā admits the old canonical definition of a wisdom-liberated arahant as one who attains liberation without possessing the formless attainments, but it sees possession of the jhānas by a wisdom-liberated arahant to “dilute” the completeness of his liberation by wisdom. The most complete kind of wisdom-liberated arahant is the one who does not achieve any jhānas but gains comprehension of the Dhamma based on a state of concentration called “threshold meditation” (sāmantaka-dhyāna), closely corresponding to the “access concentration” (upacāra-samādhi) of the Theravāda commentarial system.71

If the relationship between the texts merely remained as I have just described it, we could simply dismiss this as a difference between the Theravāda and Mahāsāṅghika systems on the one hand, and the Sarvāstivāda (and possibly Mūlasarvāstivāda) system on the other. However, the relationship between the positions of these schools becomes thorny and convoluted when we discover that the Visuddhimagga and the Pāli commentaries admit a kind of arahant who attains the goal without any attainment of the jhānas. This type is called the sukkhavipassaka, the “dry-insight meditator”. To increase the complexity of the inter-relations among the texts, the Saratthappakāsīnī, the authorized commentary to the Saṃyutta-nikāya, explains the wisdom-liberated arahants of S 12:70 in a way that resembles SĀ 347 and Vibhāṣā. It declares that these monks were dry-insight meditators, as is clear from its gloss on the term paññāvimutta as it occurs in the sutta: “We are without jhāna, dry-insight meditators, liberated simply by wisdom.”72

72Spk II 126–27: mayaṃ nījjhānakā sukhavipassakā paññāmatten’ eva vimuttā.
The fact that the Pāli commentary endorses a position that is closer to Sā 347 and Vibhāṣā than to the actual text of S 12:70 raises the question whether the views circulating in the Sarvāstivāda camp might not have influenced the interpretation proposed in the Theravāda commentary. We cannot answer this question with a definite affirmative, for it is perfectly possible that the two similar interpretations arose independently; but the fact that the Pāli sutta and M-Vin never touch on the issue of whether or not the wisdom-liberated monks possess the jhānas raises a suspicion that the underlying intent of the sutta in all versions is precisely to suggest this possibility. Thus, as I construe it, in its final formulation the sutta is intended to convey the idea that achievement of the jhānas is not indispensable to the attainment of the final goal, arahantship. In the texts with Sarvāstivāda affiliation, which probably achieved their final literary form somewhat later than the Pāli version, this idea was admitted into the sutta itself. In the Pāli version, due perhaps to textual conservatism, this idea was not stated explicitly but was hinted at by silence regarding the jhāna attainments of the monks questioned by Susīma. Explicit expression of this view was reserved for the early commentators, whose opinion eventually passed into the Sāratthapakāśini, the official Mahāvihāra commentary on the Saṃyutta-nikāya composed by Buddhaghosa.

The third column lists the two kinds of knowledge with which the Buddha answers Susīma when the latter questions him about the possibility of paññāvimutta arahantship. From this list we can see that all the versions except M-Vin agree that the names of the two knowledges are “knowledge of the persistence of principles” (dhammaññāthitiñā, 法住智) and “knowledge of nibbāna” (nibbāneññā, 涅槃智). M-Vin has instead two knowledges, 法智 and 比智, that correspond to Pāli dhammeññā and anvayeññā. These two knowledges also occur in relation to dependent origination at S 12:33, where they are respectively defined as knowledge of the conditional relationships with regard to the present time (= dhammeññā) and knowledge of the conditional relationships with regard to the past and future (= anvayeññā). It is quite
likely that the reading of the two knowledges in S 12:70 and SĀ 347 is the more original one. The preservers of the Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya might have borrowed the alternative pair of knowledges from a sūtra in their own collection corresponding to S 12:33. It is possible this change came about through a Sarvāstivādin influence; for in the Sarvāstivāda presentation of the path of realization, the two knowledges, dharma-jñāna and anvaya-jñāna, play a major role. Though the names are the Sanskrit equivalents of those found in S 12:33, they were given new meanings as determined by the Sarvāstivāda account of the path. This system had been adopted by other schools, and it is possible that the Mahāsāṅghikas, either through accidental copyists’ error or by deliberate choice, adopted the names of those knowledges for their Vinaya version of the Susīma story, dropping the names of the older pair of knowledges.

To understand the two knowledges shared by S 12:70 and SĀ 347 — “knowledge of the persistence of principles” (dhammaṭṭhitiñāna) and “knowledge of nibbāna” (nibbāne ṃañña) — I collated the different versions of the Susīma story and also consulted the explanations of them found in Vibhāṣā. Read together, these texts give us firm ground for identifying the two knowledges as direct knowledge respectively of the arising and cessation aspects of dependent origination. However, in the discussion that occurs between Susīma and the Buddha, S 12:70 includes a passage not found in the other versions. This is a catechism on the three characteristics of the five aggregates — impermanence, suffering, and selflessness — which culminates in the disciple becoming disenchanted, gaining dispassion, and becoming liberated. The Sāratthappakāsīni dissents from the apparent meaning of all versions (a meaning made explicit in Vibhāṣā) by interpreting “knowledge of the persistence of principles” as knowledge of the three characteristics and “knowledge of nibbāna” as the world-transcending path, which (based on a standard commentarial gloss) is presumably to be identified with the occasion of dispassion (virāga) in the “disenchantment-dispassion-liberation” sequence.
I noted that because this catechism on the three characteristics is not found in any of the other versions of the Susima story, it is almost certainly an interpolation. I also pointed out that because it appropriates the “knowledge of the persistence of principles” for knowledge of the three characteristics, the commentary leaves the questionnaire on dependent origination hanging in suspension almost like a vestigial organ. These considerations lead us to believe the versions that omit the “three-characteristics catechism” are more archaic in this respect.

The last column lists the attainments reached by Susima in the different versions of the story. Such a comparison, I held, may give us some insight into the motivation of the Pāli transmitters in incorporating the discussion on the three characteristics into their version of the sutta. We saw that S 12:70 does not ascribe any transcendent attainment to Susima. In contrast, M-Vin shows him gaining the “eye of Dhamma”, which would make him a noble disciple at one of the three lower stages of awakening. SĀ 347 shows him first gain the eye of Dhamma and then, at the end of the discourse, attain arahantship.

Now even though the Pāli sutta does not assign any transcendent attainment to Susima, the Sāratthappakāsini, commenting on the sutta, states that he attained arahantship during the catechism on the three characteristics. We thus find here another remarkable convergence between SĀ 347 and the position taken in the Pāli commentary. Just above, we saw that SĀ 347 explicitly states that the wisdom-liberated arahants questioned by Susima claimed to have attained arahantship without the jhānas, a position adopted by the Saµyutta commentary though not evident in the text of S 12:70 itself. Similarly, we see here that both SĀ 347 and the Saµyutta commentary attribute to Susima the attainment of arahantship, while the Pāli sutta itself remains silent about such an attainment. I surmise that the passage on the three characteristics was spliced in precisely to justify commentators and teachers (probably during the early formative stage of the commentaries) in their opinion that Susima attained arahantship. This was done because the “three-characteristics” catechism, especially when it culminates in the
“disenchantment-dispassion-liberation” sequence, is typically connected in the suttas with the attainment of arahantship, while insight into dependent origination does not play such a role.

If my suppositions and speculations are correct, the several versions of this Susima story available to us illustrate how chance variations due to oral transmission (mostly in the narrative) and subtle pressures imposed by emerging doctrinal interpretations (at key points in the dialogues) worked in unison to transform a text constructed from a simple plot and a simple script in different directions among the early Buddhist schools. Far more work is still needed in comparative study of the suttas to see how these texts may reveal traces of subtle doctrinal tendencies that came to clear articulation only in the early Abhidharma, the commentaries, and the mature philosophical systems. But comparison between the Susima-sutta and its parallels serves as an example of how such studies can be fruitful.

Bhikkhu Bodhi
On Translating Literally

Of the making of translations of the Dhammapada there seems to be no end.

Some years ago, in a review of two translations of the Dhammapada,¹ I guessed that there were forty translations into English. My guess was based on someone else’s earlier guess plus a few more. Gil Fronsdal, the author of the most recent translation of the Dhammapada I have seen,² says there are now well over fifty.³

Why do people make new translations of the Dhammapada? Presumably because they don’t like the existing ones and think they can do better. Very often it is merely the translations of basic words, e.g. saṃsāra or nībāṇa, to which they object, and they sometimes believe that they have made a better translation because they have thought of a different translation of a particular word, without considering whether they have obtained a better grasp of the meaning of the phrase or the sentence as a whole.

What should the aim of a translation be? Clearly the prime aim is to give the meaning of a text in one language in another language, keeping as far as possible in the second language the peculiarities of the first, with poetry appearing as poetry, or verse as verse. Word play, e.g. puns, should be replicated. It would seem that this aim can only be realised by someone who is fully at home in both languages and is, in fact, bilingual. As far as Pāli is concerned, however, there are very few persons, in the West at least, who can claim to be bilingual in English and Pāli, so we must recognise that this ideal is not likely to be attainable.

For anyone proposing to make a translation of a Pāli text, it is, therefore, a simple matter of deciding whether to make a literal

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¹Norman, 1989b.
²Fronsdal, 2005.
³Fronsdal, 2005, p. xi.

translation, or a free one, bearing in mind that one danger about the latter is that the elaboration associated with a free translation can be carried to the point where it is not a translation but an interpretation.

An obituary for the Cambridge classicist Guy Lee\(^4\) gave that eminent translator's views on the subject of translation. It reported that, by the time his English version of Ovid's *Amores* was reprinted as *Ovid in Love*, thirty-two years after its first publication, his ideas on translation had turned round, and he had decided to reject his early free translation. Over the years he had worked round to an exactly opposite view of what translation should be. It had become clear to him that Greek and Latin would eventually have to be taught in translation, as the Hebrew Bible had been taught since the sixteenth century. So what was needed, he believed, was close translation, as literal as possible, and Greek and Latin poetry should be treated by the translator as sacred text.

The parallel with Pāli is not hard to see.

Faced with the possibilities of making a free or a literal translation, in my own translations of the Theragāthā, Therīgāthā, Sutta-nipāta, and Dhammapada I have aimed to produce a literal, almost word-for-word, prose translation because this seemed to me to be the best way in which to convey my understanding of the Pāli. I stated\(^5\) that my decision to make prose translations of verse texts arose from my feeling that the verse form in English is properly the province of poets, and no-one should try to write poetry unless he is a poet. A translation made into poor poetry may well persuade the reader that the original text is equally bad poetry.

In some places, however, my decision resulted in a starkness and austerity of words which bordered upon the ungrammatical in English, but my aim was to make clear to readers, if they considered my translation alongside the original, the way in which I understood the authors' words.\(^6\)

\(^4\) *The Times*, Wednesday, 10 August 2005, p. 54.
My aim has been in the main overlooked by critics, with the result that they have concentrated their criticism on the literalness of my works. One web site, for example, states of *The Elders' Verses* I and II: “Both this translation and the preceding one are so literal as to lose the poetic flavor of the original, but no reliable alternative translations are available.” The reference to poetic flavour suggests that the author of the assessment had not noted my comment.

Of *The Rhinoceros Horn and Other Early Buddhist Poems* (*Sutta-Nipāta*) it states, “Again, extremely literal, but there are no other reliable (and plenty of unreliable) translations available.” Of *The Word of the Doctrine* it states, “[This] is not recommended, as it takes the principle of literalness to ludicrous extremes.” It is interesting to note that, despite this condemnation, no better translation is suggested. A Google search shows how common this combination of the words “literal” and “ludicrous” is in reviews and assessments — probably helped by the alliteration.

One reviewer, however, has possibly realised what I was trying to do. He wrote of my translation of the Sutta-nipāta (*The Group of Discourses*): “Probably, however, what Norman provides is not so much a translation as a resource for scholars and future translators. For this purpose it is excellent.” I welcome this assessment, and I am very happy to think that my efforts are in fact thought capable of serving this purpose. I am reminded of the sub-title which Alfred Edward Housman, the poet and Latin scholar, added to his edition of the work of the Roman author Lucan: *in usum editorum* “For the use of editors”, and I am very proud that my work has been judged worthy of being put in a similar category to his, although I would hesitate to print “For the use of translators” on the title page of any of my translations.

\[\text{here-and-now.org/buddrel/netbiblio.html.}\]

\[\text{Cousins, 1994, pp. 291–92.}\]
We should, however, not lose sight of comments about literal translations which have been made by two scholars whose views are not to be disregarded:

I noted Professor Gombrich’s stricture about literal translations in an article on the subject of the translation of Pāli texts into English, which I wrote more than twenty years ago.

He wrote: “The so-called literal translation — an intellectual fallacy and an aesthetic monstrosity — is still widespread; and in our examining we demand good style in Sanskrit prose but rarely in English. Yet in translation there is no clear dividing line between form and content. If our published translations from Sanskrit literature are little read, that may be because few of them deserve to be. Accuracy is a sine qua non, but so is taste.” Despite this attractive mingling of two clichés (see Google for the prevalence of both), Gombrich did not in fact define “literal”, and gave no examples of the type of translation he was condemning.

Elsewhere he was more explicit, and describing Bailey’s “translation” from the Khotanese he commented, “[It is] alas so literal and so full of foreign words that it hardly reads as English.” He also drew attention to Conze’s use of the word “non-attainmentness” and stated, “The work of these great scholars, who would surely castigate any lapse from Tibetan or Sanskrit idiom in others or in themselves, makes me wonder yet again why it is that in our field English style is held of no account.”

Dr Margaret Cone has written, “Another inheritance [from our predecessors] is the ‘literal’ translation. A literal translation is not a translation, because the meaning of a Pāli word or passage has not been expressed in English. For particular words, one English equivalent is chosen as the basic meaning, and that English word is used in all contexts.” She gave an example of the type of translation she was

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9Norman, 1984, p. 83.
10Gombrich, 1978, p. 27.
condemning: “Throughout a whole text, Miss Horner’s translations furnish good examples of literalness (not always even accurate) which produces at times incomprehensibility (e.g. ‘state of further-men’ to translate *uttarimanaussadhamma*). Did such translators ever ask, ‘What would an Indian hearer have understood from this passage? What indeed is the Buddha’s concern here, what problem is he addressing, what is he saying?’”

In view of such comments about literalness, it is interesting to note that a great deal is made of the literalness of Gil Fronsdal’s translation of the Dhammapada.

In his Preface (pp. xii–xiii) the author states, “A translator often has to strike a balance between literal but clumsy language and elegant but inaccurate language. I have tried to be as literal as possible while keeping the text both readable and enjoyable. Still, no one can make a completely literal translation, completely free of bias, of a text from a distant culture and a very different language. … In this translation I have tried to put aside my own interpretations and preferences, insofar as possible, in favor of accuracy. In attempting a literal translation, I am trying to understand early Buddhism in its own terms so I can better evaluate our modern versions of Buddhism.”

In the Foreword to this new translation Jack Kornfield states, “This new translation is both carefully and honorably literal and beautifully modern.” The blurb on the dust jacket claims: “It is the first truly accurate and highly readable translation of this text to be published in English.” It would be interesting to know who read all the fifty translations which Fronsdal says have been made of the Dhammapada, and was able to state that this one is the first truly accurate one, while “highly readable” is so subjective as to be unprovable.

We might note, in passing, the way in which such terms as “accurate” and “readable” are used elsewhere of translations of other

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13 Fronsdal, 2005.
texts. For example, we might compare the blurb on the ninth impression (1983) of the paperback edition of The New International Version of the Holy Bible: “So elegantly stated, so faithfully accurate” and “a balanced scholarly, eminently readable bible, providing the most exact, illuminating rendering of the original languages into English”. Once again, one can only wonder at the use of the phrases “faithfully accurate” and “most exact”. One begins to get the impression that the words “readable” and “accurate” are essential features in any description of a translation.

In view of the rather lavish praise bestowed upon it, it might be useful to discuss a few points in Fronsdal’s translation, to see how far it is justified. We should, perhaps, start with two points on which he challenges his own aim of literalness: the use of the masculine and feminine, and the translation of the word dhamma.

(a) He does not always observe a distinction between genders. It is obvious that if we have a third person verb, e.g. gacchati, with no subject expressed, then it can mean “he/she/it goes”. Fronsdal makes much of such potential masculine/feminine mixing. He states (p. xiv) that not only does he use the plural person to make the text a little more gender neutral than the original, but he also uses male and female pronouns more or less randomly. He justifies this by saying (p. 139) that the term bhikkhu includes both male and female. He gives no canonical authority for this statement, but says, without references, “The ancient Theravāda commentaries state that anyone engaged in Buddhist meditation practice, whether man or woman, can be called a bhikkhu.” Consequently he arbitrarily inserts “her/she” where there is no suggestion of a feminine gender in the text (“she” vv. 3–4, 17–18; “her” v. 63; “herself” vv. 103, 106). It is particularly disconcerting when there is a juxtaposition or dichotomy, and he translates “he” in v. 3 when hatred does not end and “she” in v. 4 when it does, giving the impression that the ending or non-ending of hatred depends upon gender. Scarcely less confusing is the way the sage (apaññī) will watch over herself in v. 157, but will establish himself in what is proper in v. 158.
My own feeling is that in general statements “he” is gender inclusive, e.g. “he who hesitates is lost” is not restricted to male persons. It is one of the deficiencies of the English language that there is no common all-gender third person pronoun for the singular, as there is “they/them” for the plural, so to emphasise that something refers to male or female we have to say “he or she”, but it is possible to overcome this to a large extent by using “one”, “anyone”, or “someone”, e.g. “one” or “anyone” who hesitates is lost, followed (if necessary) by “they”: “if someone hesitates, then they are lost”, or “Whoever hesitates is lost”. On the other hand, I regard “she” as gender exclusive and I would suppose that any general statement including a feminine noun or pronoun was restricted to female persons. To find that, as the reverse of this, Fronsdal actually translates itthiā in v. 242 as “people”, with a note on p. 132 justifying this, is disconcerting, since I know of no support for the view that Pāli itthi or Skt strī ever means anything other than “woman”.

In his treatment of the Pāli word Dhamma, Fronsdal is inconsistent in a number of ways, which makes for confusion for the reader. He leaves Dhamma untranslated in v. 217, but translates it into Skt Dharma in vv. 44–45, 79, 82, 86, 102, 168–69, 205, which he justifies (p. xiv) on the grounds that in that form the term has begun to take its place in the lexicon of the English-speaking world and because untranslated it better retains the multivalent meanings of the original — which is unlikely to make the meaning any clearer to readers who do not have access to the dictionary to which he refers and cannot therefore see how it is defined there. On p. 115 (ad vv. 1–2) and on p. 122 (ad vv. 84, 87) he writes dhamma. Of the title Dhamma††ha of section 19 he uses Dharma in the note on p. 132, and translates “The Just”, while giving “established in the Dharma”, “firm in the Dharma”, and “righteous” as alternatives.

On p. 122 (ad v. 84) he states, “Because dhamma has a broader meaning than just ‘truth’, perhaps the term should be left untranslated.” One might have thought that a multiplicity of meanings would have
more than justified a multiplicity of translations for all the different usages. He touches on the problem in the Preface (p. xiii): “Dhamma can mean, among other things, religious teachings, religious truth, justice and virtue.” He comments: “Probably the most debatable choice [of translation] will be my translation of dhamma as ‘experience’ in the opening two verses”, but more often than not he does not give a translation of the word, although there would be no difficulty in doing so. In EV I in the note ad Th 2, I explained the various translations I had adopted for what I considered to be the nine different meanings of dhamma found in that text.\footnote{Norman, 2007a, p. 130.} I did the same for my own translation of the Dhammapada in the note ad Dhp 20.\footnote{Norman, 1997, pp. 66–67.} Not surprisingly, the most common meaning in the Dhammapada is “doctrine” (teachings, law, rule), because the majority of verses containing the word have been selected as being appropriate to the title Dhammapada.

It is not always clear what exactly Fronsdal has in mind when he writes about “literal” meanings. I assume that he means the etymological meaning. If we look at the word dharma from an etymological point of view, then we can say that since the basic meanings of the root dh are “bear, hold, carry” the literal meaning of dharma is “the thing that bears, holds, carries”. This is seen in the older form of the word dharman “bearer, supporter, arranger” and the adjective dhara “bearing, supporting, carrying”, cf. dharami “the bearing thing”, i.e. “earth”. Dharma is therefore something like “support, foundation”, and we can see the various developments of this, depending on the field in which it is used. Thus when used of religion or government it means “doctrine, law, teachings, rules”, and of a philosophical system “characteristics, [mental] phenomena, states, things”.

Fronsdal draws attention to the literalness of his translation and yet in more than twenty-five places he gives in the notes an alternative translation which he states is literal or more literal than the one he has given. It is worthwhile looking at some of these and also at some of his
other notes on his translations.

p. 115 (title of Chapter 1): he translates *Yamaka* as “dichotomies” rather than the expected “pairs”. This seems rather strange. We don’t normally talk of husband and wife as a dichotomy. If we want to emphasise the particular nature of the pairs then we could translate as “pairs of opposites”.

p. 116 (ad v. 6): he comments on the word *yamāmase*, “Or, if read *yama-amase*, it may …”. If he is suggesting that we are to understand that there is reference to the god Yama here, then the word could be divided up as *Yam’* (or *Yamaṃ*) *āmase*, but *āmase* would be meaningless and we should have to postulate something like *emase* “we go”, for which there is no manuscript support. It is perhaps worth pointing out that the parallel verse in the Patna Dharmapada (254) reads *jayāmatha* and that in the Udānavarga (14.8) reads *udyamāmahe*, where a similar word division is, of course, not possible.

p. 117 (ad vv. 17–18): he states that *duggatim/sugatim gato* “literally means gone to a bad/good destination”. He translates *duggatim* as “realms of woe” in v. 17, and “states of woe” in v. 240, but “bad rebirth” in vv. 316–18. He translates *sugatim gato* as “reborn in realms of bliss” in v. 18, but as “goes to a good rebirth” in v. 319. These and other variations in translation may well prove confusing to readers. To explain *duggati* and *sugati* it might have been helpful to have given the list of five *gatis* listed at Dhp-a IV 226.5–7: *niraya*, *tiracchāṇayoni*, *pettivisaya*, *manussaloka* and *devaloka* (hell, birth as an animal, the realm of spirits, the world of men, and the world of gods). Of these the first three are *duggati* and the last two *sugati*. This makes it clear that some of his translations are what might be called “poetic elaborations”. We may deduce that *sugata* is someone who has attained a *sugati*, and the translations “well-gone one” in v. 285 and “well-gone” in v. 419 rather obscure this.

p. 117 (ad v. 21): he translates *amata* as “The Deathless”. He makes no comment on my translations of the various epithets of *nibbāna*, but translates as follows: p. 117 (ad vv. 21, 114): *amata*
“deathless”; p. 123 (ad vv. 97, 153–54): akata “unmade”; p. 137 (ad v. 323): agata “not gone to”. His translation of agata follows the commentary but it is a debatable explanation, since it seems to imply a passive sense of gata. I have suggested that it means “without gati” (cf. agati as an epithet of nibbāna), i.e. (a place) where there is no rebirth in one of the gatis, just as the other negatives applied to nibbāna, e.g. ajara, amata, ajāta, abhūta, akata, akālika, etc., mean “without old age, i.e. where there is no old age”, etc. 17

p. 118 (ad v. 23): he does not mention the fact that yogakkhema can also be a dvandva compound, 18 and can mean “toil and rest”.

p. 122 (ad v. 83): as he says, the editions vary between cajanti and vajanti. This represents a c/v variation in the Pāli tradition, which is very ancient. The commentary explains by vijahanti, 19 showing that the tradition which Buddhaghosa was following read cajanti. In Hinüber and Norman, 1994, we read vajanti, being influenced in our choice of reading by Udāna-v 30.52 vrajanti, GDhp 226 vivedi, and PDhp 80 bhavanti, of which the second is some centuries older than Dhp-a, although we recognised that Buddhaghosa made use of commentarial material inherited from his predecessors.

p. 122 (ad v. 89): āsava is translated “toxin” with the note that originally it “meant both the intoxicating juice of a plant and the discharge from a sore”. Etymologically the word means “inflowing (< ā-sru) and can be translated as “influx”. The Jains use it in what was probably its original psychological sense of “that by which karman flows in and takes an effect on the soul” but this does not suit the changed Buddhist use of the word. 20

p. 123 (ad vv. 92–93): confusingly, he translates both gati in v. 92 and padaµ in v. 93 as “path”, which masks the fact that in v. 92 there is a pun upon the word gati. When used of birds it means “track”, which

17Norman, 1994, p. 220 (CP VI, pp. 22f.).
18See Norman, 2007A, p. 142 (ad Th 32).
19Dhp-a II 156.
birds do not leave in the sky. Of those who have gained nibbāna it means “rebirth”, which cannot be known, since they have not gone to any place of rebirth. Consequently the skull-tapper Vaṅgisa was unable to say in which gati someone who was parinibbuta was reborn at death in the story at Dhp-a IV 226,5–7 mentioned above in the note on sugati and duggati (p. 117 (ad vv. 17–18)).

p. 123 (ad v. 95): in the Preface (p. xiii) he states that he has chosen to translate samsāra as “wandering”. In this note he states that literally it means “faring on” but, strangely, in his literal translation of the line he leaves it untranslated.

p. 123 (ad vv. 97, 153–54): he translates akata as “unmade”. See the note on p. 117 (ad v. 21) above.

p. 124 (ad v. 114): he states that amatam padam literally means “the deathless state” or “the path to the deathless.” For the meaning “where there is no death” for amata see the note on p. 117 (ad v. 21) above.

p. 127 (ad v. 173): kusala: he gives the translation “wholesome” for kusala, with the comment “[it] is more literally translated as ‘skilful’”. The etymology is by no means certain21 and if MW is a reliable guide it would seem that the earliest attested meaning in Sanskrit is something nearer “good”. This in any case makes a better opposite to “evil” in the context.22

p. 128 (ad v. 184): he translates samana as “contemplative”. He does not consider the possibility of a word play on samana and śramana (cf. p. 132 (ad v. 254)).

p. 130 (title of Chapter 16): “The Dear”. When discussing the meaning of the title (piya < Skt priya) he states that it is derived from the verbal root pr, instead of pri, which suggests that his ideas about etymology are somewhat suspect.

p. 131 (ad v. 235): he states that “door of death” (uyyoga-mukha) is literally “door of departure”. Perhaps “undertaking” would be more

21See Mayrhofer, 1976, s.v. kuśala.
22Cf. Cone, 2007, p. 102, n. 7.
literal. See MW, s.v. udyoga.

p. 131 (ad v. 240): for duggati, translated “states of woe”, see remarks about p. 117 (ad vv. 17–18) above.

p. 132 (ad v. 246): his note on paradāraµ gacchati seems unnecessarily complicated. He translates “Goes to another’s spouse”, which seems to be a perfectly satisfactory literal translation, although he says that it means literally “goes with another’s wife”. I can see no justification for believing that dāraµ is anything other than the accusative case, and can only assume that “goes with” is an Americanism. He adds, “It is possible that dāraµ here refers to any woman who is under the protection of a man (e.g., a daughter living with her father).” The verse is a straightforward condemnation of an adulterous act, and in fact in Skt paradāra has the sense “adultery”,23 and paradāragamana means “committing adultery”. For the vyāhī formation pāra-dārika PED has: “an adulterer, lit. one of another’s wife”, where a word seems to have been omitted. Strangely enough, in his comment on p. 136 (ad vv. 309–10) Fronsdal states: “I have taken the liberty of translating para dārā as “the spouse of another”. It is not clear why translating correctly should be regarded as “taking the liberty”.

p. 133 (ad vv. 268–69): he translates muni as “silent one”, and mona as “silence”. He states, without comment, that munāti means “one weighs”. This statement is doubtless based on the commentarial gloss mināti “measures”. I know of no evidence for this equivalence, but as I have pointed out,24 the cty was probably referring to the idea of tula in v. 268. If we want to preserve the word play on muni and mona, we might think of “a man is not a sage (thinker?)”25 because he is/stays silent as a sage (thinker?)” or “keeps the silence of a sage (thinker?)”.

p. 133 (ad vv. 273–75): he explains that his translation “Gods and humans” is a rendering of dipadānam (two-footed beings), but does not

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23See MW s.v.
25For the derivation of muni from munā- < mnā- < man- “to think, know”; see Norman, 1961, p. 350 (= CP I, pp. 26–28).
say that, rather than his own translation, he is giving the cty’s explanation of the word, which is certainly not a literal rendering.

p. 133 (ad vv. 273–75): readers might well wish for some explanation of the nature of the arrows which have been pulled out and it might have been helpful to quote the commentarial explanation “passion (rāga), etc.”

p. 134 (ad v. 283): there are word plays on vana in this verse, but I doubt that there is one on nibbana and nibbāna, which would entail taking and translating nibbāna as an adjective. The cty gives no hint of such a word play.

p. 135 (ad v. 285): he translates Sugata as “Well-Gone-One” here and as “well-gone” at p. 144 (ad v. 419). See also p. 117 (ad vv. 17–18) above.

p. 135 (ad v. 290): he states that mattā means “‘lesser’; more literally ‘measured’ or ‘moderate’”, although it is not clear how a noun could have these three adjectival meanings. He says, “K.R. Norman believes that the original meaning of mattā was ‘material things,’ and he translates it so.” This might give the impression that I was the first person to give this translation, but anyone consulting MW, to which I refer in my note in WD, will find that “materials, property, goods, household, furniture, money, wealth, substance, livelihood” are widely attested meanings for Sanskrit mātrā.

p. 137 (ad v. 316): he translates duggatām as “bad rebirth”, and states that more literally it means “bad destination” or “bad existence”. See remarks about p. 117 (ad vv. 17–18) above.

p. 137 (ad v. 323): for his translation agata “not gone to”, see the note about p. 117 (ad v. 21) above.

p. 137 (ad v. 326): he states that anukusa(sic)-ggaho literally means “one who handles the goad (of an) elephant driver”, although there seems to be no obvious reason for not translating it simply as “goad-holder”.

p. 138 (ad v. 334): he translates hurāhurām as “ever onward” and

26Norman, 1997, p. 142 ad Dhp 290.
states that it could perhaps be more literally translated as “onward and onward again”. Since, however, it is used of a monkey seeking fruit in a forest it is more likely to mean something like “to and fro” and be derived from Skt *huras* which is a weak grade formation from the root *hṛ- “to go crookedly”.

p. 139 (title of Chapter 25): he leaves *bhikkhu* untranslated as the title of this chapter and also when it occurs in the verses of the chapter, except in v. 365 where he translates it as “mendicant”, which is, as he says, the literal translation. In vv. 31–32 and elsewhere, however, he translates *bhikkhu* as “monastic”, and in vv. 75, 272 as “monk”. He states that he sometimes translates it as “monastic” “so it can refer to monastics of any gender”. I have already commented on his desire to make the terminology gender neutral but, as far as I understand its usage, “mendicant” is as gender neutral as “monastic”, and I can see no reason for changing from one to the other.

p. 141 (ad v. 388): he notes that in this verse there is a word play between *pabbājeti* and *pabbajito* and suggests that it is likely that there is also a play on *samacariyā* and *samana*, but he does not note that there is also a play on *bāhitapāpo* and *brāhmaṇo*, suggesting that in an earlier version of this verse the latter word was in the form *bāhaṇo*.

p. 141 (ad v. 392): he states that *sammāsambuddha* means “fully self-awakened” and explains why the Buddha was self-awakened, but I can see no part of the compound which might mean “self”. I wonder if he is confusing *sam- and sayam*.

p. 142 (ad v. 405): *tasesu thāvaresu* he translates “timid and strong” but states that the phrase might be more literally translated as “frightened and firm, or moving and unmoving, or perturbed and unperturbed”. The concept of three meanings all said to be more literal can only raise doubts about his interpretation of the word “literal”.

p. 142 (ad v. 411): he translates *amata* as “deathless”. See remarks about p. 117 (ad v. 21) above.
p. 144 (ad v. 419): he translates sugata as “well-gone” here and as “Well-Gone-One” at p. 135 (ad v. 285). See also p. 117 (ad vv. 17–18) above.

It is not always easy to see what principle Fronsdal is following for the inclusion or omission of diacritical marks. In the translation and in the preface and introduction he puts Pāli words into italics, with diacritical marks, but in the notes he usually does neither, e.g. p. 136 ad v. 302: samsara, but sansāra on p. xiii. He also has a slightly cavalier attitude towards the quotation of Pāli compounds. On p. 132 (ad v. 246) he prints para dārā instead of paradārā, and on p. 143 (ad v. 415) he writes kāma bhavaparikkhīnaṃ for kāmabhavaparikkhīnaṃ.

He refers (p. xviii) to English translations and studies which he has found useful, lists them, including my translation, on pp. 145–46, and encourages anyone interested in further study of the Dhammapada to read them. He mentions me by name in the notes to three verses (ad v. 167 lokavaddhano; ad vv. 266–67 vissāṃ; ad v. 290 mattā), and in a number of cases he gives in his notes my translation (without naming me) with a number of translations by others, only to reject them, e.g. p. 128 (ad papañca vv. 195–96 254); p. 129 (ad ussuka v. 199); p. 142 (ad tasa thāvara v. 405); p. 143 (ad nibbuta v. 414).

There is no doubt that Fronsdal’s translation reads very easily, and can justifiably be described as “highly readable”. To claim, however, that it is “the first truly accurate translation” is much more debatable. Since Fronsdal from time to time justifies himself by reference to PED, but never to CPD or DOP, one suspects that he was rather reliant on out-of-date lexicographical aids. He refers to MW only once (on p. 121 ad v. 70), and yet to try to interpret Pāli terms without reference to up-to-date dictionaries and Sanskrit parallels is not entirely commendable for anyone aiming at accuracy.

There is a small number of misprints:

p. iv: Suttaṭṭaka for -piṭṭaka
p. xvii: Viggo (not Victor) Fausbøll was Danish not Dutch
p. 119 (ad v. 23): Dhīgha for Digha
p. 130 (ad v. 209): insert period after “task”
p. 136 (ad v. 298): sangha for saṅgha
p. 136 (ad v. 308): raṭṭa for raṭṭha
p. 137 (ad v. 312): literally for literally
p. 137 (ad v. 326): anukusa for anukusa
p. 143 (ad v. 416): taṅhā for taṅhā
p. 147: Anguttara for Aṅguttara
p. 151: Mālunkyāputta for Mālunkyāputta
p. 152: Jñāna- for Jñāna-
p. 152: -bhāsiyāım for -bhāsiyāṁ
p. 152: Khuddaka-patha for -pāṭha

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On Translating Literally

CP VI, pp. 156–70)


ABBREVIATIONS

The titles of Pāli texts are as in CPD.

BSR = Buddhist Studies Review
CPD = A Critical Pāli Dictionary
DOP = Cone 2001
EV I/II = Elders’ Verses I and II (= Norman 2007A, 2007B)
GD = Group of Discourses (= Norman 2001)
JOI(B) = Journal of the Oriental Institute (Baroda)
IPTS = Journal of the Pali Text Society
JRAS = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
MW = Monier-Williams 1899
PED = Rhys Davids & Stede 1925
PTS = Pali Text Society
rev. + review
Skt = Sanskrit
WD = Word of the Doctrine (= Norman 1997)
K.R. Norman: Bibliography

Abbreviations

AO Acta Orientalia (Copenhagen)
AS Asiatische Studien
BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
BSR Buddhist Studies Review
IIJ Indo-Iranian Journal
IL Indian Linguistics
IT Indologica Taurinensis
JOI(B) Journal of the Oriental Institute (Baroda)
JPTS Journal of the Pali Text Society
JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
MAS Modern Asian Studies
MLBD Motilal Banarsidass
OLZ Orientalistische Literaturzeitung
PBR Pali Buddhist Review
PTS Pali Text Society
REB Revista de Estudios Budistas
SAS South Asian Studies
StII Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik
TPS Transactions of the Philological Society
WZKS Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes
ZDMG Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

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54. “Middle Indo-Aryan Studies XII”, JOI(B) XXVIII (1978), pp. 78–85 (Collected Papers II, no. 33, pp. 20–29)
79. “The Influence of the Pāli Commentators and Grammarians upon the Theravādin Tradition”, Buddhist Studies (Bukkyō Kenkyū), XV (December 1985), pp. 109–23 (Collected Papers III, no. 61, pp. 95–107)


156. “Adopting the Domestic Way of Life”, in P. Kieffer-Pülz and J. Uwe Hartmann, eds., Bauddhavidyāsudhākaraṇa (Studies in Honour of Heinz


**D-1. Editor**


182. *Critical Pāli Dictionary* II, fascicle 12, Copenhagen, 1982


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D-2. Co-editor

204. Dhammapada, Oxford, 1994 (with Oskar von Hinüber)
205. Index to the Dīgha-nikāya, Oxford, 1997 (with M. Yamazaki and Y. Ousaka)
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This is an introductory article about the problem of “the influence of the Pāli commentators and grammarians upon the Theravādin tradition”; it combines (and rewrites) the material in the following three articles:


A translation of K.R. Norman’s “The present state of Pāli studies, and future tasks”, Collected Papers VI, PTS, Oxford, 1996, pp. 68–87. There are two kinds of supplemental notes added to the translation: (1) some brief introduction to the Pāli texts edited in south Asia, and (2) some new publication information after 1994. There is also a brief introduction to the original author, Prof. K.R. Norman, at the very beginning of the translated article.

486. Tsai, Chilin (tr.), “Baliyu yu yijiao yuyan”, Zhengguan zazhi, No. 19, Nantou, Taiwan, Dec. 2001, pp. 95–114

A translation of K.R. Norman’s article “Pāli and the Languages of the Heretics” (Collected Papers I, pp. 238–46)

See also numbers 87 and 98 above.
The Buddha’s Truly Praiseworthy Qualities
According to the Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta and Its Chinese Parallel

Abstract

With the present article, I intend to explore the potential of comparative studies between discourses from the Pāli Nikāyas and their parallels in the Chinese Āgamas, taking up the Madhya-āgama counterpart to the Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya as an example. An annotated translation of the Madhya-āgama discourse is followed by a comparative study of some differences between the two versions.

Introduction

The central theme of the Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta is the praiseworthiness of the Buddha, a topic the discourse approaches from two perspectives by first delineating those qualities that a contemporary paribbājaka like Sakuludāyī would consider praiseworthy, followed by contrasting these to those qualities of the Buddha that truly deserve praise.

The Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta, found as the seventy-seventh discourse in the Majjhima-nikāya, has a counterpart in the two hundred and seventh discourse in the Madhya-āgama preserved in Chinese translation,¹ a translation undertaken by Gautama Saṅghadeva during the period A.D. 397–398, based on a written original read out to him by Saṅgharākṣa. Daoci (道慈) acted as the scribe, assisted by Libao (李寶) and Kanghua (康化).² The original used for the translation appears to

¹M 77 at M II 1–22 and MĀ 207 at T I 781b–783c. In order to facilitate comparison between the two versions, in my translation of MĀ 207 I adopt the paragraph numbering used in Nāṇamoli (1995: 629–47). For the same reason, I employ Pāli terminology throughout, without thereby intending to take a position on the original language of the Madhya-āgama.
²T I 809b26.

have been in a Prakrit and with considerable probability stems from a Sarvāstivāda tradition.  

Translation  

Discourse to Sakuludāyi

1. Thus have I heard. At one time the Blessed One was dwelling at Rājagaha, staying in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrels’ Feeding Place, in the company of a great congregation of one thousand two hundred and fifty monks who were observing the rains retreat.  

3. When the night was over, at dawn, the Blessed One put on his robes, took his bowl and entered Rājagaha to collect alms. Having collected alms [and partaken of them], he put away his [outer] robe and bowl, washed his hands and feet, put the sitting mat over his shoulder and went into the Peacocks’ Grove, a park [frequented by] heterodox practitioners.

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4In the Taishō edition, 汶毛 corresponds to Sakuludāyi, cf. also Minh Chau (1991: 578). In SĀ 323 at T II 481c15, the expression 毛复发 as a rendering of “Sūciloma (another version of the same discourse, SĀ 1324 at T II 363c1, uses the more precise rendering 毛发, “Needle Hair”). The name used by the Buddha to address Sakuludāyi in MA 207 is 儿陀矢, 诓da ji (Pulleyblank 1991), thus rendering the name “Udāyi, the form of address used by the Buddha in the M 77. The reasons for the translator’s choice of 毛 remain unclear to me.

5Instead of describing the company of monks that dwelt with the Buddha, M 77 at M II 1,4 lists different well-known leaders of paribbājakas who were dwelling at the Peacocks’ Feeding Place, Sakuludāyi being one of them (corresponding to paragraph 2 in Nāṇamoli (1995: 629)).

6In M 77 at M II 1,8, the Buddha reflects that it is too early to collect alms and thereon decides to approach the Peacocks’ Feeding Place to visit Sakuludāyi.

7MA 207 at T I 781bc4: 孔雀林, “peacocks’ forest”, whereas M 77 at M II 1,3 speaks of the moranivāpa, the “peacocks’ feeding place”. Ps III 235,12
4. At that time there was a heterodox practitioner in the Peacocks’ Grove called Sakuludāyi, a renowned leader and teacher of a congregation, very famous and esteemed by the people, head of a great congregation of disciples [comprising] five hundred heterodox practitioners who honoured him.\(^8\)

He was staying with a great congregation that was noisy, agitated and disorderly, giving free rein to a great clamour, discussing various types of animal talk,\(^9\) namely talk about kings, talk about thieves, talk about battles, talk about food, talk about clothes, talk about married women, talk about girls, talk about adulterous women, talk about the world, talk about spacious districts, talk about the contents of the ocean, talk about country people — they were seated together talking these kinds of animal talk.\(^10\)

Seeing the Buddha coming from afar, the heterodox practitioner Sakuludāyi admonished the congregation, “Keep silent! The recluse explains that peacocks in this place were under protection and were provided with food, \(\text{tasmiṃ thāne morānaṃ abhayaṃ ghoṣetvā bhojanam paṭṭapesuṃ.}\)\(^8\)

\(^8\)\(\text{M 77 at M II 1,12 does not specify the size of Sakuludāyi’s company, nor does it report that he was esteemed by the people.}\)

\(^9\)\(\text{MÓ 207 at T I 781c8: 衛生之論; equivalent to } \text{tiracchānakathā} \text{ in M 77 at M II 1,15.}\)

\(^10\)\(\text{The listings in the two versions differ. Both mention talk about: kings, thieves, battles, food, clothes, women, the world, and the ocean. MÓ 207 treats the theme of “women” in more detail by distinguishing between married women, girls, and adulterous women. Besides these, MÓ 207 also mentions spacious districts and country people. M 77 additionally lists great ministers, armies, fears, drink, beds, garlands, perfumes, relatives, vehicles, villages, towns, cities, countries, heroes, streets, wells, the dead, trifles, and becoming this or that.}\)
Gotama is coming. His congregation is silent; they always delight in silence and praise silence. If he sees that this congregation is silent, perhaps he will come to join us.” Having silenced the congregation, the heterodox practitioner Sakuludāyi remained silent himself.

5. [When] the Blessed One had approached the heterodox practitioner Sakuludāyi, the heterodox practitioner Sakuludāyi promptly rose up from his seat, arranged his robes on one shoulder and, holding his hands [folded in respect] towards the Buddha,11 [respectfully] said, “Welcome, recluse Gotama,12 it is a long time that the recluse Gotama has not come here. Please be seated on this seat.”

The Blessed One sat on the seat prepared by the heterodox practitioner Sakuludāyi. Having exchanged greetings with the Blessed One, the heterodox practitioner Sakuludāyi sat down at one side. The Blessed One asked, “Udāyi, what have you been talking about, for what matter have you been seated together?”

6. The heterodox practitioner Sakuludāyi replied, “Gotama, [let us] just leave that talk; that talk was not profound. If the recluse Gotama wishes to hear such talk, it will not be difficult to hear about it on a later occasion.” The Blessed One asked like this three times, “Udāyi, what have you been talking about, for what matter have you been seated together?”13 The heterodox practitioner Sakuludāyi replied three times, “Gotama, [let us] just leave that talk, that talk was not profound, if the recluse Gotama wishes to hear such talk, it would not be difficult to hear about it on a later occasion.” [Then he said], “But since the recluse

11 M 77 at M II 2.13 only reports that Sakuludāyi invited the Buddha to a seat, without mentioning that he expressed his respect by getting up from his seat, arranging his robe on one side, and greeting the Buddha with folded hands.
12 MA 207 at T I 781c17: 沙門瞿曇, whereas in M 77 at M II 2.11 Sakuludāyi employs the address bhante, “venerable sir”, and refers to the Buddha as bhagavā, “Blessed One”.
13 In M 77 at M II 2.19 the Buddha does not inquire three times after the topic of the conversation that had been going on when he arrived.
Gotama has three times expressed his wish to hear it, I shall now report it.14

“Gotama, we were seated together with many Brahmins from the country of Kosala in a study hall of [these] Kosalans,15 having the following discussion: ‘It is of great profit for the people of An̄ga and Magadha, it is of great profit for the people of An̄ga and Magadha, that a congregation that is such a great field of merit is spending the rains retreat in Rājagaha, namely [the congregation led by] Pūraṇa Kassapa. Why is that?

“Gotama, Pūraṇa Kassapa is a renowned leader and teacher of a congregation, very famous and esteemed by the people, head of a great congregation of disciples [comprising] five hundred heterodox practitioners who honour him, and he is spending the rains retreat here in Rājagaha.16

“[Likewise for] [the congregation led by] Makkhali Gosāla ... Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta ... Niganṭha Nāṭaputta ... Pakudha Kaccāyana ... Ajita Kesakambali ...

“Gotama, Ajita Kesakambali is a renowned leader and teacher of a congregation, very famous and esteemed by the people, head of a great congregation of disciples [comprising] five hundred heterodox practitioners who honour him, and he is spending the rains retreat in this Rājagaha.

“Continuing like this we also talked about the recluse Gotama, [saying], ‘This recluse Gotama is a renowned leader and teacher of a congregation, very famous and esteemed by the people, head of a great congregation of monks [comprising] one thousand two hundred and

14In M 77 at M II 2,21 the talk about the paribbājakas who were staying at Rājagaha constitutes a change of topic from what the wanderers had been discussing when the Buddha arrived.
15M 77 does not indicate that the discussion happened with Kosalan Brahmins, who in MĀ 207 appear to be visiting Magadha.
16M 77 does not specify the number of disciples of Pūraṇa Kassapa, etc., or of the Buddha.
fifty men who honour him, and he is spending the rains retreat in this Rājagaha.’

“Gotama, then we had the following thought: ‘Now, out of these honourable recluses and Brahmins, who is respected by his disciples, honoured, worshipped, and treated with respect, not being abused by his disciples with abuse in regard to the teaching, having no disciples who challenge their teacher [saying], “This is entirely impossible, it is not proper, it does not fit”, and saying this they abandon him and go away?’

“Gotama, then we had the following thought: ‘Pūrṇa Kassapa is not respected by his disciples, he is not honoured, worshipped, and treated with respect by them, he is abused by his disciples with abuse in regard to the teaching, with many disciples who challenge their teacher [saying], “This is not possible, it is not proper, it does not fit”, and saying this they abandon him and go away.’

“Gotama, on a former occasion Pūrṇa Kassapa, while being with a congregation of disciples, repeatedly raised his hand and called out, ‘You should stop! People have not come to ask you about this matter, they have come to ask me about this matter. You are not able to settle this matter, I am able to settle this matter.’ Yet the disciples continued to talk among themselves [even] more on that matter, without waiting for the teacher to complete his exposition on that matter.

“Gotama, then we had the following thought: ‘In this way, Pūrṇa Kassapa is not respected by his disciples, he is not honoured, worshipped and treated with respect by them, he is abused by his disciples with abuse in regard to the teaching, with many disciples who challenge their teacher [saying], “This is not possible, it is not proper, it does not fit”, and saying this they abandon him and go away.’

“[Likewise for] Makkhali Gosāla ... Sañjaya Belāṭhiputta ... Niganṭha Nāṭaputta ... Pakudha Kaccāyana ... Ajita Kesakambali ...

“Gotama, we had the following thought: ‘Ajita Kesakambali is not respected by his disciples, he is not honoured, worshipped and treated with respect by them, he is abused by his disciples with abuse in regard to the teaching, with many disciples who challenge their teacher
Gotama, on a former occasion Ajita Kesakambali, while being with a congregation of disciples, repeatedly raised his hand and called out, ‘You should stop! People have not come to ask you about this matter, they have come to ask me about this matter. You are not able to settle this matter, I am able to settle this matter.’ Yet the disciples continued to talk among themselves [even] more on that matter, without waiting for the teacher to complete his exposition on that matter.

‘Gotama, then we had the following thought: ‘In this way, Ajita Kesakambali is not respected by his disciples, he is not honoured, worshipped and treated with respect by them, he is abused by his disciples with abuse in regard to the teaching, with many disciples who challenge their teacher [saying], “This is not possible, it is not proper, it does not fit”, and saying this they abandon him and go away.’

‘Gotama, then we had the following thought: ‘The recluse Gotama is respected by his disciples, he is honoured, worshipped and treated with respect by them, he is not abused by his disciples with abuse in regard to the teaching, having no disciples who challenge their teacher [saying], “This is not possible, it is not proper, it does not fit”, and who, saying so, would abandon him and go away.

‘Gotama, on a former occasion the recluse Gotama was giving teachings surrounded by an immeasurable congregation of hundreds of thousands.\textsuperscript{17} Among them there was one man who had nodded off and was making a noise by snoring.\textsuperscript{18} Another man then addressed this man,
saying, ‘Don’t make a noise by snoring while nodding off! Don’t you want to hear the sublime teachings taught by the Blessed One, which are like the deathless?’ That other man immediately became quiet and made no [more] noise.\(^\text{19}\)

“Gotama, then we had the following thought: ‘In this way this recluse Gotama is respected by his disciples, he is honoured, worshipped and treated with respect by them, he is not abused by his disciples with abuse in regard to the teaching, having no disciples who challenge their teacher [saying], ‘This is not possible, it is not proper, it does not fit’, and who, saying so, would abandon him and go away.’”

7. Having heard this, the Blessed One asked the heterodox practitioner Sakuludāyi, “Udāyi, how many qualities do you see in me, owing to which my disciples respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, always following me without breaking away?”

8. The heterodox practitioner Sakuludāyi said, “Gotama, I see five qualities in Gotama owing to which his disciples respect, honour, worship, and treat him with respect, always following him without breaking off. What are the five?\(^\text{20}\)

“The recluse Gotama is contented with coarse robes and praises contentment with coarse robes. That the recluse Gotama is contented...
with coarse robes and praises contentment with coarse robes, this is the first quality I see in the recluse Gotama owing to which his disciples respect, honour, worship, and treat him with respect, always following him without breaking away.

“Again, the recluse Gotama is contented with coarse food and praises contentment with coarse food. That the recluse Gotama is contented with coarse food and praises contentment with coarse food, this is the second quality I see in the recluse Gotama owing to which his disciples respect, honour, worship, and treat him with respect, always following him without breaking away.

“Again, the recluse Gotama takes little food and praises taking little food. That the recluse Gotama takes little food and praises taking little food, this is the third quality I see in the recluse Gotama owing to which his disciples respect, honour, worship, and treat him with respect, always following him without breaking away.

“Again, the recluse Gotama is contented with coarse dwellings, beds, and seats, and praises contentment with coarse dwellings, beds, and seats. That the recluse Gotama is contented with coarse dwellings, beds, and seats, and praises contentment with coarse dwellings, beds, and seats, this is the fourth quality I see in the recluse Gotama owing to which his disciples respect, honour, worship, and treat him with respect, always following him without breaking away.

“Again, the recluse Gotama dwells in seclusion and praises dwelling in seclusion. That the recluse Gotama dwells in seclusion and praises dwelling in seclusion, this is the fifth quality I see in the recluse Gotama owing to which his disciples respect, honour, worship, and treat him with respect, always following him without breaking away.

“These are the five qualities I see in the recluse Gotama owing to which his disciples respect, honour, worship, and treat him with respect, always following him without breaking away.”

9. The Blessed One replied, “Udāyī, it is not on account of these five qualities in me that my disciples respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, always following me without breaking away.
“Udāyi, the robes worn by me have been suitably and perfectly cut with a knife,\textsuperscript{21} and [then] dyed with an unattractive colour.\textsuperscript{22} Thus [I wear] perfect robes [that are just] dyed with an unattractive colour.

Udāyi, some disciples of mine might be wearers of robes made of discarded rags for their whole life. Even [if], saying, ‘Our Blessed One is contented with coarse robes and praises contentment with coarse robes’,\textsuperscript{23} my disciples were to praise me because of contentment with coarse robes, Udāyi, [merely] because of that they will not respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, or follow me.

“Again, Udāyi, I [at times] eat cooked rice and grains, without husks, and with a limitless variety of tastes. Udāyi, some disciples of mine might go begging alms food for their whole life, eating what has been left over.\textsuperscript{24} Even [if], saying, ‘Our Blessed One is contented with coarse food and praises contentment with coarse food’, my disciples were to praise me because of contentment with coarse food, Udāyi, [merely] because of that they will not respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, or follow me.

\textsuperscript{21}Adopting the 元,明, and 雷 variant 刀 instead of 力.

\textsuperscript{22}M 77 at M II 7.16 does not refer to the colour of the robes, only indicating that the Buddha would at times wear robes given by householders of finer texture than pumpkin down, gahapatåni civaråni dhåremi da¬håni yutta låkhåni alåbulomasåni (B’, C gahapativivaråni; B satthalåkhåni and S sutta- låkhåni; C alåpulomasåni and S alåvulomasåni).

\textsuperscript{23}Instead of the address "our Blessed One", 㤃˺ used by the Buddha’s disciples in MÁ 207 at T I 783a, according to M 77 at M II 7.2 they refer to their own teacher as "recluse Gotta, samaˆa Gotamo. Here the Pāli version appears to have suffered from some transmission error, as in the discourses the expression "recluse Gotama" is used by those who do not consider themselves disciples of the Buddha. According to Wagle (1966: 56), the address "samaña, although a term of respect, denotes a certain indifference".

\textsuperscript{24}M 77 at M II 7.30 additionally mentions that they go on uninterrupted alms round and that they will not even consent to sitting down when being among the houses, sapadånacårino ... antaragharaµ pavi††hå samånå såsamå antaragharaµ pavåßhå samånå såsamå na såldåyanti.
“Again, Udāyi, I [at times] take food equal to a single *bilva* fruit or equal to half a *bilva* fruit.25 Udāyi, some disciples of mine might [at times] take food equal to a cupful or equal to half a cupful. Even [if], saying, ‘Our Blessed One takes little food and praises taking little food’, my disciples were to praise me because of taking little food, Udāyi, [merely] because of that they will not respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, or follow me.

“Again, Udāyi, I [at times] might stay in tall buildings, or in pavilions.26 Udāyi, some disciples of mine might for nine or ten months stay every night out in the open.27 Even [if], saying, ‘Our Blessed One is contented with coarse dwellings, beds, and seats, and praises contentment with coarse dwellings, beds, and seats’, my disciples were to praise me because of contentment with coarse dwellings, beds, and seats, Udāyi, [merely] because of that they will not respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, or follow me.

“Again, Udāyi, I am constantly crowded in by monks, nuns, male lay followers, and female lay followers. Some disciples of mine might join the community only once every fortnight, just for the sake of the *Dhamma* and [to declare their] purity [at the *pātimokkha* recital]. Even

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25 M 207 at T I 783:4: 松食食一瓣松食, 或如半瓣松. This seems to be a textual corruption, since in keeping with the general trend of the exposition one would expect some example of partaking of plenty of food to provide a contrast to the cupful of food taken by the disciples. M 77 at M II 7.4 provides such a contrast by describing that at times the Buddha would eat the full contents of his bowl, or even more, *iminā pattena samatītikaṃ pi bhuñjāmi, bhāṣyo pi bhuñjāmi*.

26 M 77 at M II 8.16 describes how the Buddha would at times stay in gabled mansions that are completely plastered and sheltered from the wind by having bolted doors and shuttered windows, *kāṭāgāresu pi viharāmi ullītavālītesu nivātesu phussitāgga-esu pihitavātāpānesu* (B, S: phussitāgga-esu).

27 Adopting the 元 明 卯 素 variant 露 instead of 棦. In addition to the practice of dwelling in the open, *abbhokāsika*, M 77 at M II 8.14 also mentions living at the root of a tree, *rukkhamālīka*. These are two out of the standard set of ascetic practices, on which see also Bapat (1937), Dantinne (1991), and Nanayakkara (1989).
[if], saying, ‘Our Blessed One dwells in seclusion and praises dwelling in seclusion’, my disciples were to praise me because of dwelling in seclusion, Udāyi, [merely] because of that they will not respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, or follow me.

“Udāyi, it is not due to these five qualities in me that my disciples respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, always following me without breaking off.

10. “Udāyi, there are five other qualities in me, owing to which my disciples respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, always following me without breaking off. What are the five? 28

11. “Udāyi, there are disciples of mine who praise me for supreme virtue, saying, ‘The Blessed One practices virtue and is of great virtue, he does what he says and he says what he does’.

28 The two versions list these five qualities in different sequences, cf. Talbe 1, p. 151.

12. “Udāyi, in this way my disciples praise me for supreme virtue, and it is because of this that they respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, always following me without breaking off.

13. “Again, Udāyi, there are disciples of mine who praise me for supreme wisdom, saying, ‘The Blessed One dwells in wisdom and is of supremely great wisdom. If a disputant comes with counterarguments, [the Blessed One] will certainly be able to defeat him, that is to say, [the disputant] will be unable to give [satisfactory] explanations in regard to the right teaching and discipline, and will [even] be unable to [satisfactorily] explain his own proclamations.’ 29

29 MÂ 207 at T I 783a25: 如所說所作亦然, 如所作所說亦然. M 77 at M II 9r, 16 instead mentions the Buddha’s endowment with the supreme aggregate of virtue, paramena silukkhandhena samannågato. A counterpart to the statement in MÂ 207 can, however, be found in other Pâli discourses, e.g. D 19 at D II 224, 3 (repeated at D II 229, 25): yathåvåd¥ kho pana so bhagavå tathåkår¥, yathåkår¥ tathåvåd¥, cf. also D 29 at D III 135, 16 and A 4, 23 at A II 24, 7, who formulate the same principle with the Tathågata as their subject.

30 M 77 at M II 10r, 5 only treats the abilities of the Buddha in a debate situation, not the inabilities of the opponent.
“Udāyi, in this way my disciples praise me for supreme wisdom, and it is because of this that they respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, always following me without breaking off.31

12. “Again, Udāyi, there are disciples of mine who praise me for supreme knowledge and vision, saying, ‘The Blessed One dwells knowing, not without knowing, he dwells seeing, not without seeing. The Dhamma he teaches to his disciples is with causes, not without causes; it is with conditions, not without conditions; it is able to [offer] replies [to questions], not unable to [offer] replies [to questions]; it is endowed with [the potential for reaching] deliverance, not bereft of [the potential for reaching] deliverance.32

“Udāyi, in this way my disciples praise me for supreme knowledge and vision, and it is because of this that they respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, always following me without breaking off.

14. “Again, Udāyi, there are disciples of mine who feel repugnance towards the arrow of craving and who come and ask me about [the nature] of dukkha, its arising, its cessation, and the path [to its cessation].33 I promptly answer them about [the nature] of dukkha, its arising, its cessation, and the path [to its cessation].

“Udāyi, in this way my disciples come and ask me, and I satisfy their minds with my answers and arouse their delight, and it is because of this that they respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, always following me without breaking off.

31M 77 at M II 10.8 reports that at this point the Buddha asked Udāyi if he thought that the Buddha’s disciples would nevertheless interrupt their teacher, which Udāyi denies, followed by the Buddha indicating that he did not expect to be instructed by his disciples; on the contrary, his disciples expected to be instructed by him.

32M 77 at M II 9.25 notes that the Buddha teaches the Dhamma through direct knowledge, abhiññāya, with a causal basis, sanidāna, and in a convincing manner, sappāthāriya.

33MĀ 207 at T I 783b1: “苦是苦, 起是起, 極是滅, 道是道, literally: “‘*dukkha* is *dukkha*, arising is arising, cessation is cessation, path is path”.
34–36. “Again, Udāyi, I explain to my disciples how to attain realization of the higher knowledge of recollection of past lives or how to attain realization of the higher knowledge of the destruction of the influxes.  

37. “Udāyi, in this way my disciples gain experience and deliverance in this right teaching and discipline and are able to reach the other shore, having become free from doubt and confusion, without vacillation in regard to this wholesome teaching, and it is because of this that they respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, always following me without breaking off.

38. “Udāyi, these are the other five qualities in me, owing to which my disciples respect, honour, worship, and treat me with respect, always following me without breaking off.”

Then the heterodox practitioner Sakuludāyi promptly rose up from his seat, arranged his robes on one shoulder, and holding his hands [with palms together in respect] towards the Buddha, [respectfully] said, “Gotama this is very exceptional, this is very special! You have explained a profound matter well and nourished my innermost being as if with ambrosia. Gotama, just as a great rain nourishes the whole earth, above and below, in the same way the recluse Gotama has explained a profound matter well to us and nourished my innermost being as if with ambrosia. Blessed One, I have understood, Well-gone One, I have comprehended. Blessed One, from now on I go for refuge to the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the community of monks. May the Blessed One accept

34 At this point a rather substantial difference becomes apparent, as instead of the two higher knowledges mentioned in MĀ 207, M 77 from M II 11,3 to M II 22,15 lists a range of different aspects of the path to liberation, covering the four satipaññas, the five indriyas, the five balas, the seven bojjhagass, the noble eightfold path, the eight vimokkhas, the eight abhibhāyatanas, the ten kasinaas, the four jhānas, insight into the nature of body and consciousness, production of a mind-made body, supernormal powers, the divine ear, telepathic knowledge of the mind of others, recollection of past lives, the divine eye, and the destruction of the influxes.
me as a lay follower who has taken refuge for life from now on until life ends.\(^\text{35}\)

The Buddha spoke like this. The heterodox practitioner Sakuludāyi listened to what the Buddha said, was delighted, and put it into practice.

**Comparison**

Given the fact that the praiseworthy qualities of the Buddha are the main theme of the *Mahāsakuludāyi-sutta* and its parallel, it is not surprising if the tendency to elevate the Buddha’s status would to some degree also have influenced the reciters responsible for transmitting the discourse. A comparison of the two versions in fact reveals several instances where this tendency is at work in one or the other out of the two versions.

Thus whereas the Pāli version does not count the number of disciples of the Buddha or the other teachers, the Madhyama-āgama account depicts the Buddha as surrounded by “one thousand two hundred and fifty” disciples, whereas the other teachers only command a following of “five hundred” each.\(^\text{36}\) Its presentation thus implicitly indicates that Sakuludāyi and the six well-known contemporary teachers were far less influential than the Buddha.\(^\text{37}\) In the Madhyama-āgama account, the Buddha’s influential status manifests not only in regard to his monk disciples, but also when it comes to an audience in general. Thus, according to this version, on a former occasion the Buddha was teaching an “immeasurable congregation of hundreds of thousands”.\(^\text{38}\)

\(^{35}\)M 77 does not record that Sakuludāyi expressed his respect or that he took refuge.

\(^{36}\)MÅ 207 at T I 782a13 (the Buddha’s disciples), T I 781c6 (Sakuludāyi’s disciples), and T I 782a4+9 (the disciples of the other teachers).

\(^{37}\)Manné (1990: 49) explains that in discourses that have a debate character and feature a meeting with an opponent “the description of the size of the following around each of the opponents ... serves to enhance, or otherwise, the importance of each adversary”.

\(^{38}\)MÅ 207 at T I 782b17.
The corresponding section in the Pāli version only speaks of an audience of “several hundreds”.

Another facet of the same tendency in the Madhyama-āgama is its depiction of Sakuludāyi’s behaviour when the Buddha arrives. Even though Sakuludāyi is introduced as a famous and well-known teacher, seated amidst his disciples, according to the Madhyama-āgama report he rises from his seat, arranges his robe over one shoulder and greets the Buddha with hands together in respect, a behaviour expressing the kind of deep respect a Buddhist lay disciple might show when the Buddha arrives. In the Pāli version, Sakuludāyi only welcomes the Buddha verbally and offers him a seat, a more realistic depiction of how a famous and well-known paribbajaka would have welcomed the leader of another group.

The tendency to present Sakuludāyi as if he were a Buddhist lay disciple manifests again towards the end of the Madhyama-āgama discourse. Whereas the Pāli version merely reports Sakuludāyi’s delight in the exposition he had just heard, according to the Madhyama-āgama version he takes refuge and asks to be accepted as a lay disciple. This is rather surprising, since Sakuludāyi was a paribbajaka, so that one would expect him to rather request ordination instead of becoming a lay disciple. Thus the depiction of Sakuludāyi’s reaction at the conclusion of the discourse may be yet another instance of the tendency to enhance the status of the Buddha, manifesting in the present case by relying on a standard formula for discourse conclusions applied to the present case without sufficient consideration of its appropriateness to the context.

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39 M 77 at M II 4.34.
40 MĀ 207 at T I 781c16.
41 MĀ 207 at T I 783b28.
42 As I already noted in relation to a similar variation occurring between M 80 and MĀ 209 (Anālayo 2007: 104 note 35); the articles by Freiberger (1997: 128) and Karunaratne (2004: 318) indicate that for someone who has already gone forth as a wanderer and who becomes a Buddhist, the most natural thing to do would be to join the Buddhist order of monks.
The tendency to enhance the status of the Buddha is not confined to the Madhyama-âgama version. Thus whereas in the Madhyama-âgama account Sakuludâyi addresses the Buddha with the expression “recluse Gotama”,\(^{43}\) in the Pâli version he uses the respectful address bhante and, instead of using the Buddha’s name, refers to him as bhagavâ.\(^{44}\) In this way, the Pâli version also presents him acting in a way suitable for a disciple of the Buddha, though it employs means that differ from those used in the Madhyama-âgama discourse.

Another facet of the same tendency occurs in relation to the Pâli version’s portrayal of the disciples of other teachers, which serves as a contrast to the way the Buddha’s followers behave. Although the two versions agree that the other teachers were not able to silence their disciples, according to the Pâli version these disciples would go so far as to openly tell visitors that their teacher does not know how to reply, proclaiming that they should be asked instead of their teacher.\(^{45}\) Had these disciples indeed been so outrageously disrespectful towards their teacher in public, one would not have expected these teachers to command the esteem and respect among the populace that both versions attribute to them.

The Pâli version also provides a sharper contrast to the poor impression cut by the disciples of other teachers, as it portrays the disciples of the Buddha in a more favourable light than the Madhyama-âgama discourse. When reporting a former occasion during which a particular disciple made some noise during the delivery of a discourse, the Pâli version merely records that he cleared his throat, whereas according to the Madhyama-âgama version he had fallen asleep and was

\(^{43}\)e.g. MÂ 207 at T I 781c17.

\(^{44}\)e.g. M 77 at M II 2,11: bhante bhagavâ. In relation to another similar instance, Allon (1997: 121) comments that “the use of bhante ‘venerable sir’ is particularly unusual as a form of address used by an ascetic towards the Buddha, as is the ascetic referring to the Buddha as Bhagavâ.”

\(^{45}\)M 77 at M II 3,17.
snoring, a not too flattering description of what could happen when the Buddha was giving a discourse.\textsuperscript{46}

According to the Pāli account, whenever the Buddha gives a teaching his disciples will be poised in silent expectancy comparable to a crowd of people at a crossroads that observes a man who is pressing out honey. This description seems to some degree to conflict with other discourses, which indicate that the disciples of the Buddha were not invariably paying attention during a talk given by their teacher. An example would be the Bhaddāli-sutta and its Chinese parallel, according to which the Buddha had to rebuke one of his monk disciples for recurrently paying no attention when his teacher was delivering a discourse.\textsuperscript{47}

The Pāli version also stands alone in indicating that disciples who disrobe will nevertheless continue to speak in praise of the Buddha, the Dhamma and the monastic community.\textsuperscript{48} Other discourses give a less impressive account of former Buddhist monks, suggesting that they did not always speak in praise of their former teacher and his teaching. Thus a discourse in the Āṅguttara-nikāya reports the disparaging remarks made by the former Buddhist monk Sarabhā, and according to the Mahāsīhanāda-sutta the former Buddhist monk Sunakkhatta’s denigration of his earlier teacher caused the Buddha to deliver a rather long discourse in order to reveal his qualities and abilities.\textsuperscript{49}

In sum, it seems as if the theme of the praiseworthiness of the Buddha did exert some influence on the reciters of the discourse, causing an enhancing of the status of the Buddha that manifests in different ways in the Pāli and Chinese versions.

\textsuperscript{46}M 77 at M II 4,35 and MĀ 207 at T I 782b18.
\textsuperscript{47}M 65 at M I 445,32 and MĀ 194 at T I 749b3.
\textsuperscript{48}M 77 at M II 5,14.
\textsuperscript{49}A 3,64 at A I 185,8 and M 12 at M I 68,8.
The influence of oral transmission can also be seen in regard to the sequence in which listings are preserved. Variations in the sequence of listings are in fact one of the most prominent features noticeable in comparative studies, often involving differences that are of little doctrinal import. In the present case, such variations manifest in regard to both of the sets of five qualities of the Buddha: those described by Sakuludāyī and those described by the Buddha as what make him truly praiseworthy (see Tables 1 and 2 below).

Table 1: Sakuludāyī’s Listing of Five Qualities of the Buddha

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M 77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>takes little food (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>content with robes (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>content with food (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>content with dwelling place (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives in seclusion (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The Buddha’s Listing of His Five Qualities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M 77</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>higher virtue (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>knowledge and vision (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>higher wisdom (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teaching of four noble truths (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teaching ways of development (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MĀ 207</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>content with robes (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>content with food (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>takes little food (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>content with dwelling place (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lives in seclusion (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MĀ 207</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>supreme virtue (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supreme wisdom (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supreme knowledge and vision (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teaching of four noble truths (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teaching higher knowledge (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another and considerably more significant difference occurs in regard to the last quality in the second of these two groups of five, the Buddha’s quality as a teacher of meditative development. The Madhyama-āgama version lists merely recollection of past lives and the eradication of the influxes. Though this is rather brief, as one would have expected at least a reference to the divine eye to complete the standard set of three higher knowledges, the Pāli version in contrast is

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50To facilitate comparison, corresponding qualities in the two versions are provided with numbers in brackets which reflect the sequence of their occurrence in the Pāli version.
unexpectedly long, as it presents a detailed exposition of various aspects of the path (see Table 3). Notably, the first part of this listing follows a numerical ascending order up to the ten kasīnas, while the items listed later instead come in the same sequence as found in the Sāmaññaaphala-sutta. This gives the impression that two originally independent listings may have been combined in the present instance.

Table 3: The Buddha’s Fifth Quality in M 77

Teaching the development of
the four establishments of mindfulness,
the five faculties,
the five powers,
the seven factors of awakening,
the noble eightfold path,
the eight liberations,
the eight spheres of transcendence,
the ten kasīnas,
the four jhānas,
insight into the nature of body and consciousness,
production of a mind-made body,
supernormal powers,
the divine ear,
telepathic knowledge of the mind of others,
recollection of past lives,
the divine eye,
the destruction of the influxes.

In a passage repeated after each of these items, the Pāli version indicates that with every one of these practices many disciples of the Buddha have been able to attain accomplishment and perfection of direct knowledge. According to the commentary, this description

51M 77 from M II 11.3 to M II 22.15.
52D 2 from D I 73.23 to D I 84.12; this has been highlighted by Eimer (1976: 53).
53M 77 e.g. at M II 11.8: tat ca pana me sāvakā bahū abbhāññāvossāna-pāramīppattā viharanti.
Such a potential is somewhat unexpected in regard to the development of such practices as the spheres of transcendence (abhībhyāyatana), the ten kasiṇas, the production of a mind-made body, supernormal powers, or the divine ear, etc. This specification thus does to some extent read as if an earlier listing may have only had qualities the discourses generally reckon as capable of leading to consummation and perfection through direct knowledge, a listing that might subsequently have been expanded.

In fact, the rather long exposition of all these practices is somewhat out of proportion in comparison with the space allotted to the other four truly praiseworthy qualities of the Buddha. Owing to this long treatment of the fifth quality, the Mahāsakuludāyā-sutta has become an unusually long discourse in the Majjhima-nikāya collection, one that, had this long treatment already been part of the discourse at the time of the collection of the Nikāyas, might have earned it a placing in the Dīgha-nikāya instead.

Though a comparative study of the two versions thus brings to light a number of differences that testify to the vicissitudes of oral transmission and its influence on the actual shape of the discourses in the canonical collections of different Buddhist schools, the main message given by both versions remains the same:

What makes the Buddha truly worthy of praise, what causes his disciples to follow him and practise in accordance with his instructions, is not external aspects of behaviour that were held in high esteem in ancient India. Though frugality, a secluded life style and detachment in regard to the requisites of life are key aspects of the path of development in early Buddhism, they are not an end in themselves. What really makes the Buddha worthy of praise is his teaching of how to develop the mind, his disclosure of the path to liberation.

Bhikkhu Anālayo

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54 Ps III 243.5.
Abbreviations

A Anguttara-nikāya
B Burmese edition
C Ceylonese edition
D Dīgha-nikāya
M Majjhima-nikāya
MĀ Madhaya-āgama (T 26)
Ps Papañcasūdani
SĀ Samyuktā-āgama (T 99)
SĀ“ other” Samyuktā-āgama (T 100)
S Siamese edition
T Taishō (CBETA)

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Acknowledgement: I am indebted to Rod Bucknell and Ken Su for comments on an earlier draft of this article.
A Small Problem of Tense and Person: 
Dhammapada 306 and Its Parallels

Considerable attention has been given over the years to the verses of the Dhammapada corpus. Numerous small problems, however, continue to lurk here and there. Sometimes these problems are obvious, in that a verse as we have it seems to make little sense, while at other times the issues are more subtle. It is always helpful, if not essential, to compare parallel texts, first of all the Pāli Dhammapada, Gândhāri (Khotan) and Prakrit (Patna) Dharmapadas, Sanskrit Udānavarga(s), and not rarely Chinese translations, quotations (keeping in mind that the relation between quoter and quoted is often unclear), other occurrences (including in non-Buddhist literature) and commentaries. Moreover, we should remain aware that evidence may also be found farther afield. Finally, while paying careful attention to the details of each verse, we must not in the process lose sight of our ultimate goal. Just what this goal may or should be is a question to which I will return at the close of these remarks.

The present contribution concerns a single foot of Dhammapada 306. In the edition of von Hinüber and Norman (1994) the Pāli verse is printed thus:

\[
abhūtavādī nirayaṃ upeti yo vāpi katvā na karomi cāha
ubho pi te pecca samā bhavanti niḥnakamā manujā parattha
\]

While this may represent a more-or-less readable version of the verse as transmitted in the Pāli tradition(s), some difficulties persist. K.R. Norman’s translation (1997) helps us understand this:

\[
1\text{The editors chose this over the more logical, and in many scripts graphically virtually identical, } cāpi \text{ without stating the reason for their preference. As Oskar von Hinüber tells me (email 7 March 2008), however, they followed the commentary which, with its } vā \text{ with long vowel outside sandhi, clearly indicates this reading. In this regard, it is worth noting that the reasons for preferring any given reading are rarely made explicit by most editors of Buddhist texts.}
\]

One who speaks of things that never were goes to hell; or the one who having done something says he did not do it [goes too]: both of these, when passed away, become the same — men with contemptible deeds in the next world.

The philological accuracy of Norman’s translations is well known. Nevertheless, here he appears to render neither the tense nor person of the verb in the second pāda strictly. For the text does not have “says he did not do it”, but rather something like “says I do not do [it]”. Norman’s change of first to third person may be attributed simply to the ease of expression in English, in that he wishes to avoid direct speech. The tense appears, at least at first glance, to be more of a problem. Carter and Palihawadana (1987: 332) in their strict literalness illustrate this, translating the second line: “And the one who having done says, ‘I don’t do this.’”2 They go on to translate from the commentary (Dhp-a III 477.9-11), which does not help much, other than providing an explicit patient for the gerund along with a corresponding anaphoric pronominal patient for the quoted finite verb: katvā ti yo vā pāpakammam katvā nāhaṃ etam karomī ti āha, “Or one who, having done a wrong deed, says, ‘I do not do this.’”

Von Hinüber and Norman print pāda b as yo vāpi katvā na karomi cāha. The editors cite a northern Thai manuscript (of 1786), the Sinhala script “Buddha Jayanti” edition, and the commentary as printed in H.C. Norman’s 1912 edition as having the unmeterical (or at the very least, hypermetrical) cadence karomī ti cāha. No doubt a more expansive consideration of the (surely voluminous) manuscript evidence would reveal further variant readings, though whether these would be of much value is another question. The same reading, even if not in each case accepted into the main text by the respective editors, is reported for the same verse when it appears in the Itivuttaka, Udāna, Suttanipāta, and

2They do not, however, quite translate the text they print, which has not the variant cāpi but rather vāpi. Moreover, their use of quotation marks is interpretive; as we will see, the absence of quotative (i)ti is a problem here.
Jātaka commentary. 3 Fausbøll’s 1855 editio princeps, in fact, printed pāda b in this hypermetrical form. In his second edition of 1900 (in which he professed to have corrected the meter), he printed instead yo vápi katvā na karomi-cāha (without explaining the change from the first edition). 4 It is this second edition which forms the basis of the edition of von Hinüber and Norman, although whether their claim to have undone Fausbøll’s metrical “corrections” is relevant in this verse I do not know. 5 Another Thai manuscript of the Dhammapada von Hinüber and Norman report as having karomi ccāha, a reading likewise found in other just-cited sources for the same verse. Regarding these configurations of pāda b, Fausbøll himself (1855: 394) hypothesized that “ti is a gloss, which the ignorance of the scribes introduced into the text; maybe first it had been written as karomicāha, either for karomiccāha or with pleonastic ca (va), or with c inserted for the sake of euphony.” 6 This hypothesis has been noted, directly or indirectly, by subsequent scholars. 7 But what would have been the background behind such a reading?

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3 It. 42, verse in §48, Ud 45.10 (IV.8), Sn 127, §661, Ja II 416.31.
4 I cannot resist quoting from a footnote to the Preface of the 1900 edition (p. ix), which is written in English, although the translation printed in the volume is, as it was in the first edition, in Latin. Having decried the printing of Pāli texts in Siamese script, and having stated that “There can be no doubt about the Roman (Latin) character triumphing at last over all others”, Fausbøll wrote: “As certain as the Roman character will be universal, the English language will in time likewise be the universal language of the world, for it is a well known fact that in the beginning the Lord took all languages, boiled them in a pot, and forthwith extracted the English language as the essence of them all.” It is a pity that scholars these days rarely dare to write like this.
5 This rather appears to concern cases of svarabhāti vowels for the most part.
6 Ti glossa est, quae scribarum inscitia in textum irrepsit, fortasse principio scriptum erat karomicīha, sive pro karomiccīha, sive cum ca (va) pleonast., sive cum c euphoniae causa inserto. For the translation from the Latin I am indebted to Marieke Meelen.
7 Brough 1962: 258: “Fausbøll suggested that ti was an interpolation, and that c- might be the remnant of an original (i)ti, so that the intended phrase might have been na karomiccāha (< ty āha).…” Although this is unmetrical, it
Parallels in languages other than Pāli might not — at first glance — appear to help much, but in fact they preserve important clues.\(^8\) The so-called Patna Dharmapada (Cone 1989) 114 reads:

\[
\text{abhātavādī nirayaṃ upeti yo cāpi kattā na karomi ti āha} \\
\text{ubho pi te precca samā bhavanti nihinakamṃu manujā paratra} \parallel
\]

This text here is rather close to the Pāli, and in the phrase of interest to us preserves the same tense and person. Moreover, as written pada b has the same unmetrical (or hypermetrical) reading as do some Pāli sources. To make the pada metrical, one must read *karomi āha. Removal of the c of cāha would likewise seem to make the Pāli marginally more understandable, although it would not improve the meter and would introduce an anomalous hiatus. Moreover, a reading *karomi āha is at best awkward in omitting any formal notice of direct speech. Evidently the scribe felt that the hypermeter was preferable to total omission of quotative iti. This is not the form found everywhere, however. A Gāndhāri equivalent to this verse (Brough 1962 § 269) reads as follows:

\[
\text{seems very probable that it should be re-established as the older Pali reading; for na karomi ti cāha is metrically even worse, and na karomi cāha is ungrammatical.} \quad \text{Norman 1992 (in notes to Sn 661) and 1997 (in notes to Dhp 306), referring to Brough though not to Fausbøll, agrees in taking karomi cāha to be a sandhi from karomi (i)ti āha with shortening of the third syllable m.c.: karomi (i)ti āha > karomi ty āha > karomi ec āha > karomi e āha; Masefield 1994: 85, n. 112, simply refers to Norman 1992.}
\]

\(^8\)Less help is afforded by the Chinese translations: T. 210 (IV) 570a7-8 (juan xia) = T. 212 (IV) 663e29-664a1 (juan 10) = T. 213 (IV) 781b3-4 (juan 1) = T. 1464 (XXIV) 878c26-27 (juan 7): 作之言不作 二罪後受受是行自去。Here T. 213 has for pada a 作言入地獄, and T. 213 and 1464 read pada d as 是行自去, both perhaps merely stylistic variants, while for T. 210 some editions have the reading 自作自去 for 是行自去. This I do not understand, in part because xíng 行 evidently translates karma. What zì 自 might represent I do not know and, likewise, the sense of qiánwàng 望 / qiánqù 去 is not clear to me. One possibility is that the translators understood *nihita for what Indic texts seem to have always as nihina.
A Small Problem of Tense and Person

abhūta-vādī naraṇa uvedi yo yaśi9 kitva na karoti āha
uvha’i ami preca sama bhavadi nihīna-kama maṇya parati

Close to this is the reading in the old Udānavarga, preserved (except for a lacuna in pāda d) in the so-called Subaśi manuscript, (Nakatani 1987) 8.1:

abhūtavādır narakām upaiti yaś cūpi kṛtvā na karoti āha

To this we may compare the Tibetan translation of the Udānavarga (Zongtse 1990):

gang dag gis byas bzhin ma byas zer ba dang
brdzün du snma ba [v.l. la] dnyal bar ’gro bar ’gyur
mi de gnyis ka ’dra ba pha rol tu
song nas dman pa’i chos dang ldan par ’gyur

In Tibetan, pādas a and b are inverted, the portion in question being rendered gang dag gis byas bzhin ma byas zer ba. Two things are peculiar. First, gang dag probably points to a plural. It might, however, indicate a dual, for which the corelative is mi de gnyis ka in pāda c. Neither formulation is supported in any Indic version. Second, byas

9Regarding my writing yavi for Brough’s yav, see below.
10The newer recension has for pāda b: yaś ċānyad apy ācāraśtha karma. I cannot account for this reading in relation to any other sources of the verse.
11Nakatani inexplicably prints ubhā va tau, which would seem to make of ubhā a form parallel to Pāli/Patna ubho, but then what of va? I think his division of the text unlikely. It does have the merit, however, of avoiding the odd form atau, which may, as Brough (1962: 258) thinks, be a miswriting for etau — or is it possible that there has been some confusion from adas? (To this correspond Gāndhāri ami [Sanskrit am] and Pāli and Patna te.) The recensionally later Udānavarga text reads this pāda: ubhau hi tau pretya samau niruktau. This demonstrates the redactor’s efforts to make the verse better Sanskrit. It was impossible for the Subaśi redactor to retain Middle Indic pi as Sanskrit api, since this would have resulted in unmetrical *ubhāv api, a problem the later redactor solves with ubhau hi. However, even though he is basically writing Sanskrit, the Subaśi redactor seems to have been happy with bhavanti (also in the Middle Indic versions) with a dual subject, which the later Udānavarga redactor found unacceptable, replacing the finite verb with niruktau, as again Brough pointed out.
suggests a preterite. Note that the use of *bzhin probably indicates a
sense of duration, such that the two actions of doing (something) and
saying (“I didn’t do it”) are simultaneous. We will return to this below.
Let us see what we can make of the Gândhàrì and Sanskrit texts of
pàda b.

Both the Gândhàrì and the Sanskrit agree in having, like the Pàli, a
present tense finite verb. But whereas the Pàli and Patna Dharmapada
have a first person form, karomi, Gândhàrì and Sanskrit present the
third person karoti. This is hard to understand; who is the agent of
karoti, if not the speaker of äha? But if so, the form should be karomi.
However, it may be that these questions of tense and person are
connected. Concerning this problem, Brough (1962: 258) wrote as
follows:

Although the precise form can only be guessed, there need be no doubt
that the verse started its career with a verb in a past tense. There is thus
no occasion to consider karomi here as a “timeless” present — and still
less justification to render it as an English present; for why should a
man go to hell for telling the truth?12 Most probable would be an aorist,
na karaµti åha; or perhaps we should spell it n’akaraµ, since this
aorist normally preserves its augment. After the aorist has come to be
felt archaic, karomi, first as an explanation, and then as a replacement,
leads directly to the Pàli readings. In the Prakrit, the same original
would be expected to appear as n=akaru (or n=akaro) di åha, inevitably
to be misunderstood as in the U[dånavarga], na karoti. For the Prakrit,
an imperfect *akaroµ < akaravaµ would have given the same result.
There is of course no means of deciding, in the absence of other
examples, whether the Prakrit was still correctly understood when our
manuscript was written, and it is possible that the transcription here
should be karo di.

Brough appears to suggest that pàda b as initially composed had as
its finite verb an aorist: akaraµ. This was then negated: na + akaraµ,
whence nåkaraµ before (i)ti åha. Written in or transmitted through a
script such as Kharoṣṭhì in which vowel length is generally not

12I confess that Brough’s point here is obscure to me.
marked, this would produce *nakaraµ ti åha*, then understood as *na karaµ ti åha*. With final "am" expressed as "a" (through "u"), and voicing of intervocalic -t-, this would lead to *na karo di åha > na karodi åha = na karoti åha*, when *karo* was no longer understood as preserving a first person aorist. As an alternative hypothesis, Brough suggests the imperfect *akaravaµ*, which written with Middle Indic -o- for -ava- would appear as *akarom*.

Carter and Palihawadana (1987: 491) express their unhappiness with Brough’s approach in the following terms:

> [T]he ancientness of the present tense form is proved by [the Patna Dharmapada] 114, which too has *na karamiti åha*, and the old MSS of [Udānavarga] (viii, 1), which have *na karamiti pråha* and *na karoti åha* (see Bernhard [1965] p. 161). Obviously, what prompts [Brough] to suspect the reading and suggest complex alternatives to it is the idea that the present tense does not make good sense here. This is an assumption that can be questioned. Perhaps the composer of the verse had in mind the offender who defensively says that he “does not do” (present tense) that kind of thing?

Why might Brough have felt the need of a preterite finite verb, and is such a sense justified? Carter and Palihawadana’s suggestion that “the composer of the verse had in mind the offender who defensively says that he ‘does not do’ (present tense) that kind of thing” is hardly convincing. There are, however, grammatical grounds for doubting the need for a past tense verb form.

In the expression *yo cåpi katvå na karomi cåha*, the action of saying (åha) “*na karomi*” seems to follow the action indicated by the gerund katvå. According to Speyer (1886 § 380), “in its most common employment the gerund may be said to do duty as a past participle of the active…. As a rule, it denotes the prior of two actions, performed by

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13 It seems that the long å in this verse is the only instance in the Gândhârî (Khotan) Dharmapada. See Glass 2000 § 1.1.1.
14 See Brough 1962 §§ 21, 75.
15 In fact all that the ms in question LB279 preserves is //*[rom]t[ë pra]h[ä]; see Bernhard 1965.
the same subject.” The same is true in Middle Indic; as Hendriksen (1944: 112-16, §41) has detailed, the Pāli gerund may indicate “that the action expressed by the gerund in time precedes that of the principal verb”, this being its ordinary usage. However, this is not always and necessarily the case. Hendriksen goes on to explain that “[s]ometimes the gerund indicates what is simultaneous with the principal verb”, and indeed the same holds true of Sanskrit (Speyer 1886 §381). If we understand the relation of gerund and finite verb aha to be one of simultaneity, it would be possible to understand the present tense of the quoted “na karomī”, and to translate the phrase “while doing something, one says/claims, [‘I am not doing [it.’]” With this extremely awkward bracketing of the quotation marks I seek to emphasize that the text as we have it here has, in fact, no formal indication of quotation, that being one of its difficult points. Regarding the other feature of this translation, we recall here that the simultaneity of the verbs appears also to have been intended by the Tibetan translation quoted above by its use of bzhin. Despite this possibility, however, such gymnastics may not be necessary.

As Speyer (1886: 244, §325) points out with reference to Pāṇini 3.2.120, 121, a present tense may indicate a “near past”. He refers to the example cited in the Kāśikāvytti as follows:16 “If one asks ‘have you made the mat?’, the answer may be, when using na, na karomi or nākārṣam ‘no, I have not’, or if an interrogation, ‘have I not?’” This suggests that there can be no formal grammatical objection against the use of the present karomi, understood as conveying a recently completed action; it would make good sense in our sentence, and be acceptable even by the norms of Pāṇinian Sanskrit.17 This could explain either why the sentence could have been composed using a present finite verb in the first place, or why once the verb was rewritten in a present finite

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16nasābde nusābde copapade prṣṭaprativacane vibhāṣā lapraiyayo bhavati bhūte | akāṛṣhā kaṭaṃ devadatta | na karomi bhoh | nākārṣam | ahaṃ nu karomi | ahaṃ nu akārṣam ||

17See also Bechert 1958.
form it was not judged objectionable. In spite of the seeming elegance of this proposed solution, it is merely partial. The third person karoti in the Gândhârî and Sanskrit versions remains unexplained, as does the employment of na karomi āha without any quotative iti. Brough’s hypothesis hints at a relation between these two problems.

In looking for an original first person past verb form, Brough postulated an original first person aorist akaram, from which he judged akaro to be a phonetic development. While this is not entirely impossible, such an aorist in Gândhârî would probably have developed into *akare.18 More problematic, however, is his suggestion that akaro represents the imperfect akaravam > *akaron > *akaro. In the first place, as discussed by Oskar von Hinüber (2001: §479), the imperfect is almost totally vanished from Middle Indic. Secondly, -ava- is not known to become -o- before -m in either Old or Middle Indic (email from Oskar von Hinüber 7 March 2008). This suggests that the former possibility of an aorist is considerably more likely than the latter explanation, although neither is supported by strong evidence.

However we might account for the form of the verb, much can be explained by postulating a form (a)karō(m), which would have been followed by an iti, written ti as is normal in Middle Indic. When this ti was attached to the preceding (a)karo, it was not recognized as an independent phonological unit. Hence the -t- which came after a now lost word boundary was voiced, yielding (a)karodi. Since the tendency to voice intervocalic stops is responsible for the development -t- > -d-, we would ordinarily expect that aka- would have become aga-. It seems that *agaron would also have been possible, but at least with -k- this voicing does not always take place.19

What of the augment prefixed to the hypothesized akaram > akaro? The resulting sequence *nāka- in the pāda yo yavi kitva nakarodi āha creates an unusual scansion. The pāda would most

18According to a personal communication from Stefan Baums, aorists in Gândhârî mostly develop -aṃ > e, although -aṃ > o cannot be ruled out.
19See Brough 1962, §38.
normally scan – – – – – – – as a standard triśubh. Recalling that Gāndhāri written in Kharoṣṭhi script normally does not indicate vowel length, we must keep in mind that what is written a may contextually be understood as ā or ā. The meter is then, first of all, evidence that we should write yavi rather than Brough’s ya vi, as noted above, since normal scansion would yield an equivalent to cāpi, giving the first sequence – – –. The next sequence kitva scans – –, providing the caesura here after the fifth syllable. Subsequently we would normally expect – – –. Were the text to read *nākaro di (even if actually written nakaro di), we would have instead – – –. That is, the break would be – – – rather than the expected – – –. It is true that two (actually one, since the pādas are identical) examples of this scansion do appear in the Gāndhāri (Khotan) Dharmapada (190d = 191d), but it is unlikely that this is a metrical possibility here.20

A secondary issue is how the form would be written, and whether we should expect hiatus. We do see it elsewhere in the same Gāndhāri (Khotan) Dharmapada manuscript in verse 19c na adi’adi = nādiyati, 209a/210a na apu mañe’a = māppamaññetha, 235a na abhaśamaṇa = nābhāsamaṇāṇaṃ, and so on. At the same time, it is absent in 62b nadi-mañadi = nātimaññati, 197c naśubhavadi = nānubhavanti, 274d naśuvadadi = nānupatanti, 337d naśuṇpadi for nānuttappati, and so on. Therefore, the way of writing cannot be relevant to this problem. Whether we understand n’aka° or na ka°, if we see a sandhi of na + aka° here, the result is metrically faulty. This metrical difficulty, then, seems to argue against the one-time existence of an aorist with augment.

It is, however, possible that an unaugmented form was used. Although the augment is obligatory in chaste classical Sanskrit, unaugmented forms are found in Epic Sanskrit and under some conditions in Pāli.21 I do not think the situation in Gāndhāri has yet been clarified. In

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20 For a detailed discussion of the meter of this text, see Glass 2001. I am grateful to the author for sharing it with me, and for his advice in this regard.
light of these usages, it would be possible to imagine a situation in which the metrical fault caused by the long ā of nāka° could have been avoided through the use of an original augmentless aorist, karom. Either because of accidental omission of the anusvāra, or because it was felt to be erroneous when ti (for iti) was understood to be -ti as the third person singular ending of karoti, the text came to be transmitted in the form na karoti. Subsequently, the third person form was felt anomalous, because of its position as quoted speech, and replaced easily by the metrically equivalent first person karom. Moreover, the juxtaposition of two finite verbs, the quoted karom and the following āha was also felt irregular, and ‘corrected’ by insertion of (according to this scenario, secondary) iti. Through normal phonological development this came to be reduced as follows: iti > ti > ty (preceding āha) > cc > c, various stages of this process being evidenced in different versions of pāda b, or in different readings within the Pāli tradition itself.

There is currently no direct evidence that would positively confirm the postulation of an original preterite in the phrase in question. But I believe that such a hypothesis best accounts for the variously attested forms of the pāda.

A passage in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya may shed further light on the problem. It is important to notice that the context of the expression to be quoted below is precisely the same as that in the Dhammapada, namely in forming part of a discussion of the problem of lies. We find the following stated in regard to the issue of stipulations regarding acceptable speech (Pradhan 1975: 218.9–14):

atha kasmāt mṛśāvādād viratir evopāsakasaṁvaraśīkṣāpadāṁ na paśiṁyādīviratīḥ |...

mṛśāvādaprāsanāgac ca sarvaśīkṣāvyātikrame | (34ab)
sarvacca hi śīkṣātikrame samanuvajyamānasyopasitām idam bhavati
nāham evam akārṣām22 iti mṛśāvādasya prāsānto bhavati |

22Pradhan prints abhārṣam, which is corrected here with Funahashi 1987: 192, n. 1, who refers to Tib. ma byas so and Chinese 不作. Without access to the manuscript, I do not know whether abhārṣam is a genuine reading or a misprint.
Why is only the abstention from lying speech [listed as] a rule of behavior of the layman’s vows, not the abstention from slander and the rest? …

And because if he violated all [the other] rules of behavior, he would necessarily lie about it. [34ab]

For whenever he has violated a rule of behavior, it would occur that, being questioned about it, [he would respond]: “I didn’t act like that!” inevitably resulting in lying speech.

Here the phrase nāham evam akāśam iti parallels precisely the expression of interest to us. The verb here is a first person aorist. This cannot prove the speculation that the original form of the Dharmapada verse contained a preterite, much less an aorist. It does, however, illustrate that at least the author of the Abhidharmakāśabhyāsa felt that an appropriate expression of precisely this sentiment in precisely this context would be expressed in the aorist. Almost needless to say, the denial of responsibility for the action, this denial constituting the lie in question, must have been expressed in the first person as direct speech. It is correspondingly likely that Brough’s explanation for the development of the present forms, in both persons, is correct. Originally in first person, they came to be (mis)understood as in third person, then reconfigured to first person to account for the circumstance that they are quoted in direct speech. The employment of the first person present form is thus tertiary. The verse as originally conceived is likely to have had a first person unaugmented aorist, recast through error as a third person present. The Gāndhāri (Khotan) Dharmapada and the Subaśī Udānavarga preserve, in different forms or phases, this secondary stage. This uncomfortable reading was ultimately reformulated, this time through conscious and intentional revision, into the first person present found in the Pāli Dhammapada and Patna Dharmapada.

What can we learn from all of this? Or put another way, what might be the goal to which I referred at the beginning of this essay?

\[\text{in Pradhan’s edition. However, in some North Indian scripts } k \text{ and } h \text{ can be confused. I am grateful to Harunaga Isaacson for discussion on this point.}\]
There is no doubt that the task the modern editors of the Gāndhāri, Patna and Subaši texts set for themselves was, quite appropriately, merely the establishment of the most reliable diplomatic edition of the single available manuscript of their respective texts. Any remarks about the history of the text or suggested better readings were to be relegated to notes. In an ideal world, the task of editors of “the” Pāli Dhammapada is — or should be — different. In this case, assuming that such an editor believes in the unity of the text, a first task is to determine what sort of edition is to be produced. Since there is no one traditional and “canonical” version of the text, but rather manuscript evidence containing, *inter alia*, variant readings, the first task of an editor is to decide what he or she wishes the edition to (re)present. As far as I know, few editors of Indian Buddhist texts so far have explicitly discussed this question in a scientific manner. As far as the Dhammapada is concerned, however, we are in a somewhat better situation than usual. In the notes to his translation, which in some sense can be seen as also constituting his notes to the edition he published together with von Hינüber, Norman has given extensive discussions of text critical problems. However, while he renounced any idea of recreating, reconstructing or discovering an Ur-Dhammapada, he did not correspondingly explicitly address the question of what sort of edition of the Dhammapada he did aim for. And this may be because this is a question very difficult to answer. If what one seeks is not some proto-text, what criteria guide the choice of one reading over another? If, as in the case of the verse under discussion here, it can well be argued that the metrically correct (or more common, or less idiosyncratic) reading chosen by the editors reflects (nothing more than?) a late attempt to salvage something from an even worse situation, should the editors merely go ahead and print this attested but otherwise problematic reading? Or should the editors attempt to restore a historically more justified text, even if they know that they cannot reach far enough back to create something “original”? If they conclude that competing but equally faulty “traditional” readings are found in their sources, how are
they to choose what to print? In fact, editors may well conclude, as I would suggest is in fact the case in our verse, that the early and meaningful shape of the verse was lost already by the time the text was (re)cast in Pāli. In such a case, is an editor justified in printing any reading at all? Or should the conclusion rather be that the best that can be achieved is the compilation of a set of materials, with explanatory annotation, pointing to the solution or possible solutions of a crux which the materials at hand do not permit one to resolve? Would this not better be seen as renunciation of the task of editor than as demonstrating scientific restraint? These questions and more cannot be avoided by a serious student of this literature. Seen in this light, the long history of attention to the Dharmapada literature should surely not be understood as signaling that all fundamental questions, much less small difficulties, have been addressed. Rather, I suspect that the more we dig, the more we will find quite the opposite to be true.

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Page 412, lines 19–20: Read father for father’s wife
Page 414, line 5: Read 8 August for 2 June
Page 414, line 21: Read 1951 for 1937
Page 415, line 15: Read 1951 for 1935
Page 415, note 23, line 1: Read två for tv
Page 416, note 29, line 4: Read ansåg for ansåg
Page 418, note 32, lines 4–5: Read rkh assimilerat, å förkortat [framför] gruppen for > rkh assimilerat, å förkortat [framför] gruppen
Page 418, note 32, line 13: Read märkha for markha
Page 418, note 32, line 20: Read tjockskalle for tjurskalle
Page 418, note 32, line 22: Read Turuška, som lär for Turaska, som
Page 419, note 35, line 4: Read förvaras for férvaras
Page 419, note 36, lines 1–13: Read “Kommentaren vet i allmänhet bra besked ... men jag blir mer och mer övertygad om att det finns två sorters pali: en sort som talades av Buddha och skrevs av Buddha-ghosa, tikakårarna, Aggavamsa, Moggalåna och andra theraer och förstod och lästes av Fausböll och Trenckner mfl. detta är första sortens pali; den andra sortens pali är smidigare och mer ägnat att uttrycka kristendomens grundläror och Epikuros filosofi — det är den komparativa religionsforskningens pali, det talas bl.a. i Lund; det är ett lyckligt språk, för dess ordförråd är ringa och det besväras icke av någon grammatik.”
Page 419, note 36, lines 2–5 (“Käre Per, ... Din tillgivne Gunnar.”) are to be deleted.

Postscriptum: Page 420, immediately after line 1: Having re-read Smith’s letter to Nils Simonsson again and again and discussed it with several colleagues, I have become sure that Helmer Smith, one of the

most outstanding scholars of Pāli, cannot have been serious in this letter addressed to N. Simonsson. It had probably nothing to do with local patriotism. Smith simply tried to make fun of Jarring, Simonsson, and certain historians of religion in Lund by making these extremely odd statements.

Siegfried Lienhard
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PTS Research Grants

In keeping with the aim of the Pali Text Society to foster and promote the study of Pali texts, the Council of the PTS invites applications for PTS Research Grants from suitably qualified persons working in the field of Pāli studies. Applicants’ research will normally be expected to lead towards material suitable for publication by the PTS, and conditions of any grant awarded will be that the PTS has first option on the publication rights of the research and holds the copyright of any material it publishes.

Applications should be submitted by 28 February and 31 August of each year for consideration by the Council of the PTS in March and September respectively. Applicants are asked to submit (1) a statement briefly outlining their research project (two A4 pages with an appendix if necessary) clearly stating the purpose of their research, indicating a timetable for its completion, and stating whether they will be working on the project full-time or part-time, (2) a CV, (3) the names of two academic referees, (4) a statement of their financial circumstances. Grants will not normally be awarded to those in full-time academic employment.

Grants may be awarded to cover a period of research (full-time or part-time) up to a maximum of one year, but with a possibility of renewal. Applications should be sent either by email (pts@palitext.com) or by post to the President of the Pali Text Society, c/o CPI Antony Rowe — Melksham, Unit 4 Pegasus Way, Bowerhill Industrial Estate, Melksham, Wilts, SN12 6 TR, U.K.