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EXPLORING THE SADDANĪTI

1. Introduction

Grammars may be considered the absolute fringe of literature. Nevertheless, they go straight to the core of language — the medium in which literature is presented — and reveal a great deal about what those who wrote them thought about their own language, about language in general, and about their literature. Moreover, if a grammar becomes influential it will inevitably affect not only the composition of subsequent literature but also the way in which earlier literature is perceived, in much the same manner that David Lodge must have had in mind when he had one of the characters in his novel Small World write a thesis on the influence of T.S. Eliot on Shakespeare.

Devoted to the study of their canon, Theravāda Buddhists produced a number of grammars of the Pāli language. The Kaccāyanavākarana or Kaccāyanappakaranā, named after its author Kaccāyana about whom we know nothing, was composed in Ceylon some time after Buddhaghosa, who clearly does not know of it, and before its earliest known commentary, the Mukhamattadipani, written in probably the eleventh century. It is obviously influenced by the Pāñinian

* First and foremost I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. K.R. Norman who asked me to lecture on the Saddaniti during the academic year 1989–90. My sincere thanks are also due to the other two faithful auditors of those lectures, Drs M. Cone and J.D. Smith. The three of them provided extremely valuable criticism, thoughtful suggestions, and indispensable encouragement. Furthermore, I would like to thank Prof. Norman for patiently and generously answering the many queries I have had in the course of writing this essay. Last but not least I gratefully thank Dr J.W. Benson who read through a previous draft and offered valuable comments. The no doubt numerous errors and inaccuracies which still remain are of course my own responsibility, as are the interpretations and views put forward.

tradition and by the Kātantra. The Kaccāyana grammar triggered off a long tradition of commentaries, as well as a series of expanded, revised versions of it such as the Rūpasiddhi and the Bālāvatāra.

Later another school emerged in Ceylon, a school separate from that of Kaccāyana, through the work of Moggallāna or Moggalāyana who composed his Moggallānavyākarana or Saddalakkhana during the reign of Parakkamabāhu in Anurādhapura, that is, some time between 1153 and 1186. K.R. Norman (1983:165), referring to G.P. Malalasekara (1928:186), informs us that the colophon of the work says that it was composed after Parakkamabāhu had purged the Sangha of all heretical monks, an event which can be dated to 1165. Drawing upon earlier Pāli grammars and the sources built upon by them, the Moggallānavyākarana is also heavily influenced by Candragomin.

As a third major work on Pāli grammar we find the Saddanīti of Aggavamsa. According to M.H. Bode (1909:16), this Burmese monk completed his monumental work in the kingdom of Pagan in the year 1154. Bode also claims that the work was taken to Ceylon: “A few years after its completion the therä (‘elder’) Uttarājīva left Pagan and crossed the sea to visit the celebrated Mahāvihāra, taking with him a copy of the Saddanīti, which was received with enthusiastic admiration, and declared superior to any work of the kind written by Śiṅhalese scholars” (ibid.:17). It may seem surprising that such a celebrated work did not

1 See R.O. Franke 1902:14–20; Norman 1983:163. L. Renou (1957:129), on the other hand, points out that Kaccāyana’s adherence to the Kātantra “n’est pas constante”.

2 M.C. Duroiselle (1905:147, note 1) informs us that Forchhammer gives the year as 1156 but claims that Aggavamsa himself gives the date as 1154. Recently, Tin Lwin (1991?) has queried this, claiming that “nowhere in the Saddanīti it is given its dates” and that the introductory gāthās are missing in all manuscripts available to us (p. 124). He concludes, somewhat confusingly, that the Saddanīti “should be placed towards the end of the reign of Caṅśī II (1173–1210) or during the first half of the thirteenth century” (p. 126). Intriguing though it is, this claim would require a more detailed argumentation to be conclusive.

3 Malalasekara (1928:185) gives the Sāsanavamsa as the source for this, and states (ibid.:196): “It was about this time, somewhere about the beginning of

form a separate school and that no Pāli commentary on it is known to us. The only thing that resembles a commentary on it is its Burmese nissaya, a translation type of commentary paraphrasing the Pāli text while adding additional information in Burmese.

While no Pāli commentary on the Saddanīti exists, at least the text itself was made beautifully accessible to modern scholars through the critical edition of Helmer Smith (1928–30) which he supplemented with two volumes of tables (1949–66), comprising lists of texts quoted (index locorum), suttas (index aphorismorum), verbal roots (index radicum), various elements of word formation (index formantum), the very useful conspectus terminorum and metricorum, and an index to the whole work (index verborum), which, however, he did not complete. Once again the Saddanīti was well received and highly praised, this time by modern scholars. Thus, for example, W. Geiger (1916:37 [§50]): “Eine besondere Stellung in der Wertschätzung der Heimischen Überlieferung nimmt die Saddanīti des Aggavamsa ein”; B.C. Law (1933:636, note 1): “It is no doubt a standard work on Pāli grammar and philology”; A.K. Warder (1963:383): “The finest and most comprehensive grammar, and standard authority on all questions of grammatical analysis”; K.R. Norman (1983:164): “The greatest of extant Pāli grammars is the Saddanīti”. The only dissident voice in this chorus of unanimous praise was that of Franke (1902). It is therefore surprising that the Saddanīti has attracted so little attention among modern scholars, in much the same way

Parākrama’s regime in A.D. 1165, that the Elder Uttarajīva left Pagan to visit the celebrated Mahāvihāra, taking with him, as we saw, a copy of Aggavamsa’s great work, the Pāli Grammar, Sadda-nīti.”

1 Bode (1909:93) claims that Paññāsāmi, author of the Sāsanavamsa, “at the request of ‘many of his hearers’ ... wrote a Pāli commentary on the first Pāli work that had brought honour to Burmese scholarship, the Saddanīti”. Nowhere else have I seen any reference to such a commentary and, in fact, I doubt whether such a work ever existed since Paññāsāmi wrote as late as the latter half of the 19th century. It seems rather unlikely that so late a work should have vanished without trace.

2 The last part (V:2) was completed by N. Simonsson in 1966 on the basis of notes left behind by Smith.
as it failed to produce any Pāli commentary or to form any separate school of grammar.

To my knowledge the only Western work published on the Saddanīti before Smith’s edition is that of Franke (1902:45–52) who discussed the author, the character of the work, and its sources. The obvious limitation of Franke’s work is that it is based on the ākhyaṭakappa (pariccheda 25) alone. Working from notes left behind by the late Helmer Smith, N. Simonsson completed the last index volume of Smith’s work in 1966. After that I am aware of only three publications dealing with the Saddanīti in more than passing. A.K. Warder (1967:66–68) translated two short passages pertaining to metrical problems, and Y. Ojihara (1971), with a ‘note préliminaire’ by C. Caillat, compared a chapter of the Saddanīti (kībbidhānakappa, pariccheda 26) with ‘données pâninéennes’. Ojihara’s work deals mainly in equating sūtras or giving text references and contains no discussion of the material. Recently, my attention was drawn to an article by Tin Lwin (1991?) which gives a brief, general introduction on the Saddanīti, including its date and authorship. I am aware that extensive work on the Saddanīti has been carried out by G. Gren-Eklund in Uppsala. With characteristically profound scholarship she has also taken the trouble of mastering the Burmese nissaya, a source I am not able to make use of myself. It is to be hoped that she will publish her work in the near future.

That so little work has been done on the Saddanīti is particularly surprising when one considers how important the text is not only for determining the state of Pāli language and scholarship in twelfth century Burma but also for diagnosing the effect it may have had on the transmission of the Pāli canon and the composition of subsequent Pāli literature. At the time of Aggavamsa the Āṭṭhakathās were written, but probably not all the Ṭīkās, and certainly not the later Ṭīkās (the Navaṭīkās) and the Anuṭīkās. To my knowledge H. Smith was the first to formulate this point very clearly (1928:VI):

C’est donc dans la conviction que notre pali est une fonction de celui du 12ème siècle — et que la connaissance de la philologie birmane et singalaise de ladite époque est indispensable à qui voudra remonter, à travers la recension Buddhaghosa-Dhammapāla, à un pali d’intérêt linguistique —, que j’ai entrepris l’étude de la norme pali enseignée par Aggavamsa dans les trois volumes qui forment la Saddanīti.1

This requires the assumption that the text is a reasonably independent work dealing with genuinely existing language from the canon and that the work was influential. This links up with another severe problem pertaining to transmission. Sometimes one traces a quotation to some canonical text only to discover that in our version of the canon it appears in a slightly different form. It is thus often difficult to determine what is a quotation and what is not. By implication this leads on to the problem of determining when Aggavamsa adduces examples of genuine Pāli usage and when he constructs examples to fit a particular grammatical phenomenon in Sanskrit. If Pāli grammarians could twist language to suit their rules, a detailed study of their grammars would be important for our studies of Buddhism and its literature.

When I first read Otto Franke’s Geschichte und Kritik der einheimischen Pāli-Grammatik und -Lexicographie (Franke 1902) my reaction to his treatment of Aggavamsa’s Saddanīti was one of slight irritation. How could he base his evaluation on so small a sample of this monumental work? At the time I had read only bits and pieces of the Saddanīti. Now I have read more, and in what follows I am going to do something very similar to what Franke did. I shall examine in detail pariccheda 22, the kārakakappa, of the third part of the text, the

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1 See Franke 1902:46, note 1. He based his work on a palm leaf Ms. in the India Office Library which contains just this pariccheda.


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1 Quoted also by Caillat 1971:84 and referred to by Norman 1983:6, 165. See also O. v. Hinüber 1978.
Suttamālā. The first part, the Padamālā, which presents its material in the form of an elaborate commentary on bhū sattāyām, the opening entry of a Pāṇiniya dhātupāṭha, deals in considerable detail with the morphology of Pāli. The second, the Dhātumālā, is a dhātupāṭha in eight gaṇas with meaning entries and a commentary with examples of derivatives allegedly attested in the canon. The Suttamālā then is a sūtrapāṭha, giving its material in the style of Indian grammars, that is, in the form of 1347 short rules, with a commentary, vṛtti (vutti). This arrangement means that lots of the material is given twice or thrice, a circumstance which does not necessarily imply that the work is three times as good, only that it is extremely bulky. If the sheer volume of the Saddanīti is taken into consideration, it goes without saying that I can only deal with a small sample section here. I have chosen a chapter from the Suttamālā because this part of the work is more technical and traditional in its presentation and thus lends itself to a more stringent analysis and comparison with other works on Sanskrit and Pāli grammar. I have chosen the section on kārakas because of its recognised importance in Pāṇinian grammar.

In pursuing this investigation I want to raise one basic question: What kind of a grammar is the Saddanīti? Is it a good grammar? This immediately triggers the question: What is a good grammar anyway? I am inclined, for example, to consider a grammar a good grammar if it takes into consideration many facts about a language as possible and treats them in a systematic and economic way. Smith, who edited the text and thus no doubt knew it better than any other Western scholar, refers to ‘la système de la Saddanīti’ (1928:VI, note 2). Is there such a system? Smith also calls it ‘un cours complet de Palie’ (1928:VI). Is it? Or is it an open-ended treatment of linguistic facts from the canon in the form of a slavish parroting of Sanskrit grammars and Pāli grammars based upon them so that it basically treats Pāli as Sanskrit? O.H. Pind (1990:217–18) suggests, with reference to an example offered in the Kaccāyanavutti, that “we are dealing with a tradition which aimed at illustrating the rules of Pāli, not merely by means of Pāli translations of examples taken over directly from Sanskrit grammar, but through genuine canonical quotations. This tendency reached its peak with Aggavamsa, who is claimed, by the author of the Kaccāyanavanāṇanā, to have based his grammar on the Pāli” (my emphasis). Once more, the question here is to what extent they found Pāli quotations to suit their rules or whether they really wrote their grammars on the basis of the Pāli canon. And this leads to the most fundamental question of all: What purpose was the Saddanīti meant to serve?

All these questions, moreover, link up with the question of influence, so I will in what follows also try to investigate in detail possible sources for the grammatical statements Aggavamsa brings forward. Already Franke (1902:50) pointed out the strong influence of Kaccāyana and the fact that Aggavamsa made use of “der in Senart’s Kacc.-Ausz. mitgedruckte Comm. in seiner ganzen Ausdehnung”. Smith (1928:VI), on the other hand, stresses that the Padamālā is a ‘critique assez sévère des préceptes de Kaccāyana’. But there can be no doubt that Aggavamsa was strongly indebted to Kaccāyana in as much as he included all of the Kaccāyana rules and most of the vṛtti in the Suttamālā. Franke (ibid.:51) claims influence also from Mogalgāna, but this becomes more than doubtful if the Saddanīti was composed in 1154 and Mogalgāna wrote after 1165.

Among Sanskrit sources Franke (ibid.:51–52) claims that Aggavamsa drew on Pāṇini and the Kāśikāvṛtti and that he at least knew the Kātantra, or, in Franke’s own words, ‘das Kātantra hat Aggav. mindestens gekannt’. But that is not certain if Aggavamsa relied heavily on Kaccāyana and Kaccāyana knew the Kātantra. This, again, brings up the difficult question of transmission: In what form did Pāli authors have access to previous works? When they quote a text they sometimes quote

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1 I take this commentary to be a vṛtti included by the author himself, in the very same manner as Aggavamsa has written a vṛtti on his own rules in the Saddanīti. Aggavamsa considers the vṛtti to be by Kaccāyana and thus part of the text. This is evident from the fact that he quotes from the vṛtti and refers the quotation to Kaccāyana, e.g. 699,2 (cf. 2.6.1.11 below).

it in a form slightly different from the one in which we have it. Were they quoting from memory and making mistakes, were they simply sloppy, or did they have a different text? And in the case of the grammarians quoting from Sanskrit works, did they have access to the texts themselves or to someone around them saying: ‘I read that text twenty years ago and seem to remember ... ’. The attitude towards other grammarians did not change that much from Buddhaghosa to Aggavamsa. They both had some knowledge of the works of the Sanskrit grammarians, but not necessarily any systematic or full knowledge. Thus, when C. Caillat (1971:83) points to L. Renou’s invitation ‘à déterminer exactement comment, et dans quelle mesure, les descriptions anciennes du sanskrit ont été imitées par les docteurs des écoles grammaticales palies et prakrites dans les traités qu’ils ont consacrés au moyen-indien’, she raises a complex issue indeed. And important as this task is, I can at present see no solution to the problems involved. But a text should certainly be investigated with these questions in mind.

In the case of the Saddaniti we also have to consider the fact that the Burmese were probably familiar with Sanskrit before Pâli came their way. Duroiselle (1905:147, note 1) describes the situation as follows:

On a des raisons de penser que le sanskrit fut connu en Birmanie avant le pâli. Le birman du Xe et du XIe siècles, alors que le pâli venait tout récemment d’être importé de Thaton à Pagan et n’était connu que de l’élite des moines, ne laisse aucun doute à cet égard: car dans les inscriptions de l’époque se rencontrent des mots clairement dérivés du sanskrit, et non pas seulement des termes techniques, mais des mots qui devaient être déjà d’un usage courant, tels que, par exemple, prassad, du skt. prâsâda, le pâli étant pâsâda; Sakrâ = skt. Śakra (p. Sakka). Après son introduction, le pâli fut étudié avec ardeur, et le premier fruit de ces études, un siècle environ après la chute de Thaton, fut le Saddaniti, une grammaire du Tipitaka est la plus comprenensive qui existe. ... Il est donc plausible de supposer que le sanskrit existait à Pagan dès le XIe siècle au moins et y était scientifiquement étudié avant le pâli, puisque le premier ouvrage en cette langue écrit en Birmanie se fonde sur la grammaire sanskrite pour expliquer quelques formes pâliées.

What bearing did this have on their knowledge of vyākarana and what impact did this have on their analysis of Pâli texts and their composition of grammatical works?

When I carry out this investigation of the kārakakappa I sincerely hope that my interpretations, conclusions, challenges, and — no doubt — errors, will instigate future work on the Saddaniti. Quotations from the text are based upon Smith’s edition but I do not follow him slavishly with regard to punctuation and the many typographical devices used by him to indicate how, in his opinion, the text should be read. Apart from the fact that his indications are sometimes unintelligible, this is reading too much into the text, and I do not consider that part of an editor’s duties. Any major deviations will of course be pointed out. Moreover, Smith quite often marks something as an untraced quotation. Since he does not indicate whether this is due to his own intuition or whether they are marked as quotations in the Burmese nissaya, and because Aggavamsa often constructs examples ad hoc, I have for the most part not indicated these potential quotations but left that to the judgment of the reader. References are either to page and line or to paragraph number in Smith’s edition. Since the Saddaniti is difficult to make sense of in many places I have stuck to a very literal style in my translations.
1.1 kāraka:

In Pāṇinian grammar the term kāraka (lit.: ‘doer; accomplisher’) applies to direct participants in actions.1 Such participants are assigned to a set of six kāraka categories which in Pāṇini’s grammar are defined in the following order:2 apādāna ‘stable point when there is movement away’, sampradāna ‘recipient; indirect goal’;3 karāṇa ‘instrument’, adhikaraṇa ‘locus’, karman ‘object; goal’, and kārtr ‘agent’. Moreover, a subcategory of agent is defined, namely hetu, the causal agent. The abstract syntactic level at which kārakas are introduced in the grammar serves to mediate between the levels of semantics and morphology. By this device Pāṇini is able to account for the relationship between possible semantic choices on the side of the speaker and some basic features of Sanskrit syntax and morphology. In practice, the advantage is that at the abstract syntactic level of kārakas these structures can be treated as identical and thus share operations. For example, a passive sentence is in no way derived from an active sentence. Both are simply alternative manifestations of what at the underlying abstract kāraka level is represented as the same idea. This means that in the process of derivation the starting point is semantics, semantics here including such features as past, present, and future time, active, passive or stative voice, and the participants in actions.

Such participants in actions are, at the level of kāraka syntax, assigned to particular kāraka-categories. In a similar way the set of la-kāras, a set of ten suffixes marked with a diacritic L, are introduced after verbal roots at the same abstract level. At this level all verbal endings can be said to signify agents and objects in relation to activities and can thus be treated according to what they at this level have in common. By rule 3.4.69 lah karnā ca bhāve cākarmakebhayaḥ an L-suffix is added to a verbal root to denote — in addition to the agent (kartari, rule 3.4.67) — the object, or, in the case of verbal roots which are objectless (akarmaka, that is, intransitive verbs), the mere activity expressed by the verbal root (bhāva, lit.: ‘being’). Moreover, these L-suffixes serve to mark tenses. For example, rule 3.2.110 lūn teaches that the aorist L-suffix laN is added after a verbal root (3.1.91 dhātou) when the action refers to the general past (3.2.84 bhūte). These abstract L-suffixes are subsequently replaced by finite verbal endings or by participial suffixes.

When the relevant semantic choices have been considered on the side of the speaker, the abstract syntactic level of kārakas and la-kāras is sorted out. The correct distribution of case endings and finite verbal endings is then accounted for in the surface syntax of a Sanskrit sentence by means of operational rules. By letting sentences be subject to shared operations at the abstract syntactic level, Pāṇini is able to account for the relationship between semantics and case endings, between sentences with finite verbs in the active, passive or impersonal passive (stative) voice, and between sentences containing finite verbs and nominal sentences. Moreover, he succeeds in accounting for syntactic problems pertaining to such areas as control1 and ellipsis.2

An example may serve to clarify this. Consider the following sentences: puruṣo vrksam chinatti, ‘the man is cutting the tree’, and puruśena vrksaś chidyate, ‘the tree is being cut by the man’. To end up at one or the other of these surface levels, derivation proceeds through three

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3 As G. Cardona has rightly pointed out (1976:340, note 273; 1988:168–69), the terms apādāna and sampradāna do not easily lend themselves to any one translation. The apādāna category, for example, includes a stable point when there is movement away, an object of fear, etc.

1 That is, the problem of accounting for the implied agents and objects of non-finite verbal form such as absolutives and infinitives. Consider, for example, the shift of agent in the case of absolutives as illustrated by the two English sentences: ‘Having arrived in the village, John cooked the rice’, and ‘Having arrived in the village, the rice was cooked by John’.
2 That is, the problems arising from the fact that words may be elided in sentences, as for example in sa vrksam chinatti and vrksam chinatti, both meaning ‘he cuts the tree’.
stages. My intention here is simply to give the skeleton of the procedure, so I do not list the rules which map level (1) onto level (2) or level (2) onto level (3), nor do I list the conditions which affect these rules at level (2) and level (3).

(1) Semantic level introducing the participants in the action of cutting:

$\text{puruṣa} (\text{svatantra, the independent participant}) + \text{vrksa} (\text{ipsitatama, that which is most desired by the agent}) + \sqrt{\text{chid}} + LA^T (\text{vartamāna, present time})$

(2) Abstract syntactic level; participants assigned to kāraka categories:

$puruṣa (\text{kartr}) + vrksa (\text{karman}) + \sqrt{\text{chid}} + LA^T (\text{kartari})$

or:

$puruṣa (\text{kartr}) + vrksa (\text{karman}) + \sqrt{\text{chid}} + LA^T (\text{karmani})$

(3) Surface level of morphology:

$puruṣa + sU + vrksa + am + \sqrt{\text{chid}} + S\alpha P + tiP \rightarrow puruṣo$

$\text{vrksa} + \text{chinatti}^1$

or:

$puruṣa + Tā + vrksa + sU + \sqrt{\text{chid}} + yaK + te \rightarrow puruṣena$

$\text{vrksa} + \text{chidyate}$

Thus, looking back at given semantic conditions, kārakas and la-kāras serve to derive correct Sanskrit sentences by sorting out an abstract syntax on the basis of which operational rules distribute the proper morphology at the surface level.

It should be noted, however, that the above two sentences could equally well appear in the form of corresponding nominal expressions. 2With an agent noun and a genitive construction we get $\text{puruṣo} \text{ vrksasya chettā}, \text{‘the man [is] a cutter of the tree’},$ and with a past participle in a passive construction and the agent in the instrumental case we get $\text{puruṣena vrksa} + \text{chidya} + \text{nah}, \text{‘the tree [is] being cut by the man’}.^1$ Disregarding details of morphology, the derivation procedures would be the same.

But kārakas do not pertain to the derivation of sentences alone. Any verbal noun derived by a krt-suffix (a primary suffix) is considered to denote either a participant in an action and thus assigned to one or the other of the kāraka categories, or the mere activity expressed by the verbal root and thus assigned to the category of bhāva ‘being; state of action’. In other words, a certain krt-suffix is added to a verbal root when a particular kāraka, participant in the action denoted by the verbal root, is to be denoted, or when the mere verbal process or state of being (bhāva) is to be denoted. By way of example, the suffix Lyu$T (\text{-ana with guna}$ and presuffixial accent) is introduced to form neuter action nouns (bhāve) (by A 3.3.115 lyu$T ca$), but also to derive nouns expressing the instrument or the locus of the action expressed by the root (by A 3.3.117 karanādhikaranayo$\tilde{\text{S}}$ ca). This means that when analysing a particular word alternative interpretations are often possible. For example, the word sthāna can be interpreted as bhāvasādhanā, that is to say, as an action noun (with Lyu$T$ by A 3.3.115 lyu$T ca$) denoting the mere activity of standing, as such equivalent to the word sthiti ‘a standing’. But it could alternatively be interpreted as adhikaraṇasādhanā, that is to say, as a noun denoting a locus, ‘place’; or even — theoretically — as karana-sādhanā, as a noun denoting a means of standing (the two latter formed with Lyu$T$ by A 3.3.117 karanādhikaranayo$\tilde{\text{S}}$ ca which teaches that this suffix is also added to denote the instrument and the locus). This, roughly, is how kārakas work in the Pāṇini tradition.

It is of course possible to write a grammar without introducing the notion of kārakas. Candragomin, the famous Buddhist grammarian, cut out the level of kārakas completely. 2 For Pāṇini the introduction of

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1. We may at this stage speak of a fourth level of phonetics at which the correct sandhi rules apply, but that need not concern us here.

2. For a discussion of what this implies and which is the better procedure, Pāṇini’s or Candragomin’s, see S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen 1975:xvi–xix.
kārakas is a technical device serving a distinct theoretical purpose. When this purpose disappears, what then? This raises the question of why Aggavaṃsā retained them when his grammar in this respect is not in any sense derivational or generative.

2. The kāraka-section of the Suttamālā

Aggavaṃsā deals with kārakas in several places.¹ I have chosen the more formal part which is given in pariccheda 22 of the Suttamālā. I shall confine myself to the section of this pariccheda which deals with kārakas proper, that is, suttas 547–73 (690,30–711,23), but it is noteworthy that the section on kārakas is immediately followed by his treatment of the functions assigned to the genitive and the vocative, and by his treatment of case endings.

2.1 Preliminaries

The 22nd pariccheda is introduced by the following verse (690,30–31):

Ito param sasambhandham vibhattippabhavam chadhā
kārakam vibhajitvāna pavakkhāmi, sunātha me.

This verse is by no means a clear piece of writing and accordingly it does not lend itself to any one clear interpretation. Particularly puzzling are some of its statements when compared with what Aggavaṃsā has previously said about kārakas. I offer the following tentative translation:

In what follows I shall explain the kāraka, which has its origin in case suffixes, along with the [general] relation [denoted by a genitive case ending], dividing it [= the kāraka] into six, [so] listen to me.

Under this interpretation I have taken viṅbhaj to mean ‘divide’. One may, however, take it in the slightly more general sense of ‘analyse’. In that case vibhajitvāna would be more exclusively linked to kārakam, and one could translate: ‘... while analysing kāraka, along with the [general] relation, as something which has its origin in case suffixes [and] is sixfold, I shall [now] explain [it] ...’. But several problems present themselves. The first is whether to interpret the absolute vibhajitvāna as referring to the past or to the present, in other words, to decide whether Aggavaṃsā considers himself as having already, in previous parts of his work, analysed kārakas as stated in the verse, or whether he is now “analyzing” them in this way and is about to explain them in detail. This problem could only be settled if it could be established that he has previously analysed the concept of kāraka in a similar way. If not, I think it would be justified to claim that he means to give a broad definition before explaining it further in what follows.

Three other problems are raised by the three attributes ascribed to the word kārakam in the verse, sasambhandham, vibhattippabhavam, and chadhā. The first is how to interpret sasambhandham. One possible interpretation would be that a kāraka is something which has a relation. The relation (sambandha) alluded to under this interpretation I would take to be the relation of a kāraka to an action. That such a relation holds is stated clearly in the subsequent paragraph (691,5–6): Kiriyābhisaṃbandhalakkhaṇam kārakam, ‘a kāraka is that which is characterized by a relation¹ to an action’. This view would be supported also by a passage such as the following (20,29–30):

¹ In the Padamālā kārakas and related topics — notably that of bhāva which Aggavaṃsā includes in his concept of kāraka — are dealt with in three sections (5,18–24, 20,29–21,11, and 68,30–69,17).

¹ The terms sambandha and abhisambandha have been discussed by A. Aklujkar who concludes that “no technical or grammatical distinction of any kind exists between sambandha and abhisambandha” (1989:303). He goes on:
Kārakam iti kammakattubhāvā, te hi upacāramukhyasabhāvasena karonti karanān ti ca kārakā ti [ca] vuccanti; te ca yathākkammaṁ kiriyaṁimittatamsādhakatamsabhāva ti veditabbā.

‘kāraka’ː¹ that is, the object, the agent, and bhāva (‘being; state of action; the verbal process’),² for these do³ [something] by force of their being [in relation to the verbal activity] secondary, primary, or [its] very nature [respectively], and⁴ they are called [partly] doing⁵ and [partly] kārakas.⁶ And these should be

²The appearance of, and to some extent the preference for, abhisambandha when its equally non-technical colleague sambandha can convey its meaning seems to be due to the sensitivity which early Sanskrit authors had for the shades of meaning expressed by the upasargas or prefixes. As the situation was probably perceived as one in which word ‘X’ turned to thing ‘x’ or word ‘Y’ for effecting a connection, it was perhaps felt that an addition of the prefix abhi, which indicates ‘facing’ or ‘looking in the direction of,’ was appropriate (ibid.).

¹ This passage deals with kāraka as the second of three ākhyātappavatti ‘functions of a finite verb,’ the other two being kāla ‘time’ and purisa ‘person’.

² Aggavamsa gives the following definition of bhāva (8,3-4): Evam sante pi bhāvo nāma kevalo bhavanalavanapancāṇidho dhātuatho yeva, ‘nevertheless bhāva is nothing but the meaning of the verbal root itself, such as “being”, “cutting”, “cooking”,’ Thus already Yāska (Nirukta 1.1): bhāvapradhānam ākhyatam, ‘a verb is that which has bhāva as its predominant notion’.

³ karonti seems to be a kartrsādhanā analysis of kārakas: cf. 691.a.

⁴ The syntax here is peculiar. Another iti after karonti would yield the interpretation: ‘Because they do something, and because of doing, they are called kārakas.’ That is, karonti refers to kamma and kattar while karana refers to bhāva.

⁵ With reference to bhāva.

⁶ Without the ca expurgated by Smith one may translate: ‘and considering (iti) [also] “doing” they are called kārakas’. It seems in any case clear that Aggavamsa wants to include bhāva as one of three kārakas pertaining to a finite verb and that he is aware of the problem caused by the fact that bhāva does not in fact do something, it is mere doing. To get around this he says ‘partly doing, partly kārakas’. It might even be possible, taking into consideration Aggavamsa’s inclination to use words in a technical and non-technical sense side by side, that kāraka here means ‘doer’; that is, the passage would define the three known respectively as the target of an action,¹ its accomplisher, and its very nature.

The following statement would likewise point in this direction (712,7–8): Kiriyaḥbhīsambandhābhāvā n’ esā kārakata śambhavati, ‘this property of being a kāraka is not adequate [for the genitive] because there is no relation (abhisambandha) to an action’.

In accord with this last statement, however, the expression sasambandha could also be taken to refer to the genitive case; that is to say, one would have to translate: ‘kāraka along with the [general] relation [denoted by a genitive]’. Basically, the Sanskrit grammarians consider the genitive to denote a mere relation, sambandhamātra, but Bhartṛhari includes the relations designated by the word śeṣa ‘the rest’² in the sādhanasamuddēsa of his Vākyapadiya.³ This interpretation is also

καρακασ as partly doing, partly doers. Smith refers in a note to the following passage (10,23): Evam sante pi so karanamattati kārakām; tathā hi ‘karanam kāro kiryā, tad eva kārakān’ bhāvassā kārakata datthabbā, ‘nevertheless, it is a kāraka in as much as it is nothing but doing, for with regard to bhāva the property of being a kāraka has to be considered in accordance with [the maxim?] “doing, doer, deed — only that is kāraka”’; cf. 691,1-6.

¹ The expression kiriyaṁmitita must refer to kamma in the present context, and so lends itself to a translation ‘that on which the action is directed; target; goal’, but it seems worthwhile to point out that the sutta defining kāraka in the Suttamālā runs (547): kiriyaṁmitita kārakam, where the sense seems to be ‘cause of action’.

² Pāṇini’s rule 2.3.50 saṣṭhi śeṣa teaches that a genitive case ending is introduced to denote the rest, śeṣa. From the previous rules it is clear that this rest is any relation, sambandha, which is not a kāraka-relation. In other words, a genitive case suffix is introduced to denote any relation sustained between entities, that is to say, any non-verbal relation in general, such as father-son, master-servant, part-whole, etc. The fact that two entities are mutually related by their appearance in a given context is expressed by the genitive case. But the particular type of relation is not specified.

³ VP 3.7.44: sāmānyaṁ kārakam tyasya saptādyā bhedayonayah / sāt karmākkhyādibhedena śeṣabhēdas tu saptamī //
supported by the fact that the section on kārakas proper in the Suttamāla is immediately followed by a section on the functions of the genitive case (§§ 574–75). The same order is followed in Kaccāyana. Under this interpretation, the kārakas plus the sambandha would cover everything denoted by case endings. In fact, this would entail that kārakas are only a subset of vibhatiss: not all vibhatiss are kārakas, but all kārakas are vibhatiss, the remaining element being the sambandha. On the above evidence I consider this second interpretation of the word sasambandham the more likely one.

The problem raised by the interpretation of sasambandha as including the genitive case is linked with the following one. The second characteristic of a kāraka is said in the verse above to be vibhattippabhave. This expression too lends itself to various interpretations, depending first and foremost on how we interpret the word pabhava. Aggavamsa himself gives us the clue in this case in as much as he has previously interpreted the word as either bhāvasādhana, an action noun in the sense of ‘an originating, producing, production’, or as apādānasādhana, a noun denoting that from which something originates.1 This would mean that kārakas are either something ‘of which there is originating in vibhatiis’, that is ‘which have their origin in vibhatiis’, or that kārakas are something ‘which arise from vibhatiis’. It seems these two interpretations yield more or less the same sense. This agrees well with one of the six interpretations previously given of vibhati (15,4):

kammādayo vā kārake ekavacanašabhubhavanāsasena vibhajati ti vibhatti.

Or: it distributes/divides the kārakas [which are] kamma etc. with regard to singular and plural; hence vibhatti.

This interpretation of vibhatti as kartrśādhana would support the view that kārakas are only treated as a subset of vibhaktis, thus distorting the whole purpose of introducing kārakas as met with in Pāñjinian grammar. There the abstract level of kārakas is introduced to account for the correct distribution of vibhaktis, case endings and verbal endings.1 It is noteworthy in this respect that the expected interpretation of vibhatti as karmasādhana, as an object of the action denoted by the verb vibhajati, is met with as well. In fact, two such interpretations are given, but with completely different senses of vibhajati (15,5–9):

vibhajitabbā ṇānenā ti pi vibhatti, ... athā vā sati pi jinasāsane avibhattikanidde sabbena sabbam vibhattihi vinā atthassāmīdissitabbato visesena vīdhena vā ākārena bhajanti sevanti nam pānditā ti vibhatti.

But it can even be distributed/divided (analysed ?), [that is to say,] with the intellect; hence vibhatti; ... Alternatively: even if

[something] originates from it, in as much as that which originates from which [= it], that is pabhava’.

1 In Pāñjinian grammar the term vibhakti comprises case endings as well as verbal endings (A 1.4.104 vibhaktiś ca).
in the words of the Buddha there are expressions without endings, a meaning cannot be expressed altogether without endings. Therefore [the word vibhatti can be explained in the following way]: particularly (visesena) or in many ways (yvīdhenā ākārena) the learned devote themselves to (bhajaniti), that is, occupy themselves with (sevanti) it; hence vibhatti.

This strengthens one’s suspicion that Aggavamsa does not think of kārakas as distributors of vibhattis. So does the fact that he himself has named the 22nd pariccheda of his grammar kārakavibhāga ‘the division/distribution of kārakas’ (740,21).

The third characteristic, that kārakas are sixfold, he has stated before. Still, he seems unable to make up his mind as to what classification and what number he should settle for. In the passage quoted above (20,29), he says that kārakas are kamma, kattar and bhāva. This he sums up neatly in the continuation of that passage (20,33): Kamman kattā ca bhāvo ca ite evam kārakā tidhā, ‘kamma, kattar, and bhāva: thus kārakas are threefold’.

In a later passage of the Padamālā, however, he gives a different classification (68,30–69,2):

Evam ettha bhāvakattukamakaranapadānādhirakaraṇavasena cha sādhanaṁ pakāsitāṁ, tāṁ sāmadanāsādhanena sattavidhāṇī bhavantī, tam pana uttarīṃ āvibhavissati ‘dhamam assa bhavati ti Dhanabhūti’ ti ādīnā. Ite evam kitakavasena sabbathā pi sattavidhāṇī sādhanaṁ honti, yāni kārakānī ti pi vuccantī; ito aññāṁ sādhanaṁ n ’atthi.

Thus, in this context, the six sādhanas have been promulgated as bhāva, kattar, kamma, karanā, apādāna, and adhikaraṇa;

1 cf. Dhatumāla (225): bhaja sevāyam.
2 The term sādhana, lit. ‘means; accessory’ (sādhyate ‘nena [something] is realised/accomplished by means of it’), here equals kāraka. The term occurs in

they are sevenfold with that sādhana which is the sampadāna, but that will become clear later on by [analytic statements] such as “‘let there be (bhavatu) wealth (dhana) for him (assa),” thus [he is called] Dhanabhūti”. 1 This being so, through primary formations there are [these] sevenfold sādhhanas in fact on every occasion, 2 these which are [hence] also called kārakas. Any sādhana other than this does not exist.

Here he claims kārakas to be sixfold, including bhāva but not sampadāna, or sevenfold if the latter is included. In the kāraka-section of the Suttamālā, however, he includes sampadāna but not bhāva. There may be a real question about the sampadāna in as much as Aggavamsa, as will become clear later on, does not distinguish between kāraka and vibhakti, and further because the confluence of the dative and genitive suffixes may cause some confusion in this respect. Is Pāli case morphology responsible for the separate mention of a kāraka which in Sanskrit is expressed by the dative? It could also be that the list is given the way it is for some stylistic reason. The passage is not verse, but could it be derived from a verse where such an expression as “with X as seventh” is innocuous? Be this as it may, the above and the following passages are still illuminating in as much as they, at least to some extent, reveal the basis for his diverging classifications (10,19–31):

the Mahābhāṣya but is most readily associated with the Vākyapadīya where it is the term used for kāraka and the name of the section on kārakas, the Sādhanasamuddesa.

1 This is equal to ‘let him be the recipient of wealth’. The analysis is repeated 72,22 in the context of the i-kāranta (forms ending in the suffix -i). The suffix seems to be considered as forming bahuvrihi compounds in the masculine in the sense of assa bhavatu ‘let there be x for him’. Smith indicates that the statement is a quotation. Whether this is correct or not, it has not been traced as such.
2 That is, ‘in exactly every way; indeed everywhere’, or the idea seems to be that krt-formations realise all of these sādhanas.
3 That is, the krt-formations are, so to speak, the missing link which explains why sādhhanas can be called kārakas and vice versa.
The practice of referring to [such a category as] bhāvakāraka in the case of verbal words proceeds following the conventions of niruttinaya, but in fact the property of being a kāraka does not apply to bhāva, for neither does it (= bhāva) produce anything, nor is it the cause of [any] action, and the property of being the cause of an action is the one and only defining characteristic of a kāraka. Therefore the property of being a kāraka does not apply to bhāva, for it is neither the source nor the cause of an

Saddaniti to niruttinayam have to be identified before one is able to place within the grammatical tradition the texts mentioned. Likewise the concept of niruttinaya has to be carefully examined. Smith (CT 7.1.2.2) does also give niruktä in the sense of what I prefer to translate as ‘semantic analysis’ as the meaning of niruttinayam. The expression niruttinayam nissāya may thus be equivalent to a Sanskrit niruktyanusarena ‘following the nirukta method’. And indeed it seems to me more likely that niruttinayam here refers to a particular tradition of grammar or grammatical method in accordance with a Pāli tradition of nairuktas; cf. in this respect the pañcavidham niruttam, Smith CT 7.2.1: ‘phonème intercalé, échange, modifié ou tombé, sens élargi, vannâgama, vannavipariyāya, vannâvikāra, vannâpāna, athātīsativagota’, ‘This “fivefold niruktä” is known also from Sanskrit sources through a verse quoted by Durga in his commentary on the Nirukta (ed. Bhadkañkar 1918:32) and in the Kāśikā on A 6.3.109:

\[
\text{vannâgama} \text{ varnaviparyayaś ca dvau cāparau varnavikāranāśau / dhātos tadadharthātīsavyena yogas tad ucyate pañcavidham niruktam //}
\]

[Addition of] an augment-sound, sound-metathesis, and the other two: sound-substitution and sound-elision, [as well as the circumstance that] a verbal root is connected with an extension of its meaning — that is called the fivefold niruktä.

Aggavamsa builds on the idea of athātīsativagotä for one of his interpretations of the term dhātu (2.6): athātīsativagotam parartham pi dhāreti ti dhātu, ‘because it is connected with extension of meaning, [according to the analysis:] “it carries (possesses; constitutes; dhāreti) also the meaning of something else”, hence [it is called] dhātu’. Pointing out that Buddhaghosa alludes to the above verse in his Visuddhimagga (210,30) and thus making it clear that it is well established in exegetical traditions, O.H. Pind (1989:40–42) claims that the first complete Pāli version of it is to be found in Upasena’s commentary on the Niddesa.  

1 This reflects the definition of kāraka offered in § 547: kriyānimittam kārakam. See below.  

2 The underlying form of the word mukhyato I consider to correspond to Skt maukhya. The expression here refers back to the first alternative of the preceding
action]. Nevertheless, it is a kāraka in as much as it is nothing but doing,\(^1\) for with regard to bhāva the property of being a kāraka has to be considered in accordance with [the maxim ?] ‘doing,\(^2\) doer, deed — only that is kāraka’. But since the condition of being the cause of an action is the one and only defining characteristic of kāraka, then, in the case of nominal words the defining characteristic of which is kāraka,\(^3\) the grammarians, abandoning the practice of referring to a bhāvakāraka, adopt the practice of referring to kattukāraka, kammakāraka, etc. for the six entities kattar (agent), kamma (object), karana (instrument), sampadāna (recipient), apādāna (stable point when there is movement away), and adhikarana (locus). Thus it has been stated, following the conventions of niruttī, that the bhāvakāraka and the two kārakas agent and object constitute a triad of kārakas, and the verb with [its] three kārakas illustrates this.

This makes it clear that Aggavamsa has the two main divisions of kārakas in mind, namely kārakas as realised by finite verbs and kārakas as realised by nouns. A finite verb can only express kattar, kamma or bhāva, while nouns can express all the (normally defined) six kārakas plus bhāva. But it is not at all clear to me whether Aggavamsa in his classification of kārakas realised by nouns had in mind all nouns, regardless of their derivation, which participate in the action of a sentence, or verbal nouns (krt formations) viewed as separate linguistic entities, or both. His remark that ‘through primary formations (krt

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1 The quotation — if it is a quotation — has not been traced.
2 Sace 63d.
3 Literally: ‘syllable-ponderers’. It is not clear to me whether this term has any derogatory connotations, or whether he tries to distance himself from such a category.
4 Literally: ‘by a wandering monk it should be ...’. It is not surprising that he resorts to the frequently occurring future passive participle to illustrate a bhāva-construction, here “properly” constructed with the instrumental case.

\[^1\] The word karana here interpreted as bhāvasādhana, as an action noun of √kr.
\[^2\] It may be that karana here has the sense of ‘instrument’ and that Aggavamsa’s interpretation of karana as bhāvasādhana is not fully justified. It would be useful if the quotation — if it is a quotation — could be traced.
\[^3\] I consider an interpretation as a bahuvrihi the only one possible for the compound kārakalakkhane.
suitably attired’, etc. Therefore, in their view, in the expression *tena ubbhāviyate* it should only be constructed with the instrumental case. But in the view of the Jina [it should be constructed] only with the nominative as in *so bhūyate*. For in the *Saccasamkheppapakaraṇa* by the teacher Dhammapāla, in the text of the *Nidesa* by Dhammasenāpati, and in the *Dhajaggasutta* by The Blessed One, a *bhāva*-word has been stated with [a syntactic] expectancy for the nominative case.

He goes on to list these examples, which all illustrate the use of the nominative case. It goes without saying that this conception of what

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1 Aggavāmsa himself refers the example ‘*so bhūyate*’ to the *Saccasamkhāpa*, further identified by Smith as occurring in 63d, in fact the only occurrence of the form *bhūyate* in this text. The verse, which I would rather abstain from translating, runs as follows:

\[
\text{opapātikabhāvīsa dasākā satta kammajā;} \\
\text{kāme ādo bhavant’ aggijādi pubbe va bhūyate.}
\]

(Tentative translation: ‘For those who have an existence as *opapātikas* (spontaneously born) there are ten kinds of existence (*satta*, case ?); those who are produced by *kamma* (= born in accordance with their *kamma*) exist first (ādo = Skt. ādau, loc. of ādi ?) in the desire[-realm]; those who are born from fire come into existence previously.’)

The *Saccasamkhāpa* belongs to a group of Abhidhamma manuals known in Burma as *Let-than*, the Little-finger Manuals (cf. Norman 1983:153). Its author, Dhammapāla, is hard to identify and date (*ibid.*:152), but it seems clear that he must be reasonably close to Aggavāmsa in time. This makes it likely that the type of Pāli employed by Dhammapāla must be reasonably close to that used by Aggavāmsa, and it is therefore surprising that he quotes this bizarre form without reservations. Normally he sticks to canonical literature for his examples. The words *aggijādi pubbe va bhūyate* one could translate: ‘Those which are born from fire etc. do indeed (eva) / as it were (iva) come into existence previously’. A passive form of \(\sqrt{bhū}\) is in any case hard to distinguish from an active one in meaning, that is, ‘it is being come into existence’ is very close to ‘it comes into existence’. Another possibility is that \(\sqrt{bhū}\) here is simply treated as a 4th class verb, *bhūyate* again meaning ‘it comes into existence’.

constitutes a *bhāva*-construction is very different from the one of the Sanskrit grammarians.¹

To sum up, then, there are in the case of finite verbs three *kārakas*: *kattar*, *kamma* and *bhāva*. This is as much as a finite verb is able to express on its own. In the case of nouns — be they nominal words analysed separately, nouns as parts of sentences, or both — there are six *kārakas*, including *bhāva* but excluding *sampadāna*, or if the *sampadāna* is included, there are seven. In the *Suttamālā*, however, Aggavāmsa deals with six *kārakas*, plus the *hetu* or causal agent as a subdivision of *kattar*. Here he includes the *sampadāna* whereas *bhāva* is completely excluded from the enumeration. In light of this it is somewhat surprising that he opens his *kāraka* section with a verse claiming that *kārakas* are sixfold, having seemingly forgotten what he stated previously. This could be simply because Aggavāmsa here slips into the common way of dealing with *kārakas* in Indian grammar. But such a lack of consistency is not what one wants from a grammarian. One may also ask whether or not he has inherited the order in which he deals with them here from some predecessor. They are discussed in the order of *kattar*, *hetu*, *kamma*, *karaṇa*, *sampadāna*, *apādāna*, and *okāsa* (= adhikaraṇa). The order in *Kaccāyana* is *apādāna*, *sampadāna*, *okāsa*, *karaṇa*, *kamma*, *kattar*, and *hetu*, that is, the same order as in Pāṇini’s grammar. This is also the order of the *Kātantra*. The order in the *Sādhana-samuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadiya*, however, comes quite close: *karaṇa*, *karaṇa*, *kattar*, *hetu*, *sampradāna*, *apādāna*, *adhikaraṇa*, and *śeṣa*.

If one simply moves the agent — and thus also the causal agent — to the front, one gets Aggavāmsa’s order.

### 2.2 Definition of *kāraka*

**547 Kiriyānimittam karaṇaṃ.** Yaṃ sādhanaṁabhāvattā mukhyavasena vā upacāravasena vā kiriyaṁbhāhinipphatityā

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¹ I cannot enter into this intriguing problem here, but intend to do so in a future publication.
and he accordingly comes up with the analysis: karotiti kārakam, ‘it does (= brings about; accomplishes) [something], hence [it is called] kāraka’.

The problem then is that only the agent would be a kāraka proper. This is solved by claiming that actions differ according to different kārakas, that is, each kāraka participates in different ways in bringing about the action. Kaiyata remarks in this context (Mbh II:379): sādhyatvena kriyaiiva sābdāt pratiyate iti kriyāyah nirvartaka vyāsa kārakasamjñāpādānādisamjñā ca pravartate, ‘since it can be accomplished it is action which can be understood from words, and so the name kāraka and such a name as apādāna apply to something which accomplishes action’.

Various definitions along these lines prevail throughout the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, and I shall adduce a few examples. The Kaśikāvyottti on rule 1.4.23 states: kārakaśabdas ca nimittaparyāyaḥ / kārakam, hetur ity anarthāntaram / kasya hetuḥ? kriyāyāḥ, ‘and the word kāraka is a synonym of nimitta (cause); kāraka, hetu (cause) — [these terms] do not convey any different sense. The cause of what? Of an action (kriyā)’. The Jain grammarian Abhayandindin states (JV 1.2.109): kārakaṃ nirvartakaṃ hetur vā / kasya? kriyāyāḥ, ‘kāraka is something which brings about or [is a] cause. Of what? Of an action’. Vāsudevadiksiīta states in his Bālamanaṃ (SK I:597): kriyājanakam kārakaṃ, ‘a kāraka is something which produces an action’. This last remark employs a form of jān in its explanation.

Aggavamśa amplifies his definition of kāraka with the words mukhyasvāna vā upacārvāsvaṇa vā, ‘primarily or secondarily’. This statement is based on the problem alluded to above, namely, that if the term kāraka is to be understood according to the analysis karotiti kārakam, ‘it brings about, accomplishes, hence [it is called] kāraka’, only the agent would be a kāraka proper. This question was raised and answered already by Kātyāyana in vārttikas 6 and 7 on A 1.4.23 and by Patañjali in his commentary. In vārttikas 8 and 9 and in the Bhāṣya
discussion of them a distinction is made between the main agent (pradhānakartr) and the agency ascribed to the other kārakas.¹

The definition of kāraka as the cause (nimitta) of an action comes up also in the commentary of Helārāja on Vākyapadiya 3.7.24 (Hel 251.2–3): yat tu kriyāpadopātīyāḥ kriyāya nimittam tat kārakam eva, ‘that which is the cause of an action which is mentioned through an action word is a kāraka’. In the Vākyapadiya context a distinction is made between nimitta ‘cause’ and lakṣāna ‘sign’, the latter also interpreted as a cause in the context of Pāṇini’s rule 1.4.84 amu lakṣane.²

This discussion need not concern us here, but I mention the occurrence of the kriyānimitta definition since it will later become apparent that there is some connection between Helārāja’s commentary on the Vākyapadiya and the Saddaniti.

Aggavaṃsa’s final remark, that a kāraka is that which is characterized by a relation to an action, I am not familiar with as a standard phrase. It goes without saying, however, that it is acceptable as a general statement about kārakas. It is obviously his own creation, since he gives similar definitions by way of compounds ending in lakṣāna for all the kārakas. Whether he intends these as alternative definitions or as more precise formulations of the ones he gives in the suttas, I am not in a position to tell.

2.3 The agent: kattā

548 Yo kurute yo vā jāyati, so kattā. Yo attappadhāno huvā gamanapacanādikām kriyām kurute yo vā jāyati, so kārako kattā nāma bhavati. Vāsaddo vikappanattho, tena añño

¹ In the context of the attitude of Indian thinkers to the ‘metaphorical’ use of language and more specifically with regard to the concept of mukhya and upacāra this has been pointed out by G. Gren-Eklund (1986:91) with reference to the present passage of the Saddaniti.

² This rule teaches that the technical term karmapravacanīya applies to the particle anu when a sign or characteristic (lakṣāna) is to be denoted. In this context lakṣāna is interpreted so as to signify hetu ‘cause’.

pi attho yojetabbo. Kiriyaṃ karoti ti kattā, so tividho: suddhakkattā hetukattā kammakattā ti. Tattha yo sayam eva kiriyaṃ karoti, so suddhakkattā nāma, tam yathā: puriso maggam gacchati, sūdho bhattam pacati, putto jāyati, buddhena jito Māro, Upaguttena baddho Māro; yo aññaṃ kammani yojeti, so hetukattā nāma, so hi parassa kiriyaṃ kāranaḥhāvena hinoti gacchati pavattāti ti hetu, hetu ca so kattā ca ti athena hetukattā: Yaññadatto Devatatam gamayati; yo pana parassa kiriyaṃ patiṣca kammabhūto pi sukrattā sayam eva sijhanto viya hoti, so kammakattā nāma kammai ca tam kattā ca ti athena: sayam eva kaṭo karīyati sayam eva paciyati odano ti – evam tividhā bhavanaṃ kattāro. Api ca abhihitakattā anabhāhitakattā ca ti ime dve te ca tayo ti kattūnā paṇcavidhatham api icchānti garū. Tattha puriso maggam gacchati ayam abhihitakattā ākhyaṭena kathitattā; sūdha paciyati odano ahañā dattho naro ayam anabhāhitakattā ākhyaṭena kitenā vā akathitattā. Adbhīppadānalaṅkhaṇāṃ kattukārakam. Kattā icc anena kv attho: “kattari paṭhamā tatiyā ca”.

‘The one that acts or [for example²] the one that is being born, that [kāraka] is the kattar “agent”.’ The one that has presumed predominance and performs an action such as a going or a cooking, or [for example] the one that is being born, that participant of an action is called the agent. The word vā has the sense of option, and through it even another sense is to be included. [It is called] agent (kattar) according to [the analysis:] ‘it performs (karoti) [something, namely] an action’; [and] this [agent] is of three kinds: the pure agent, the causal agent, and the

¹ § 594.
² This, I think, is how Aggavaṃsa’s usage of vā is to be understood. See below and 2.3.2.
object-agent. With regard to this, the one that performs an action all by himself is called the pure agent, as for example: ‘the man walks the road’; ‘the cook cooks food’; ‘a boy is born’; ‘Māra was conquered by the Buddha’; ‘Māra was bound by Upagutta’. The one that instigates another to action is called the causal agent, for he is one that impels (hinoti), moves, conduces as the reason for another’s action and is therefore called hetu. From the meaning ‘it is cause (hetu) and it is agent (kattar)’, [it is called] causal agent (hetukattar): ‘Yajñadatta makes Devadatta move’. But even the one occurring as the object, with reference to the action of another, is accomplished easily by itself, as it were; it is called kammakattar according to the sense that it is both object and agent: ‘the mat is made by itself’, ‘the rice is boiling by itself’; thus agents appear as of three kinds. Moreover, the agent specified [by a finite verb] and the agent not specified [by a finite verb], [there are] these two and the [other] three, [so] the teachers teach also the fivefoldness of agents. As far as this is concerned, [in the sentence] ‘the man walks the road’ there is an agent that has been specified [already] in as much as it has been stated by a finite verb; [in the sentences] ‘rice is cooked by the cook’ [and] ‘the man is bitten by a snake’ the agent has not been specified [already] in as much as it has not been stated by a finite verb or by a primary suffix. The kāraka which is the agent has as its defining characteristic the bringing about [of something]. What is the purpose in calling it the agent? ‘The first and the third of case endings occur’ when the agent is to be denoted.’

1 That is, an agent which is treated as an object. See below.
2 The Sanskrit grammarians (and so also the Pāli grammarians) refer to case endings by numbers, not by names. Thus, the nominative is referred to as the first, the accusative as the second, the instrumental as the third, the dative as the fourth, the ablatival as the fifth, the genitive as the sixth, and the locative as the seventh. The vocative is treated as a variety of the nominative.

Kaccāyana’s definition runs (143): yo karoti sa kattā. This is the definition met with also in the Kātantra (2.4.14). Aggavamsa has taken over this definition, but obviously feels the need to somehow include Pāṇini’s definition in rule 1.4.54 svatantrah kartā, adding attappadhāno huvā in the vutti. The word pradhāna as a gloss of tantra in svatantra ‘the independent one’ occurs already in the Mahābhāṣya.1 The Kāśikā (on A 1.4.54) explains svatantra by pradhānabhūta ucyate ‘who [by the speaker] is spoken of as predominant’ and the word pradhāna occurs also in the Nyāsa.2 Haradatta’s explanation of svatantrah, on the other hand, comes even closer to the wording of the Saddhanī (Kāś 583): sva ātmā tantram pradhānam asta; so does Helärāja’s (Hel 312,2): sva ātmā tantram pradhānam asta; and likewise Kaiyāta’s (MbhP II.436): svaśābda ātmavāci / sva ātmā tantram pradhānam yasya sa ‘svatantra’ ucyate, ‘the word sva means ātman “self”; he whose sva, that is, ātman “self” is tantram, that is, pradhānam “predominant”, he is called svatantra’.

The kartrvyutpatti of the term kattar, that is, its analysis as agentival, offered in the sutta definition is repeated in the vutti (kiriyaṃ karoti). Such an interpretation is of course reasonable, though Aggavamsa does not return to the problem brought up already by Kātyāyana (vt. 6 on A 1.4.23), namely, whether the interpretation karotī kārakam, ‘it acts, hence [it is called] kāraka’, would make all kārakas agents. The issue was however touched upon under sutta 547 in the context of mukhya and upacāra.

One characteristic detail is worthy of notice. Here and in the subsequent suttas which define kārakas Aggavamsa lists alternative definitions, introducing them with the word vā. In the vutti he explains that this term in fact allows other meanings to be recognized. In the present case his choice of an additional definition, yo vā jāyati, is not

1 Mbh 1:338,19–20: svatantra ‘sau brāhmaṇa ity ucyate svapradhāna ity gamyate, ‘[for example, when] it is said “that Brahman is independent”, [the meaning] “having himself as the predominant one” is understood’. 2 KāśN 583.
made at random. It goes back to an issue raised in the *kartradhikāra* of
the *Sādhanasamuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadiya* and developed at length in
the commentary of Helārāja. Bhartṛhari’s first verse brings it up in the
following manner (VP 3.7.105):

\[
\text{upatteh prāg asadbhāvo buddhyavasthānibandhanah /}
\text{aviśiṣṭāh satānyena kartā bhavati janmanah ||}
\]

Prior to [its] production the existence of something non-existent
depends upon a state of mind. Not different from anything else
that exists, it is [conceived as] the agent of [the act of] being
born.

The problem is that the agent of the act of being born is a
contradiction in terms if what is born is considered not to exist prior to its
coming into existence. Helārāja remarks (Hel 314,17–22):

‘āṅkuro jāyate’ iti janikartṛtvam sato ’sato vā / tatra
yadi saj jāyate kasmād athāsaj jāyate katham /
ityādinā pārvam vāṣṭavātipāśrayena sadasatpaksabhedenāpi
janikartṛtvam ayuktam ity uktam / upacārasattāśrayena
tūlpatiḥ siddhāntā
tumacaryā tu kartāram …
ityādinā /

[With regard to the expression] ‘the sprout is being born’, the
property of being the agent of being born pertains either to
something which exists or to something which does not exist. In
this respect, it has first been stated, through [the words of VP
3.3.43c–d:] ‘if it exists, why is it born, and if it does not exist,
how is it born?’ etc., that the property of being the agent of
being born does not apply because [the expression is thought of
as] resting on [an idea of] external form and also because of the
dichotomy in viewing [the sprout] as existent and non-existent.
But [its] production is established as true since [the expression]
rests on secondary being, according to [VP 3.3.45a:] ‘but
transferring [the application to include] the agent …’ etc.

The difficulty raised by verbs such as *jāyate* is thus not the
problem of intransitivity but the problem of ascribing agency to the agent
of the action denoted by them. It is brought up also by Kaiyata in the
context of A 1.4.30 *janikartuh prakṛtiḥ*, ‘[the name *apādāna* is assigned
to] the origin of the agent of being born’. The problem here is really how
the name *apādāna* applies to the *prakṛti*, the origin or cause of the act of
being born, since no separation takes place once and for all. The
examples commonly offered by the commentators are: *śṛṅgāc charo
jāyate*, ‘the arrow is produced from horn’; *gomayād vrściko jāyate*, ‘the
scorpion originates from cowdung’. Patañjali concludes that one can do
away with this rule since some sort of separation is taking place, either
because a continuous process is involved (*samīttatvat*) or because a
succession is implied. In this context Kaiyata brings in also the
expression *āṅkuro jāyate* ‘the sprout comes into being’, and states that
there is no fault in ascribing agency to the sprout (MbhP II:399): *buddhyavasthāpitaśaryāthasya kriyāyām kārakarūpapopagamāt*, ‘because the
thing [which is to be produced] conceived of in [our] mind acquires the
form of a participant in the action’. This reflects the view that grammar
deals not with ontology but with things as they are spoken about. The
thing which is to be born is thought of as born.

Aggavamsa’s classification into *suddha-, hetu-, and kamma-
kattar* is, as far as I know, not common. However it is an obvious one if
one is fond of such classifications, and Aggavamsa truly is. The
examples offered for the *suddhakattar* are either extremely simple, as
*putto jāyati* ‘a boy is born’, or, they are flavoured by Buddhism, in which
case they are taken from *Kaccāyana*. The way Aggavamsa brings in the
causal agent here is somewhat surprising. The verbs employed to define
it, *hinoti, gacchati, and pavattati*, are not taken up again in *sutta 550*
which deals with the causal agent. It is also surprising that these verbs are
not causatives, but Aggavamsa is probably proceeding in a very
mechanical manner since *gati* is one of the senses attributed to *śāi* in the
*Dhātumālā* (1225). The last three verses of the *kartradhikāra* of the
*Vākyapadiya* deals with the causal agent. The final verse begins (VP
3.7.124): *nimitebhyah pravartante sarva eva svabhūtaye, ‘for [various]
reasons, everyone engages in activity for his own benefit’. Here we meet
with the verb *pravṛt* and in the commentary of Helārāja on this verse the
forms *pravartamāna* and *pravṛtti* occur numerous times. Also in
Kaiyata’s commentary on A 1.4.55 *tatprayojako hetuś ca, ‘the prompter
of that [agent A 1.4.54] is [called] cause and also [agent A 1.4.54]’, the
word *pravartana* occurs (MbhP II:438): *evam manyate — praisād
ūrdhvaṃ prayojyasya svayyāpăre pravartanāt svātantryam, ‘the thought
is as follows: after being called upon [to act] the one who has been
prompted [keeps] his independence since he engages in his own activity.
Both *pravartana*, *pravṛtti*, and *pravartana* occur also later in the passage. The forms
*pravṛttā, pravṛttī, and pravartana* occur also in the *Padamañjari* in the
context of A 1.4.54. Haradatta here quotes the two opening verses of the
*kartradhikāra* of the *Vākyapadiya*. The first of these runs (VP 3.7.101):

prāg anyatāḥ śaktilebhān nyagbhāvāpādanād api /
tadadhinapravṛttitvāt pravṛttānāṁ nivartanāt //

[The independence of the agent is claimed] because he gets his
ability [to participate in the action] before any other [participant],
moreover, because of [his] bringing about the subordination [of
others], because of the activity of those subject to him, because
he stops those engaged in activity.

Could it be that one or more of these occurrences inspired
Aggavamsa to include the verb *pavattati*?

The *kammakattar*, the object-agent, concerns the agent of
actions denoted by what is often referred to as reflexive verbs.1 Already
Pāñini uses the term (A 3.1.62 *acah karmakartari*), and the *karmakartr*
construction is taught by rule 3.1.87 *karmavat karmanā tulyakriyāḥ
which states that an agent (A 3.1.68) that acts like an object is treated like
an object.2 The purpose of the rule is above all to trigger passive
morphology, and the agent may be viewed as parallel to the object of a
transitive sentence. Accordingly, *sayam eva kato kāriyati* and *sayam eva
pacīyati odano* should not be viewed as passive sentences in as much as
one could not specify some agent of these actions without changing the
meaning of the sentences: *devadattenā pacīyati odano* would mean that
Devadatta cooks the rice, in contrast to ‘the rice is boiling’. In order to
underline this difference the commentators add *svayam eva* ‘by itself; on
its own’, though Kātyāyana (A 3.1.87, vtt. 9–10) derives the *karmakartr*
construction *odanāḥ pacyatā* from *odanaḥ pacyata ātmanā* by elision of
ātmanā ‘by itself’. Does this no longer make it a *karmakartr-
construction*? The direct use of an item such as ātman to express a
reflexive construction reminds one of Middle Indo-Aryan where this
might be the only available device. The examples offered by Aggavamsa
for the *kammakattar* construction occur already in the *Mahābhāṣya*
on A 3.1.87. One wonders whether such constructions occur in Pāli at all.

Aggavamsa goes on to expand the threefold classification into a
fivefold one. This enterprise is simply a category error. His including the
*abhihitakattar* and the *anabhihitakattar* reflects a device in Pāñini’s
grammar. The restriction rule A 2.3.1 *anabhihīte, ‘if not expressed
[already]’, secures a principle underlying *kāraka* theory: a *kāraka* can
only be expressed once. A verbal ending can express *kartr, karman,* or

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1 That this is misleading and that we are not merely dealing with a reflexive agent
in the ordinary sense has been pointed out by P. Filliözet (1983:12). Clearly, a
verb such as *pacati* ‘is cooking’ is not reflexive but ‘the rice’ when we say ‘the
rice is cooking’ is both agent and object.

2 The interpretation of A 3.1.87 has been discussed recently by S.D. Joshi
(1982), P. Filliözet (1983), and M. Deshpande (1985), but I refrain from going
into details here.
bhāva. A choice in this respect determines the further choice of
morphology in the derivational process. For example, in a sentence such
as devadattah pacaty odanam, ‘Devadatta boils rice’, agency is
expressed by the active, finite verb ending. In Pāṇinian derivation this
goes back to the choice that the la-kāra IAT signify the agent. The agent
here would thus be an abhīhitakāra and the rules for kārakas and case
suffixes then secure that the nominative case ending is assigned to the
nominal stem devadatta-. Rule A 2.3.46 prātipadičārtihālingā-
parimānāvacanamātre prathamā teaches that the first case ending, the
nominative ending, is added merely to denote the gender and number of
the nominal stem meaning.2 The nominative ending, then, does not
express any kāraka. If the la-kāra IAT had been chosen to express the
object (karman), then the agent would not have been expressed already
and so the instrumental case which expresses the agent would be
assigned to the stem devadatta-. devadattena pacyata odanah, ‘rice is
boiled by Devadatta’. Surely, the terms abhīhitakartṛ and
anabhīhitakartṛ do occur in Sanskrit works on grammar, but this
division has to do with the way the kāraka agent is expressed, that is, it
only triggers morphological rules which depend on whether one has
chosen an active or passive construction, and it can in no way be said to
represent two further types of agent in the way the three previous
categories do.

The example aṁhinā daṁtho naro is offered by Kaccāyana under
the kattar rule (143). The definition of the kattukāraka as abhi-
nipphādana is not familiar to me from any source.

2.3.1 Agency, non-existence, and empty terms

549 Asantaṁ santāṁ va kappiyati, taṁ ca. Yaṁ
asantaṁ santāṁ viya buddhiyā parikappiyati, taṁ ca
kattusānāṁ bhavāt: saṁnogo jāyati, abhāvo hoti,
sasavisānāṁ tīṭhati, udumbarapupparpam vikasati, vaṁjāputto
dhāvati.

‘That which is non-existent is considered as if it were existent;
that too [is assigned to the category of the agent].’ That which,
though non-existent, is considered by the mind as if it were
existential also something to which the name kattar ‘agent’
applies: ‘a connection is coming about’; ‘non-existence’ exists;
’the hare’s horn exists’; ‘the fig-tree flower is blooming’; ‘the
son of the barren woman is running’.

There is no trace of this rule in Kaccāyana, and it seems to me
completely superfluous. First of all, the rule seems to reflect —
mindlessly the wording of an important verse in the Vākyapadīya
where Bhattarhari expresses a fundamental view on kārakas in general
(VP 3.7.3):

sādhana-vavahāraś ca buddhyavasthānibhandhanaḥ /
sann asan vārtharūpeśu bhedo buddhyā prakāpyate //

Also the practice of [referring to] the means [of an action] is
dependent on [the speaker’s] frame of mind. Difference in the
form of things, whether it is existent or non-existent, is
conceived by the mind.2

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1 A 1.2.45 arthavād adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam states that a nominal
stem, prātipadika, is a meaningful linguistic unit which is neither a verbal root,
nor a suffix, nor a form which ends in a suffix. A 1.2.46 kṛtadvaitasamāsāś ca
teaches that a derived linguistic unit that ends in a kṛt suffix, a taddhita suffix or
is a compound is also a nominal stem, prātipadika.

2 This is one possible interpretation of A 2.3.46. The most common traditional
interpretation takes the rule to teach that the nominative case ending is added
merely to denote the meaning of the nominal stem, its gender, measure, and
number.

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1 Or, possibly, ‘something non-existent’.
2 This concerns the notion of vivakṣā ‘the wish to express’, in this context the
freedom of the speaker to choose how to talk about the participants of an action.
Secondly, the rule reflects the same view that was expressed in the *vutti* on the previous rule, namely that grammar deals not with ontology but with things as they are spoken about. This view is formulated explicitly by Helarāja in his commentary on the kartradhikāra of the *Vākyapadiya* (Hel 313,16): *vyākarane hi sabdārtho rtha na vastvarthah*, ‘in grammar, meaning/object is the meaning/object conveyed by words, not real objects’. Later in the same adhikāra he states (Hel 316,12): *idānīm sabdārtho rtha iti svasiddhāntam nigamayitum āha*, ‘in order to conclude his own view that the object/meaning is the object/meaning conveyed by words, he [=Bhartṛhari] now states: …’. This introduces the following two verses (VP 3.7.109–10):

*bhāveṣv eva padanyāsaḥ prajñāyā vāca eva vā /
nāstity apade nāsti na ca sad bhidyate tataḥ //
buddhisabdau pravartete yathābhūteṣu vastuṣu /
teṣām anyena tatvena vyavahāro na vidyate //*

Both for knowledge and for speech forms any display of scope is based on existing things. The [utterance] ‘it does not exist’ does not exist when there is no scope, nor is that which exists any different from that [which does not exist in this respect]. [Both] cognition and speech function with regard to things as experienced; through no other principle can there be [scope for linguistic] usage of them.

It is noteworthy that these verses occur in the very section where the problem caused by expressions such as *aṅkura jāyate* is discussed. This may account for Aggavamsa’s example *saṅkogala jāyati* which, to me at least, seems peculiar. Consider also the wording of the *sutta* and its expansion in the *vutti* (*Asantam santam va kappiyati*, tañ ca. *Yam asantam santam viya buddhiyā parikappiyati*) in the light of the following passage from Helarāja’s commentary on the first of the verses cited (Hel 316,16–19):

tathā hi nāstity abhāvālambanau kañ caṇa paraparikalpitam svayam upreksitam vākaram avalambhya jāyete yena sadākārāvalambanābhyaṁ jñānasaabdābhyaṁ anayor viśesābhāvaḥ, svākārāvagrahāsāmyād iti vyavahāre sarvam eva bhāvabhāvajātaṁ samānām //

For instance, [when one says] ‘it does not exist’ both nonexistence and cognition arise in dependence upon some form — be that imagined through something else or itself observed — since in the case of both [word and cognition] there is nonexistence of something specific, because both word and cognition are dependent upon some existing form in as much as it does not matter whether it takes on its own form, [and] thus it is all equally arising — be that something existing or something non-existing — when there is linguistic usage [of it].

As for the rest of the examples offered by Aggavamsa, they illustrate the points made here. The terms chosen for this purpose are the standard examples in Sanskrit literature for so-called empty terms, terms which possess meaning but no reference, or Sinn but not Bedeutung, to use Frege’s terminology.

2.3.2 The causal agent: *hetu*


‘The one that causes [someone else] to act or [for example] the one that generates, that [kāraka] is the *hetu* “causal agent”.’

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1 Ce Be ns utṭhāpay; Bm upaṭṭhāpay.
Here as well the word vā has the sense of option and through it even other senses are to be included, as [seen] also subsequently: ‘a man makes a man perform an action’; ‘[a man] makes [a man] lift up a stone’; ‘[a man] makes [a man] arise from [his] seat’.

Kaccāyana’s definition runs yo kāreti sa hetu (143). Why Aggavaṃsa has chosen just u[pa]ṭṭhāpayati as the second half of the definition I am not able to tell, but again he makes it clear how his use of vā is intended. The fact that he repeats here the explanation he gave under the previous rule makes one wonder whether this is to stress that it is always the case that vā should be understood in this way, or whether it is uniquely to be understood in this way also here but not when it occurs in subsequent definitions. I am inclined to believe in the first of these alternatives.

Kaccāyana gives the example so puriso tam purisam kāreti, moving on to treat tam purisam as a variable by giving it also in the instrumental and genitive case. He then adds evam vihāreti, pāleti, pātheti, dhāreti, pāceti, nāyeti. This makes it likely that in Aggavaṃsa’s examples puriso purisam is to be supplied in the last two cases.

2.4 The object: kamma

551 Yam kurute yāṃ vā passati, tam kammam. Kariyate tam kiriyāya pāpuniyate ti kammam. Kiriyāpattilakkhaṇam kammakārakaṃ. Tam tividham nibbatthaniyādivasena, sattavidham api keci icchanti icchitādivasena. Tattha ratham karoti, sākham janayati, puttam vijāyati, aladdham paththi ti idam nibbattaniyām nama; katthham angāram karoti, suvannam keyūram kātakam vā karoti, vihaya lunāti idam vikaranīyām nama; tam duvidham: pariccaṭṭhakaraṇaṃ apariccaṭṭhakaraṇan ti, tattha pariccaṭṭhakaraṇaṃ nama, yāṃ kāraṇassa vināsena sambhūtam, apariccaṭṭhakaraṇaṃ nama, yattha kāraṇabhūte vatthumhi vijjāmāne yeva gunantaruppathiyā vohārabheda dissati; ubhayaṃ pan’ etam yathādassitatayiyāvogavasena datṭhabbam; nivesanam pavisati, Ādiccaṃ namassati, rūparām passati, dhāmmanā sunāti, pandite payirupāsati, manosā Pāṭaliputtim gacchati idam pāpanīyam nama, tathā hi nivesanam pavisati ti ādisu nivesanādinā kiriyāya na koci viseso kariyati aṅkātra sampattimattā; bhattam bhūjīte iicc ādisu bhattādi icchitakammanaṃ nama, visam gilati iicc ādisu visam anicchitakammanaṃ nama, gāman gacchāno rukkhamūlam upasamkamati iicc ādisu rukkhamūlādi nevicchitānānicchitakammanaṃ nama; ajam gāman nayati, Yaṅnadattam kambalam yāceti brāhmaṇo, samiddham dhanam bhikkhati, “rājānam etad abravi”1 iicc ādisu ajādaya kathitakammanaṃ nama, gāmādayo akathitakammanaṃ nama, tathā hi ajam gāman nayati ti ettha ajo kathitakammanā dvikamikāya nayanakiriyāya pattum icchitataratā, gāmo pana appadhānattā akathitakammanā, esa nayo itaresu pi — puriso purisam kammam kāreti iicc ādisu pana ānattapurisādayo kattukammanaṃ nama kattā ca so kammañ ca ti atthena; mayā ijjate buddho, Yaṅṇadhatto kambalam yācīyate brāhmaṇena, “nāgo manim yācito brāhmaṇena”2 iicc evamadīsī buddhādayo abhīhitakammanaṃ nama ākhīyātena paccayena vā kathitattā; chattam karoti, ghaṭam karoti iicc ādisu chattādayo anabhīhitakammanaṃ nama ākhīyātena akathitattā.

‘What one does or [for example] what one sees, that [kāraka] is the kamma “object”.’ It is done (kariyate), it is attained through the action, thus [it is called] object (kamma). The kāraka which is the object has as its defining characteristic the reaching [something] through an action. It is of three kinds: in as much as

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1 Sadd 600,28; Ja IV 462,2.
2 Sadd 338,22; 600,25; Vin III 147,22 = Ja II 285,22.
it is to be produced etc.; others teach that it is also sevenfold in as much as it is wanted etc. For example: ‘he makes a chariot’; ‘he makes pleasure arise’; ‘she gives birth to a son’; ‘he longs for something he has not got’ — this is what we call [the object] which is to be produced (nibbatāniya); ‘he makes wood [into] charcoal’; ‘he makes gold [into] a bracelet or a ring’; ‘he cuts paddy’ — this is what we call [the object] which is to be modified (vikaranīya). The latter is twofold: the one that has left [its] (material) cause behind (pariccattakārana) and the one that has not left [its] cause behind (apariccattakārana). Among these we call that the one that has left [its] cause behind which has come about as a result of destruction of the cause, [and] we call that the one that has not left [its] cause behind where a different designation is noticed as a result of the birth of a different property [pertaining to the object] only when that which existed as cause is met with in the objects. But this pair is to be considered according to demonstrated usage. ‘He enters the abode’; ‘he venerates the Āditya’; ‘he perceives form’; ‘he hears the doctrine’; ‘he reveres the learned’; ‘he goes to Pāṭaliputra in his mind’ — this is what we call [the object] which is to be attained (pāpanīya); for in such a way no difference is made to the abode etc. by the action in [sentences] such as ‘he enters the abode’ other than the mere attainment. In [sentences] such as ‘he eats rice’, rice etc. is what we call the object which is wanted (icchitakamma); in [sentences] such as ‘he swallows poison’, the poison is what we call the object which is unwanted (anicchitakamma); in [sentences] such as ‘going to the village he comes to the foot of the tree’, the foot of the tree etc. is what we call the object which is neither wanted nor unwanted (nevichitanānicchitakamma). In [sentences] such as ‘he leads the goat [to] the village’, ‘the Brahman begs Yajñadatta [for] a blanket’, ‘he begs the rich [for] wealth’, ‘he spoke this [to] the king’, the goat etc. is what we call the object which is specified (kathitakamma) [and] the village etc. is what we call the object which is unspecified (akathitakamma); for thus, with regard to [the sentence] ‘he leads the goat [to] the village’, the goat is the object which is specified in as much as it is the object that is most wished to be attained through the action of leading which has two objects, but the village is the object which is unspecified since it is subordinate; this principle [applies] also in the rest [of the examples]. But in such [sentences] as ‘a man makes a man perform an action’, the man who is ordered etc. is what we call the agent-object (kattukamman) according to an analysis [as a karmadhāraya compound]: ‘it is agent and it is object’. In [sentences] such as ‘the Buddha is honoured by me’, ‘Yajñadatta is asked [for] a blanket by the Brahman’, ‘the Nāga is asked [for] the jewel by the Brahman’, the Buddha etc. is what we call the object which has been expressed already (abhihitakamma) in as much as it is specified (kathita) by a finite verb or by a suffix. In [sentences] such as ‘he makes a sunshade’, ‘he makes a pot’, the sunshade etc. is what we call the object which has not already been expressed (anabhīhitakamma) in as much as it has not been specified (akathita) by a finite verb.

Kaccāyana’s definition runs yaṁ karoti taṁ kammaṁ but the vutti is more elaborate (142–43): Yaṁ vā karoti yaṁ vā passati yaṁ vā sūnati taṁ kāraṇaṁ kammaṁ saṁnāṁ hoti. Not only does this account for one possible source of the alternative definition given in the Saddanītu, but it seems to me also to reveal why Aggavamsa (twice) explained how he intended the particle vā to function when he offers two alternatives in his definitions: passati, like jāyati and upa[jā]thapayati in the preceding rules, stands for other things too. It should be noted, however, that the particular choice of the verb passati could also be motivated by the fact that it is dealt with as a special case in the karmaṁdikāra of the Sādhana-samuddeśa of the Vākyapadiya. I shall return to this later on.
Aggavansa claims that *kamma* is of three kinds, starting with the *nibbattaniya*, or, according to others, of seven kinds, starting with the *icchita*. It is therefore somewhat surprising to note that one seems to end up with three plus eight, at least if one counts them as listed. One way to account for this discrepancy, however, would be to take the first three as also constituting the first three of the group of seven, then take the *icchita*, *anicchita*- and *neccidanānicchita-kamma* as the fourth group, the *kathita*- and *akathitakamma* as the fifth, the *kattukamma* as the sixth, and the *abhihita*- and *anabhihita-kamma* as the seventh. This makes sense although it is not exactly what Aggavansa has stated. Otherwise one would have to conclude that his counting abilities were not too good. But if one turns to the *Vākyapadiya*, one will find that there *karman* is said primarily to be of three major kinds to which four minor ones are added. This would give us a classification as three or as seven. Although Aggavansa presents us with a distorted version, it is clear that the *Saddanīti* classification in some way or other goes back to the one met with in the *Vākyapadiya* (VP 3.7.45-46):

\[
\begin{align*}
nirvartyaḥ ca \quad & \text{vikāryaḥ ca prāpyaḥ ceti tridhā matam} / \\
tatrepitātāṃ ca \quad & \text{karma caturdhānyat tu kalpitām} // \\
audāśīnyena yat prāpyaḥ yac ca kartur anīpsitam / \\
samjhāntarair anākhyaṭāṃ yad yac cāpy anyapūrvakam //
\end{align*}
\]

Among them [= the *kārakas*] the object, being what is most desired, is considered to be of three kinds, as it is to be produced, modified or attained. Furthermore, it has been imagined as fourfold: that which is to be attained through indifference and that which is not desired by the agent, that which has not been designated by another technical term [= another *kāraka* category] and that which previously had another [kāraka designation].

To me it seems reasonable to think Aggavansa was familiar with the existence of a classification into three and four, adding up to form seven. It seems, however, that he just pushes all the information he possesses into this straightjacket without really having a grip on details or on what exactly constitutes a group. That the *Saddanīti* classification doubtlessly goes back to the one met with in the *Vākyapadiya* will be clear from the following chart of parallels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Saddanīti:</th>
<th>Vākyapadiya:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nibbattaniya</td>
<td>nirvartya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vikaraṇiya</td>
<td>vikārya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pāpaniya</td>
<td>prāpya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>icchita</td>
<td>[īpsitātāma]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>anicchita</td>
<td>anīpsita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nevicchitanānicchita</td>
<td>audāśīn yapāpya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kathita / akathita</td>
<td>samjhāntarānākhyaṭa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ś</td>
<td>anyapūrvaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kattukamma</td>
<td>ś</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>abhihita / anabhihita</td>
<td>ś</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I consider it worthwhile to enter into a more detailed discussion here:

1. **nibbattaniya**: This category clearly corresponds to Bhartṛhari’s *nirvartya*. I shall discuss some issues pertaining to this pair in the context of the *vikaraṇiya* / *vikārya* type.

2. **vikaraṇiya**: This obviously corresponds to *vikārya*. Aggavansa says this is of two kinds, as the one that has left its material cause behind (*pariccatākāraṇa*) and the one that has not left its material cause behind (*apariccatākāraṇa*). There can be no doubt that Aggavansa intends this twofold classification to pertain to the *vikaraṇiya*
alone. Now, in the Vākyapadīya Bhartṛhari expands on the nirvartya, and not the vikārya, as follows (VP 3.7.47):

sati vāvidyamānā vā prakṛtiḥ pariñāmini /
yasya nāśriyate tasya nirvartyatvam pracaṅkṣate ///

The property of being produced is said to belong to that whose material cause which undergoes transformation — whether it is existent or not — is not taken into consideration [for the statement].

That is to say, the property of being nirvartya pertains to that karman which is not viewed as a transformation of its material cause. The text continues (VP 3.7.48):

prakṛtes tu vivakṣāyām vikāryaṁ kaiś cid anyathā /
nirvartyaṁ ca vikāryaṁ ca karma śāstre pradarṣitam ///

But when the speaker intends [to express] the material cause, then it [is called] vikārya; karman as nirvartya and vikārya has been defined differently by others in the Śāstra.

In other words, where Aggavaṃsa comes up with a division of the vikaraṇīya according to whether it has left its material cause behind or not, Bhartṛhari primarily applies this division as a difference between the nirvartya and the vikārya. Note in passing that Helārāja (Hel 268,1) glosses prakṛteh here by kāraṇasya, the word preferred by Aggavamsa to denote the material cause. Bhartṛhari goes on to say that in the Śāstra others have defined the difference between nirvartya and vikārya differently (VP 3.7.49–50):

1 cf. his wording: 9idām vikaraṇīyaṁ nāma — tam duvidham: pariccattakāraṇam apariccattakāraṇan ti.
3. pāpaniya: This, of course, corresponds to Bhartṛhari’s prāpya ‘to be attained’. The relevant verse runs (VP 3.7.51):

kriyākṛtā viṣeṣāṇāṃ siddhir yatra na ganyate /
darśanād anumānād vā tat prāpyam iti kathyate //

That [object] upon which the establishment of differences that has come about through the action is understood neither by observation nor by inference, that [object] is called prāpya ‘to be attained’.

In Helārāja’s commentary on this verse we meet with the example ādiyam paśyati ‘he looks at the sun’ (Hel 270,9). Whether or not it is a coincidence that Aggavaṃsā gives the example Ādīccam namassati in this context is hard to say. I am inclined to believe that this refers to the gotra or clan name of Sākyamuni’s family, but of course this is not the only possible meaning of ādīcca here.

The idea of adducing prāpya as a separate category is to distinguish objects which are merely attained without any effect being imposed on them by the action. But Bhartṛhari here adds that, according to some, actions such as seeing do have effects on the object of seeing (VP 3.7.52):

viṣeṣalābhah sarvatra vidyate darśanād dibhiḥ /
kesām cit tadabhivyaktisiddhir drṣṭivisādiṣu //

The attainment of difference [in the object] by such actions as seeing is observed everywhere, according to some. In the cases of such that have poison in their gaze a distinction is established in that [object of such actions].

It may be a common view that snakes should have poison in their gaze although I am not familiar with it, but the point he wants to make is obvious: According to some, all actions, even the act of seeing, have an effect on their objects, and so the prāpya category would be superfluous. Whether this is the source for Aggavaṃsā’s choice of ‘what one sees’ as the second alternative of his kamma definition or whether he took it straight from Kaccāyana is not possible to tell. I do not, however, think the Vākyapadiya link is without significance, since Aggavaṃsā clearly — through some source or other — is familiar with the divisions set forth in that work. The act of seeing is brought up again later in the karmādhikāra (VP 3.7.64–65).

So far so good, but with the pāpaniya any simple one to one correspondence between Aggavaṃsā and Bhartṛhari comes to an end. The subsequent categories common to both the Saddanīti and the Vākyapadiya reflect three rules from the Aṣṭādhyāyi, namely A 1.4.49 kartur ipsitatam karma, 50 tathāyuktaṁ cânipsitam, and 51 akathitam ca. These rules have recently provoked some discussion. The first of them assigns the name karman to that kāraka which is most desired to be attained by the agent. Rule A 1.1.50 then adds that also that which is not desired but is related to the action in a similar manner has the name karman assigned to it. Finally, to account for ditransitive constructions, rule A 1.4.51 teaches that the name karman is assigned also to that kāraka which is unspecified, that is, which has not otherwise been assigned to any specific kāraka category. My rendering of ipsitatama and of rules 50 and 51 rests on the traditional interpretation. S.D. Joshi (1976), on the other hand, suggests that ipsitatama should be understood in the more general sense of ‘immediate goal’ and that it is the subsequent rule A 1.4.50 tathāyuktaṁ cânipsitam which accounts for double accusative constructions of the type mānavakam panthānām prcchati ‘he asks the boy the way’. This is echoed and developed further by P. Kiparsky (1982:39 foll.), who suggests that A 1.4.51 akathitam ca, the rule held by the tradition to account for double accusatives, in fact accounts for elliptical constructions where the object is omitted from the sentence and therefore identified as akathita ‘not expressed’. Recently M.M. Deshpande (1991) has discussed issues pertaining to the problem
of double accusative constructions, particularly when they are turned into passives. I refrain from entering into a discussion of these matters here, limiting myself to Aggavamsa’s way of dealing with the issues.

4. icchita, anicchita and nevicchitanānicchita: Bhartṛhari, as we saw, does not include Pāṇini’s ipsitatama in his enumeration, but adds it as a general characterization of karman which is then divided further, first into three types and then into four more (VP 3.7.45–46). Aggavamsa, on the other hand, gives icchita as a separate type of kamma, seemingly on a par with anicchitakamma and nevicchitanānicchitakamma. As noted earlier, it is tempting to see these three as constituting one group in the Saddhanī enumeration, although Bhartṛhari classifies anipsita and audāsīnyena prápya as two distinct types of karman.

The word anipsita reflects rule A 1.4.50 tathāyuktam cānipsitam mentioned above. So does the nevicchitanānicchitakamma / audāsīnyena prápya if anipsita is taken as a negation of ipsita which encompasses the two other possibilities of being undesired or being the object of indifference. The example adduced by Aggavamsa for anicchita, namely visam gilati ‘he swallows poison’, is so frequently met with in Pāṇiniya literature that it seems fruitless to mention any text in particular. The word udāsīna occurs in Pāli but not any derivation corresponding to audāsīnyə. This could account for Aggavamsa’s choice of terminology. The audāsīnyə category is, as far as I know, first met with in the Vākyapadya classification. In Sanskrit works the standard example is grāmam gacchan vrksamulāmi upasarpati ‘going to the village he comes near the roots of a tree’, met with for example in the Kāśikā. In Helārāja’s commentary on VP 3.7.46 it is given in the form grāmam gantur vrksamulādi where the ādi indicates the variety in its occurrence.

5. kathita and akathita: This draws directly on A 1.4.51 akathitam ca, ‘also that which is unspecified’. Bhartṛhari is less ambiguous in his formulation (VP 3.7.46): samjñāntarair anākhyātam, ‘that which has not been designated by another technical term’, that is, which has not already been assigned to any other kāraka category. As is clear from the examples, Aggavamsa uses this Pāṇiniya rule to account for the assignment to the category kamma of the second object of a double accusative construction such as gāmam ‘village’ in ajam gāmam nayati, ‘he leads the goat [to] the village’.

In a ślokavārttika quoted by Patañjali in the Bhāṣya on A 1.4.51 (Mbh 1:334,1–2) we find that a specific list of verbal roots is given in order to teach the verbs which are involved in ditransitive constructions and the objects which are considered akathita. This is a feature very rarely resorted to by Sanskrit grammarians.1 With the roots duh ‘milk’, yāc ‘beg’, rudh ‘obstruct; lock up’, pracch ‘ask’, bhiks ‘beg’, and ci ‘pick’, the cause of the object which is used, for example ‘milk’ with duh, is called akathita provided that no other designation has been taught previously; so too are the subordinate objects of brū ‘speak’ and śas ‘instruct’. Patañjali subsequently states that only three of these are valid examples of ditransitive roots, namely, yāc, pracch, and bhiks, and gives the following examples (Mbh 1:334,15): puravam gām yācate, mānava vikṣam pracchati, and puravam gām bhikṣate. The reason for this is probably his interpretation of akathitam ‘unspecified’. He opens his discussion of the rule as follows (Mbh 1:333,25): kenākathitam / apādānādibhir viśesakathabhīḥ, ‘unspecificed by what? By special designations such as apādāna etc.’. This is quoted also in the Kāśikāvṛtti, but there we also meet with the verse quoting the whole list of roots. In as much as double accusative constructions involving other

1 As pointed out by M.M. Deshpande (1991), this might have its background in the fact that difficulties arise when we try to turn a construction such as gām dogdhi payah, ‘he milks milk from the cow’ (lit.: ‘he milks the cow milk’) into a passive construction. We are faced with two possibilities according to whether the cow or the milk is considered the primary object: gaur duhaye payah, lit.: ‘the cow is milked milk’, or *gām duhaye payah, lit.: ‘milk is milked [from] the cow’. Deshpande has tried to provide a solution to this anomalous situation by investigating ideas scattered in commentaries. Aggavamsa does not touch upon this problem at all, although he does give the passive version of Yaṇṇadattam kambalam yācati brāhmano as Yaṇṇadatto kambalam yāciyate brāhmanena, ‘Y. is asked a blanket by the Brahman’.
than these three roots do occur in the Sanskrit language, the later tradition
does not accept the limitation. Important in this respect is the view of
Bhartṛhari\(^1\) that assigning something to a kāraka category is a function of
the speaker’s wish or intention (vivakṣā). Patañjali too recognises that
ditransitive constructions with verbs other than the three listed do occur.
He introduces another Ślokavārttika, quoted also by Helārāja,\(^2\) with the
words (Mbh I:335,18) *ke punar dhātunām dvikarmakāh, ‘but which of
the roots are ditransitive?’. Kaiyāta comments on this as follows (MbhP
II:423): duhyādpaparīganānād anyatra dvikarmakatvaṃ na prāṇnoti,
drṣyate ceti matvā prechati — *ke punar iti, ‘the feature of taking two
objects does not obtain elsewhere than [with regard to the roots] in the
list beginning with [the root] duh “milk”, but it is [nevertheless]
observed. With this [fact] in mind, he asks: “but which” [are these
roots]?” Patañjali then quotes the Ślokavārttika and gives the following
examples (Mbh I:335,19–22):

\[
\begin{align*}
nīvahyor harates cāpi gatyarthāṇāṃ tathaiva ca / 
dvikarmakeṣu grahanam draṣṭavyam iti niscayaḥ //
ajāṃ nayati grāmam / bhāram vahati grāmam / bhāraṇaḥ harati 
grāmam / gatyarthāṇāṃ / gamayati devadatam grāmam / 
yāpayati devadatam grāmam / 
\end{align*}
\]

It has been settled that among ditransitive verbs one should
observe mention of [the roots] *nī ‘lead’, *vah ‘carry’, and also of
*hr ‘take’, and likewise of [verbs] with the meaning of motion.
[For example:] ‘he leads the goat [to] the village’, ‘he carries the
burden [to] the village’, ‘he takes the burden [to] the village’. Of
verbs of motion: ‘he makes Devadatta go [to] the village’, ‘he makes
Devadatta move [to] the village’.

\(^1\) VP 3.7.3, referred to in section 2.3.1 above.
\(^2\) On VP 3.7.71.

6. kattukamma: Aggavaṃsa’s introduction of the
kattukamma, the object which is also the agent, that is, the agent which
is prompted to do an action and so is the object of the agent of a causative
verb, is peculiar. It does not correspond to Bhartrhari’s category of
anyapūrvaka ‘that which previously had another [kāraka designation]’.
The latter is interpreted by Helārāja (on VP 3.7.46) as referring to the

Aggavaṃsa’s examples cover only four of the verbs prescribed
by the Pāṇiniya tradition: nayati, vācati, bhikkhati, and brūti. The
examples given are standard, except for rājānam etad abravi which
Aggavaṃsa seems to have remembered from the canon (Ja IV 462,2). It
is not in Kaccāyana where kamma is dealt with very briefly. Why
Aggavaṃsa has chosen just these four examples is hard to ascertain. Is
he indicating that these verbs were the only ditransitive ones occurring in
Pāli, or is his choice completely arbitrary? It is noteworthy that Patañjali
brings in causatives when he gives examples for verbs of motion, an
issue I shall return to below.

With regard to Aggavaṃsa’s identification of principal and
subordinate objects the following verses in the Vākyapadiya are of
interest (VP 3.7.70–71):

\[
\begin{align*}
sarvam cākathitam karma bhinnakasyam pratīyate / 
dhātvṛdhodheśahenā tan nepsitatam kila //
pradhānaksama kathitam yat kriyāyāḥ prayojakam / 
tatsiddhaye kriyāyuktam anyat tv akathitam sṛtama //
\end{align*}
\]

But every unspecified object is understood to fall under a
different zone; because there is difference in the scope of the
meaning of the root, it is indeed not what is most desired [to be
obtained by the agent]. The principal object has been specified
as that which prompts the action [to take place], but that which
is connected with the action for attaining it [= the principal
object] is something else, declared to be the unspecified.
assignment of Devadatta to the category karman in sentences such as devadattam abhikrudhyati 'someone is angry with D.', whereas he is assigned to the category sampradāna when there is no preverb, as in devadattāya krudhyati 'someone is angry with D.' The Saddanitī text here becomes rather tricky too. Smith phrases it as follows (Sadd 692.30-31): ‘... akathitakammanā, esa nayo itaresu pi — purīsā puriṣam kammaṃ kāreiti icc ādisu pana ...’. What did Smith intend by indicating a phrasing like this? What is the link between the preceding and the following passages? The word pana seems to indicate a contrast to the preceding, but in what way? It is hard to translate esa nayo itaresu pi in any other way than ‘this principle [applies] also in the rest [of the examples]’. But which are the rest of the examples? One would immediately think of the three adduced subsequently as similar to the one of the goat and the village. When it comes to the contrast indicated by the word pana it could be that Aggavamsa has in mind the causatives listed in the ślokavārttika quoted in the Mahābhāṣya. But let us once again turn to the Vākyapadiya. Bhartrhari deals with double accusative constructions at some length (VP 3.7.70–77). Of immediate interest are the following verses (VP 3.7.72–73):

duhyyādivan nayatyādau karmatvam akathāśrayam /
ākhyātānupayoge tu niyamāc cheṣa izyate //
antarbhūtanijarthānāṃ duḥyādīnāṃ niyantavat /
siddham pūrṇaṃ karmatvam niyantaniyāmas tathā //

As in the case of [the roots] duh etc., the property of being object [applies also] in the case of [the roots] ni etc. based on the fact that they lack specification; but when there is no fitness for the action because of the restrictions [specified in the body of rules], the rest [= the genitive] is taught. For [roots] such as duh with the meaning of the causative suffix inherent, as if they ended in the causative suffix, the property of being object is previously established [by A 1.4.49]; thus a restriction [has

been made by A 1.4.52] with regard to [roots] ending in the causative suffix.

Bhartrhari here suggests a causative solution to the problem of double accusatives. Instead of saying ajāṃ grāmam navayati one could say ajāṃ grāmam gamayati ‘he makes the goat go to the village’. If so, the goat would be the prayojyakartr, the agent which is prompted, and accordingly assigned to the category karman by A 1.4.52 gati-buddhi-pratyavasānārthasaabdakarmākarmānāṃ anikartā sa naū which teaches that the agent of actions denoted by verbal roots meaning ‘move’, ‘know’, and ‘eat’, or roots the object of which is a word meaning ‘sound’, or intransitive verbs which are not in the causative, is assigned to the category karman in the causative.

On this view the two objects in a double accusative construction can no longer be graded as primary or secondary; they are both primary. Bhartrhari eventually gives up this view (VP 3.7.76–77), but this could nevertheless — via some channel or other — be the reason why Aggavamsa (apparently) makes a contrast to the previous division into primary and secondary objects for constructions like ‘he leads the goat [to] the village’.

In as much as the text is rather unclear at this point, it is tempting to speculate a little further. Could it be that when Aggavamsa talks about itara he has in fact misunderstood the meaning of the word šeṣa ‘rest’ in the Vākyapadiya verse? I am not saying that he is not aware that the word šeṣa denotes the genitive, only that he could have misinterpreted or had a badly transmitted version in this particular context. Moreover, Aggavamsa has clearly moved into the causative domain, but does he think that is what Bhartrhari indicates by anyapūrvaka ‘that which previously had another [kāraka designation]’, namely the change from agent to object in the causative?

7. abhīhitā and anabhīhitā: Aggavamsa finally introduces the abhīhitakamma and the anabhīhitakamma in the same manner as he introduced the abhīhitakattar and the anabhīhitakattar above (2.3), and
my remarks in that context would be valid also here. He simply talks about objects in passive constructions as abhihita ‘already expressed’ and thus taking a nominative case ending, and about objects in active constructions as being anabhitha ‘not expressed already’ and thus taking an accusative case ending. In other words, we are not really dealing with different types of objects, only with differences in the morphology that expresses them. In an attempt at making Aggavamsa’s enumeration add up I have in the case of kamma treated the abhihita and anabhitha as one category. True, this does not correspond with what he did for the agent, where he expanded a threefold classification into a fivefold one by inclusion of the abhihitakattar and the anabhithitakattar. Some internal inconsistencies will thus stubbornly remain.

2.5 The instrument: karana


‘That by means of which one acts or [for example] that by means of which one sees, that too is [the kāraka] karana “instrument”.’ Something is done with it, [or] one accomplishes an action with it, [that is,] with a thing being an implement for the agent, thus [it is called] instrument (karana). And with regard to this, although the property of being a means of [accomplishing] an action pertains to all kārakas, [this] statement, having specified ‘that by means of which’ etc., is intended for the understanding of only the most effective means among the means which work as implements for the agent. The kāraka which is the instrument is characterized as the implement of the action.1 It is of two kinds, as internal and external: ‘He sees shape/colour by means of the faculty of seeing, he hears sound by means of the faculty of hearing, ... he understands the doctrine by means of the faculty of thinking’; ‘he performs an action by means of the hand’; ‘he cuts the tree by means of an axe’.

The Kaccāyana definition runs (141): yena vā kayirate tam karaṇam. The vuttī explains: yena vā kayirate yena vā passati yena vā sunāti tam karaṇakam ... . As Senart points out (142), this is not necessarily the obvious interpretation of vā in Kaccāyana’s definition, but it is in complete agreement with Aggavamsa’s and with the examples the latter offers. Apart from the final example in the Dighanikāya quotation, all examples occur in the Kaccāyana-vuttī.

Aggavamsa obviously felt the need to include the core of Pāṇini’s definition (A 1.4.42): sādhakatam karaṇam ‘the most effective means [is called] the instrument’. All kārakas are instrumental in bringing about an action. The superlative suffix -tama therefore serves to point out the means par excellence. The discussion brought up by Aggavamsa is met with already in the Mahābhāṣya on A 1.4.42. Aggavamsa’s treatment of the karaṇa, then, does not bring in any new material. All he does is to elaborate on the Kaccāyana definition in the by now familiar way of including options, and then link this definition to the one given by Pāṇini and to a basic issue in the discussion of the

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1 Smith reads visesetvā-vacanam with a hyphen. His reason for doing so escapes me. I take visesetvā to be the absolutive of a causative and vacanam, the subject, to go with gahanathām.

2 D II 338, 19-22.

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1 Smith (CT 5.1.1.3): ‘l’outillage de l’action’.
Pāniniyas. Aggavamsa’s division into ajjhātika ‘personal; internal’ and bāhira ‘external’, on the other hand, I am not familiar with at all. It is certainly not met with in the Vākyapāḍīya from where several of his divisions stem. The focus of the discussion in that text is on degrees of instrumentality and on whether one talks about properties or things as instruments. But the opposition ajjhātika-bāhira is familiar from Buddhist literature, particularly in the context of skandha-, āyatana-, and dhātu-analysis.¹ In the present context of grammar, however, I find it hard to understand how the division serves any purpose at all.

2.6 The recipient etc.: sampadāna

The sampadāna is dealt with at length in the Saddanitī. This is the case also in the Kaccāyanavuttī. Moreover, the two texts follow an identical procedure; one rule deals with the more general exposition and is followed by another rule which points out special cases and which is elaborated upon at great length with a multitude of examples in the vuttī. Among all the kārakas only the apādāna is dealt with in the same extensive manner.

553 Yassa dātukāmo yassa vā ruccati, taṃ sampadānam. Yassa vā dātukāmo yassa vā ruccati yassa vā khamati yassa vā dhārayate, taṃ kārakam sampadānasaṅñaṃ hoti: samanassa danaṃ dātukāmo samanassa civaram dadāti, tassa purisassa bhattam ruccati “gamanam mayham ruccatii”,² “mā āyasmanthānam samghabheda ruccittha”,³ Devadattassa suvaṇṇacchattam dhārayate Yaññadatto. Sammā pakārenna assa dadāti ti sampadānam patiggāhako. Patiggaḥana- lakkhanam sampadānakārakam. Taṃ pan’ etam sampadānam tividham hoti anirākaren’-ajjhesanānumativasena; tathā hi

¹ E.g. M I 61,12; cf. CPD.
² Ja VI 64,28.
³ S 147,9 = 161,4.
⁴ Ja VI 572,23.
⁵ S I 132,25 = Thi 190a.
⁶ Ja II 353,15.

‘That kāraka⁶ to whom [the agent] has a desire to give, or [for example] [that kāraka] to whom [something] is pleasing, is called sampadāna “recipient”? One to whom [the agent has] a desire to give, or one to whom [something] is pleasing, or one to whom [something] is owed, that kāraka is something to which the technical name sampadāna applies. [For example:] ‘There is a wish to give a gift to the Śramaṇa; ‘he gives a robe to the Śramaṇa; ‘food pleases this man; ‘going pleases me; ‘division in the Samgha should not please the venerable ones’; ‘Yajñadatta owes Devadatta a golden sunshade’. In the proper (sammā = sam) way (prakārenna = pra) one gives to that one, thus [it is called] sampadāna, [that is,] the one who receives.

₁ As noted already, ‘recipient’ is not a fully adequate rendering of sampadāna. See p. 10, note 3 above.
The kāraka which is the sampadāna is characterized by receiving. Now, this sampradāna is threefold in as much as [the giving is characterized by] non-rejecting (anirākarana), requesting (ajhiesana), or approval (anumati). For thus [a kāraka] to whom something is being given through non-rejection gets the technical name sampadāna, as for example: ‘He gives a flower to the Buddha’; ‘he gives water to the tree’; [likewise] one [to whom] something [is given] by request [as in]: ‘He gives food to the beggars’; [and likewise] one [to whom] something [is given] by approval [as in]: ‘He gives an offering to Nārāyana’; ‘he gives food to the monk’. And here in the teaching both the statement of sam and the statement of upa are appropriately taught when the sense is that of approval as in such [sentences] as: ‘Truth pleases the Śramaṇa’; ‘solitude has appealed to you who desire heaven’; ‘you find pleasure in the slaughter of what single thing, Gotama?’; ‘may I not find pleasure in the slaughter of a man’; ‘why do you not approve of birth?’ But in such [sentences] as: ‘I dislike, venerable ones, the Anointment of the Owl’, only the statement of the sampadāna appears when there is the sense of ruccana ‘to seem good to’. Accordingly this principle demands keen attention.

The Kaccāyana definition runs (134): yassa dātuṅkamo rocate vā dhārayate vā tam sampadānam. It is noteworthy that Aggavamsa has replaced rocate with ruccati, a form based on a weaker grade of the root. This, it seems, is in agreement with his peculiar subsequent distinction between rocanatthe and ruccanațthe. As usual Aggavamsa gives only two alternatives in his definition, but the exclusion of dhārayate could be motivated by the fact that this verb is listed separately in the subsequent rule as it also is in Kaccāyana.

A nirvacana, semantic analysis, of the term sampadāna very similar to the one offered by Aggavamsa is met with in the Nyāsa on the Kāśikāvṛtti (KāśN 1:546): samyak prakārṣeṇa diyate ‘properly, excellently it is given’. The Nyāsa is definitely earlier than the 11th century, maybe as early as the 7th.

The threefold division of the sampradāna, on the other hand, goes back to the Vākyapadiya (3.7.129):

anirākaranat kartus tyāgānāṃ karmanesitam /
preranānumatibhyāṃ ca labhate sampradānātāt //

That element in [the act of] forsaking which is the goal to be attained by the object [of the action of giving, i.e. the gift,] attains the property of being the sampradāna [either] from not refusing (anirākarana) the agent [of giving], or from urging (prerana) [the giver] or from giving consent (anumateh).

Apart from the replacement of the term prerana with the synonymous term ajhiesana the classification is the same.

As for the examples, one may be puzzled by the fact that a Burmese Buddhist comes up with nāryanassa balim dadāti, ‘he gives an offering to Nārāyana’. It is noteworthy then that Helārāja makes the following statement in his commentary on VP 3.7.129 (Hel 332,8–9): tathā diyamānam na nirākaroti balyādi devatāditi tad api kriyāgam, ‘thus, such [an entity] as a deity [who] does not decline such [an entity] as an offering which is being given [to it], that too is an element in the action [and gets the name sampradāna]’. Here we meet with the word bali ‘offering’ and an unspecified deity as the sampradāna.

The final issue to be brought up by Aggavamsa under this rule I find somewhat peculiar. He claims that both the statement of the sampradāna and the statement of the upayoga appears in such sentences as samanassa rocate saccam, ‘truth pleases the Śramaṇa’. Smith (CT 3.3.3) claims that upayoga is a term for the accusative case; so also CPD (s.v.) where reference is made to the Kāśikāvṛtti on A 1.45.1 akathitas ca. I doubt whether one could claim that this is the whole story. As noted already, it is rule 1.45.1 which — if we stick to the traditional
interpr etation — accounts for double accusative constructions. The term upayoga occurs in the ślokavārttika on this rule which specifies a list of ditransitive verbal roots. More precisely it occurs in the compound upayoganimitta ‘the cause of the use [of something]’ with reference to the cow in a sentence such as gām dogdhi payah, ‘he milks the cow milk’. It is thus not a question of the accusative case but of assigning the upayoganimitta, i.e. such entities as the cow in constructions of this kind, to the category karman. This is clear also from the Kāśikā on 1.4.51 which quotes the ślokavārttika from the Bhāṣya and remarks on the term upayoga as follows: upayuyāyata ity upayogā payahprabhṛti, tasya nimittam gavādī, tasyapayuyāyānapayahprabhṛtinimittasya gavādeh karmasamjñā vidhiyate, ‘[according to an analysis as karmasādhana, i.e., as the object of the act of using, namely:] “it is used”, [it is called] upayoga, that is, the milk etc.; its cause (nimitta) is the cow etc.; [and] the technical name karman is allotted [also] to this cause of the milk etc. which is being used, namely to the cow etc.’ So it is only in the special case of the principal and subordinate objects in ditransitive constructions that the terms upayoga and upayoganimitta apply. A similar analysis and use of vocabulary is met with in Kaiyata’s remarks on the ślokavārttika from the Bhāṣya.

It seems worthwhile to mention the paragraph in Kaiyata’s commentary which introduces this ślokavārttika (Mbh P II:413–14):

kim udāharaṇam iti / natsasya śrṇotiṣyādvāt api karmasam-

jāprasānga iti praśnaḥ / atha vāpādānādibhiḥ sarvasya viṣayasya vyāpanād udāharaṇāsambhavam 1 matvā prechati /

“What is the example?2” The question concerns the possible application of the term karman even [to the actor etc.] in such cases as natsasya śrṇoti, ‘he listens to the actor’. Or else he asks

1 So read for vyāpanāduḥharda.
2 That is, of something unspecified (akathita) which has not been covered already by the apādāna etc.

Could it be that Aggavaṃsa had this discussion in mind? Could it also be that he has mixed up a genitive such as natsasya with an imaginary dative in the Pāli, thus linking it to the sampadāna category and thinking it equivalent in usage to a kamma? It may also be the case that he has taken his inspiration from another part of the discussion of A 1.4.51 where the sampradāna category is directly in the picture. The discussion at this point concerns sentences such as putram anuśāste dharmam, ‘he instructs his son in dharma’ which would exemplify the rule stated in the ślokavārttika. Patañjali rejects them saying (Mbh I:334,14): naitad asti / kathitātra pūrvā sampradānasamjñā, ‘this is no good; with regard to this the previous name sampradāna has been specified [by rule 1.4.32]’. Kaiyata remarks on this (Mbh P II:417): kathiteti / dharmena vacanānāsanakarmanā putrasābhipeyamānaṁvatā, ‘[concerning] “has been specified”: because the son is what is in view1 via the dharma which is the karman of the instruction through words’. Patañjali here discards all but three verbal roots as ditransitive and thus leaves matters somewhat vague in as much as constructions such as gām dogdhi payah do occur. Later grammarians rely here on Bhartṛhari who resorted to the principle of vivakṣa, the wish or intention of the speaker.2

It could well be that Aggavaṃsa took advantage of this slightly vague situation to “place” the examples he offers, although they are very different in as much as they are not double accusative constructions. It is in any case clear that Aggavaṃsa is on slippery ground. His example kim nu jātim na rocesi, ‘why do you not approve of birth?’, is an absurdity in as much as it is a construction entirely different from the preceding

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1 The wording here goes back to Pāṇini’s definition of the sampradāna in rule 1.4.32 karmanā yam abhipraita sa sampradānam, ‘that which one aims at through the karman, that is the sampradāna’.
2 VP 3.7.3; cf. the discussion of kathita and akathita in section 2.4 above.
ones. This links up with his peculiar insistence on a distinction between rocana ‘approving of’, the “object” of which he claims can be assigned to both the sampadāna and the upayoga categories, and ruccana ‘seeming good to’ which is linked exclusively to the sampadāna. The reason for this is probably due to the possibility of viewing ditransitive constructions as pseudo-causative constructions. Among the forms adduced by Aggavaṃsa rocesi is a causative whereas the others are middle forms from a different grade of the root.

Although I shall have to leave this mystery partly unsolved, it is clear that the source for the introduction of \textit{vruc} in the first place is A 1.4.33 \textit{ruçyarthānām priyāmānah} which assigns the one who is pleased to the category \textit{sampadāna} in the context of verbal roots with the sense ‘to please’. The standard example is \textit{devadattāya modako rocate}, ‘sweets are pleasing to D.’. Moreover, it seems worthwhile to quote VP 3.7.130:

\begin{verbatim}
hetutve karmasamjñāyām śesatve vāpi kārakam /
ruçyarthādiṣṭa śāstreṇa sampradānākhyam ucyate //
\end{verbatim}

In [the rules] beginning with \textit{ruçyarthānām} etc. the kāraka called \textit{sampadāna} is taught by the Śāstra even when the properties of being \textit{hetu}, \textit{karman}, or \textit{śesa} are there.

2.6.1 More on the sampadāna

The basic \textit{sutta} dealing with the \textit{sampadāna} is followed by one which specifies several specific cases and is expanded on at length in the \textit{vuttī}. I shall therefore split the text up into convenient portions.

554 \textit{Silāghahānuṭhāsapadhārapihakudhaduh’-}
\textit{issosuyyarādhiikkhapaccāsuṇaanupatigīnapubba-
katī’ārocanathatadatadhatumatthālamattamaññānā-
dar’appāṇini nayanagatyathakammani āsimatsatha-
sammutitatiyathādīsu ca. Silāghha hanu thā sapa dhāra

piha kudha duha issa icc etesam dhātūnam payoge ca,
usuyyathānam payoge, radh’ikkhapayoge ca, paccāsuna-
anupatigīnam pubbakkattari ca, ārocanathayogadadatthe
tumatthe alanathapayoge ca, maññatipayoge anādare
appāṇini ca, nayanagatyathānam kammani ca, āsimatsath-
ayogac ca, sammutipayoge ca, tatiyathādisu ca — tam
kārakam sampadānasahānam hoti. Etth’ādisaddena pañcami-
chaṭṭhisattamnam attho ca, sārattho ca, bhūvigho
akkarappayoge ca gahito; etesu pi canuthi vibhatti bhavati.

‘[The technical name sampadāna applies] also in the cases of
[the verbal roots] silāgha, hanu, thā, sapa, dhāra, piha, kudha,
duha, issa, usuyya, rādha, and ikkha, of the agent of the
previous action [of requesting] with regard to [the verbal root]
suṇa with preverbs \textit{pacc} or ā and [the verbal root] \textit{gina} with
preverbs \textit{anu} or \textit{pati} in the sense of declaring (ārocanā),
of that which is for the sake of something, of the sense of the
infinitive, of the sense of sufficiency, [in the case of the object]
of mañña “think; consider” when it has the sense of contempt
provided [the object] is inanimate, in the case of the object of [an
action denoted by verbal roots] having the senses of “moving”
or “leading”, in cases where there is the sense of benediction,
[usage of the word] \textit{sammuti} “permission; consent”, and
the sense of the third [case ending] etc.’ Also when there is usage
of the roots silāgha, hanu, thā, sapa, dhāra, piha, kudha, duha,
and issa; also when there is usage [of a verbal root] in the sense of
‘finding fault with’ (usuyya); also when there is usage of [the
roots] rādha and ikkha; also when there is a previous agent of
[an action denoted by the verbal root] suṇa preceded by
[the preverbs] \textit{pacc} and ā and [the verbal root] \textit{gina} preceded by
\textit{anu} or \textit{pati}; also when there is usage in the sense of ‘declaring’.

\footnote{Smith, \textit{Index verborum}, gives ārocanā (f.) for reasons which escape me; CPD
gives ārocanā (nt.).}
for the sake of something, when there is the sense of the infinitive, [and] when there is usage in the sense of sufficiency; also when there is usage of maññati when there is contempt and [it applies] to something inanimate; also in the case of the object of [an action denoted by verbal roots] with the senses of ‘moving’ or ‘leading’; also when there is usage in the sense of benediction; also when there is usage of [the word] sammuti ‘permission; consent’; [and] also when there is the sense of the third [case ending] etc. — that kāraka [too] is something to which the technical name sampadāṇa applies. As far as this is concerned, by the word ādi ‘etc.’ [is indicated] the meaning of the fifth, the sixth, and the seventh [case endings], moreover the meaning sāra ‘advantage; reminder (?)’, and it is accepted that linguistic usage is of many kinds; in these cases too the fourth case suffix applies.

Kaccāyana offers an identical rule (135), except that Aggavaṃsa has added nayana to gatyartha and the Kaccāyana rule has a different ending, equally obscure, reading bhīyasattamayathuesu ca after sammuti. The rule covers rules from the kāraka section of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, but also from A 2.3, the section where vibhaktis are assigned. The above translations of several of the phrases taken over by Aggavaṃsa are out of place, and I think syntactically coherent translations of them are virtually impossible, particularly because many of the elements are quoted verbatim but deprived of their original syntactic context. In as much as Aggavaṃsa comments at length on each and every one of the elements listed, it seems better for me to reserve further discussion until an element is brought up anew. Note that in general most of the examples offered in the commentary on Kaccāyana are met with also in the Saddanīti where a few more are normally listed.

2.6.1.1 silāgha, hanu, thā, and sapa

(694,20–695,5) Silāghapayoge tāva buddhassa silāghate, sakamupajjhāyassa silāghate icc evamādi; ettha ca silāghate ti kathati, thometi ti atho. Hanupayoge hanute mayham eva, hanute tuyham eva icc evamādi; ettha ca hanute ti apanayati, apalapati allāpasallāpaṁ na karoṭi ti atho. Thāpayoge upatiṭṭheyya Sakyaputtānam vaddhāki icc evamādi; ettha ca upaṭṭhānam nāma upagamanan saddatthavasena, samketatthavasena pana upaṭṭhahanan ti atho, tathā hi garum "annena pānena upaṭṭhito 'smiti' ti "upagantvā 'hitō asmi' ti attham vadantī saddatthavasena, samketatthavasena pana mātāpituupāṭṭhānan" ti ādisu viya upaṭṭhahanam adhippetam. Sapapayoge "sapattham pi te samma aham karomi", mayham sapate, tuyham sapate ti; ettha ca sapate ti sapatham karoṭi ti atho, sapapathā ca nāma paresam tosāpanathām saccakaranam "alamkāṭa suvasanā mālinī candamussadā ekikā sayane setu yā te ambe avahāri ti ādisu viya, puriso attano verim sapati ti ādisu pana paresam tosāpanathām saccakaranam na hotī, tasmā tādesesu ṭhānesu sampadānasānāṁ na hotī ti daṭṭhabbāṁ.

As for the usage of silāgha ‘praise’: ‘He praises the Buddha’, ‘he praises his own preceptor’, and so on in the same manner. And in this context silāghate [means] kathati ‘boasts’, that is to say, thometi ‘praises’. As for the usage of hanu ‘hide’: ‘He hides from me alone’, ‘he hides from you alone’, and so on in the same manner. And in this context hanute [means] apanayati

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1 Smith, note: cf. Pv-a 135,9 (Ja V 173,26 et Ja V 175,21, Pv 256b).
2 Khp V 5a.
3 Ja V 481,2.
4 Ja III 139,9–10.
5 The wording sakamupajjhāyassa (so Smith) is tricky. It is difficult to take sakam on its own and difficult to explain it as part of a compound.
leads away’, apalapati ‘conceals [in speech]’, that is to say, he does not make conversation. As for the usage of thā ‘stand’1: ‘The carpenter should do service (upatīṭheyya) for the sons of Sakya’, and so on in the same manner. And in this context that is called upatīṭhana which is upagamanā ‘approaching [someone]’ according to its literal meaning, but in its conventional meaning (it means) upatīṭhahana ‘standing by [someone’s side]; serving (= being a servant)’; that is the meaning. For thus they teach that [when someone says] ‘I approach the teacher2 with food and drink’ it means ‘having gone up to [him] I stand [there]’, in accordance with the literal meaning, but according to the conventional meaning [the sense of] upatīṭhahana ‘standing by; serving’ is intended, as in such expressions] as ‘looking after one’s mother and father’. As for the usage of sapa ‘swear; curse; make an oath’: ‘To you I properly make an oath as well’, ‘he makes an oath to me’, ‘he makes an oath to you’! And in this context sapate means ‘makes an oath (sapatā)’; and that is called sapatā ‘oath’ which is a statement of truth in order to bring about happiness for others, as in such [sentences] as ‘adorned, well dressed, garlanded, abundant in sandal perfume — she who took away these your mango fruits, let her solitory lie in bed’. But in such [sentences] as ‘the man curses his enemy’2 there is no statement of truth in order to bring about happiness for others, and therefore it should be understood that the technical term sampadāṇa does not apply in cases such as these.

1 Literally, ‘stopping [one’s] movement’. This is the meaning entry given in the Dhātumāla (300; 1113); thā gatinvatiyaṃ, taken verbatim from the Pāṇiniya dhātupātha (1.975; sthā gatinvirtaia). This, however, is not the meaning relevant here. See below.

2 Smith gives the text here as follows: tathā hi garum “annena pānena upatīṭhito ‘smi’” ti “upagantvā ṭhito asmi” ti attham vadanti ..., adding the following note to garum: sic Ce Bem ns (i.e. garū). I do not think that Smith intended this garū as a nominative plural to be taken with vadanti. In that case one would have to translate: ‘For thus the teachers teach [that when someone says] “I approach [someone] with food and drink”, it means “having gone up to [them] I stand [there]”’. Rather I think he intended to signal that what we are dealing with here is a genitive singular, the ending -ū being historically correct, and then shortened to garu. One may refer to the phrase kissa hetu ‘for what reason’. The form garum, then, is probably a scribal correction by someone who has tried to make sense of a form he did not recognise by adding an anuvāra and thus making it an accusative singular. Surely, at any time in the history of the Pāli language a long vowel could be replaced by a short nasalised vowel, but hardly in a genitive case ending. For these reasons I also take garum as part of the example. This may seem at odds with Smith’s indication of where the example begins, but if he did not consider it an accusative singular the reason he kept garum outside the quotation mark could be that the person waited upon is not stated in the similar constructions he refers to. Finally, a strong reason for taking it as part of the example and as a genitive form is that otherwise we would in fact lack a sampadāṇa in Aggavaṃsa’s example of the same.

The roots dealt with here are given in identical fashion by Kaccāyana. They are taken directly from A 1.4.34 ślāghahumnsthāsapām jñīpsyaṃānah which teaches that the name sampadāṇa is assigned to someone who is meant to know in the context of the verbal roots ślāgh ‘praise’, hnu ‘hide’, sthā (in a special meaning to which I shall return), and śap ‘swear; curse; make an oath’. As for the Saddanitī passage, one may assume that the meanings intended for these roots are the same as the ones assigned to them in the Dhātumāla — which, incidentally, are identical with the ones given for these roots in the Pāṇiniya dhātupātha. But if this is all there is to it Aggavaṃsa would be simplifying the picture to the extent of missing the point of introducing the rule.

In the first place, the Pāṇini rule includes the special requirement that the one who is assigned to the category of the sampradāṇa is to be

1 My translation ‘make an oath’ here is a consequence of following Smith’s reading sapatham karoti in the immediately following clause which explains the meaning of sapate and of Aggavaṃsa’s subsequent claim that in the case of these expressions ‘a statement of truth in order to bring about happiness for others’ is involved.

2 The form verim creates a slight problem. I take it to be the accusative singular of verin ‘bearing hostility’, here used as a substantive meaning ‘enemy’.
informed (jīṉṣyasamāṇah) of the activities expressed by these roots. This seems to have become lost both in Aggavamsa’s treatment, and also, as noted already by Senart, in the Kaccāyanavutti (140):

Les quatre premiers cas prévus par cette règle semblent empruntés à Pāñini, 1, 4, 34 : “cīlghahnunsthāçapām jīṉṣyasamāṇah”. Mais comme, ni dans le texte de notre règle, ni même dans le commentaire, le mot “jīṉṣyasamāṇah” ne se trouve reproduit, il est naturel de penser que le sens particulier que son addition forç a attribuer aux quatre racines dans le grammaire sanscrit ne doit pas être transporté aux quatre verbes pālīs. C’est ainsi que j’ai traduit “silāghate” non: il se vente à quelqu’un, mais: il loue quelqu’un, et “sapate mayharin”, non: il me fait serment de … mais: il me blâme, conformément à Vārt. 8 in Pāñ I, 3, 21 (çapate upālambhane : devadattāya çapate).

Aggavamsa’s case is slightly more complex. He does somehow try to bring in particular meaning nuances for the roots involved albeit not in any particularly illuminating way and certainly not in a way which captures the intentions of Pāñini fully. Moreover, he clearly realises that there is something odd going on in the case of the root thā and tries, although erroneously, to make the terrain agree with the map in this case and in the case of sapa.

According to A 1.4.34 the sentence buddhassa silāghate ought to mean ‘he praises the Buddha [and shows it to him]’. There is no evidence that this was Aggavaṃsa’s intention. Similarly, hanute mayham eva ought to be translated ‘he hides from me alone [wanting me to know it]’ as in the Sanskrit gopi kṛṣṇaya hnite ‘the milkmaid hides from Kṛṣṇa [wanting him to know it]’. Aggavamsa indicates the meaning of hanu by resorting to the meaning entry of the Dhātumālā (1284), apanayane, taken from the Pāñiniya dhātupātha. But he curiously glosses apanayati by apalapati which he must have taken from Sanskrit since there is no such verb in Pālī. The problem is: from where? It is not found in the Kāśikā on this rule, nor in the commentaries thereupon. The Mahābhāṣya does not comment on this rule. It is of course possible that he just took this verb from his Sanskrit vocabulary, and that the interpretation ‘he does not make conversation’ is his own innovation.

When we come to the root thā we are facing more trouble. The meaning alluded to in A 1.4.34 is the one taught by Pāñini in rule 1.3.23 prakāsasthāṣeṣyākhyayoḥ ca. The rule preceding this one states that ātmanepada suffixes are added to the root sthā when it is preceded by any one of the preverbs sam, ava, pra, or vi. Rule 1.3.23 then teaches that ātmanepada suffixes are added to this root also when it has the senses of prakāsana ‘revealing one’s intention’ or stheṣyākhyā ‘proclaiming someone an arbitrator’. To give an example, devadattāya tiṣṭhate could mean ‘she reveals herself to Devadatta [wanting him to know of her desires]’. This has escaped Aggavaṃsa completely, but he bravely sets out to find some Pālī usage which could possibly be accounted for by this rule. He settles for the usage of upāḥṭhā. In order to make his distinction clear here, he then resorts to the circular enterprise of explaining upāṭṭhāna by itself, that is, by another action noun, upāṭṭhāhana. This procedure — much as one can sympathise with Aggavaṃsa in his difficult task — does leave a few holes and discrepancies here and there as is bound to be the case when the territory is forced to agree with the map.

Let me then finally turn to the case of sapa. As pointed out by Senart, vārttika 8 on A 1.3.21 states that ātmanepada substitutes are introduced after the root sap when the swearing is perceived as such by the recipient of the swearing. This is specified further in the Kāśikā so as to involve touching the body ‘with the statement’ (vācā). The situation is clarified further in the commentaries of Haradatta and Jinendrabuddhi who both explain that we are dealing with a special kind of oath — sapathaviśeṣa. Moreover, Jinendrabuddhi makes a clear distinction in meaning here between the ātmanepada and the parasmaipada forms of the root sap: sapatiyā akroṣatitī arthah, ‘sapati, that is to say, “abuses; curses” [in the parasmaipada]’. It is this distinction which is reflected in
Aggavamsa’s attempt to distinguish between āmanepada usages of this verb where ‘a statement of truth for the sake of other people’s happiness’ is involved and parasmaipada usages where this is not the case, as in puriso attano verim sapati ‘he curses his enemy’, clearly stating that in the latter case the term sampadāna does not apply. Neither Haradatta nor Jinendrabuddhi are clear on this point, however, and such a claim is certainly not in complete accordance with Sanskrit usage, where — I believe — one could say devadattāya śapati ‘he swears at Devadatta’ with the verb in the parasmaipada voice and the recipient of the abuse in the dative case. One may therefore be entitled to question Aggavamsa’s examples for the āmanepada usage of the verb in the sense of making an oath. These are extremely simplistic and do not necessarily reflect anything more than a knowledge of what the Sanskrit grammarians claim and thus are not genuine Pāli language usage. It is noteworthy that in the Dhātumālā (557) Aggavamsa lists only the parasmaipada form sapati. If his example verim sapati is genuine and not constructed by him to fit the occasion, sapati takes an object in the accusative case.

Four references are given under sapati in the PED. Three of these reveal relevant information:

1) Mhv 25.113: vinā samghena āhāram mā bhuṅjetha kadāci pi, mātāpiṭhāre sapimsu dahare va no; clearly parasmaipada with an unambiguous accusative, so that on the authority of Aggavamsa we ought to translate: ‘When we were young [our] mother and father cursed us, saying: “without the Saṅgha you shall never enjoy a meal”’. But, in that context, one might consider this as making an oath. The PTS translation (Geiger) runs: ‘“Without the brotherhood you shall never take a meal,” thus our mother and father have caused to swear us in our boyhood at the meal’. The form sapimsu is certainly not causative, but the translation may serve to indicate that the construction was considered problematic.

2) Ja V 104,21: tvam sapasi rajānām; again parasmaipada with an accusative, and if we follow Aggavamsa we ought to translate: ‘You curse the king’.

3) S I 225: Sapassu ca me Vepacitti adubbhāya ti; clearly an āmanepada imperative form of the verb, while me could be taken as a genitive/dative, although, analogous to no above, it is occasionally met with as an accusative, and, as we shall see below, Buddhaghosa takes it as a locative. But the genuine dative adubbhāya is crystal clear, and — if we follow Aggavamsa I hasten to add — we ought to translate: ‘And make an oath to me, Vepacitti, who am free from violence’. The PTS translation (Mrs Rhys Davids), on the other hand, runs: ‘Thou mayest swear, Vepacitti, that I will use no treachery’.

This does not provide us with enough material to draw any absolute conclusions, but nothing so far contradicts Aggavamsa’s claims. We have two cases of parasmaipada forms with an accusative, and one case of an āmanepada form with a genitive/dative. One may, however, question whether the parasmaipada form sapimsu really makes a case since āmanepada forms of aorists are extremely rare, and likewise whether one can attach much significance to the fact that the imperative sapassu is an āmanepada form since āmanepada imperatives are quite frequent.

Buddhaghosa’s explanation of sapassu ca me, on the other hand, is quite informative: mayi adubbhattāya sapatham karohi. Here it is no longer possible to apply Aggavamsa’s distinction. We do have a dative form, but he glosses me as mayi which undisputably is a locative. I can only take this to mean: ‘make an oath on me for the purpose of non-violence’, with the genuine dative form understood as a dative of purpose.1 Although Aggavamsa’s explanation deviates from Buddhaghosa’s and although he may have been inspired by the formulations of Haradatta and Jinendrabuddhi, it is nevertheless possible that

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1 This word can either be taken as an abstract noun formation from adubbha in the sense of ‘non-violence-ness’ or as a compound with atta (= Skt. ātman) as the second member in the sense ‘who is of a non-violent nature’. It is noteworthy, though, that the Burmese edition reads adubbhathāya ‘for the sake of non-violence’ and indicates that the Sinhalese reads adubbhanātiṣṭa with v.l. adrubhātāya. The readings have one thing in common: they are all datives of purpose.
Buddhaghosa was the direct source for Aggavamsa’s introduction of the phrase *sapatham karoti* as the explanation of *sapate* since Aggavamsa was no doubt familiar with Buddhaghosa’s works.

It seems to me likely that Aggavamsa here has tried to reconcile what the Sanskrit grammarians say with actual occurrences in the Pāli canon. In a passage such as *sapassu me adubbhāya* it is therefore possible that, unlike Buddhaghosa, he actually considered *me* as a dative agreeing with *adubbhāya*, both words taken to denote the person to whom the oath was made. But it is clear that this does not reflect genuine Pāli usage. Consider the following passages:

1) **Vin I 347,37:** *Brahmadatto ca Kāsirājā Dīghāvu ca kumāro aṇīmaṇānassā jīvitaṃ adamsu pāṇī ca agghesum saphatā ca akāmsu adṛbhāya,* ‘Brahmadatta, king of Kāsī, and the young Dīghāvu granted life to each other, and grasped [each other’s] hands, and made an oath for non-violence’. This is a completely different conception of how the dative *adṛbhāya* links up with the verbal phrase.

2) **Mhv 7.23:** *Adubhaththāya sapatham so tam yakkhiṃ akārayi,* ‘he caused the Yakṣi to make an oath for the sake of non-violence’. Here there is no doubt that we are dealing with a dative of purpose since the element *atha* has been added.

3) **Ja I 180,22:** *... attano adubhāya sapatham karētvā,* ‘having caused [them] to make an oath for non-violence against him’.

4) **Ja VI 460,21:** *ubho pi aṇīmaṇānām adubhāya sapatham karīmsu,* ‘and they both made an oath for non-violence to each other’. Note that the recipients of the oath are indeed expressed in the accusative case.

All of these datives are datives of purpose as is indeed normal for genuine datives in Pāli. It is clear that Aggavamsa has tried to thrust a pattern from the Sanskrit language upon the Pāli language which the latter cannot take.

It is equally clear, then, that his clever distinction between *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada* usages of the verb *sapa* is untenable, since the person at whom the oath or curse is directed is expressed in the accusative in all the genuine examples, just as in the *parasmaipada* example he adduces: *puriso attano verim sapati* ‘the man curses his enemy’.

One little detail ought to be mentioned before we leave Aggavamsa’s representation of A 1.4.34. Could it be that the expression *paresanam tosāpanaththam saccakaraṇam,* ‘a statement of truth in order to bring about happiness for others’, is Aggavamsa’s idea of *jñāpsyamānah,* the requirement expressed in A 1.4.34 that the one who is assigned to the category of the *sampadāna* in connection with the roots mentioned is to be informed of the activities expressed by these roots? Although he is mistaken when it comes to actual facts, Aggavamsa could be seen to apply such a distinction here. What speaks against the idea is that he applies this requirement only to the verb *sapa.*

### 2.6.1.2 dhāra

(695,9–13) Dhārayatipayoge ‘*iḍha gaṇapati kulaputto na kassaci kiṃc dhāreit appam vā bahum vā*,1 suvaṇṇam dhārayate, “tassa raṇino mayam nāgam dhārayāma”2; tattha dhārayate ti inavasena ganhaṭi, inam katva ganhaṭi ti attho, ettha dhaniko yeva sampadānam.

As for the usage of *dhārayati* ‘owe’: ‘In this case, householder, a clansman does not owe anyone anything, little or much’, ‘he owes gold’, ‘we owe this king an elephant’. And in this context *dhārayate* means ‘incurs a debt’, that is, having created debt he keeps it; here the creditor is indeed the *sampadāna*.

This reflects A 1.4.35 *dhārer uttamarnāh* which teaches that the name *sampadāna* is given to the creditor in relation to the verb *dhārayati*. This is standard usage in Sanskrit as well as in Pāli. Note that

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1 A II 69,26.
Aggavamsa has left out the *sampadāna* in the example *suvannam dhārayate* ‘he owes gold’.

### 2.6.1.3 *piha*

(695,13–17) *Pihapayoge* “devā pi tesam pihayanti sam-buddhānam satimatam”;¹ *buddhassa aṇṇatiththiyā pihayanti,* “devā dassanakāmā te”² icc evamādi — ito icchāmi bhad-antassā ti idam pana sar’icchāyoge kammani chaṭṭhiyantam padan ti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

As for the usage of *piha* ‘yearn for; desire; envy’: ‘Even the gods envy these fully enlightened, mindful ones’, ‘heretics envy the Buddha’, ‘the gods desire to see you’,³ and so on in the same manner. But [in the sentence] ‘henceforth I long for prosperity for you’, it should be understood that the word which ends in a genitive case suffix is [assigned] to [the category of] the object in relation to [the activities of] longing and remembering.

This goes back to A 1.4.36 *sprha िपसित* which teaches that the object desired to be obtained in relation to the verbal root *sprh* is assigned to the *kāraka* category *sampradāna*. The *Dhātumālā* (1676) gives *piha icchāyam* which no doubt reflects the meaning given in the *Pāṇiniya dhātupātha* 10.325 *sprha िपसितम* so that the meaning intended is that of *ipsā* ‘wish to obtain’ and not simply *icchā* ‘desire’, although the semantic difference here may in practice be slight. The example given in the *Dhātumālā* (1676) is *pihanīyā vibhūtiyo*, ‘[various] attainments are to be

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¹ Dhp 181cd.
² Ja VI 104,5.
³ The word *te* is ambiguous and three equally strange interpretations are possible: ‘these gods have the desire of seeing you’, ‘the gods are desirers of seeing you’, or ‘the gods have a desire to see in respect of you’.

longed for’. As a possible quotation this has not been traced as such. Now, the most common meaning of *piha* in Pāli seems to me to be ‘envy’, a meaning which clearly applies in two of Aggavamsa’s examples, that is, if *buddhassa aṇṇatiththiyā pihayanti* is not merely a gloss of the preceding example, or coined in analogy with it. But one may wonder whether at least the last example here really is based on common usage. The *Mahābhāṣya* does not comment upon A 1.4.36, but the *Kāśikāprātim* does. There, in reply to why Pāṇini says *ipsita* “desired to be obtained” in the rule, the sentence *puspebhyo vane sprhayati*, ‘he longs for flowers in the forest’ is added. Haradatta clarifies this in his commentary (KāśP 1:553):

\[\text{िपसितमात्रे यि जा भाजी ती प्रकराष्वविवक्षयाम तु परत्वत} \\
\text{karmasamjñaiva bhavati — puspāṇi sprhayati ti yadā tv} \\
\text{िपसितम इपसितामात्रे वा शेषात्वना विवक्ष्यां, तदां शग्हात} \\
\text{bhavati //}
\]

This technical term [i.e., *sampradāna*] applies to that which is only desired to be obtained [i.e., not to the forest, for example]. But when there is a wish to express superiority [in desire] then, because it follows, only the technical term *karman* applies [by rule A 1.4.49, and an accusative case ending is added], as in *puspāṇi sprhayati* ‘he wants to obtain flowers’. When, however, one wishes to express that which is desired to be obtained or that which is most desired to be obtained by means of the property of being [one of the relations referred to as] the rest, then a genitive case ending is added.

One wonders whether this argumentation really holds water, that is, whether the expression *puspāṇi sprhayati* would be approved of by Pāṇini. If by rule 1.4.36 the assignment to the *sampradāna* category would not overrule the assignment to the *karman* category in the domain
of √sprh, then the rule would be niravakāśa, without scope elsewhere.\(^1\) Be that as it may. We do, however, have clear examples in Sanskrit of √sprh being used with both accusatives and genitives, and what is of interest here is that it could quite well be that Aggavaṃsa picked up Haradatta's explanation or something similar and transferred it to Pāli when he contrasts the sampadāna usage with one where a genitive usage is explained as an accusative, that is, where a genitive ending is made applicable through an assignment to the category kamma. Here he takes the opportunity to include also verbs meaning 'remember' to account for constructions such as the Sanskrit mātuh smarati 'he remembers his mother' in distinction to mātaram smarati 'he remembers his mother'. That, however, has nothing to do with the sampradāna. In the Aṣṭādhyāyī the usage of the genitive case to express the karman in relation to verbs meaning 'remember' is accounted for by rule 2.3.52 adhīgarthadayesaṃ karmanī which teaches that a genitive ending denotes the karman when there is usage of verbs having the sense of 'remember' and of day 'distribute' and īś 'own'.

2.6.1.4 kudha, duha, issa, and usuyya

(695,17–25) Kudhaduhaissausuyyatthānām payoge kujjhati Devadattassa, "tassa kujha mahāvīra",\(^2\) "yadi 'han tassa kuppeyyam",\(^3\) duhayati disānām megho, "yo mittāna na dubbhati";\(^4\) koci pana "na dāhati " ti pathanti; titthiyā issayanti samanānam, "devā na issanti purisappakkamassa",\(^5\) aṁnatitthiyā samanānam usuyyanti lābhagedhena,\(^6\) dujjana
gunavantānam usuyyanti gunasamiddhiyā, "kā usuyyā vijānataṁ"\(^11\) — dutiyā ca: "brāhmaṇo Vassakārabrahmanām usuyyati"?\(^2\)

As for the usage of kudha ‘be angry’, duha ‘injure’,\(^3\) issa ‘envy; not tolerate’, and usuyya ‘find fault with; feel resentment’: ‘He is angry with Devadatta’, ‘let there be wrath toward him, Great Hero’, ‘if I had felt angry with him’, ‘the cloud gives milk (duhayati) in the quarters’;\(^4\) ‘he who does not injure (na dubbhati) [his] friends’, but some read ‘na dihati’, ‘members of other sects envy (or; do not tolerate ?) the Buddhists’, ‘the gods do not envy what a man can do’;\(^5\) ‘non-Buddhists feel resentment against the Buddhists out of greed for the gain [the Buddhists are given]’, ‘bad people feel resentment against the good because of their wealth of good qualities’, ‘what resentment is there against the wise?’; also the second [case suffix occurs]: ‘the Brahman feels resentment against / finds fault with the Brahman Vassakāra’.

Aggavaṃsa still moves along the tracks of the Aṣṭādhyāyī and has now reached rule 1.4.37 krudhadruhersyāśyarthānām yaṁ prati kopah which teaches that the one towards whom anger (kopa) is felt is assigned to the category sampradāna in relation to the meanings of the verbal roots krudh ‘feel angry’, druḥ ‘injure; harm’, īrṣy ‘be jealous’, and asūya ‘find fault with’. In the Mahābhāṣya discussion of this rule Patañjali raises the question of whether these roots are synonymous since their meanings can be summed up by the word kopa ‘anger’. The answer

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1 Of course, for Haradatta the distinction here rests on the -tama suffix.
2 Ja III 42.7.
3 Cp II 3: 4c.
4 Ja VI 14.7–25.
5 Ja III 7.20.
6 Senart (Kacc-v 135) phrases this differently here: titthiyā samanānam usuyyanti; lābhagiddhena dujjana gunavantānam usuyyanti; gunavaddhena kā usuyyā vijānataṁ.

1 Vin I 43.28; S I 127.8.
2 Ps IV 74.1–2 ad M III 15.5.
3 Smith (695, note 12) refers to Mmd Ce 224.5 which gives the meaning of duha as jīgimesā ‘wish to injure’. It is not listed in the Dhātumālā.
4 This is what I think this sentence means, but see below.
5 i.e., mere mortal efforts; gods can do much more.
is that they do have different meanings, but what they have in common is summed up by the meaning of the word krodha. You are not harming something or feeling jealous unless you are angry. What is not discussed, though, is whether the name sampradāṇa would apply when a root synonymous with one of the roots listed is used. This issue has some bearing on the Saddaniti passage since Aggavamsa in addition to the listed root kudha (krudh) brings in also the root kup (kuppati; Skt kupyate). It seems that the Sanskrit commentators did not understand the rule to be applicable in such a way, so that most probably Aggavamsa is just freely adding a root in accordance with the examples that come to his mind. The Sanskrit commentators do, however, point out that the specification ‘towards whom anger is felt’ is necessary since one may, for example, feel jealous protective of one’s wife while one’s anger is directed against someone else who would then be the sampradāṇa whereas the wife would not, as in bhāryāṁ īrṣyati ‘he is jealous in respect of his wife’. Here the sense is that one jealously keeps an eye on his wife and the word bhāryā ‘wife’ accordingly appears in the accusative case. Such usage could be Aggavamsa’s reason for stating towards the end of the passage that the second case also occurs, although there is another more probable explanation for this to which I shall return.

The root duha in the sense ‘harm’ does not occur in the Dhātumālā. It is therefore obvious that Aggavamsa has just taken it over from the list of verbs in Pāṇini’s rule. Moreover, he seems to have ended up in a real shambles here in as much as the root duha occurs in the Dhātumālā (1036) in the sense of papūraṇa. This is the meaning entry of the root duh ‘milk; extract’ met with in the Sanskrit dhātupāṭhas. Aggavamsa’s first example here involves the verb duhayati. This is not a common verb in Pāli. It would most probably be a 10th class verb since as a causative Pāli would strengthen its first syllable: *dūhayati. Smith (index) takes it as equivalent to Skt druhyati although he points out (with an exclamation mark) that the Burmese nissaya (quoted Sadd 695, note 17) relates it to dohati, that is, to Skt dogdhi ‘milks’. I believe that this in fact is the connection and that Aggavamsa and not the nissaya-kara is to blame. The idea would in that case be that the cloud gives moisture as if being milked (cf. papūraṇa ‘filling up’). But for duhayati we have only this one example, we do not know where it comes from, and, admittedly, its meaning is far from clear. It seems to me that Aggavamsa does not have an example for duha (druh) but has to face the inherited list of verbs. If we take the forms met with in Aggavamsa’s examples and add that dubbhāti also alternates with dūbhāti,1 we end up with four different forms: dubbhāti, dūbhāti, dūhāti, and duhayati. This provides a striking example of the difficulties facing lexicographers of Pāli.

The examples for issa and usuyya do not present particular difficulties apart from determining the exact nuances of meaning.2 Notably, though, the root usuyya is not listed in the Dhātumālā. But Aggavamsa’s final remark, exemplified with usuyya, offers more interesting information. First of all, he mixes up the notions of kāraka and vibhakti, case suffix. He refers to the alternative usage of the second case ending. Now, as mentioned above, this claim could have been triggered by the fact that in Sanskrit a root like īrṣy is constructed with an accusative when the form to which that ending is added does not denote the sampradāṇa. I do, however, believe that Aggavamsa has mechanically followed in Pāṇini’s footsteps. The immediately following rule is A 1.4.38 krudhrāhupuṣṭrayoh karma which teaches that when the roots krudh and druhr occur with preverbs, then the one towards whom anger is felt is no longer assigned to the category sampradāṇa but to the category karman and thus appears with an accusative case ending, as for example devadattaṁ abhikruhyati ‘is angry at Devadatta’ and yajñadattam abhīdruhyati ‘harms Yajñadatta’. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that any such distinction between the roots kudha and duha with or without preverbs seems not to exist or is at least blurred in Pāli. A good example is provided by a

2 The root issa is explained by itself in the Dhātumālā (872): issa issayam. In the Pāṇiniya dhātupāṭha the entry īrṣyārthāḥ specifies the meaning of the three roots īrṣa, sūrṣa, and īrṣa.
quotation offered by Aggavamsa himself, namely the Cariyāpiṭaka phrase yadi 'ham tassa kuppeyyam ‘if I had felt angry with him’. But the edition of Jayawickrama (PTS, 1973) reads pakuppeyyam in all occurrences of this phrase. A similar formulation also occurs with the sampadāna in the dative/genitive plural (Cp II 1.8, 10): yadi ‘ham tesam pakuppeyyam’. Now this provides metrical difficulties, so not surprisingly the variant reading kuppeyyam occurs in all instances, but not systematically in any one edition (Morris, Burmese, Thai, Sinhalese, etc.). It is perhaps too simple to say that pa has been added and that that is how the metrical problem arose. The atṭhakathā explains the phrase (Cp-a 157): tassa mānatthadhassā kūṭajātillassa āham yadi kujjheyyam, ‘if I were to be angry with him, that is, with Mānatthaddha Kūṭajatila’. Here pakuppeyyam is glossed by kujjheyyam, without a preverb but in exactly the same construction.

2.6.1.5 rādha and ikkha

(695,25–696,6) Rādha ikkha icc etesam dhātunam payoge, yassa vipucchanām kammavikhyāpanaththam, tam kārakaṃ sampadānasamānihām hoti;tattha ca dutiya: ārādho 'ham raiṇo ārādho 'ham rājānam, “ky āham ayyānam aparajjhāmi”2 ky āham ayye aparajjhāmi,3 āyasmato Upālissa upasam-padāpekho Upatisso āyasmantam Upālim vā, “cakkhum janassa dassanāya tam viya maññe”.4

Rādha ‘satisfy’5 and ikkha ‘look’: when there is usage of these roots, one about whom there is an inquiry which has the aim of clarifying an action,6 that kāraka is assigned the name sampadāna; but likewise the second [case suffix]: ‘I am a homager of the king’, [or:] ‘I am homaging the king’, ‘do I offend against the masters ’, [or:] ‘do I offend the masters ’, ‘Upatissa has an expectation of ordination from the venerable Upāli’, or ‘Upatissa looks’ to the venerable Upāli [for ordination]’, ‘the eye is for the seeing of people, like that I think’.

The rule is in this case A 1.4.39 rādhiṣyor yasya viprāśnah which states that the name sampradāna is assigned to one about whom there is an inquiry in relation to the roots rādh ‘satisfy; propitiate’ and ikṣ ‘look’. Aggavamsa is moving on very slippery ground here. First of all, the Sanskrit commentaries reveal that we are dealing with very specific usages here; so for example the Kāśikā: yasya subhāsabham prcchayate / devadattāya rādhya tī / devadattāyakeṣate / nāmītikah prṣṭah san devadattasya daivam paryālokatītī arthah. This makes the context clear: ‘He about whom good and bad is being asked: “He makes prophesies for Devadatta.” “He looks into Devadatta.” That is to say, a fortune-teller being asked considers the fate of Devadatta.’ The Nyāsa adds: daivam iti subhāsabham karma, ‘daiva (fate), that is, good or bad karma’.

On the authority of the Sanskrit grammarians, then, we ought to translate kammavikhyāpanaththam: ‘which has the aim of clarifying [somebody’s] karma’. But it seems doubtful that this is what Aggavamsa had in mind when one looks at his examples. The first one, ārādho ‘ham raṇiṇa, can hardly mean that he investigates the fortune of the king. Aggavamsa’s claim that it is equally possible to use the accusative is also obscure. The CPD lists ārādha with both dative and accusative but the references are only to the Pāli grammarians. The Kaccāyanavuttī (136)

1 Cp (ed. Jayawickrama) II 3.4, 5.8, 7.4, 8.6.
2 Vin III 162,11.
3 Smith: cf. Vin I 56,11; but he has not marked it as a quotation.
4 Smith: cf. M II 121,14 (Ps).
5 This root is not listed in the Dhatumāla; Mmd Ce 224,7 gives rādha himsāsamṛadhēsu. The meaning ‘injure’ clearly does not apply here and the author seems to have confused √rādh with √radh, cf. dhp 4.84 radha himsāsamṛadhēyoḥ while we are dealing with 5.16–17 rādha sādha samsiddhau.
6 For this translation of kammavikhyāpanaththam, see below.
has ārdho me rañño / rājānam. The Padamañjari on the Kāśikā passage cited above states that the form yasya in the rule is an objective genitive, karmani saśthi. It could be that Aggavamsa has had some such statement in mind, and since his usages are clearly genitives and not datives he could have considered it possible to use the accusative for the genitive, but I do not find this explanation very convincing. But his examples are not very convincing either. In fact, I doubt whether his accusative examples are genuine. Only the genitive ones are attested. The "accusative version" of the Upāli example seems outrightly strange, whereas in his last example he does not give an accusative equivalent although an action noun in -ana such as dassana could take an accusative in Pāli. It is also noteworthy that the verbs or verbal nouns added as examples of the roots rādha and ikka in all instances occur with preverbs. In the last example he uses ṇḍrś instead of 欢喜. One seems forced to conclude that again Aggavamsa slavishly follows the Aṣṭādhyāyī and parrots lists of verbs he has not even included in his own Dhatumālā and for which he can only produce dubious examples, so that again he tries to force upon the Pāli language an unsuitable mould from the Sanskrit.

2.6.1.6 paccāsuṇa and anupatigīṇa

(696,6–22) Suṇotissa dhātussa paccāyoge, yo etassa kammuno kattā, so sampadānasaiñño hoti, tam yathā: "Bhagavā bhikkhu āmantesi: ‘bhikkhavo’ ti, ‘bhadante’ ti te bhikkhū Bhagavato paccassosum", 1 ettha ca Bhagavā āmantanakirīyāvasesa kammabhūtanām bhikkhūnaṃ kattā hūtvā paccāsavinakirīyāvasesa sampadānaṃ hoti — evam akkharacintakānam matavasesa attho veditabbo, āgamiṅka pana ‘Bhagavato vacanam paccassosun’ 2 ti chaṭṭhipayogam icchanti. Suṇotissa dhātussa payoge dvīsu kamesu yaṃ kammaṃ pubbam kathitakammattā, tassa kammuno pubbassa yo kattā, so sampadānasaiñño hoti, tam yathā: bhikkhu janam dhamman saveti tassa bhikkhuno jano anugināti tassa bhikkhuno jano patigiiṇāti, sādhukaradānādīna tam uassahayati ti aṭṭho; ettha ca janan ti akathitakammam, dhamman ti kathitakammam, bhikkhu pana savanakirīyāvasesa kammabhūtassa kattā hūtvā anugāyanatigīyanakirīyāvasesa sampadānaṃ hoti ti datthabbam.

When [the preverbs] pacca or ā are attached to the verbal root sunoti, the one who [was] the agent of that [previous] act, [that participant in the subsequent action] is assigned the name sampadāna, as for example: 'The Noble One addresses the monks saying "Monks", [and] these monks replied (paccassosum) 1 "Venerable One" to the Noble One'; and here the Noble One, having been the agent in relation to the monks who were the objects due to the act of addressing, is the sampadāna due to the act of replying — thus the meaning is to be understood according to the view of the grammarians; those versed in scripture, on the other hand, teach the usage of the sixth [case suffix], [saying that it really means] bhagavato vacanam paccassosum, 'they reply to the statement of the Noble One'. When there is usage of the verbal root suṇoti with two objects, it is the agent of the previous object which was the previous object in as much as it was the object that was specified, that receives the name sampadāna; as for example: A monk makes people listen to the Doctrine, [and] people encourage this monk, people respond to this monk. That is to say, they incite him by giving their acclamation. And here 'people' is the unspecified object, while 'the doctrine' is the specified object; the monk, on the other hand, having been the

1 A I 1,6–8.
2 Smith: cf. Mp I 18,25 = Ps I 14,34 (Sv ad D II 263,21).

Most translators render paccassosum ‘assented’, but I prefer to translate it simply as ‘reply’ here.
agent in relation to that which was the object due to the activity of hearing, is the *sampadāna* due to the activities of praising (*anugāyana*) and responding (*patigāyana*); thus it should be understood.

The first rule underlying this is A 1.4.40 *pratyānghyām śrūvaḥ pūrvasya kartā*. This rule teaches that when the root śru ‘listen; hear’ is preceded by the preverbs prati or ā, thus meaning ‘promise’, then the one who was the agent of the previous act of requesting and is now the one to whom the promise is made is assigned to the category of the *sampradāna*. I doubt whether one would be able to make sense of Aggavamśa’s wording without this information. Moreover, he applies Pāṇini’s rule to a different context and provides an example with a verbal form that, as far as I can see, has a different meaning. The standard example in Sanskrit is *devadattāya gām pratīṣṇotī / āśṛṇotī*, ‘[on request] he promises a cow to Devadatta’. The situation in the Pāli example is clearly one of address and return of address. Aggavamśa seems to have felt a bit uncomfortable here, so he dismisses the grammarians (“syllable-ponderers”) saying that those who know their scripture understand that the word *vacanam* has been left out. Thereby he betrays confusion between what is a historical genitive and datives which have been taken over in the form of genitives. Moreover, we are never certain whether he means the *sampadāna* or the dative case.

The second rule of relevance here is A 1.4.41 *anupratiṅgaṇaḥ ca*, ‘also in the case of the root gf preceded by anu or prati [is the agent of the previous action assigned to the category of the *sampradāna*]’. This refers to the specific context of Vedic ritual. The *Kāśikā* gives the example *hotre ‘nugrṇāti*, ‘he responds to the Hotṛ reciting’. The Hotṛ, the priest who recites from the *Rgveda*, is in many ways the prima donna of Vedic ritual, and is encouraged by the Adhvaryu priest who repeats his recitation. The verbs *anugrṇāti* and *pratigrṇāti* thus mean to answer or respond in recitation, to encourage by repeating. Although he was probably not too familiar with these verbs, Aggavamśa still feels he has to account for this rule as well. The result is peculiar. First of all, he introduces *sunoṭī* again, not *gināti*. Then, oddly, he brings in the causative of this verb, *sāveti*, and the ditransitive construction that goes with it. One may be allowed to question the purpose of introducing the *akathita*- and *kathita-kamma* distinction here. To me it makes no sense whatsoever. One may also question the authenticity of Aggavamśa’s example. According to the CPD, *anugrṇāti* is attested only here and in the parallel text of the *Kaccāyanavutti* as well as in the 13th century grammatical work *Payogasiddhi*. The assumption that the example is fabricated is strengthened by the fact that for the verbal noun Aggavamśa uses *anugāyana* ‘singing after; praising’ presumably because *anugāyati* is the verb that actually occurs. When the CPD gives the meaning of *anugrṇāti* as ‘to say after, repeat [the word of another]; to approve or assent’, this is probably due to an attempt at mediating between the Sanskrit meaning of the verb and what the context in Aggavamśa’s example requires. But who knows, maybe people did repeat in chorus to encourage a monk who was teaching the doctrine by reciting from the canon?

2.6.1.7 *ārocanatha, tadattha, tumattha, alamatthappayoga, and maññatipayoga*


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1 Note that he does not say which one.
2 The *Kaccāyanavutti*, by comparison, is quite clear in its formulation (136): *Paccāsaṅgaanupatigīnānām pabbakattati ca.*
3 D II 120, 13.
4 Ja VI 544,7,9.
When there is the sense of ārocanā⁵ ‘announcing; declaring’: ‘I announce to you, king, I make known to you, king’. When there is the sense of āmantana ‘addressing; inviting’ only the second [case suffix applies], not the fourth: ‘Well now, monks, I address you’; ‘call your children’, and so on in the same manner. When there is [the sense of] ‘for the purpose of it’⁶: ‘For the sake of making up the deficiency’; ‘I abandon my livelihood/living/life for the sake of the Buddha’; ‘certainly for the sake of me, Bhaddā, the daughter-in-law, has come to the house’. When there is the sense of tum (the infinitive suffix): ‘For the mercy upon the world’, that is to say, to commiserate the world; ‘for the comfort of the monks’, that is to say, to dwell comfortably.¹ Also when there is usage in the sense of alam ‘enough’ the term sampadāna [applies]; and here the meaning of the word alam is araha ‘capable [of]; worthy [of]; fit [for]’ and paṭikkhepa ‘rejection [of]; enough [of]’. When the sense is araha, then: ‘The Buddha is sufficient for me’; ‘kingship is sufficient for me’; ‘a monk is worth his begging-bowl’; ‘one wrestler is enough for the other’, that is to say, ‘one wrestler is worthy of [= equal to] the other’. When the sense is paṭikkhepa: ‘Enough of living here for you’; ‘enough of gold and glitter² for me’; ‘what with [= what’s the point of] matted locks for you, you fool’. When there is the usage of maññati ‘thinks; considers’ in the sense of contempt, except in the case of animates: ‘I consider you a stick of wood’; ‘I consider you a mere piece of wood’. What is the point in stating ‘in the sense of contempt’? [Compare:] ‘I consider this [to be] gold’. What is the point in stating ‘except in the case of animates’? [Compare:] ‘I consider you a donkey’.

The introduction of ārocanattha is peculiar. It is, however, met with also in Kaccāyana. But so far things have proceeded along an exact parallel to the treatment of the sampadāna in the Āṣṭādhyāyī. This is the deviation. The reference is clearly to the meaning of ārocanā, not the usage of that particular word. The word ārocanā itself is not common in Sanskrit, but cf. BHSD. A 1.4.33 introduces the sampadāna in connection with ṛuc, but in the sense ‘to be pleasing’, and Aggavamsa included this in his main definition of the sampadāna. Moreover, it is not

¹ Unless one assumes that the word phāsu has a cognate accusative suppressed, then it is an accusative used adverbially. According to the PED it is an adjective which “never occurs by itself in form phāsu”. This is certainly not the case; cf. Th 537–38. Etymologically connected with ṛprṣ ‘touch’; Turner (1973) claims it is < *spārṣu as a vṛddhi derivation, not < *sparseru. Its basic meaning (cf. C. Caillat 1960 and 1961) is ‘touchable’, that is, ‘ritually free to be touched’, hence ‘comfortable; all right’.

² Normally translated ‘gold coined and uncoined’.

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¹ Vin III 203,36.
² M I 21,27.
³ Vin III 184,16.
⁴ Dhp 394a.
⁵ CPD lists this as a neuter action noun. Smith (Index verborum) gives ārocanā, feminine. His reason for doing so escapes me.
⁶ Aggavamsa is obviously sticking to his set phrase ātthe out of habit. This makes the expression elliptical and quite difficult to translate accurately.
very helpful of him to give as his example here an enclitic which can represent five different cases. Admittedly, there is a debate on whether te can be accusative. It is then even more puzzling when Aggavamsa claims that vo must be accusative and cannot be dative.

Once again it becomes clear that Aggavamsa does not distinguish between kāraka and vibhakti. This is evident from the fact that he now leaves the kāraka section of the Aṣṭādhyaśī and moves on to incorporate rules from the vibhakti section, the section which teaches the addition of case suffixes to nominal stems. The rules covering the dative case suffix are A 2.3.12–17, and Aggavamsa incorporates all of them, directly or indirectly, in the remaining part of the passage cited above.

First in this sequence is the expression tadaithē which is clearly intended to cover the dative of purpose. Although it is not clear where Aggavamsa has this expression from, it is evident that he quietly moves in the shadows of A 2.3.13–14. In Pāli the dative has lost its donative usage, and so the dative of purpose is by far its most common usage, with some occurrences of datives of place and time. In Sanskrit the situation is different, and the dative of purpose is by no means the exclusively prominent one. In the Aṣṭādhyaśī, rule 2.3.13 caturthī sampradāne is a general rule which teaches that the dative case suffix is added to a nominal stem when the sampradāna is to be denoted and has not already been expressed otherwise. This is followed by rule 2.3.14 kriyārthopapadasya ca karmani sthāninah which teaches that a dative case ending is added to denote the object (karman) of a substituend, an original that has been replaced, which served as an attendant word in expressing the purpose of the action. For example, in edhebyo vrajati ‘he goes for firewood’ the dative suffix is added to what was the object of the action expressed by the infinitive in the construction edhān āhartum vrajati ‘he goes to fetch firewood’. Clearly, the wording of A 2.3.14 is too complex for Aggavamsa’s purpose, since it appears in a network of rules involving among other things the unstated substitution of the infinitive suffix tum UN which is added by rule 3.3.10 tumunyulau kriyāyām kriyārthāyām. This rule need not concern us here in any detail. It states that the action denoted by the root to which the suffix tum UN is added must be the purpose of the action denoted by another verb. This sense of being for the purpose of another future action is referred to as tādarthya in the tradition.

In Sanskrit grammatical works the expression tādarthya comes up in the first vārttika on A 2.3.13, caturthīvidhāne tādarthya upasamkhyānam which states that when the caturthī is being taught one should state additionally that it is also added when there is the sense of ‘for the purpose of that’, tādarthya. This is clearly intended to refer to a material used for a particular purpose. Patañjali offers the examples yūpāya dāru ‘wood for a sacrificial post’ and kundalāya hiranyam ‘gold for an earring’.

The same expression and the same examples come up also in the context of A 2.1.36 caturthī tadarthārtha balihitasukhāraksitaḥ. The first part of this rule states that a word in the dative case is optionally compounded with a word denoting a thing which is for the purpose of what the first member of the compound signifies. The first vārttika on this rule raises the question of whether compounds should be made with any word denoting a thing for the sake of something else. The answer is that only when there is a relation between material and product should a compound be made. Thus, from yūpāya dāru ‘wood for a sacrificial post’ and kundalāya hiranyam ‘gold for an earring’ one can make the compounds yūpadāru and kundalahiranyam, but one cannot make such a compound from randhanāya sthāli ‘a pot for cooking’. The discussion moves on to the second word artha in the rule and whether one should form a nityasamāsa, an obligatory compound, with this word. An example is brāhmaṇarthaṃ pāyāḥ ‘milk for the Brahman’. Details in this need not concern us here. Suffice it to say that Aggavamsa does not seem to include such datives of purpose that are covered by the vārttika on A 2.3.13, by A 2.3.14, or by A 2.1.36 under his tadaithē formulation.

Next we have the word tumatthe. This is most likely taken over from the subsequent rule in the Aṣṭādhyaśī, namely 2.3.15 tumarthāc ca bhāvavacanāt which teaches that a dative case suffix is also added to a
stem expressing bhāva, that is, to the stem of an action noun denoting the mere activity of whatever the verbal root signifies, and having the sense of the suffix tumUN, the infinitive suffix. Examples are yāgāya vrajati ‘he goes to sacrifice’ in the sense of yaṣṭum vrajati. This does not fit in too well with the examples adduced by Aggavamsa. The presumption that he follows the progression of the Aṣṭādhyāyī here is strengthened by the next item introduced, the dative used alamattha, in the sense of alam ‘enough’.

In this case there can be no doubt that Aggavamsa has drawn on A 2.3.16 namahsvastivāhāsvadhālamvaṣadyogāc ca. This rule teaches that a dative case ending is introduced also after a nominal stem that co-occurs with any of the words listed. Why Aggavamsa has picked out only alam remains a mystery. That he finds no usage of the Vedic ritual interjection vaṣat is hardly surprising, but namah is common in all Pāli Suttas. More alarming is the fact that Aggavamsa has mixed up two usages of the word alam here. The one he wants is ‘enough’ in the sense of ‘equal to; a match for; sufficient for’, which Aggavamsa indicates by the meaning araha ‘capable [of], etc.’. Even here one might claim that there is a distinction between the examples ‘the Buddha is sufficient for me’ and ‘a monk is worth his begging-bowl’. But clearly he errs when introducing the sense of paṭikkhepa ‘rejection; enough of’ which involves neither the sampadāna nor the dative case suffix at all.

This raises several issues. One may note that Aggavamsa uses here the expression alamatthapayaṇe ‘when there is usage in the sense of alam’ and not simply alamatthe ‘when there is the sense of alam’, as in the previous ārocanatthe, tadatthe, and tumatthe. This, I believe, is quite revealing. In the Aṣṭādhyāyī rule 1.1.68 svam rūpaṃ sabdasyāśabdasamjñā sets down the principle that in the grammar a word denotes its own form except in the case of a word which is a technical term of grammar. The inclusion of synonyms, then, have to be provided for by special statements. With regard to alam in A 2.3.16, the Sanskrit grammarians have a long discussion which goes back to the Mahābhāṣya and the second vārttika on this rule: alam iti paryāpyarthagrahaṇam

[by the word] alam there is mention of the meaning “being a match for” (paryāpti). This, according to Patañjali, is to exclude the usage of the dative in sentences such as alam kurute kanyām ‘he adorns his daughter’ which requires the accusative case ending. Patañjali brings in the example malla mallāya ‘one wrestler is a match for the other’ in the sense that they are equals. But he also adduces other examples fitting the paryāpti requirement: prabhur malla mallāya ‘one wrestler is a lord for the other’ and prabhavati malla mallāya ‘one wrestler is overpowering for the other’. This is the first sign that Aggavamsa may have understood the application to be restricted not only to the occurrence of the word alam, but to any usage where there is the sense of alam. This, of course, is a gross misunderstanding. The vārttika and the necessity of stating it is brought up again in several subsequent Sanskrit works, for example the Kāśikāvrtti and its commentaries. The reason is that the paribhāṣā, general rule of interpretation, upapadavibhaktē kārakavibhaktī baliyaśi1 is considered to make the vārttika superfluous. Briefly, the paribhāṣā states that a vibhakti signifying a kāraka supersedes a vibhakti occasioned by an upapada ‘attendant word’, that is, a syntactically co-occurring word such as alam. This would account for the usage of the accusative in alam kurute kanyām where A 2.3.2 karmani dvitīyā teaches the application of the accusative as a kārakavibhaktī while the dative ending taught by A 2.3.16 would be an upapadavibhaktī and thus superseded by the ending taught by A 2.3.2.

Whether Aggavamsa had seen this particular passage or not, the remarks of Kaiyāta ad locum may serve to illustrate my point (MbhP II:788): tena tatparyāyāṇām api grahaṇam sidhyati / anyathā svarūpasaiivgrahaṇam syāt / atha válam ityarthaghetti grahaṇam vyākhyeyam ity arthaḥ, ‘Thereby [that is, by stating only the wording paryāpyarpththa “with the sense of being a match for”] understanding also of synonyms of alam would be established. Otherwise there would be understanding of the own form [of the word alam] alone. Or else, the interpretation [of

1 For a detailed exposition of this paribhāṣā and its needlessness, see Cardona 1980.
the vārttika is that by the word) alam there is understanding of [its] meaning. Both of these solutions open the way for the inclusion of synonyms of alam which then is to be taken to mean ‘in the sense of alam’, alamathe, Aggavamsa’s wording in his rule.

It is clear that Aggavamsa, if he did not understand the situation here fully, could have taken this or a similar passage as a green light to include any usage of alam and any synonym of alam, including even kim occurring with a form in the instrumental in a construction such as kim te jaṭahi ‘what is the sense of matted locks for you’ where the pronoun te occurs as a genitive/dative form but with no relevant relation to the construction in question. One may note that the example with kim is not met with in the Kaccāyanavuttī.

That I have gone into such detail here may seem unnecessary. But to me it is significant that none of the subtleties alluded to above have been grasped or included by Aggavamsa while he includes constructions which miss the point completely. To me this serves to illustrate the crudeness and superficiality with which he handles kāraka as a grammatical device.

The expression maṇṭatipayoge removes any doubt that in the present section Aggavamsa is following the sequence of rules in the Āstādhyāyī. In this case he is dealing with A 2.3.17 manyakarmān anādare vibhāṣaprāṇisu which teaches that optionally a dative ending is introduced after a stem which is the object of the verb man ‘to consider’ when this has the sense of contempt except in the case of animates. Aggavamsa accounts well for this rule. The question remains, however, whether we are dealing with genuine Pāli usage here or whether Aggavamsa has construed examples to fit Pāṇini’s rule. None of the examples have been traced as quotations. This calls for considerable caution. The word kāṣṭha ‘stick of wood’ occurs in a verse cited in the Kāṣikā: manye kāṣṭham ulūkhalam ‘I consider a mortar to be a piece of wood’. Here there is no sense of contempt, so the accusative case ending is added. To illustrate the requirement that animates have to be excluded,
sequence dealing with the assignment of cases when the kāraka karman is to be denoted. As I understand it, the rule states that the second or fourth case suffixes are used to signify the object (karman) of verbs having the sense of gati 'going' provided movement actually occurs and the object is not a path. So far so good; Aggavamsa has acceptably accounted for the usage of both the dative/genitive and the accusative in the case of objects of verbs of motion. But he has included this rule in his sampadāna section, not in the section dealing with kamma. Moreover, it is not clear whether these objects of verbs of motion are assigned to the category kamma when there is an accusative ending and to the category sampadāna when there is a dative/genitive ending. It seems at first easy to say that this confusion is due to the fact that Aggavamsa does not distinguish clearly between kāraka and vibhakti. This, however, is too simple in as much as the problem was not entirely clear to the Sanskrit grammarians either. The discussion of how to interpret A 2.3.12 goes back all the way to the Mahābhāṣya. Questioning the purpose of this rule, Patañjali states (Mbh I: 448,18–21):

kim arthaṃ punar idam ucyate / caturthi yathā syāt / aśa dvitiyā siddhā / siddhā karmanīty eva / caturthy api siddhā / kathām / sampadāna ity eva / na sidhyati / karmanā yam abhipraitī sa sampradānam ity ucyate kriyāyā cāsa guṇam abhipraitī / kāyā kriyāyā / gamakriyāyā / kriyāgraḥanam api tatra codyate /

Now, for what purpose is this [rule] stated? So that the fourth [case suffix] would be applicable. Is the second established, then? It is indeed established by [rule 2.3.2] karmanī dvitiyā 'the second [case suffix] when the object is to be denoted'. [But] the fourth [case suffix] has been established too. How? By [rule 2.3.13 caturthī] sampadāne 'the fourth case suffix] when the sampadāna [is to be denoted']? [No.] it has not been established. [Rule 1.4.32] states that 'what [the agent] aims at through the karman, that is [called] the sampradāna', but [here the agent] aims at the village through the action [and not through the karman]. Through what action? Through the action of going. There [i.e., in the discussion of rule 1.4.32] mention of [the word] kriyā 'action' is also urged.

If I understand Patañjali correctly here, he is proposing that one can do without rule 2.3.12. In that case, one could simply assign the village to the category karman, add the accusative case suffix according to A 2.3.2 karmanī dvitiyā, and thus get a sentence like grāmam gacchati 'he goes [to] the village'. Likewise one could assign it to the category sampradāna by A 1.4.32, including the reading kriyā 'through the action', add the dative case suffix according to A 2.3.13 caturthī sampradāne, and thus get the sentence grāmasya gacchati 'he goes to the village'. Rule 2.3.12 would thus be superfluous. It is worthy of notice, though, that Patañjali rejects the inclusion of the word kriyā in rule 1.4.32 in his discussion of that rule.2 It seems then reasonable to assume that Patañjali would be forced to retain rule 2.3.12.3 And if rule 2.3.12 is retained, it seems clear that the village would be assigned to the category karman and one has a choice with regard to the accusative or the dative case suffix. The Kāśikāvṛtti accepts the rule.4

Nevertheless, the Bhāṣya discussion seems to have created quite a bit of havoc and is obviously at the core of certain issues raised in the Vākyapadiya in explaining the varieties of sampradāna. The entire

1 That is, kriyāyā 'through the action' as well and not only 'through the karman'.
2 Mbh I: 330,23–331,2.
3 I am not quite certain about this, though, since Patañjali at A 1.4.32 accepts the interpretation of karmanā = kriyāyā.
4 However, the Kāśikā raises the question of why the word dvitiyā, seemingly redundant because of A 2.3.2, is included in the wording of the rule. The reason given is that it is to block A 2.3.65 kartrkarmanoh kṛiti from taking effect, and the subsequent addition, for example, of the genitive case suffix and not the accusative to the stem grāma- in an expression like grāmam ganiṭā 'a goer to the village'. Details are of no interest here.
discussion of the *sampradāna* there covers only seven verses (VP 3.7.129–35). The first of these gives the general definition, the second brings in the usage accounted for by A 1.4.33 which Aggavamsa incorporates in his main definition of the *sampedāna*, and the remaining five deal with issues pertaining to A 2.3.12. Roughly, Bhattacharjy suggests that the issue depends on whether an action is thought about as a unity or as consisting of parts (VP 3.7.133–34):

*bhedābhedavivāsa ca svabhāvena vyavasthitā /

tasmād gayarthakarmatve vyabhackō no drṣṭya //

vikalpenāiva sarvatra samjñē syātām ubhe yadī /

ārambheṇa na yogasya pratvākyāṇām samām bhavet //

And the wish of the speaker [of whether to express the action] as having parts or as a whole depends on its own nature. Therefore there is no error in the case of objects of [verbs] having the sense of motion. If the technical terms [karman and sampradāna] were both to appear everywhere according to option alone, the rejection of the rule would not be the same as its statement [that is, would not have the same effect].

One has to adopt some principle in order to determine when an action is to be considered as a whole or as having parts, but clearly both the karman and the sampradāna are considered possible with regard to verbs of motion. The Vākyapadiya may thus be Aggavamsa’s source for including A 2.3.12 in the sampadāna section and for not making it very clear whether, when there is usage of the accusative case, the object of the act of going is assigned to the category kamma.

One final but significant point remains to be considered, namely Aggavamsa’s inclusion of the word *nayana* ‘leading’ in his rule. This is obviously done on his own initiative in as much as it is absent in *Kaccāyana* and the *vuttī*. His exact source for this is difficult to trace, but there can be no doubt that it is one or more of the Sanskrit grammarians.

The word appears already in the third vārttika on rule 2.3.12: *ceṣṭāyām anadhvani striyam gacchaty ajām nayaty atiprasāṅgah, ‘[the expression] “provided movement [actually occurs] and [the object is] not a path” would cause overapplication, as in “he approaches the woman” and “he leads the goat”’. The point here is that both *gacchati* and *nayati* are verbs of motion and the objects stated are not a road and movement does actually occur. But the expressions *striyai gacchati* and *ajāyai nayati* are not acceptable. The solution is offered by vt. 4: *siddham tv asamprāptavacanā, ‘it is established, however, if we state “[an object] which has not been reached [yet]” ’*. Kaiyāta explains (Mbh P II:784):

*strī tu samprāpteti caturthyabhāvah / ajām nayatity atrāpy

ajāyāh samprāpanāc caturthyabhāvah / atha vā nayatir
gatyartha eva na bhavati / praṭīyate hy atra gatiḥ, na hy asau
nayater arthaḥ, tasya prāpaṇavācītvād ity āhuh /

But the woman has been reached, therefore a fourth [case ending] is lacking. Also in the case of ‘he leads the goat’ the fourth is lacking since there is reaching (delivery) of the goat. Or else, the verb *ni* is not only a verb of motion. For here ‘going’ is understood, but that is not the meaning of *ni*, since it expresses [the sense of] praṇaṇa ‘conveying; transporting’, they say.

In other words, the verb *ni* is not simply to be considered a verb of motion and ought therefore to be mentioned separately. Whether inspired by this Kaiyāta passage or some similar passage — Helārāja discusses the *samprāpta vārttika* under VP 3.7.134 — it is clear that Aggavamsa’s inclusion of *nayati* has been triggered by the Sanskrit grammatical tradition. He remembers the genuine example *dakāya neti* ‘he leads [me] to water’ but does not seem to bother about the *samprāpta* problem. I wonder whether the accusative version, *dakām neti*, would be
genuine Pāli, though, or whether it would simply mean ‘he leads the water’.\footnote{1}{Dhp 80a: udakaṁ hi nayanti nettikā, ‘for irrigators lead water’.

2 Ce sammatā; cf. also sādhusammata D I 48; S IV 398; Sn 92,1 et passim; Mil 421.}

2.6.1.9 āsimsattha and sammutipayoga

(697,12–15) Āsimsatthe ca: āyasmato dighāyu hotu, bhaddam bhavato hotu, kusalaṁ bhavato hotu, svāgataṁ bhavato hotu icc evamādi. Sammutipayoge: sādhusammuti\footnote{2}{Ce sammatā; cf. also sādhusammata D I 48; S IV 398; Sn 92,1 et passim; Mil 421.} me tassa Bhagavato dassanāya.

Also when there is the sense of benediction (āsimsā): ‘May long life (dīghāyu) befall the Venerable One’; ‘may good fortune (bhadda) befall you’; ‘may welfare (kusala) befall you’; ‘may there be welcome/welfare for you’, and so on in the same manner. When there is usage of sammuti ‘approval; consent’: ‘There is approval of the Sangha for me to see the Noble One’.

Āsimsattha incorporates A 2.3.73 caturthi cāsīsyāyuṣya-madrabhadrakūsaśulasukhārthahitaiḥ. This rule teaches that instead of a genitive (A 2.3.50 saṣṭhi seṣe) a dative case suffix is optionally (anyatarasāyam, A 2.3.70) added after a nominal stem when it co-occurs with the words āyusya ‘long life’, madra ‘joy’, bhadda ‘good fortune’, kusala ‘welfare’, sukha ‘happiness’, artha ‘prosperity’ and hita ‘good’ when āsīsi ‘benediction; blessing’ is intended. Apart from A 2.3.62 which teaches a certain usage of the dative in Vedic, this is the only rule after A 2.3.17 concerning the usage of the dative case suffix. But it has nothing to do with the sampadāna. Note that Aggavamsa’s examples, presumably to the extent he has been able to find some, follow the progression of the words mentioned in A 2.3.73. This rule is the final rule in the section assigning case suffixes in the Aṣṭādhīyāyi so

Aggavamsa has by now taken what he thinks he can use from that text on the sampradāna and the fourth case suffix. The rest of his sampadāna passage deals more directly with issues brought up by the Pāli itself.

Quite problematic is the first issue of this kind: sammutipayoga ‘when there is usage of sammuti’. I presume one has to add ‘the term sampadāna applies’. As far as I know, this has no parallel in Sanskrit grammar. Aggavamsa offers one single example which is not without ambiguity as to its translation. First of all, I take sādhusammata to be a tatpurusa or a karmadhāraya compound, to be interpreted as ‘approval by good ones’ or ‘approval as good’. Moreover, there are variant readings here. For example, sādhusammata is translated by K.R. Norman as ‘well-thought-of by the general public’\footnote{1}{The group of discourses II, Sn 92,1 etc.} which would imply ‘approved of as sādhu by those who are sādhu’. This implication might well have been intended. Then there are two possible dative forms, me ‘for me; of me’ and dassanāya ‘to see’; ‘approval/agreement for me of the seeing’ would be a dative of purpose. Kaccāyanav has sammuti\footnote{3}{Smith: ns cit. S II 242,21.} with the variant sammati. The vuttī, incidentally, offers one more example, aṇṇaṭra sanghasammutiyā bhikkhuṣa vippavatṭaṇa vaṭṭati, which Senart translates ‘il n’est pas permis au religieux de s’absenter autrement que du consentement de la communauté’.

2.6.1.10 tatiyatthādi

tattha bhīyoso ti idaṁ bhīyosaddena atirekatthavācakena
nipātena samānatham nipātapanam “aham bhikkhave yāvade
ākamkhami vivicc‘ eva kāmehi vivicc ca akusalehi dhāmmehi”1 ti
etiha yāvadevasaddena samānatham yāvade ti nipātapanam viya;
na e‘ ettha vattabbam: ‘bhīyoso ti nipātapanam nāma
atthi ti ācariyehi nididhiṁ na diṭṭhapubban‘ ti ācariyehi
nipātā nāma‘ ti aniddhiṁnaṁ pi bahūnam nipātānāṁ sāsane
dissanato, “maṁkate Sakka kassaci”3 ti ettha hi man ti
amhatthe upayogavacanam sambannāmikapadam, katte ti
nipātapanam; tasmaṁ samsayam akatvā bhīyoso mattāya ti
etiha ‘mattato bhīyyo‘ ti attho gahetabbo ‘tinā bhīyyo’ ti ettha
 tinato4 bhīyyo ti attho viya, imam attham yeva sandhāya porānā
bhīyoso mattāya ti atirekappamānera‘ ti tatiyāvibhattivasena
attham kathayimsu, paṁcamvibhattīhi kattacari tatiyāya
samānattha “mattāsukhapariccāgā”5 ti ettha viya, appamatti-
kassa sakkha pariccāgena6 ti hi attho. Keci pan‘ ettha
vadeyyum: ‘mattāsukhapariccāgā’ ti ādīsu yasmā mattāsaddo
iththilingo, tasma ‘bhīyoso mattāya‘ ti etthā pi mattāya ti idam
iththilingaṁ tatiyekavacananam, ten‘ eva hi ‘atirekappamānera‘
ti vivaranam katan ti. Tan na; kiṅcā pi ‘mattāsukhapariccāgā’
ti ādīsu mattāsaddo iththilingo, tathā pi mattan ti
napumsakalingaṁ pi bahusu ṭhānesu dissati; tasmaṁ
napumsakalingaṁ mattasaddato cattuthekavacanassa ayādeṣe
kate mattāya ti rūpaṁ bhavati, taṁ ca bhīyoso ti
nipātapanayogato paṁcamiyatthe cattuthi ti viṁśayati. Keci
pana ‘bhīyoso mattāya‘ ti ettha ‘so puggalo mattāya madana-
tāya1 bhīyyo‘ ti attham vadanti. Tan sāsane pahāradāna-
sadisam ativiya na yujjati.

[When the fourth occurs] in the sense of the third2 [case suffix
the term sampādana may apply]: ‘But we are not honoured in
respect of Dhanañjāyā‘, that is to say, we are not honoured by
queen Dhanañjāyā. By the word ādi ‘etc.’ [is indicated that the
technical term sampādana applies] also [when the fourth
occurs] in the sense of the fifth [case suffix], for this usage
‘bhīyoso mattāya‘ is a usage of the fifth, like in the usage: ‘But
he who considers cold and hot as no more than grass’. There
this [word] bhīyoso is a particle (nipāta) synonymous with the
linguistic item bhīyyo which is a particle expressing the sense of
atireka ‘surplus; excess; remains’, just like the particle yāvade
is synonymous with the linguistic item yāvadeva here in: ‘I,
monks, as much as indeed (yāvade) I strive to separate myself
from desire, separate myself from bad phenomena’. But in this
respect one should not say that it has not been seen before that
the teachers have taught explicitly that bhīyoso is indeed a
particle, because, with regard to numerous particles which have
not even been taught explicitly, it has been attested in the Šāstra
by the teachers that they are indeed particles. For in the case of
‘[there should not be harm]‘ O Sakka, to anyone on my account
(maṁkate)‘ maṁ is a pronominal word expressing the thing
used in the sense of [the pronominal stem] amaḥa- [while] kate
is a particle. Therefore, without creating doubt — in the case of
bhīyoso mattāya the meaning is to be understood as mattato
bhīyyo ‘more than so much’, just as in the case of tinā bhīyyo

1 This is Buddhaghosa’s exegesis; cf. Smith: Spk ad S I 49,11: Spk ad S I 24,19
= Sv ad D I 211,12.
2 cf. S II 210,25.
3 Ja IV 14,2.
4 Smith: Sv ad D III 185,16: tinato pi uttarim.
5 Dhp 290a.
6 Dhp-a III 449,5.

1 Bm madanathāyā.
2 This is how I understand Aggavamsa’s intention here, although the phrasing is
admittedly extremely ambiguous. One may as well translate ‘when there is the
sense of the third’ or ‘in the sense of the third’. Pāṇini uses the expression
A 1.4.85 triyārthe, ‘when there is the sense of the third [case suffix]’.
the meaning is tinato bhiyyo ‘more than grass’ — ancient authors explain the meaning by means of the third case suffix as in bhiyyosyo mattāya, that is, ‘through extraordinary measure’, with reference to this meaning alone, for the fifth case ending sometimes has the same sense as the third, as in the case of mattāsukhapariccāga (ablative) ‘from renouncing small pleasure’, for the meaning is ‘through (instrumental) the renouncing of small-measured pleasure’. [Objection:] Some, however, would say about this that in [expressions] such as mattāsukhapariccāga, since the word mattā has feminine gender, so also in the case of bhiyyosyo mattāya this [form] mattāya has feminine gender and ends in a singular third case suffix; and that is why he explains it by atirekappamānena ‘through extraordinary measure’. [Reply:] No. [For] although the linguistic item mattā has feminine gender in such [expressions] as mattāsukhapariccāga, [the form] mattam with neuter gender is still seen in many instances; therefore, in as much as the substitute -āya is made for the singular fourth case suffix after the word matta with neuter gender, the form mattāya occurs, and so the fourth case suffix [occurs] in the sense of the fifth due to the construction with the particle bhiyyosyo — thus it is to be understood. [New objection:] But with regard to bhiyyosyo mattāya some declare that the meaning is so puggalo mattāya madanatāya bhiyyo ‘he (so), that is, the individual, is more than mattā, that is, [more than] intoxication’.¹ [Reply:] This is highly unacceptable in this Śāstra, [and] just like giving a slap [in the face].

Aggavamsa now ventures to show that words with a fourth case ending appearing in the sense of another case ending can assign what they signify to the category sampadāna. In general, Aggavamsa here tries to account for problematic usages, normally not more than one, by basically saying that anything can stand for anything and loosely talking about one case suffix occurring in the sense of another.

First is the instrumental, and his example may indeed call for an assignment to the sampadāna category, although I can see no problem in a karaṇa assignment. Incidentally, the commentary partly incorporated in Fausboll’s Jātaka edition states (Ja III 98,16): Dhanañjayāyā’ ti karaṇatthe sampadānam. To say that the sampadāna occurs in the sense of the karana is a peculiar juggling with categories and shows how loosely some Pāli authors dealt with these notions.

Next Aggavamsa turns to the word ādi ‘etc.’. He says that by including this word in the rule he meant to indicate that the name sampadāna applies also when there is the sense of the ablative case suffix. His whole issue here is the expression bhiyyosyo mattāya. Notably, Kaccāyana here reads only bhiyya, followed by sattamayatthe ‘when there is the meaning of the seventh [case suffix]’, a term which is taken up by Aggavamsa later. All the vutti has to say on the issue is: Bhiyyapayog: bhiyyo somattāya [sic]; iccevamādi, ‘when there is usage of bhiyya [as in] “bhiyyosyo mattāya”, and so on in the same manner’. Aggavamsa’s inclusion of ādi and, as will be clear later, the fifth and sixth as well as the seventh case ending thus seems to be his own project.

Now my view here is that it is definitely of more interest to find out what Aggavamsa thinks bhiyyosyo mattāya means than to state reasons for what we may think it means. Still, this is such a tour de force that it seems necessary to clear the ground a little bit. The form bhiyyosyo is roughly translatable as ‘for the most part’, in some places ‘to a greater extent’. As for the expression bhiyyosyo mattāya, two solutions immediately present themselves. If we take bhiyyosyo as a genitive of the corresponding Sanskrit bhūyas, we may translate ‘to the measure of something greater’. If we take it as an adverb formed with the suffix -sas, commonly added to numeral or quantitative stems, and thus equivalent to Sanskrit bhūyasas, we may translate ‘to a measure in a greater way’. Edgerton remarks (BHSD): “bhūyasya, *śyā, *so, bhūyosya, with (in

¹ Or, with v.l. madanatthāya, ‘for the intoxicating’ (dative of purpose)?
Mv rarely without) mātrayā (instr. of Skt. mātṛa), or once mātrām, = Pali bhīyoso-mattāya, adv. or adverbial phrase, *in specially high degree*. The common BHS expression is bhūyasā (instr. fem. of Skt. bhūyas-) mātrayā, e.g. SP 23.1; LV 321.17; Mv ii.345.2 (vs. prob. read with v.l. "syā m.c."); exceptionally bhūyasā (a m.c.?) mātrām (so mss., Senart em. "am") Mv ii.338.13 (vs.); ... in SP 71.10 (prose) ed. with Nep. ms. has the usual bhūyasā mātrayā, but Kashgar rec. bhūyaso (intending Skt. "so; cf. Pali bhīyoso) mātrayā.". It could, of course, be an instrumental, and we would have to translate something like ‘for the most part with respect to measure’, but I doubt whether this is genuine Sanskrit usage and not a back-formation from Pāli or some other Middle Indo-Aryan dialect. J. Brough, with reference to Dhp 290a mattāsukha-pariccāgā quoted by Aggavamsa above, remarks (1962:229): “In addition to its more usual meanings, mātrā is widely recognized by the Sanskrit lexicographers in the sense of ‘property, household goods, worldly possessions (paricchade, dhane).’ I abstain from speculating on the possible implications this could have for the interpretation of the forms in question here, since it was obviously not in Aggavamsa’s mind.

Aggavamsa himself proceeds as follows. He first identifies bhīyoso as a nipāta ‘particle’, synonymous to the particle bhīyoy, just as the contracted form yāvade is synonymous to yāvadeva. From this he proceeds to suggest that bhīyoso mattāya is to be understood as mattato bhīyyo ‘more than so much’, thus assuming an ablative case ending for mattāya. Why he suggests this solution I am not able to tell. It is of course possible, but not terribly convincing.

To this the objection is raised that elsewhere we meet with the feminine mattā, so that in bhīyoso mattāya the word mattāya is in the instrumental case. It is not clear what case ending he would ascribe to bhīyoso under this alternative, but it might be thought of as instrumental as well. This would accord with the forms attested in BHS and thus represent an apparently common interpretation. Aggavamsa refutes this objection, though, claiming that the neuter mattām is also met with, as attested also in BHS, and so, he says, the fourth case suffix -āya occurs in the sense of the fifth after bhīyoso. This is Aggavamsa’s final view.

The second objection put forward consists in the fanciful nirvacana analysis so madanātāya bhīyyo which implies that mattā is taken to be an abstract feminine noun derived from mad ‘be intoxicated’. This is rejected by Aggavamsa straight away as no more than a slap in the face, a view with which one is inclined to agree.

Aggavamsa’s view, then, is that in the expression bhīyoso mattāya, mattāya is a dative form where, in construction with bhīyoso which he conceives of as a particle, the fourth case suffix occurs in the sense of the fifth. This problem occurs only because he takes matta-as neuter. If it is taken as feminine, there would be no problem. Also, he has a problem with the tinābhīyyo example where there is no dative. In sum, it seems that Aggavamsa has not quite understood the construction, and the whole exercise is the result of that.

2.6.1.11 chaṭṭhiyattha, satamatiyattha, etc.


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1 Smith 133,7: ita Bm h.l. et Ce Bm Sd § 554 (Ce 613,26), cf. 135,12 [= ganāya bhattā ti]; Ce Be ns J mahā-.
2 Ja V 363,12.
3 M III 253,20.
4 It 110,10.
veditabbā, taṁ yathā: “upamam te karissāmi”,1 dhammaṁ vo ...

dessissāmi,2 “ko attho supanena te”,3 kim attho me buddhena,
kaṁhinassa dusssam, āgantukassa bhattam icc evamādi.
Tatiyatthādisu cā ti casaddaggaṁaṁ avuttatthā-

samucayatthaṁ eva sampadānagahanathaṁ ca; Kaccāyane

pana sattamyathēsu cā ti casaddaggaṁaṁ
vikappanaṁthāvāggaṁaṁukaḍḍhanaththāṁ4 eva.

Also [when the fourth occurs] in the sense of the sixth [case
suffic the term sampadāna may apply]: ‘Supporter of my great
flock’.5 Also [when the fourth occurs] in the sense of the
seventh [case suffic the term sampadāna may apply]: “And
indeed I show it to you”; ‘for me here the Śākya has become
manifest’. Also when the sense of sāra ‘most excellent bit’ is to
be expressed, the fourth case suffic occurs, the meaning of sāra
namely being the meaning ‘best’ or the meaning ‘reminding’:
‘Venerable Noble One, make the monks think about the
doctrine’; ‘for their best’; ‘one should send to him’; ‘just like the
Noble One would explain to us, in the same way I shall explain
to them’; ‘practice is the essential thing for Śramaṇas’; ‘for us
there is need of a jewel’; ‘O venerable one, Mahāpajāpati
Gotami is of much service to the Noble One’; ‘monks, a mother
and father is of much service to their children’ — and so on in
the same manner. Thus, by the word ādi ‘etc.’, the function
of the fourth [case suffic] is to be understood in many a linguistic
usage, as for example: ‘I shall make you a parable’; ‘[monks.] I
shall teach you the doctrine’; ‘what need have you for sleep’;
‘what need have I for the Buddha’; ‘cloth for a Kāthina-cloth’;

‘food for those who have arrived’ — and so on in the same
manner. The mention of the word ca ‘also’ in the phrase

tatiyathādisu ca does indeed serve the purpose of adding the
sense of something that has not been stated as well as the
purpose of mentioning the sampadāna. But in Kaccāyana,
when he says sattamyathēsu ca ‘also in the sense of the
seventh’, the mention of the word ca is only for the sake of
referring back to a previous mention in rules through the word
vā in the sense of option.

Aggavaṁsa’s first example, mahato ganāya bhattā me,
intended to illustrate a dative used in the sense of the genitive, is
problematic. I strongly suspect that he has put this in only to make
the number of cases complete. The Ja edition reads mahāganāya as
a compound, and one might have suspected that the vigraha giving mahato
was done by Aggavaṁsa himself to find an example which contrasts, but
the variant reading indicated in the notes above more or less rules out this
possibility. Earlier in the Saddanīti (133,7) Aggavaṁsa has explained the
phrase as mama mahato hamsaganassa bhattā ‘supporter of my mighty
flock of geese’. Moreover, one may ask why ganāya is stated when
ganassasa would scan perfectly? One may also wonder whether ganāya is a
feminine form. If it were, that would alter the situation considerably.

The sense of sāra, as much of the material here, has been taken
over from the Kaccāyanavuttī. This includes also the example desetu
bhante Bhagavā dhammaṁ bhikkhūnam, which at first does not seem to
fit any of the two meanings he has outlined for sāra. But I think there is a
way out if one takes desetu in the sense of cintāpana ‘causing someone
to think [about something]; reminding’. Several of these are marginal
usages of the dative, and many of them may be summed up as usages of
an “ethical” dative, that is, ‘for the sake of the best’. It is also conceivable
in some of these examples to take sāra in the sense of ‘advantage; profit’.

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1 M I 148,35.
2 cf. M III 37,11.
3 Ja IV 84,22.
4 Kacc: vikappanatthāṁ vā.
5 This example and the translation will be discussed below.
We also re-encounter an old problem here, in that so many of the examples include pronominal forms such as me, te, vo, etc. which can stand for a number of cases.

That Aggavamsa draws heavily on the Kaccāyanavutti here is especially obvious from the fact that he quotes from it by name. It is, incidentally, noteworthy that he refers to it as Kaccāyana. Now, in that text we read (137): *Atthaggahaṇena bahūsu akkharapayoyesu dissatii,* 'by mentioning the word attha [the function of the fourth case suffix] is to be understood in many a linguistic usage'. Aggavamsa has a completely parallel construction, though using ādi and not attha. Does this indicate that the author of the Kaccāyanavutti thinks of sattamy-atthesu in the rule as sattamy[atthe] and atthe? That is to say, does he take these datives as datives of purpose? Finally, the word ca in Kaccāyana, according to Aggavamsa, pulls in a previous vā which signifies option. Kaccāyana’s use is only to do this, Aggavamsa’s use is “only” (= especially) to this and that.

2.6.1.12 Excursus

(699,2–701,15) Eththa pana ṭhātvā kiṃci vadāma: saddasattha-vidūṇam matavasena hi rajakassa vatham dadāti, Yaññadatto Devadatattasa inām dadāti ti ādisu sampadānasaññāya na bhavitabbam, saddasatthesu hi yassa saṃmā pūjābuddhiyā anuggahabuddhiyā vā diyate, taṃ sampadānan ti vuttaṃ, rajakassa vatthādānaṃ c’ eva Devadatattassa inādānaṃ ca pūjāvasena va anuggahavasena va na hoti, accantavacanānaṃ ca na hoti, tasmā saṃma pakārena assa dadāti ti sampadānan ti athena virodha[na]tō1 sampadānasaññāna na hoti ti tesam laddhi, ten’ eva rajakāya, Devadattāyā ti ca catuthhi vibhatti tehi na vihitā; chaṭṭhī yeva vihitā: rajakāsā ti ādinā ti. Eththa asmākāṃ vinicchayo evam veditabbo: yadi rajakasaddo vatta-

1 Ce Bm virodhanato; Be ns virodhato.
saddasatthayuttito rajako sāmi hotu chaṭṭhivibhavattvasena vuttattā, sāsanayuttito pana sampadānaṃ hotu catuthī-
chaṭṭhinām avisesena vuttattā¹; kathacci kathacci thāne yebhuyyena pālinayasaddasathanayānaṃ aṇñamaṇiṃnaṃ accantaiviruddhattā ca, tathā hi saddasatthe āpasaddo bahu-
vacanantam itihilingam Bhagavatā āhacca bhāsīte pullīngam ekavacanantam; tathā saddasatthe dārāsaddo bahuvacanāntam pullīngam, pāvacane vacanadvayuttam pullīngam; sadda-
satthe dhātusaddo ekantapullīngam, pāvacane ekanta-
ithilingam, evamādayo aṇñamaṇiṃnaṃ viruddhasaddagatiyo dissanti. Kiṇca bhiyyo: saddasatthe Devadattāya ti catuthī, tad eva Devadattāya ti padam pālinayaṃ patvā vibhattivi-
pallāsavasena tatiyāpaṇicāmaṇicāṭhīnāṃ atthe catuthī siyā na suddhacatuthī, Yajñadatto Devadattāya asakkato ti ādinā vojettabbatt “asakkatā c’ asma Dhanāṇjayaśa”² ti ādisu viya; kiṇca bhiyyo: guṇo assa attthi gunavā ti ettha sadā-
sathanayānaṃ assā ti padam chaṭṭhiyantar bhavati, pālinaye aṭṭhakathānaye ca olokiyamāne atthisaddayogato catuthi-
yantam yeva bhavati; katham: “udet’ ayam cakkhumā ekarāja”,³ “āsāvatī nāma latā jātā Cittalatāvane tassā vassasahessena ekam nibbattate phalam tam devā payirupāsantī”⁴ ti imā dve pāliyo assā ti padassa catuthith-
yantattam sadhenti; tatha “cakkhumā ti, sakalacakka-
vāḷavāsinaṃ andhakāraṃ vidhametvā cakkhuapṭilābhaka-
karane yaṃ tena tesāṃ dinnaṃ cakkhu, tena cakkhumā suriyo”,⁵ at’ idam nibbācanaṃ: cakkhu etassa attthi ckkhumā, cakkhū ti ca kassa cakkhu: alookadassanasamattathā mahā-
janassa cakkhu, tam mahājanassa cakkhu etassa suriyassa

atto, tena dinnattā ti atthavasena suriyo sampadānaṃ bhavati, na sāmi, dvinnam sāminam ettha anicchitabbattā; tathā āsā etissā attthi ti āsāvati, evamāmikā latā, āsā ti ca kassa āsā: devānam āsā, sā devānam āsā etissā latāya aththi, tam paticca uppajjanato ti atthavasena latā sampadānaṃ bhavati, na sāmi, dvinnam sāminam etthāti pu anicchitabbattā — evamādike pālinaye aṭṭhakathānaye ca upapariikkhyamāne yathāvutto attho yeva pāsamo, kim saddasathanayano karissati. Atha vā rajakkassa vattham dadāti ti ettha saddasathanayena chaṭṭhī hotu, rajakkassa hatthe vattham dadāti ti aththam eva mayam gaṇhāma, vacanasesanayassa pi dassanato; evaṃ ca sati ubhinnam nayānaṃ na koci virodho.

But at this point in the argument we have something to say; for according to the view of the grammarians, in such [sentences] as ‘he gives the clothes to the washerman’, ‘Yajñadatto gives a loan to Devadatta’ the name sampadāna does not apply; for in the science of grammar it has been stated that that to which [something] is properly (sam = samma) given with an intention of worship or with an intention of kindness, that is the [kāraka] sampadāna. [But] neither the giving of the clothes to the washerman nor the giving of the loan to Devadatta is by worship or by kindness; moreover, it is not a complete statement.¹ Therefore — because it is conflicting with the sense of [the term] sampadāna [arrived at by the analysis] ‘in the proper (sam = samma) way (pa = pakārēna) one gives it to’ — the name sampadāna does not apply, such is their view, [and] for that very reason they do not teach the genuine fourth case suffix in rajakāya and Devadattāya; only the sixth is taught by way of such [forms] as rajakassa. In this respect one should

¹ Deviate considerably from Smith’s punctuation in this passage.
² Ja III 98,16.
³ Ja II 33,22.
⁴ Ja III 251,7–9, Ap 41,29–42,1.
⁵ Ja II 34,1–3.

¹ Complete statements would be something like ‘I’m giving my clothes to the washerman, but I want them back clean’ and ‘I’m giving a loan to Devadatta, but I want it back with twelve percent interest’.
know that our opinion is as follows: If the word rajaka ‘washed’ were to be related to the word vattha ‘clothes’, then the meaning would be ‘he gives the washman’s clothes to someone else’, and the washman would be [assigned to the category of] owner (sāmi). If, on the other hand, the washman were to be connected with [the act of] giving as in ‘he gives the clothes to the washman for the purpose of making [them] clean’, then why would not this washman be the sampadāna in as much as he has been established in the state of receiving with regard to the act of giving, for thus, in [phrases] such as ‘to whom there is a desire to give’ and even ‘without regard, without consideration, he gave food to the monks’, whether by fact of a desire to give or by fact of giving inconsiderately, he who is to take possession of the gift and he who takes possession of the gift, both of them are indeed [to be assigned to the category of] the sampadāna because [that] is proper with regard to the Pāli canon. And also in the Pāli canon, except for the usage for the purpose of something as in ‘for the sake of, for the benefit of’, and except for the convention of exchanging case suffixes (substitution) in usages such as ‘he leads to water’, ‘[few] go to heaven’, ‘but we are not honoured in respect of Dhananājīyā’, ‘for the most part/to a greater extent’, and ‘supporter of the flock’, the substitute -āya in the place of the singular fourth [case suffix -(as)sā] does not occur in connection with [actions such as] honouring, giving, and the like. Therefore, in the [canonical] teaching approved of by the three councils, statements such as ‘he gives to the Buddha (buddhāya)’ or ‘homage to the Buddha (buddhāya)’ do not exist. Only statements of such a form as ‘I gave to the best (seṭṭhassa) among Buddhas’, ‘do reverence to the snake (nāgassa)’, lacking the substitute -āya, are met with. Accordingly, such a statement as ‘a certain man gave dirty clothes to the washman (rajakassa)’ is met with in the Athasālinī; with respect to that, there must be the fourth [case suffix] in rajakassa, since the fourth and the sixth are identical in every way in every place where they occur because the case endings -sa and -nam have the same form. For thus has the meaning of the fourth and the sixth been declared by the teachers when stating the meaning of the canonical passage ‘he who gives to the best / of the best is a sage’ to be ‘he who gives to the best, that is, to the three jewels (the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha)’, or else, ‘he who gives1 of that which has the property of being such that it can be given’. Thus, let the washman be the owner (sāmi)2 by way of fitness in the science of grammar in as much as [the word rajakassa] has been stated with a sixth case ending, but let it be the sampadāna by way of fitness in the canon in as much as it has been stated without distinction between the fourth and the sixth. Moreover, we get this endless opposition between the conventions of the canonical texts and the conventions of the science of grammar. For example: In the science of grammar the word āpa ‘water’ is something which has a plural ending and feminine gender, [whereas] it has actually been uttered by the Noble One with masculine gender and a singular ending3; likewise the word dārā ‘wife; women folk’ is something which has a plural ending and masculine gender in the science of grammar, [while] in the [canonical] teaching it has masculine gender [but is] constructed with both numbers; in the science of grammar the word dhātu ‘element’ is something with exclusively masculine gender, [while] in the [canonical] teaching it is of exclusively feminine

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1 Or, reading with Bose dānam, ‘a giving’.
2 That is, the owner in an owner-owned relationship expressed by a genitive case ending.
3 cf. Sadd 107.21: Āpasadde ācariyānam lingavacaknavasena matihedo vijjati, ... ‘concerning the word āpa we meet with a difference in opinion among the teachers when it comes to stating the gender, ...’. 
gender; onwards in the same manner we meet with verbal patterns which are opposed to one another. What’s more: In the science of grammar devadattāya is [a word ending in] a fourth [case suffix], [but] that very word devadattāya, having received the conventions of the [canonical] teaching, would be [a word ending in] a fourth case suffix in the sense of the third, fifth, or sixth [case endings] by force of the exchange of case suffixes, [and] not a genuine fourth [case suffix], in as much as it is to be related to such [expressions] as ‘Devadatta is not honoured by Yajñadatta’ just as in [canonical statements] such as ‘but we are not honoured by Dhanañjayā’. What’s more: With regard to [the grammatical rule] saying that a quality pertains to it (assa), hence it is quality-possessing,⁴ assa is a word ending in a sixth [case suffix] according to the conventions of grammar, but if you look at the conventions of the canon and the Aṭṭhakathās it is simply [something] which ends in the fourth [case suffix] from being connected with the word athi ‘is’. How? [For example:] ‘He rises, [he who] possesses sight (cakkhumā), the supreme ruler’; ‘in the Cittalātā grove a creeper grows by name of Āsāvatī; of it (tassa, cf. Skt asya asti) a fruit is produced once in a hundred years; the gods sit closely around it’. These two canonical statements establish that the word assa ends in the fourth [case suffix]. In this respect [it has been stated]:

‘cakkhumā “possessing sight”, that is, having scattered darkness for those who live in the entire range of spheres, since by him sight was given to them (tesam) by causing them to obtain sight, because of that¹ [he is called] cakkhumā, that is, the sun’. [In accordance with A 5.2.94] the semantic analysis (nirvacana) here is: ‘sight pertains to it, thus [it is called] cakkhumā’. But [when you are] talking about sight, whose sight [are you talking about]? Sight is the faculty of sight pertaining to the entire populace, [and] the sun has got that sight which pertains to people, [and] because of this property of having been given [it], for this very reason the sun is the sampadāna, not the sāmī ‘possessor’, since it would be undesirable with two possessors here. Likewise [according to A 5.2.94]: ‘hope (āsā) pertains to it (etiṣā), hence āsāvatī’, that is, the creeper so named. But [when you are] talking about hope, whose hope [are you talking about]? This hope pertaining to the gods is [directed] towards that creeper; [and] since [the hope] arises towards it, for that very reason the creeper is the sampadāna, not the sāmī ‘possessor’, since it would be undesirable with two possessors also in this case. In these and other cases when you examine the conventions of the canon and the Aṭṭhakathās, only the meaning as it has been stated [there] is praiseworthy, [so] what will the science of grammar do [= who cares about the grammarians]? Or else, let the sixth [case ending] apply according to the conventions of the grammarians with regard to [a sentence such as] ‘he gives the clothes to the washerman’, [so that] we understand only the sense ‘he gives the clothes in the hands of the washerman’ from which also the remainder of the [elliptical] statement is seen. And when it is like this, there is no opposition between the two conventions.

¹ Or, following the v.l. of Ja, tena cakkhumā cakkhumā, we could translate: ‘what sight was given, by that sight [he is called] cakkhumā’.

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¹ What he hints at here goes back to A 5.2.94 tad asyasty asmīn iti matup, which teaches that the possessive suffix matUP (unaccented -mat, under certain conditions to be replaced by -vat) is added to form derivatives in the sense of ‘that is pertaining to it’ or ‘that is located in it’. A vārttika quoted by Patañjali under this rule states that the suffix can only be added when certain meanings, such as censure or abundance, are to be expressed. By rule 8.2.9 māduṇḍhāyās ca mator vo ‘yavādhīpyah the initial of the taddhita suffix matUP is replaced by v when the stem to which the suffix is added either ends in or has the sounds m or a as penultimate, except for members of the gāṇa beginning with yava ‘barley’.

² Formed with the suffix matUP.

³ Formed with the suffix matUP, v replacing m by A 8.2.9.
In this quite informative excursus Aggavāṃsa first and foremost contrasts the science of grammar with the word of the Buddha. He begins by bringing up an issue discussed by the Sanskrit grammarians, namely that in a sentence such as ‘he gives the clothes to the washerman’ the washerman should not be assigned to the category of the sāṃpadāna because the clothes are not given with an intention of worship or out of kindness. They are handed over to get clean. The washerman would therefore be the sāmi ‘possessor’ in an owner-owned relationship, and the word rajaka- would take the genitive case suffix in accordance with A 2.3.50 śaṭṭhi śeṣe which teaches that a sixth triplet ending, a śaṭṭhi, is introduced to denote the rest, śeṣa. From the previous rules it is clear that this includes any relation, sambandha, which is not a kāraka-relation.

Since Aggavāṃsa relied on a threefold classification of the sāṃpadāna suggested in the Vākyapāda 3.7.129, the following section of Helārāja’s commentary on that very verse is worthy of notice (Hel 332,14):

‘rajakasya vastraṃ dadāti’, ‘ghnataḥ prṣṭham dadāti’ ityādau tu dadāyartho nāsti / tyāgo hi saḥ / tena ca hānātmakena mamatāvicchedasyākṣepād eva paropayogābhisamdhinā parasvatvāpadanam api svikṛtam / atra ca tadabhāva iti gauno ‘yaṃ dadāteh prayogah /

But in such [statements] as ‘he gives the clothes to the washerman (genitive)’ or ‘he turns his back to the murderer (genitive)’ there is no sense of giving. For that (= giving) is surrender [of ownership]. And it is because the latter, whose nature is abandoning, implies the cutting off of the sense of ‘mine’ that one who intends service to another agrees even to the establishment of another’s ownership. In this case there is no such thing, and therefore this is a metaphorical usage of [the verb] ‘give’.

Consider also the following passage from the Nyāsa on the Kāśikā at A 1.4.32. The Kāśikā states: anvarthasamjñāvijñānād dadāti-karmanetī vijñāyate, ‘because [the name sampradāna] is to be understood as a term which corresponds to its analytical meaning, [the rule] should be understood to mean [that which the agent aims at] through the action/object of giving’. The Nyāsa comments (KāśN I:546):

tenā dadāteh karmanā yam abhipraitī tat sampradānā iti vijñāyate / nanv evam api rajakasya vastraṃ dadāti, ghnataḥ prṣṭham dadāitya atra prāpnoti, naitat asti, dānam hi nāma pūjānugrahakāmyayā svākiyadravyaparityāgaḥ parasvatvāpattīḥ, tac cēha nāsti, ato na bhavīyati /

Therefore (i.e., since sampradāna is an anvarthasamjñā), one should understand ‘that which one aims at through the action/object of giving, that is the sampradāna’. But it applies in the case of ‘he gives the clothes to the washerman’ and ‘he turns his back to the murderer’ as well. This is not so. For giving is indeed an abandonment of one’s own property incurring ownership by someone else with a desire of worship or kindness. But there is no such thing here [and] therefore it will not be [like that].

It seems to me extremely likely that this passage was known to Aggavāṃsa. Not only is this evident from the phrase saddasatthesu hi yassa sammā pūjābuddhiyā anuggahabuddhiyā vā diyate, ‘for in the science of grammar it has been stated that to which [something] is properly (sam = sammā) given with an intention of worship or with an intention of kindness, that is the [kāraka] sāṃpadāna’. Note that the Nyāsa here plays on the fact that sampradāna is an anvarthasamjñā.¹ Aggavāṃsa’s reliance on the Nyāsa is, however, also evident from the

¹ cf. section 2.6 above.
fact that Jinendrabuddhi seems to stick to the argument that since sampradāna is an anvarthamajñā it is applicable only in connection with verbs denoting giving, and the verb ‘give’ entails transfer of ownership to someone else (parasvatvāpattih, parasvatvāpādanan), and the washerman can therefore not be assigned to the category of the sampradāna. But this is not the view held by other Sanskrit grammarians. Compare, for example, Kaiyāta on the Bhāṣya statement (Mbh I.331,3) evam api karmanah karanasamjñā vaktavyā sampradānasya ca karmasamjñā / paśunā rudram yajate / paśum rudrāya dadātity arthah, ‘even so it should be stated that the term karana pertains to the karman, and that the term karman to the sampradāna as in “he sacrifices to Rudra with a sacrificial animal”, that is to say, he gives a sacrificial animal to Rudra’. Kaiyāta comments (MbhP II:403):

kaiś cid anvartamasamjñāvijñānād dadātīvisaya eva sampradānasamjñeyty abhyupagatam / dānam ca svatvanivṛtthi parasvatvāpattiparyantet pratyajñāyī / tadubhayam apy ayuktam / anyatrāpi bhāṣyakārena samjñāyā abhyupagamat / tathā ca kriyāgraḥanasya gatyarthakaranātī tūtāyā ca praty-ākhyānaṃ kṛtam / tathā svatvanivṛttyabhāve ‘pi dadāteḥ prayogo drṣyate — na śudrāya matim dādyād iti / khandikopādhyāyas tasmāi capeṭām dadātīti ca /

Since [the term sampradāna] is understood to be an anvartahasamjñā, it is agreed by some [authors] that the term sampradāna is [applicable] in the domain of the verb ‘give’ only. Moreover, it is recognised [by them] that ‘giving’ is a cessation of ownership which entails the transfer of ownership to someone else. However, both of these [views] are wrong because Patañjali has agreed [to the application] of the term [sampradāna] also in other places. And thus [he] has rejected [the possible] mention of [the word] kriyā ‘action’ [in rule 1.4.32] as well as the rule [2.3.12] gatyarthakaranā [dvitiyā-caturthayau cestāyām anadhvani]. Likewise, even when there is no cessation of ownership, usage of [the verb] ‘give’ is met with, as in ‘one should not give instruction to a Śūdra’ and ‘the khandīka- teacher gives him a slap’.

Kaiyāta thus denies that the analysis of sampradāna as an anvartahasamjñā can form a part of any argument claiming that the name is valid only in the context of giving and that a transfer of ownership has to take place. He relies on Patañjali for this view, and adduces two examples to buttress it. Of course it does not follow from this that Aggavāmsa did not know Kaiyāta’s Pradīpa and indeed the present passage, but it strengthens the assumption that he did know the Nyāsa and probably also Helārāja’s commentary on the Vākyapādiya and that he made at least the Nyāsa discussion the basis for his claim that this is the view of the grammarians.

Aggavāmsa does not accept this view and says that if we are dealing with a genitive relation, then the sentence rajakassa vattham dadāti would mean that the clothes belonging to the washerman are being given away to someone else. Instead, Aggavāmsa claims, the washerman is the sampradāna because he receives what is given. He supports this argument by quoting his definition of the sampradāna as one ‘to whom there is a desire to give’, taken over from Kaccāyana, and a sentence from the canon, ‘without regard, without consideration, he gave food to the monks’ where there is no engagement in the act of giving. This gives him his first, though not quite well-founded, opportunity to contrast the view of the Sanskrit grammarians with what is ‘proper with regard to the Pāli canon’.

1 cf. above, p. 99 (2.6.1.8).
2 cf. above, p. 99 (2.6.1.8). Kaiyāta obviously understands Patañjali to have rejected the rule, cf. MbhP II:400: tasya prayāḥkhyātāvād ity adoṣah, ‘[but] there is no fault because this [rule 2.3.12] has been rejected’.
He goes on to buttress this claim, first by saying that all the genuine dative usages are exceptions and that the substitution of the suffix āya in the place of the singular fourth case suffix -(as)sa does not occur in the domain of actions such as honouring and giving. Therefore, he says, there are no statements in the canon where the receiver in the act of giving or honouring takes a genuine dative ending. So, when we meet with the form rajakassa in the Atthasāliṇī, we know it has a fourth case ending because, he says, the fourth and the sixth are identical wherever they occur since they have the genitive endings -sa and -nam. He thus distinguishes between a fourth and a sixth, although they are identical in form.

Aggavamsa concludes that in the science of grammar it is suitable to assign the washerman to the category of the sāmi ‘possessor’, since the word rajakassa has been stated with a sixth case ending, while in the canon it is suitable to assign it to the category of the sampadāna, since there is no distinction between the fourth and the sixth. This is a weak argument indeed. All it amounts to in fact is a claim that since there is no difference between the fourth and the sixth, we can do as we please, and it pleases us to deviate from the Sanskrit grammarians and decide that we are dealing with a fourth case suffix.

Obviously this whetted Aggavamsa’s appetite. Claiming that there is an endless opposition between the science of grammar and the canon, he goes on to cite random examples of words which show differences in gender and number, differences no historical linguist would find troublesome, and which, if detected by them, the Sanskrit grammarians would have recorded as varieties of usage and dealt with as such.

Further arguments are adduced to substantiate his claim. First he comes up with the form devadattāya which, he says, ends in a fourth case suffix. In other words, it is a genuine dative form. But when it is analysed according to the conventions of the canon, Aggavamsa tells us, then it becomes a word still ending in a fourth case suffix, but a fourth case suffix in the sense of the third, fifth, or sixth case endings in as much as case endings are substitutable. His one and only example is Yajñadatto Devadattāya asakkato, which is a mere copy of the canonical example asakkatā c’ asma Dhanañjayāya ‘but we are not honoured by Dhanañjayá’. Indeed, a feminine Dhanañjayāya can be an instrumental, dative, ablative, or genitive form. But Aggavamsa has made it clear before that the name sampadāna applies also when there is the sense of the third, fifth, sixth, and seventh case suffixes.¹

Secondly, Aggavamsa launches a peculiar attack on Pāṇini’s rule 5.2.94 tad asvyāsy asmnīn iti matup which accounts for the possessive suffixes -mat and -vat.² He claims that assa is a word ending in the sixth according to the conventions of grammar, but on the evidence of the canon and the Aṭṭhakathās it ends in the fourth. He brings in two examples, cakkhumā ‘possessing sight’ and āsāvati ‘possessing hope’ according to an analysis ‘sight pertains to it’ and ‘hope pertains to it’ respectively, and claims that these words cannot have possessive meanings. His strategy is to ask whose sight and hope we are talking about. Of course, philosophically speaking there is a problem here. Sight involves the faculty of seeing, an agent of seeing, an object of seeing, and the seeing itself. But Aggavamsa’s argument for cakkhumā is nevertheless awkward. He claims the sun has been given sight and so becomes the sampadāna and not the sāmi ‘possessor’, that is, he makes the point that the form assa, which stands for suriyassa, is a dative (donative) and not a genitive. But the Jātaka-āṭṭhakathā, from which the example is taken, says ‘sight was given to them (tesam)’. This may become a little clearer by the second example where the creeper āsāvati is said to be so called not because it possesses hope, but because hope is directed towards it. Thus hope pertains to the gods but is directed towards the creeper which then becomes the sampadāna, in as much as it is not desirable to have two possessors here. One may ask, why not? One may also compare the English ‘Cape of Good Hope’.

¹ cf. above, 2.6.1.10.
Needless to say, these attacks are not terribly convincing, but they are nevertheless quite significant in as much as they seem sufficient for Aggavamsa to make his claim that there is an opposition between the science of grammar and the canon. He concludes by saying that the sole authority is the canon and the Aṭṭhakathās, and that grammar is practically useless. He admits, though, that if the by now familiar example of the washerman were rephrased ‘he gives the clothes in the hand of the washerman’ there would be no opposition between grammar and canon since the washerman would then be unambiguously the sāmi ‘possessor’ of the hand.

2.7 The stable point when there is movement away, etc.:

apādāna

555 Yato apeti yato vā āgacchati, tad apādānaṃ.

1 Bm ti; Ce Be ns (coni.) tam.
2 Ce upāttavisaya2; VP 3.7.136, on which this classification undoubtedly is based, reads upāttavisayam.

‘That from which something moves away, or [for example] that from which something comes, that [kāraka] is the apādāna.’ That from which something moves away, or [for example] that from which something comes, that kāraka is something to which the technical name apādāna applies. ‘Moving away (apecca) from it something takes (ādāṭī), thus [it is called] apādāna. That is to say, moving away from it, [that is,] from some thing, physically or mentally, one attains something else. Some, however, say that [it is called] apādāna [according to the analysis:] ‘leading away (apanetvā) from it one takes (ādāṭī)’. On their view the meaning is ‘having led oneself or the mind away from it’. One should understand that just like the technical name sampadāna, this name [apādāna] too is made in accordance with [both its] analytical meaning and [its] conventional meaning. Now, this apādāna is of two kinds, according to whether the moving away is preceded by physical contact or whether it is preceded by mental contact; likewise according to whether the starting point is moving or whether the starting point is not moving. Or rather it is of three kinds, according to whether the starting point is moving, whether the starting point is not moving, or whether the starting point is not only moving or the starting point is not not moving; likewise according to where [the movement away] has been directly stated, where it is comprised, or where it has to be inferred. All these subdivisions we shall explain one by one below. [Some examples:] ‘The sages go away from the village’; ‘the king has proceeded from the city’; ‘liquid has come out of the earth’; ‘he descends from the elephant’s shoulder’; ‘he emerges from the house’; ‘he comes from Sāvatthī’. What is the use of this thing called the apādāna? ‘The fifth [case suffix is added to a nominal stem] to express the apādāna’.
Aggavamsa here deviates from the Kaccayana definition which runs (125) yasmād apei bhayam ādatta vā tad apādānam, ‘that from which something moves away or becomes afraid is the apādāna’. Pāṇini’s definition runs (A 1.4.24) dhruvam apāye ‘pādānam, ‘the stable point when there is movement away [is called] the apādāna’. Aggavamsa’s way of phrasing alternative definitions is here almost meaningless.

The source of the twofold division of the apādāna, depending on whether the moving away is preceded by physical contact or by mental contact, is uncertain. Note, however, that Kaiyata, commenting upon the Bhāṣya at A 1.4.24 states (MbhP II:388): jugupsati / samśeṣapūrvako viśleṣo pāyā / sa cātra nāsti / buddhikalpitas tu gauṇa iti bhāvah, ‘[on] jugupsā “disgust”: apāya “moving away” is disjunction preceded by conjunction, and that does not apply here. However, [a moving away] imagined by the mind is metaphorical; that is the meaning’. The compound samśeṣapūrvakah and the idea of an imagined moving away is certainly reminiscent of kāya- and citta-samyogapubbako. The whole context of the discussion is, however, lacking.

The threefold division, on the other hand, stems from the Vākyapadiya (VP 3.7.136):

nirdiṣṭaviṣayam kim cid upāttaviṣayam tathā /
apēkṣitakriyam ceti tridhāpādānam ucyate //

The apādāna is said to be of three kinds: sometimes [it is the one] where the moving away3 is directly expressed, likewise

1 This stems from the first vārttika on A 1.4.24 which suggests that verbs denoting among other things jugupsā should be incorporated.
2 That is, in the examples adduced by Patañjali, such as adharmāj jugupsate, ‘he is disgusted by adharma’.
3 viṣaya ‘domain’ here refers to the topic under discussion, namely the moving away.

where the moving away is included, and also where the action [of moving away] is implied.

Kaiyata too brings in this threefold division in his commentary on the Bhāṣya at A 1.4.24 (MbhP II:389):

trividham cedam apādānam — nirdiṣṭaviṣayam upāttaviṣayam apekṣitakriyam ceti / tatra nirdiṣṭaviṣayam, — yatra dhātunāpāyalaṅkāsana viṣaya nirdiṣṭaḥ / yathā — grāmād āgacchati / upāttiviṣayam, — yatra dhātur dhātvantarārāhāgam svārthām āha / yathā ca ‘balāhakād vidyotata’ iti / nihsaraṇāṅge dyotane ‘tra dyutir1 vartate / yathā va ‘kusūlāt pacati tyādau / ādānāṅge2 pāke pacir vartate / apekṣitakriyam yatra kriyāvāci padam na śriyate, kevalam kriyā pratiyate / yathā — sānkāśyakebhyaḥ pātaliputrākā abhirūpatara’ iti /

And this apādāna is of three kinds: where the moving away is directly expressed (nirdiṣṭaviṣayā), where it is included (upāttaviṣayā), and where the action [of moving away] is implied (apekṣitakriya). Among these, nirdiṣṭaviṣayā is where the domain which is defined as apāya ‘moving away’ has been directly expressed through a verbal root, as for example ‘he comes from the village’; upāttaviṣayā is where the verbal root expresses its own meaning to which is subordinated the meaning of another verbal root, as for example ‘it is lightening from the cloud’; here [the verbal root] dyut ‘shine’ occurs in the sense of dyotana ‘a flashing’ to which is subordinated [the action of] nihsaraṇa ‘going forth’3; or, for example, in

1 Corrected from dyutivartate.
2 So read for odanāṅge.
3 That is, balāhakād nihsaraḥ jyotir vidyotate, ‘having gone forth from the cloud, the lightening flashes’ (cf. Helārāja on VP 3.7.136).
[sentences] such as ‘he cooks from the granary’, where the root pac ‘cook’ is used in the sense of pāka ‘a cooking’ to which is subordinated [the action of] ādana ‘taking out’; apekṣitakriya is where the word expressing the action is not heard, the action is only understood, as for example ‘the inhabitants of Pātaliputra are more handsome than those of Sāmkāśya’.

Of course, this threefold division is dealt with also by Helarāja in his commentary on VP 3.7.136, but he does not add anything in particular to what Kāyita has stated, with the exception of one small but significant detail: He talks about the apādana with regard to an avadhīviśa ‘a particular starting point’.

Whereas the examples provided for each of the three categories by Kāyita and Helarāja are perfectly to the point, Aggavaṃsa’s are not. In fact, as far as I can see, they illustrate only the first category. Incidentally, the first two examples are from the Kaccāyanavutti on the basic apādana rule, the third from the same text under the following rule.

The final remark, apādāne pañcami, is Pānini’s rule 2.3.28, repeated as 607 in the Saddannīti, where, incidentally, Aggavaṃsa cites the third example from the Kaccāyanavutti on this basic apādana rule (Kacc-v 125).

2.7.1 The cause of fear etc.


‘The cause of the arising of fear etc.’ That which is the cause of the arising of fear etc., that kāraka too is one to which the name apādana applies: ‘Fear arises from a thief’; ‘fear arises from love’; ‘sorrow arises from desire’.

This goes back to A 1.4.25 bhīrārthānām bhayahetuvah which teaches that the name apādana applies to the cause of fear in connection with verbal roots meaning ‘fear’ or ‘protect’. Aggavaṃsa’s use of adi ‘etc.’ is accounted for by the word soka ‘sorrow’ in the last example.

2.7.2 Cooking from the granary and shining from the clouds

557 Yato pacati vijjotati vā. Yato niharitvā pacati yato vā niggama vijjotati, tam pi kārakam apādānasāṇāṃ hoti: kusūlato pacati, valāhakā vijjotati cando.

‘That from which [one] cooks or [for example, from which something] flashes.’ That from which one takes something out and cooks, or [for example] that from which something goes out and flashes, that kāraka too is one to which the name apādana applies: ‘He cooks from the granary’; ‘the moon shines forth from the clouds’.

This short passage is quite revealing. Aggavaṃsa has here made a special rule out of the two examples provided by Kāyita (MbhP II:389), discussed above (2.7). They are also brought forward by Helarāja on VP 3.7.136 (Hel 338,13 foll.), and by Haradatta (KāŚP I:537). Aggavaṃsa does not include the context in which these examples are discussed, nor does he add anything. The case may serve as an illustration of how the Saddanīti came to be so voluminous. To me a good grammar is a grammar which does not make special rules out of material that can be perfectly well covered by a general rule.
2.7.3 Parādipubbaji etc.

558 Parādipubbajidhātādippayoge. Yathāraham parā icc ādiupasaggapubbāṇām jīdhātādīnaṃ payoge ca tam kārakam apādānasāṇāṃ hotī; tathā hi ji icc etassā dhātussa parāpubbassa payoge yo asayho,1 so apādānasāṇo hotī, tam yathā: buddhasmā parājenti aṇṇatītīhīyā; bhū icc etassa dhātussa papubbassa payoge yato acchinmapabhavo, so apādānasāṇo hotī, tam yathā: Himavatā pabhavanti paṇca mahānādiyo, Anotattāmā mahāsarā pabhavanti, Aciravatiyā pabhavanti kunnadiyo.

‘When there is usage of the roots ji “conquer; overwhelm” etc. preceded by parā etc.’ Also when there is usage of the roots ji etc. preceded by [the preverbs] parā etc. as appropriate, that kāraka is something to which the name apādāna applies. So indeed when there is usage of the root ji preceded by parā he who cannot be resisted is someone to whom the name apādāna applies, as for example: ‘Heretics are overwhelmed by the Buddha’. When there is usage of the root bhū ‘be’ preceded by pa, that from which the source is not cut off, that is something to which the name apādāna applies, as for example: ‘Five major rivers arise from the Himavat mountain’; ‘the great lakes originate from the Anotatta lake’; ‘small rivers arise from the Aciravati river’.

The rule itself incorporates A 1.4.26 parājera asodhāh which teaches that the name apādāna applies to that which cannot be endured or overcome in connection with the verbal root ji preceded by parā. Note that there is no ādi ‘etc.’ here. Aggavaṃśa has fashioned the previous rule in the Saddanīti from two examples adduced by Sanskrit authors. In

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1 So read for Smith’s asaho, which I take to be a mere misprint. The Kaccāyanavuttī (126) reads asayho.
kāraka is something to which the name apādāna applies: ‘An action other than that action, different from that.’

Aggaṭamaḥ seems again to have jumped into the vibhakti-section of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. A 2.3.28 apādānē paṇicami is the general rule which teaches that a fifth case suffix is added to a nominal stem when the apādāna is to be denoted. A 2.3.29 anyārāditarartedikśabdāncaṭṭārapadājāhiyukte then teaches that a fifth case suffix is added also after stems co-occurring with anya ‘other than’, ārāt ‘near to; remote from’, itara ‘different from’, rte ‘without’, words denoting directions, compounds with -aṁc as the final member, and words ending in the suffixes -āc or -āhi. In the Kātantra (2.4.21) this list is reduced to diś, itara, rte, and anya (digitārte ‘nyāś ca). Aggaṭamaḥ refers to the list as ‘anya etc.’, but cf. 2.7.11 and 2.7.16.4 below.

2.7.5 apa and pari in the sense of exclusion

560 Vajjanatthehi apa pari icc etehi yoge ca tam kārakaḥ apādānasahānāḥ hoti: apa sālāya āyanti vānījā, upari pabbatā devo vassati. Ettha ca suddhanāmānam upasaggehi yogo upasaggyogo nāmā ti gahetabbo, na guṇanāmānam upasaggehi yogo; tathā hi ubhato sujato putto ti ādisu upasagge vijjamāne pi upasaggyogo nāma na bhavati.

‘When there is construction with apa ‘away from’ and pari ‘around’ in the sense of exclusion.’ Also when there is construction with apa and pari in the sense of exclusion, that kāraka is something to which the name apādāna applies: ‘The merchants withdraw from the hall’; ‘the deity rains (= it rains) up high from (= on) the mountain’. And with regard to this one should understand that the construction of nouns pure and simple with preverbs is indeed upasaggayogo ‘preverb-construction’, not the construction of quality-expressing nouns with preverbs. For example, in [a sentence] such as ‘the boy is nobly born (of noble birth) on both sides’, although a preverb (su-) is met with, there is indeed no construction with the preverb.

This is an odd passage. It clearly links up with the second apādāna rule in Kaccāyana, dhātunāmānam upasaggyogā dipping api ca, in particular with the compound upasaggyoga ‘construction with a preverb (upasarga)’. The phrasing of the Saddaniti rule, however, so much reflects A 1.4.88 apapārī varjane that it must be more than a coincidence. This rule assigns apa and pari to the category karma-pravacaniya when they are used in the sense of exclusion. They are assigned to this category by A 1.4.83 karmapravacaniyāh which is valid up to and including A 1.4.97. The technical term karmapravacaniya denotes particles (nipāta) that operate as governing prepositions with regard to both nouns and verbs under conditions specified in each rule. A 2.3.10 paṇcamy apāṇparibhiḥ teaches that a fifth case suffix is added after a nominal stem co-occurring with any of the karmapravacaniyas apa, āN, or pari. Aggaṭamaḥ’s examples apa sālāya āyanti vānījā and upari pabbatā devo vassati seem reminiscent of this rule. Rule A 1.4.88 is also related to A 2.1.12 apaparibahirāṅcavah paṇcamyā. This rule teaches that apa ‘away’, pari ‘around’, bahis ‘outside’ and forms ending in -aṁc optionally combine with nominal words ending in a fifth case suffix to form avvayībhāva compounds. For example, pari trigartebhyah combine to form the adverbal compound paritrigartam ‘around the Trigarta country’.

In any case, Aggaṭamaḥ’s odd example reflects some acquaintance with the examples of raining known from the Kāśikā on

1 Although in what follows the technical term upasagga in some places is better translated ‘preposition’, I shall keep the translation ‘preverb’ throughout.
both A 1.4.88 and A 2.1.12, such as paritrigartam vrṣṭo devah ‘the god rained (= it rained) all around the Trigarta country’. These examples are also met with in the Candravyākaranā 2.1.82 pariyābhyām varjane which clearly could have been Aggavāmaṇa’s source as well. His own example upari pabbatā devo vassati is odd since upari is normally constructed with a genitive in Pāli. Moreover, the Sanskrit rule speaks about pari, not upari.

2.7.6 u and pari in the senses of upwards and around


‘When there is construction with u and pari in the senses of uddham “upwards; above”5 and samantato “all around;

1 All references are to the edition of B. Liebich 1918.
2 Be ns uddhamsamantatathupari°.
3 Smith reads “samanta-ta>ti-th’-upari. He uses the sign <x> to indicate an ‘élément de texte considéré superflu par l’éditeur’. Cf Bem ns all read samanatathupari as they do in the rule itself. Why Smith has not bracketed the ta there I do not understand. I suggest that the brackets be ignored.
4 Ja VI 564,13.
5 Of course uddham has many semantic nuances; cf. CPD.

completely’.’ Also when there is construction with the two preverbs (upasaggga) that are the preverb u and the preverb pari and they are, respectively, meaningful as ‘upwards; above’ ‘all around; completely’, that kāraka is something to which the name apādāna applies: ‘The deity rains (= it rains) up high from (= on) the mountain’, that is to say, ‘above the mountain, all around, it rains’. This is the judgment here: u and pari are said to be a pair of preverbs, but there is also the particle (nipāta) upari ‘on; upon; with regard to’. If, however, upari is [taken to be] a particle in [the sentence] upari pabbatā devo [vassati] ‘the deity rains (= it rains) high up from (= on) the mountain’ instead of uttering1 pabbatā, pabbatassa (genitive/dative) or pabbate (locative) should be stated. Since it is not stated thus it is understood that u-pari is proclaimed as a pair of preverbs. For what purpose [has] upari [been specified] in the senses of uddham samantato? In order to make known that the word upari, being a particle, as in ‘all different sorts of fruit grow upon that mountain’, explains only the sole meaning ‘uddham’, not the meaning ‘uddham samantato’.

Again the underlying rule is A 2.3.10 pañcamy apānparībhīh which teaches that a fifth case suffix is added after a nominal stem co-occurring with any of the karmacarvacanīyas apa, āN, or pari. It is clear, however, that Aggavamaṇa includes this section on u and pari or upari on the basis of Kaccāyana and the vuttī thereon. As mentioned above (2.7.5), Kaccāyana’s second rule on the apādāna includes the requirement that there has to be upasaggayoga ‘construction with a preverb (upasagga)’, and the vuttī (126) offers the example upari pabbatā devo vassati ‘the deity rains (= it rains) up high from (= on) the mountain’. Apparently ignoring the ādi ‘etc.’ in Kaccāyana, Aggavaṃsa wants to account for the upasagga-requirement and the form pabbatā in

1 I take avatvā to be a negated absolutive of vac ‘speak’.
the vutti. His problem, though, is that even though u and pari are taken as a pair of upasargas, we also have the nipāta ‘particle’ upari, and, consequently, if we had recognised upari as a nipāta here we should not have the ending -ā but the locative -e or the dative/genitive ending -assa. This goes without saying.

The passage is nevertheless illuminating in that it gives us an indication that Aggavamsa feels he has to explain Kaccāyana and the vutti, reasoning something like ‘I have to explain the canon; Kaccāyana and the vutti explained the the canon, so whatever is in there I too have to explain’.

2.7.7 a and yāva signifying exclusive or inclusive limit

562 Marīyādābhividhatthaāyāvayoge. Marīyādābhividhattha ā icc upasaggena yāva iti nipātena ca yoge tāṃ kārakam apādānasāñām hoti: ā pabbatā khettaṃ, ā nagaraḥ khadiravanam, ā Brahmāloka saddo abbhuggacchāti, yāva Jetuttaranagarā maggam alamkāri,1 “yāva Brahmāloka saddo abbhuggaṅchit”,2 yāva Brahmāloka ekakolāhalaṃ jātam.3 Ėtha ca ā pabbatā ti ādayo payoga saddasathanayavasena vutta, yāva Jetuttaranagarā ti ādayo pana pālinayavasena ti vedītabbā.

‘When there is construction with ā or yāva signifying exclusive (marīyāda) or inclusive (abhividhi) limit.’ When there is construction with the upasagga ‘preverb’ ā or the nipāta ‘particle’ yāva signifying exclusive or inclusive limit, that kāraka is something to which the technical name apādāna applies: ‘The field up to [but excluding] the mountain’; ‘the acacia-forest up to the city’; ‘word spreads right up to

Brahmaloka’; ‘he adorned the road as far as the city of Jetuttara’; ‘word spread as far as Brahmaloka’; ‘utter tumult arose as far as Brahmaloka’. And here usages such as ā pabbatā ‘up to the mountain’ have been stated by force of the conventions of the science of grammar, [those] such as yāva Jetuttaranagarā ‘as far as the city of Jetuttara’, on the other hand, by force of the conventions of the canon — thus it should be understood.

A 2.3.10 pañcamy apānparibhiḥ is still in the picture, this time with regard to the karmapravacaniya āN (ā). But once again it is obvious that Aggavamsa has taken his wording from another rule, namely A 2.1.13 ān maryādābhividhiyoḥ. Also, A 1.4.89 ān maryādāvacane is taken by the Kāśikā as including exclusive or inclusive limit as in ā pāṭaliputrād vrṣṭo devah, ‘it rained up to Pāṭaliputra’. The purpose of A 2.1.13, however, is to allow for optionally making an avayābhāva compound with āN as the first member signifying exclusive or inclusive limit. For example, ā pāṭaliputrāt ‘up to Pāṭaliputra’ — where, incidentally, the ablative case suffix is assigned by A 2.3.10 — can optionally be made into the adverbial compound āpāṭalipuram in the same sense. But rule 2.1.13 has nothing directly to do with kārakas or the assignment of case suffixes.

The example ā Brahmāloka saddo abbhuggacchāti has been taken over from the Kaccāyanavutti. From what Aggavamsa says it is clear that he is willing to include things on the basis of the grammarians. That he has added yāva to the rule is hardly surprising since yāva is much more common than ā in Pāli.

1 Smith: cf. Ja VI 592,5.
2 Vin III 19,5; Sp I 78,23.
3 Smith: cf. Sp I 95,12.
2.7.8 pati signifying proxy or barter


‘When there is construction with pati signifying patinidhi “proxy; substitute” or patidāna “barter; exchange.”’ Also when there is construction with the preverb (upasagga) pati signifying proxy or barter, that kāraka is something to which the technical name apādāna applies: ‘For a season Sāriputta spoke for the teaching of the doctrine (= taught the doctrine) as proxy of the Buddha; ‘he gives him ghee in return for sesame oil; ‘he gives him a blue lotus in return for a red; ‘he gives him molten gold in return for wrought gold’.

Aggavamsa is now probably back in the vibhakti section of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. The rule is A 2.3.11 pratinidhipatidāne ca yasmāt which teaches that also when there is construction with a karmapravacaniyā (A 1.4.83, 2.3.8) a fifth case ending is added after a nominal stem signifying pratinidhi ‘proxy’ or pratidāna ‘barter’. But one should also consider A 1.4.92 pratiḥ pratinidhipratidhānayoh which teaches that the term karmapravacaniyā (A 1.4.83) applies to the particle prati when it signifies proxy or barter. When the particle prati has these senses it is constructed with an ablative (A 2.3.11) as in māṣān asmai tilebhyāḥ prati yacchatī, ‘he gives him māṣa beans in return for sesame oil’. Note that in all the Pāli examples pati, defined as an upasagga, is a postposition with a dental t. All of the examples occur in the Kaccāyanavutti (126).

2.7.9 visum and puthu

564 Visumputhuyoge. Visum puthu icc etehi nipātehi yoge ca tam kārakaṁ apādānasaññaṁ hoti: tehi visum, tato visum, ariyehi puthag evāyam jano.

‘When there is construction with visum “separate(ly)” or puthu “separate(ly); various”.’ Also when there is construction with the particles (nipātas) visum and puthu, that kāraka is something to which the technical name apādāna applies: ‘Separate from them”; ‘separate from that” ; this person is indeed separate from the Āryas’. I can see no obvious source for this rule. The Kaccāyanavutti attempts to account for the word api in the rule, and in doing so says (126): Apiggahaṇena nipātappayoge pi paṁcam vittho dutiyā ca tatiyā ca, ‘by the mention of api, [is taught that] the fifth as well as the second and third [case suffixes] apply also (api) when there is construction with a particle (nipāta).’ Now the fact that Aggavamsa has moved on to deal with two nipātas as well as the fact that the Kaccāyanavutti very soon after this goes on to deal with vinā ‘without’ and nānā ‘without; different from’ may have inspired Aggavamsa to make a separate case for puthu (Skt prthak). He classifies this word as a nipāta, since in the Aṣṭādhyāyī prak, vinā, and nānā are dealt with in the same rule, namely A 2.3.32 prthagvinnānābhis trīyā ‘nyatarasyām. This rule teaches that in addition to the fifth case suffix a third or second (A 2.3.31) may optionally be added after a nominal stem when there is construction with prthak ‘separate(ly)’, vinā ‘without’, or nānā ‘without; different from’. The Kaccāyanavutti (126–27) deals with vinā and nānā.

1 Smith: Ce Bm ns vā; Be om. (ns comp. fecit).
Aggavamsa deals with vinā later on (566). Note that tehi and ariyehi of the examples can be instrumental as well as ablative forms.

2.7.10 aṅñatra

565 Aṅñatravyoge pañcamī, tatiyā ca. Aṅñatra icc etena nipātena yoge pañcamī vibhatti hoti tatiyā ca: “nāṅñatra sabbanissaggā sothim passāmi pāṇinam”\(^1\), aṅñatra buddhuppādā lokassa saccābhīsamayo n’ athi, “tadantaram ko jāneyya aṅñatra Tathāgatena”\(^2\).

“When there is construction with aṅñatra “apart from; other than; except; without” the fifth as well as the third.’ When there is construction with the particle (nipāta) aṅñatra, [then] the fifth case ending applies, and also the third: ‘Except by abandonment of everything, I do not see any safety for living beings’; ‘there is no comprehension of the truth for the world except by the birth of the Buddha’\(^3\), ‘who would know the difference of/from it, apart from the Tathāgata’?\(^4\).

There is no rule corresponding to this in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, nor in Kaccāyana(-vatti), Candrayākaraṇa, or Kātantra, and I have found no other source for it. The fact that Aggavamsa stresses that we are dealing with a particle (nipāta) strengthens the assumption made under the previous rule that he has moved on to deal with nipāta-words inspired by

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\(^1\) S I 54,4.
\(^2\) A III 350,3. Smith reads tadantaram, so also CPD (s.v. 2 antara), for A tadantaram.
\(^3\) Or: Buddhās (pl.): cf. Dhp 194 buddhānam uppādo, ‘the birth of the Awakened Ones’.
\(^4\) PTS transl.: ‘But who save the Tathāgata can judge this difference’. I prefer to take tadantaram as a compound. One may translate as a karmadhāraya, ‘that difference which is it’ = ‘that difference’.

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the Kaccāyanavutti. The inclusion of aṅñatra would in that case be on his own initiative.

2.7.11 rite and vinā

566 Ritevināyoge dutiyā ca. Rite vinā icc etehi nipātehi yoge pañcamī tatiyā dutiyā ca hoti: rite saddhammā kuto sukham bhavati rite saddhammam rite saddhammena vā, vinā saddhammā n’ athi’ aṅño koci nātho loke vijjati vinā saddhammam vinā saddhammena vā, vinā buddhamhā vinā buddham vinā buddhena vā.

‘Also the second [as well as the fifth and the third case endings] when there is construction with rite “without; except” or vinā “without; except’.” When there is construction with the particles rite or vinā, the fifth, the third, and the second [case endings] apply: ‘Except for the true doctrine (saddhammā [ablative], saddhammam [accusative], or saddhammena [instrumental]), from what is there happiness’?; ‘except for the true doctrine (saddhammā [ablative], saddhammam [accusative], or saddhammena [instrumental]), there is no other leader in the world’; ‘without the Buddha (buddhasmā [ablative], buddham [accusative], or buddhena [instrumental])’.

This brings us back to A 2.3.29 anyārāditarartedik-śabdāṅcūttarapadājāhiyukte which teaches that a fifth case ending is added also after nominal stems constructed with, among other words, rite

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\(^1\) The text here is problematic in that we have a negation and both athi and vijjati. We can translate both ‘there is not; there does not exist’ but one verb would do, and the line scans badly. Smith lists the following v.l.: ita Bm (ns: vijjati hū so ākhyaḥ katuḥ phrac sañ // vā / n’ athi vijjati / ma rhi / nathipatī patisedthāha); Be n’ athi ‘nño; Ce nāñño. Kaccāyanavutti (126) reads: nathipato koci nātho loke vijjati. Note the nathipatī of the nissaya. The problem does not affect the point under discussion, though.
‘without’, and to A 2.3.32 prthagvinānānabhīs trīyā ‘nyataraśyāṁ which teaches that a third, second, or fifth (A 2.3.31) case suffix is optionally added after a nominal stem when there is construction with prthak ‘separate(ly)’, vinā ‘without’, or nānā ‘without; different from’. As noted above, the Kaccayana-vuttī (126–27) deals with vinā and nānā. Why Aggavamsa has not included nānā is hard to tell, but it may be worth noticing two rules from the Candavyūka-rāna. Rule 2.1.84 rte dvitiyā ca with the vṛtti explanation rtiṣadbenā yoge dvitiyā bhavati pañcami ca, teaches that when there is construction with the word rte, the second case suffix applies, and also the fifth, and 2.1.85 vinā trīyā ca, teaches that in construction with vinā the third case suffix also applies in addition to the second and the fifth. The succession of these rules is suggestive, and so is the fact that we meet with only rte and vinā. The problem is that rte is taught only with an accusative or an ablative and that the examples are very different. Aggavamsa’s examples for vinā occur in the Kaccayana-vuttī.

2.7.12 pabhuti

567 Pabhutādyatthe tadathapayaoge ca. Pabhutādyatthe ca tadathapayaoge ca tam kārakaṃ apādānasāññaṁ hoti: “yato ‘ham bhagini ariyāya jātiyā jāta”,”1 “yato sarāmi attānām yato patto ‘smi viññatam”;2 yato pabhuti,3 “yato paṭṭhāya”;4 “tato paṭṭhāya”;5 “ito paṭṭhāya”;6 “aśjato paṭṭhāya”.7

‘Also when there is the sense of pabhuti “beginning; starting” etc. and when there is usage that has that sense.’ Also when there is the sense of pabhuti etc. and when there is usage in that sense, that kāraka is something to which the technical name apādāna applies. ‘Since when I, sister, was born of noble birth’; ‘since when I remember myself, since when I am one who had reached the age of discretion’; ‘beginning since when’; ‘starting out since when’; ‘starting out since then’; ‘starting out from here’, ‘starting out from today’.

I am not quite confident about my translation of this rule. Does he intend to say ‘when there is the sense of pabhuti or ādi’? What is the meaning of ca here? Is it to be read twice, so to speak, or does it only connect the two requirements for the name apādāna to apply? Does he mean to say ‘when there is construction with pabhuti and ādi, and when there is usage of words in that sense’? Admittedly, ‘when there is the sense of X and when there is usage in that sense’ does not make too much sense (or, rather, that is exactly what it does). The first examples have the sense of pabhuti; yato pabhuti has the very word form, and the last four examples have a synonym, paṭṭhāya ‘taking X as starting point; beginning with X’. My guess is that the last examples are tadathappayoge but I am not at all sure.

There is no rule corresponding to this in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, Candavyūka-rāna, or Kātantra. Several of the examples occur in the Kaccayana-vuttī, triggered by the word ca in the rule itself. The vṛtti explains (127,1–2): casaddagghanena aññatthāpi pañcami vibhatti hoti, ‘the fifth case ending applies also in other senses by force of the mention of the word ca [in the rule]’.

It is interesting to note, however, that Patañjali brings up the word prabhṛti in the Mahābhāṣya under vt. 6 on A 2.3.28 apādāne pañcami (Mbh 1.455,24–456,2): kārttiyā āgraḥāyāni māsa iti / idam atra prayoktavyaṃ san na prayujyate kārttiyāḥ prabhṛty āgraḥāyāni māsa iti, ‘[take the statement] “Āgraḥāyāni is in a month from Kārttiki”; here what should be used is not used: “starting (prabhṛti ) from Kārttiki Āgraḥāyāni is in a month”’. Kaiyāṭa elaborates on this usage of prabhṛti.

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1 M II 103,19.
2 Ja VI 79,2.
3 Smith: cf. Vv-a 158,2.
4 Ja VI 79,11.
5 Ja I 78,8.
6 Vv-a 157,30.
7 Vv-a 246,22.
in his Pradipā (MbhP II:800): kārtikyāḥ prabhṛtītī / tata ārabhyety arthah / bhāsyakāravacanāt prabhṛtiyoge pañcamī, “kārtikyāḥ prabhṛtītī”, that is to say, beginning from that; on [the authority of] the statement of the author of the Bhāṣya a fifth [case ending is added] when there is construction with prabhṛti'. From this it is clear that the usage of an ablative in construction with prabhṛti was well established usage among the Sanskrit grammarians.

2.7.13 The time or distance between two kārakas or actions

568 Kārakakiriyānām majjhatthā kāladdhā ca. Athāyoyanakkamavasena pana dvinnam apādānakkamakārakānām vā pubbāparakiriyānām vā majjhe ṭhitā kāladdhā ca apādānasaññāh honi: pakkhasmā vijjhati migam, kosā vijjhati kuñjaram, māsasmā bhuṇjati bhojanam. Tatra luddako ito pakkhasmā migam vijjhati ti athayoyanakkamo kārakavasena, kiriyavasena pana luddako ajja migam vijjhitvā pakkhasmā vijjhati ti; esa nayo itartrā pi.

‘And also time and distance which stands between kārakas or actions.’ Also, however, by force of the order of explaining a meaning, [words] that signify time or distance [and] occur between the two kārakas apādānā and kamma or [between] a prior and a posterior action, are such to which the technical name apādāna applies: ‘He kills the deer after a fortnight’; ‘he hits the elephant from [the distance of] a krośa’; ‘he consumes food after a month’. As far as this is concerned, [in] ‘the hunter kills the deer after a fortnight hence’, there is an order of explaining a meaning by force of kārakas, but by force of action [in] ‘having killed a deer today, the hunter kills [another] one

after a fortnight’. This principle applies also in the other [examples].

Aggavamsa has here incorporated two rules from the Aṣṭādhyāyī, or at least their wording. A 2.3.5 kālādhvanor atyantasamyoge teaches that a second case suffix (A 2.3.2) is added to a stem signifying time or distance to indicate absolute connection with an action. A 2.3.7 saptamipañcamayau kārakamadhye then teaches that a seventh or a fifth case suffix is added to a stem signifying time or distance (A 2.3.5) when they occur between one participant of an action and another. The question remains as to the source of Aggavamsa’s compound kārakakiriyānām, which brings in the alternative of occurrence between two actions. This, and his whole conception of what is at stake here, goes back to the Bhāṣya discussion at A 2.3.7 (Mbh I:446,9–13):

kriyāmadhye iti vaktavyam / ihāpi yathā syāt / adya devadatto bhuktvā dyuḥahāh bhoktā dyuḥahāḥ bhoktā / kārakamadhye ityaty ucyamāna ihāva syāt / ihastho ’yam iṣvāsah krośāḥ lakṣyam vidhyati kroṣe lakṣyam vidhyati / yam ca vidhyati yataḥ ca vidhyaty ubhayos tan madhyam bhavati // tat tarhi vaktavyam / na vaktavyam / nāntareṇa sādhanam kriyāyah pravrtti bhavati / kriyāmadhye cet kārakamadhyam api bhavati tatra kārakamadhyā ity eva siddham //

[The wording] kriyāmadhye ‘occurring between two actions’ should be stated so that [the rule] would apply also here: ‘Having eaten today, Devadatta is going to eat after two days (ablative), [or] is going to eat in two days (locative)’. If only as much as ‘between two actions’ is being stated, [the rule] would apply only here: ‘Standing here, the archer hits the target from [the distance of] a krośa (ablative), [or] at [the distance of] a krośa (locative)’. That which is between the two, [namely, the distance between] that which he hits and that [place] from where

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1 ‘This is not clear to me. Is it because apparent sequence in reality requires an “order” of explanation?”
he hits, is madhya ‘between’. Then need this statement be made? It need not be. There is no engagement in an action without something effecting [it]. If there is an interval between two actions, then there is also an interval between the two participants [of it]. In that case, it is fully established by [the wording] kārakamadhye ‘between two kārakas’ alone.

As is clear from this, Patañjali considers the addition of kriyāmadhye ‘between two actions’ unnecessary. It is clear, however, that the formulation kārakamadhye ‘between two kārakas’ caused the Sanskrit grammarians some difficulties. Turning to the Kāśīka on A 2.3.7, we find that, with regard to the example adya bhūtvā devadatto dvyae bhoktā dyahād vā bhoktā, ‘having eaten today, Devadatta is going to eat in two days, or is going to eat after two days’, kārakamadhye is understood as kartrśaktiyor madhye kālah, ‘the time between two capacities as agent’. Whether Aggavamsa thought he faced a problem here and therefore consciously included the element kriyānaṁ majjhatthā, or whether he erroneously thought it ought to be included on the basis of the wording kriyāmadhye from the Mahābhāṣya discussion, is a question that remains open.

2.7.14 rakkhanaṭṭha

569 Rakkhanaṭṭham icchitaṁ anicchitaṁ ca. Rakkhanaṭṭham dhātūnam payoge, yam icchitaṁ yaṁ ca anicchitaṁ, tam kārakam apādānasaññāṁ hoti: kāke rakkhanti ṣaṇḍulā, ucchūhi gaje rakkhanti, mantino mantena dārakehi pisāce rakkhanti, yavā pāṭisedhenti gāvo, nānārogato vā nānā-uśaddevato vā ārakkham ganhantu,1 akusalehi dhammehi mānasāṁ nivārethi, “pāpā cittaṁ nivāraye”.2

‘In relation to [verbal roots] meaning “protect; ward off”, that which is desired and that which is not desired.’ When there is usage of verbal roots meaning “protect; ward off”, that which is desired as well as that which is not desired is a kāraka to which the technical name apādāna applies: ‘They ward off crows from the rice’; ‘they ward off elephants from the sugar-cane’; ‘enchanters ward off goblins from children with a spell’; ‘they ward off crows from the corn’; ‘let them take protection from all kinds of diseases or from all kinds of misfortunes’; ‘keep the mind from unwholesome phenomena’; ‘one should keep the mind from evil’.

In Kaccāyana (128) this rule appears in the form rakkhanaṭṭham icchitaṁ, in the Kātantra (2.4.9) as ipsitaṁ ca rakṣārthānām, but Aggavamsa adduces a larger number of examples. The corresponding rule in the Aṣṭādhya is 1.4.27 vāraṇārthānām ipsitaḥ, ‘in relation to [verbal roots] meaning “warding off; keeping back”, that which is wanted to be obtained [receives the name apādāna]’. It is therefore clear that Aggavamsa prefers the Kātantra/Kaccāyana wording. The additional anicchitaṁ ca, ‘also that which is undesired’, is apparently Aggavamsa’s own invention, though it seems based on the issues raised in Pāṇiniya grammar when the karman is defined (A 1.4.49) as kartur ipsitatam, ‘that [kāraka] which is most desired to be attained by the agent’. Rule A 1.1.50 tathāyuktaṁ cānipīṣitaṁ then adds that also which is not desired but is related to the action in a similar manner is assigned to the category karman.

2.7.15 Concealment, wishing not to be seen

570 Yassa adassanam iccham antaradhāyati. Yassa adassanam icchantu koci antaradhāyati tattha tattha paticchannāṭhāne bhayena nilyati, tam kārakam apādānasaññāṁ hoti: upajjhayā antaradhāyati sīso, mātarā ca pitarā

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1 Considered by Smith an untraced quotation.
2 Dhp 116b.
ca antaradhāyatī putto. Idam lakkhanam bhayena antaradhānam sandhāya vuttam, iddhiyā adassanagamanasamkhāte antaradhāne pana sattami vibhatti hoti, tassa ca lakkhanam upari bhavissati.

‘The one in relation to whom [someone] hides wishing not to be seen.’ The one in relation to whom someone hides wishing not to be seen, in such circumstances keeping [oneself] hidden out of fear in a concealed place, that kāraka is something to which the technical name apādāna applies: ‘The pupil hides from the master’; ‘the son hides from the mother and the father’. This definition has been stated with reference to concealment out of fear, but in the case of that concealment named ‘going to invisibility’ through magic power, [then] the seventh case ending applies and the definition of this will take place further on.\(^2\)

A 1.4.28 antaradhau yenādārśanam icchati assigns the name apādāna to the one by whom (yena) the agent desires not to be seen when concealment is involved. In Kaccāyana (128) the rule is formulated yenā vādassanam, ‘or the one by whom there is non-seeing’. I find myself unable to explain why Aggavamsa has replaced yena with yassa. The vā in Kaccāyana is in the vuttī said to be there to account for usages of the locative case, as in Jetavane antaradhāyatī bhagavā, ‘the Noble One vanishes in the Jeta grove’. This is a straightforward locative usage. Aggavamsa, on the other hand, confines the locative usage to a form of disappearance through magic. More disturbing is the fact that mātārā and pitārā are clearly instrumental forms. Aggavamsa takes them as ablatives. Both examples have been taken over from the Kaccāyanavuttī.

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1 See comment below.
2 § 573 below.

2.7.16 More on the apādāna

As in the case of the sampadāna, there is also for the apādāna a lengthy rule which lists several specific cases and is expanded on at length in the vuttī. I shall again split up the text into convenient portions.

571 Dūr’antik’addhakālamānātvālopadisāyo-gāvibhatti āra’ppayogasuddhapatamocanahetuvivittapamāṇapubbādiyogabandhanagunavacanapaññhakath-anathokakicchakatipayākkattu ca. Dūratthe antikathe addhanimmāne kālanimmāne tvālope disāyoge vibhatte ārappayoge suddhatte pamocane hetutthe vivittathe pamāṇe pubbādiyoge bandhane gunavacane pañhe kathane thoke kicche katipaye akattari ca icc etev atthesu payogesu ca tam kārakaṁ apādānasañām hoti.

‘[The technical name apādāna applies] also when [there is usage of] dūra or antika, when there is measurement of distance or time, when there is elision of the absolutive-suffix, when there is construction with disā, when [something] is completely separated, when there is usage of āra, when there is construction with [a word signifying] pure, liberation, cause, separated, measure, or [construction with] pubba etc., when there is [usage in the sense of] binding, expressing a property, question, answer, a little, difficult, a few, or no agent.’ When there is the sense of dūra, when there is the sense of antika, when there is measurement of distance, when there is measurement of time, when there is elision of the absolutive-suffix, when there is construction with disā, when [something] is completely separated, when there is usage of āra, when there is the sense of pure, when there is liberation, when there is the

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1 Smith proposes to read ārati presumably because this is the form used by Aggavamsa when he discusses this part of the rule in detail (706,20).
sense of cause, when there is the sense of separated, when there is measure, when there is construction with pubba etc., when there is binding, when there is the expressing a property, when there is a question, when there is an answer, when there is a little, when there is difficulty, when there are a few, or when there is no agent, when there are [any of] these meanings and usages, that kāraka is something to which the name apādāna applies.

There is an identical rule in Kaccāyana (128), except that Aggavamsa has added an ādi after pubba and inserted kicchantipaya before akattusu. The suttas covers mainly rules from the vibhakti section of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, but draws also on other sources. As in the case of the corresponding sampadāna rule discussed earlier, the words in the rule appear out of context and are therefore difficult to translate in any coherent and fully satisfactory manner. Each element will be given a more detailed treatment below.

2.7.16.1 dūra and antika

(705,8–24) Dūratthappayoge tāva: kīvadūro ito Nāḷakāragōmo, “tato ha ve dūrataram vadanti”,1 gāmato nātidiśe, “ārakā te moghapurisā imasā dhammavinañā ārakā tehi Bhagavā”,2 dūratthe: dūrato vāgama,3 “dūrato vā namassantu”,4 “addasa ... Bhagavantam dūrato va āgacchantam”5 — dūratthappayoge dutiyā ca tatiyā ca: dūram gāmam āgato, dūrenā gāmema āgato, dūrato gāmā āgato ti attho, dūram gāmena vā, ārakā- saddayoge dutiyā tatiyā ca chaṭṭhi ca: ārakā imam

dhammavinayam, anena dhammavinayena, “ārakā mandabuddhiṁ”1 ico evamādi. Antikathappayoge: antikam gāmā, āsannam gāmā, samipam gāmā — gāmessa samipan ti attho; yathāsambhavām dutiyā ca tatiyā ca chaṭṭhi ca: antikam gāmam antikam gāmena, āsannam gāmam āsannam gāmena, samipam saddhammar samipam saddhammena, “nibbānass eva santike”2 — “ārakā ca vijānatan”3 etha pana ārakāsadda samipavācako datthhabbo, Bhagavā hi vijānatan santike ti attho.

When there is usage [with a word] in the sense of dūra ‘distant; far’, then: ‘How far from here is the village of Nāḷakāra?’, ‘they say it is indeed further from here’; ‘not too far from the village’; ‘far are those foolish men from this doctrine and the discipline, far from them is the Noble One’. When there is the sense of dūra: ‘Having come from very far away’; ‘they pay homage from very far away’; ‘he saw the Noble One approach from very far away’. When there is usage in the sense of dūra ‘distant; far’, also the second and the third [case suffixes may apply]: ‘Come afar to the village (accusative)’, ‘come from afar by the village (instrumental)’, that is to say, ‘come from the village from afar (ablative)’; or: ‘come afar (accusative) by the village (instrumental)’.4 When there is construction with the word ārakā ‘far from; away from’ the second, the third, and the sixth [case suffixes may apply, as well as the fifth]: ‘away from this doctrine and discipline (accusative)’; ‘far away with this doctrine and discipline (instrumental)’; ‘far away in relation to the slow-witted (genitive)’, and so on in the same manner.

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1 Vism-mht ad 201,23–25.
2 Σ I 33,14.
3 Vism-mht ad 201,23–25.
4 It seems to me impossible to give adequate translations of these examples. They will be discussed below. In particular I do not think the instrumentals should be translated as above, which is also odd English. I have done it in this way only to achieve a contrast.
When there is usage [with a word] in the sense of antika ‘near; proximate’: ‘Near to the village’, ‘close to the village’, ‘proximate to the village’ (ablative), that is to say, ‘proximate in relation to the village (genitive)’. According to circumstances, also the second, the third, or the sixth [case suffixes may apply]: ‘near to the village (accusative)’, ‘near with the village (instrumental)’; ‘close to the village (accusative)’, ‘close with the village (instrumental)’; ‘proximate to the true doctrine (accusative)’, ‘proximate with the true doctrine (instrumental)’; ‘in the vicinity of the very Nirvāṇa (genitive)’. But in ‘and ārakā in relation to those who know’, the word ārakā must be understood to mean ‘near’\(^1\) for the Noble One is in the vicinity of understanding, that is the meaning.

This is ultimately based on two rules in the vibhakti section of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. A 2.3.34 dūrāntikārthaḥ saṣṭhy anyatarasyām teaches that a sixth, as well as a fifth (2.3.28) case ending, is optionally added to a nominal stem in construction with words meaning dūra ‘far; distant’ or antika ‘near; proximate’. The standard examples (e.g. Kāśikā) are dūram grāmāt ‘far from the village’, dūram grāmasya ‘far in relation to the village’, antikam grāmāt ‘near from the village’, and antikam grāmasya ‘near in relation to the village’. The instrumental is here precluded. A 2.3.35 dūrāntikārthebhyyo dvitiyā ca then teaches that the second case ending is also added after words meaning dūra or antika. The ca is understood by the Kāśikā to include the instrumental by anuvṛtti from

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\(^1\) This is odd indeed. In the commentary on the Visuddhamagga (devanāgarī ed. p. 423) we meet with a verse, quoted also Sadd 580,11-12, which begins: ārakā mandabuddhīnaṃ ārakā ca vijñātām. I would translate this: ‘Far away from those of slow wit and far away from those who know’. I find it hard to believe that an author would use one and the same word with opposite meanings within the same line of a verse. The reason for Aggavamsa’s claim seems to be that the Visuddhamagga commentary here is proposing various nirvacana analyses of arahā; cf. Vism-mh, devanāgarī ed. p. 421,6 where ārakā seems to be equal to āsanne ‘near’.

A 2.3.32. The requirement from A 2.3.33 that the words in question do not denote a substance (sattva) is also understood here. This gives us the examples dūram grāmasya, dūrena grāmasya, and dūrād grāmasya, all meaning ‘far away in relation to the village’, and similar examples for antika.

Not only can one have an ablative in construction with dūra or antika, but one can also have ablatives of them, that is, dūrāt and antikāt. This seems to be the motivation behind Aggavamsa’s expressions dūratthappayoga and dūrattha, where the first accounts for an ablative, and eventually also for an accusative or an instrumental case suffix, added to a nominal stem syntactically connected with dūra, and the second accounts for an ablative added to words meaning dūra.

It seems Aggavamaśa has combined the two rules from the Aṣṭādhyāyī somewhat inaccurately. This is evident from the examples adduced, some of which are rather peculiar. The parallel passage in the Kaccāyanavutti (129) begins: Dūratthappayoge tāva: kivadūro ito naḷakāraṇgā; dūrato vāgama; ārakā te moghapurisā imasmā dharmaviniyā. This is all incorporated into Aggavamaśa’s text, but the Kaccāyanavutti continues: Dutiya ca taṇiyā ca: dūram gāmanā āgato dūrena gāmena vā; ārakā imam vinayam aneṇa dharmaviniyena vā; iccevamādi. This is limited to the usage of the second and the third case suffixes, while the inclusion of the genitive seems to be Aggavamaśa’s attempt at incorporating A 2.3.34. Since dūram gāmanā āgato dūrena gāmena vā are taken from the Kaccāyanavutti, it seems likely that the subsequent dūrato gāmanā āgato is stated to elucidate the meaning of all these expressions. It seems that gāman, gāmena, and gāmā are meant to be in syntactic agreement with dūram, dūrena, and dūrato, respectively. Aggavamaśa seems to revolt against this when he adds dūram gāmena vā. I very much doubt that this is based on textual evidence, but of course I cannot prove this. For the syntactic agreement, on the other hand, there is some justification. In the Mahābhāṣya on A 2.3.35 this question is raised by the first vārttika. The entire discussion of this rule runs as follows (Mbh I:457,17-23):
Another source possibly made use of by Aggavamsa here is Candragomin. In the Candrayrvti on rule 2.1.87 stokālpakrcchra-
katipayād asattāvāthāt karane\(^1\) we meet with the following passage:

\[\text{dūrām grāmāt, antikam grāmād ity avadher eva pañcamī.} \]
\[\text{dūrām grāmasya, antikam grāmasyetī sambandhe sāṣṭhi.} \]
\[\text{dūrām gatah, antikam gata iti kriyāpye dvītiyā. dūreṇa gatah,} \]
\[\text{antikena gata iti karane trītiyā.} \]

\[\text{In dūrām grāmāt ‘far from the village’ [and] antikam grāmāt} \]
\[\text{‘near to the village’ [we have] indeed the fifth [case suffix} \]
\[\text{added] after [a word denoting] a limit.}^2 \]
\[\text{In dūrām grāmasya} \]
\[\text{‘far in relation to the village’ [and] antikam grāmasya ‘near in} \]
\[\text{relation to the village’ [we have] the sixth [case suffix] to} \]
\[\text{express a relation. In dūrām gatah ‘gone far’ [and] antikam} \]
\[\text{gatah ‘gone near’ [we have] the second [case suffix] to express} \]
\[\text{that which is to be reached by the action. In dūreṇa gatah} \]
\[\text{‘gone by far’ [and] antikena gatah ‘gone by near’ [we have] the} \]
\[\text{third [case suffix] to express the instrument.} \]

Candragomin thus firstly accounts for dūrām and antikam in
construction with words ending in the ablative as well as the genitive,
secondly for words in construction with the accusative and the
instrumental forms of dūra or antika, with dūrām or antikam, and
dūreṇa or antikena assigned to the categories karman and karana,
respectively. The latter solution I find difficult to embrace.

\[2.7.16.2 \text{addha and kāla} \]

(705,25–28) Addhakālaniṃmāne: ito Madhurāya catusu
yojanesu Saṃkassam, Rājagahato pañcacattālīsāyojana-

\(^1\) Manusmṛti 4.151ab.
\(^2\) Candrayākarana 2.1.81 avadher pañcamī.
matthake Sāvatthi, “ito kho bhikkhave ekanavutikappe”,2 “ito tinnaṃ māsānaṃ accayena parinibbāyiissāmi”3 icce evamādi.

When there is measurement of distance or time: ‘From here, Madhurā, Saṃkṣaṃsa is at four yojanas’; ‘Sāvatthi is at the distance of forty-five yojanas from Rājagaha’; ‘at ninety-one kalpas before now (= ninety-one kalpas ago), monks’; ‘by the end of three months from now I shall enter nībbāna’, and so on in the same manner.

The fourth vārttika on A 2.3.28 apādāne pañcamī (Mbh I:455,11), yataś cādhvakālanirmānam, states that ‘[a fifth case suffix is added] also [after a stem] from which there is measurement of distance or time’. Patañjali eventually rejects all the vārttikas on this rule, showing that the examples are in fact accounted for by A 2.3.28. In the case of the fourth vārttika, he explains the examples as elliptical constructions. Thus, gavīdhumataḥ sāmkāśya catvāri yojanāni, ‘Saṃkāśya is four yojanas from Gavīdhumat’, is explained by supplying words as follows (Mbh I:456,4–5): gavīdhumato niḥśrtya yadā catvāri yojanāni gatāni bhavanti tatāh sāmkāśya, ‘having departed from Gavīdhumat, when four yojanas have passed, then Saṃkāśya [is there]’. These usages are thus covered by A 2.3.28. So are the usages exemplified under vt. 5 tadyuktāt kāle saptamī, ‘the seventh [case suffix is added] after which is connected with that [from which there is measurement of time] when time [is expressed]’, and vt. 6 adhvahanah prathamā ca, ‘also the first [case suffix, in addition to the seventh, is added] after [a word denoting] distance’.

What is of immediate interest here, however, is that the sixth vārttika makes Patañjali (Mbh I:455,17–18) allow for the locative forms caturṣu yojanesu as well as the nominative catvāri yojanāni. In discarded the vārttika he rephrases the locative construction as an absolute locative (Mbh I:456,5): catuṛṣu yojanesu gateṣu sāmkāṣyam, ‘[having departed from Gavīdhumat,] when four yojanas have passed, [then] Saṃkāśya [is there]’. Aggavamsa’s first example, ito Madhurāya catusu yojanesu Saṃkṣaṃsa, is a close rewording of the Bhāṣya example with the locative construction. But he has based his whole rule on a vārttika rejected by Patañjali. If he had this from the Bhāṣya, one would then have to assume that he has either ignored Patañjali’s rejection of it or not understood what was going on. This could of course more easily have happened if Aggavamsa’s source was not the Bhāṣya itself but the Pradīpa of Kayīya where the examples are discussed. There is another possibility, though. The vārttikas appear in the Kāśikā on A 2.3.28, together with some of the examples provided by Patañjali. There the legitimacy of the vārttikas is not questioned and the rephrasings which do away with the vārttikas are not met with. But the examples involving the locative construction are not met with either. These do, however, occur in the Padamāṇjari (KāśP II:186) and the Nyāsa (KāśN II:186). Aggavamsa’s source could thus have been one or both of the commentaries on the Kāśikā.

2.7.16.3 tvālopa

(705,28–706,6) Tvālope kammādhikaraṇesu: “pāsādā samkameyya”,1 “hattihikkhandhā samkameyya”,2 āsanā vuttaheyya icce evamādi; ettha ca tvālopo nāma athasambhava pi sati tvāpaccayantassa saddassā avijjāmānatā, tathā hi “pāsādā samkameyyā” ti ettha pāsādam abhirūḥitvā tamhā pāsādā aṁinan pāsādam samkameyyā ti atho; esa nayo “hattihikkhandhā samkameyyā” ti ettha pi, āsanā vuttaheyyā ti ettha pana āsanā nisidvitvā tamhā āsanā vuttaheyyā ti atho; evān kammādhikaraṇesu pañcamī vibhatti bhavati, kammādhī-

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1 Bh.vo.
2 D II 2,15: Ito so bhikkhave ekanavuto kappo.

1 S I 95,30.
2 S I 95,29.
karaṇabhūtāni yeva vatthiṁ tiḷāopavisaye apādāṇaṁ nāma honī ti attho.

When there is elision of [the absolute-suffix] -tvā, [the fifth case suffix applies] to denote the object or the location [of the action denoted by the elided verb]: ‘[Just as] someone might shift from one platform [to another]’, ‘[just as] someone might shift from one elephant’s back [to another]’, ‘[just as] someone might get up from [his] seat’, and so on in the same manner. But here there is elision of -tvā even though there is the arising of [its] meaning, because no word ending in the suffix -tvā is met with; for thus, in the case of ‘[just as] someone might shift from one platform [to another]’, the meaning is ‘having mounted one platform, from that platform he might shift to another platform’. This principle [applies] also in the case of ‘[just as] someone might shift from one elephant’s back [to another]’, but in the case of ‘[just as] someone might get up from [his] seat’, the meaning is ‘having sat down on [his] seat he might get up from that seat’. Thus the fifth case suffix applies to denote the object or the location [of the action denoted by the elided verb], that is to say, things are indeed the apādāṇa in the domain of elision of -tvā but only when they have the form of the object or the location [of the action].

Just as in the preceding case of addha and kāla, this is ultimately based on vārttikas on A 2.3.28 apādāṇe pañcamī. The first vārttika on this rule, pañcamīvidhāne lyablope karmany upasamp-kyānam, states that an addition to the rule should be made that the fifth case suffix applies to express the sense of the object of the action when a word ending in the absolute suffix Lyap (-ya) has been elided. The second vārttika, adhikarane ca, then adds that, in addition to the object, inclusion should be made also of the location. Patañjali gives the example (Mbh 1:455,5) prāśadām āruhya prekṣate prāśādāt prekṣate, making it clear that the clause ‘he looks out from the platform’ is short for ‘having mounted the platform he looks out’. The point in stating the first vārttika is that this example cannot be accounted for by A 1.4.24 and A 2.3.28 in as much as the platform is not the stable point (dhruva) from which there is movement away. This applies also to the examples offered under the second vārttika (Mbh 1:455,8), āsanāt prekṣate, ‘he looks out from [his] seat’, and āsanāt prekṣate, ‘he looks out from [his] bed’. As in the preceding case, however, Patañjali rejects these two vārttikas, claiming that the examples are in fact accounted for by A 2.3.28 itself. In the case of the examples offered under the first vārttika, Patañjali claims that we can say it is the sight which moves away (Mbh 1:455,20). The question raised in the Mahābhāṣya is how you can talk about movement away here since the sight does not move away once and for all. Patañjali answers that there is movement away, either because a continuous process is implied (samattatvā) or, alternatively, because a succession is implied (atha vānyāṇyaprādurbhavāt, ‘or else, [because] they become visible one after the other’) (Mbh 1:455,21). We face, then, the same problems in tracing Aggavamśa’s sources as we did in the case of the previous passage. The vārttikas and the examples appear in the Kāśikā.

The examples from the Mahābhāṣya occur also in the Candravṛtti under rule 2.1.81 avadheḥ pañcamī which teaches that a fifth case suffix is added after a word denoting a limit. Candragomin expresses himself briefly: prāśadām āruhya prekṣate, prāśādāt prekṣate ity avadher eva pañcamī. evam āsane upaviṣya prekṣate, āsanāt prekṣate, [the clause] “he looks out from the platform” [is in fact short for] “having mounted the platform he looks out”, [and] thus a fifth [case suffix] is indeed [added] after [a word denoting] a limit; likewise, [the clause] “he looks out from [his] seat” [is short for] “having sat down on [his seat] he looks out”.

All the examples adduced in the Saddaniti occur in the Kaccāyanavutti (129). Obviously, the authors have looked for examples containing such words as pāśāda and āsana, familiar from the Sanskrit grammatical tradition. But the examples offered are still a bit strange. On
the analogy of forms such as pappiya, vineyya, or vitareyya, which may be taken as absolutes as well as optatives,¹ samkameyya and vutthaheyya might even be taken as absolutes, in which case one would have a strange situation indeed, but the context in which samkameyya appears (S I 94–95) makes this possibility very unlikely. One may note, however, that in the Saddaniti passage there is movement from one elephant-back to another, etc. This may involve the problem as to whether an elephant, if moving, can be called dhruva ‘the stable point’, but it means that the problems raised in the Bhāṣya as to whether there is apāya ‘movement away’ do not really arise in the case of the Saddaniti examples. These could perfectly well have been accounted for by rule 555, the main rule on the apādāna. In other words, in Aggavamsa’s case there is no need to account for tvālopa. In his case the procedure consists in creating a difficulty, explaining it, and calling it grammar. This, however, gives a clear indication of how heavily he relies on his predecessors, including Kaccāyana.

2.7.16.4 disāyoga

(706,6–15) Disāyoge ca pañcamī bhavati, tattha disā ca disāyogo ca disāyogo sarūpekasesanayena, tasmin disāyoge; ettha ca disāvacanena disattho gahito, disāyogacacanena disatthavācīhi yogo. Tathā disatthavācīhi yoge tāva “ito sā purimā disā ... ito sā dakkhinā disā ... ito sā pacchimā disā ... ito sā uttarā disā”²; Avicito upari Bhavaggam antare, “uddham pādatalā adho kesamathakā”³; “yato khemam tato bhayam”⁴, yato assosum Bhavagantam. Disatthe: puratthimato dakkhinato. ti ādi, ettha pana sattamayatthe topaccayo bhavissati.

The fifth [case suffix] applies also when there is disāyoga ‘construction with a direction’; but in this respect, disāyoga ‘construction with a direction’ [means] both [a word signifying] direction and construction with [a word signifying] direction, through the principle of single remainder of [elements] which are of the same form¹; when there is that, disāyoga. And in this respect, the meaning of disā ‘direction’ is understood by the enunciation of disā, [while] by the enunciation of disāyoga [one understands] construction with [words] expressing the meaning of disā ‘direction’. As far as this is concerned, then, when there is construction with [words] expressing the meaning of direction: ‘This direction is east from here, this direction is south from here, this direction is west from here, this direction is north from here’; ‘from Avici up to Bhavagga, [namely.] in between’; ‘from the soles of the feet up, from the top of the hair down (= from head to toe)”; ‘from whatsoever thing you have safety, from that there is fear’; ‘whence they heard the Noble One’. When there is the sense of direction: ‘In the east, in the south’, etc. But in this case the suffix -to will be [a fifth case suffix] in the sense of the seventh.

After the little detour involving the vārttikas on A 2.3.28 we now return to A 2.3.29 anyārāditārtedikṣabdāṇcūttarapadājāhiyute which teaches that a fifth case suffix is added, among other things, after stems co-occurring with words denoting directions.² The examples are reasonably straightforward, with the exception of yato khemam tato bhayam which lacks any word meaning direction and which I can only translate ‘from whatsoever thing you have safety, from that there is fear’. All the examples occur in the Kaccāyanavutti (129), including puratthimato and dakkhinato which are there followed by pacchimato and uttarato, thus providing the explanation for Aggavamsa’s usage of

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¹ cf., e.g., PED under vitarati.
² D III 197,1; 198,1; 198,37; 202,7.
³ M 157,14.
⁴ Ja III 513,21.

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¹ A 1.2.64 sarūpānām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau. See below.
² For a full rendering of the rule, cf. 2.7.4 above.
ādi ‘etc.’. But Aggavamsa has singled out this latter group, wanting to
distinguish between disattha and disatthayoga. That is to say, when there
is disatthayoga, an ablative form such as ito is used with a word
signifying direction. When there is disattha, we have an ablative form of
a word signifying direction. Why he has not resorted to his previous
device of distinguishing, for example, between dūrattha and
dūratthappayoga and has instead resorted to the ekaśeṣa principle, is
hard to tell. A 1.2.64 sarūpānām ekaśeṣa ekavibhaktau teaches that
among series of linguistic elements having the same form, only one of
them occurs as a single remainder if a single case suffix is used. This is
the ekaśeṣa principle. For example, one cannot say *vrksavrksau or
*vrksavrksavrksāḥ, one has to say vrksau and vrksāḥ with only one
occurrence of the stem. Aggavamsa’s application of this principle in the
present case is more than dubious.

2.7.16.5 vibhatti

(706,15–20) Vibhatte pañcamī bhavati chaṭṭhi ca, ettha
vibhättam nāma sayam vibhattass’ eva tadaññato guṇena
vibhajanam: yato panitataro vā visiṭṭhataro vā n’ attih,
Mādhurā Pāṭaliputtahe abhirūpatarā, “attadanto tato
varam”,1 “channavuṭṭham pāsanḍānaṃ dharmānaṃ pavaram
yadidam sugatavinayo”2 icc evamādi.

When something is separated (vibhatta), the fifth [case suffix]
applies, and also the sixth. Here vibhatta ‘separated’ is as much
as separation, which pertains only to that which is itself
separate, through some quality, [and the separation is] from
something other than that: ‘Something more exquisite or more
distinguished than it does not exist’; ‘the people of Mathurā are
more handsome than those of Pāṭaliputra’; ‘a self-controlled self

is better than that’; ‘this very doctrine of the Sugata is better than
the ninety-six heretical views’.

This is A 2.3.42 pañcamī vibhakte which teaches that the fifth
case suffix is added to a nominal stem which denotes something from
which something else is set apart (A 2.3.41 yatas ca nirdhāraṇam)
provided there is separation. The Kāśikā explains: yasmin
nirdhāraṇāśraye vibhaktam asyāsti tataḥ pañcamī vibhaktir
bhavati, ‘a fifth case suffix applies after [a nominal stem denoting]
that which is the foundation for setting apart with regard to which
something is separated’. The example provided is the Mathurā one,
where the people of Mathurā are completely distinct from and set apart
from those of Pāṭaliputra. Aggavamsa has taken the genitive instance
from the Kaccāyanavuttī. In Pāṇiniya grammar there is a distinction here.
A 2.3.41 yatas ca nirdhāraṇam teaches that a genitive or locative ending
is added to that which is set apart, for example the doctrine of the Buddha
from the ninety-six heretical views. A 2.3.42 requires total separation, but
that may have been the very intention of Kaccāyanā with regard to
singling out the doctrine of the Buddha from the heretical ones, implying
that they do not all belong to the class of all doctrines. In that case we are
dealing with religious propaganda, not with grammar.

2.7.16.6 āratippayoga

(706,20–22) Āratippayoge: gāmadhammā vasaladhammā
asaddhammā ārati virati paṭīviraṇi, “pañātipūtā veramaṇi ”1 icc
evamādi.

When there is usage of ārati ‘abstinence’: ‘Abstaining from,
leaving off, shrinking from country-matters, the ways of the

1 Dhp 322d.
2 Mnd Ce 219,18.

1 Khp II 1.
morally low, the ways of the untrue'; 'disgust from destruction of life', and so on in the same manner.

This is problematic. Kaccāyana reads ārappayoga, and not āratippayoga. So does the vutti (130) which Aggavaṃsa has otherwise copied verbatim with the same examples. This in itself would not present a problem, were it not for the fact that the word ārati, as well as the approximately synonymous virati and paṭīvirati met with in the example, and the word āra or āra do not seem to mean the same thing. There are several similar words here. I list the immediately relevant ones with their meaning entries from CPD: āra = āraka (mfn.) 'distant, far from, away from'; ārakā (ind.) [= Skt ārakā] 'far from, far off, away from' which according to CPD is used either as an adverb or as a preposition with accusative, instrumental, ablative or genitive; āra (ind.) 'far off, far from, remote, distant'; ārata (mfn.) 'keeping away from, abstaining from'; ārati (f.) 'leaving off, shrinking from, abstinence'.

There can be several explanations of how this confusion came about. I strongly suspect that as a grammatical issue this is ultimately based on A 2.3.29 anyārāditaratedikšabdāncauttarapadājāhiyukte. This rule, as we have seen, permits a fifth case suffix to be added after a stem that co-occurs with the word āra 'near to; far from'. Senart, in his translation of Kaccāyana, takes the word to be ārā 'loin de', translating (132) arā imasmā dhammavināyā as 'loin des prescriptions de la religion'. He translates this example only. As far as I can see, we are left with at least the following possibilities: 1) This has nothing at all to do with A 2.3.29 and is an original rule made by Kaccāyana and retained by Aggavaṃsa to account for the usage of āralārālārati, all meaning 'abstinence'. 2) Kaccāyana thought he was dealing with āralārā in the sense 'far from', and Aggavaṃsa, who has already dealt with ārakā in

the context of dūra, also covered by A 2.3.29, replaces this with the word ārati, either in order to avoid repeating himself or in order to include conveniently this word and its usage with an ablative. 3) Both Aggavaṃsa and Kaccāyana are wrong, thinking that ārā is synonymous with the words used in their examples. They seem in any case to think not of the word ārā in itself but of any word with the same meaning. 4) It is the case that ārati and, one would be forced to assume, virati and paṭīvirati all mean 'far away from', or, at least, that Kaccāyana and Aggavaṃsa thought these words meant 'far away from'.

2.7.16.7 suddha- and pamocanatthappayoga


When there is usage of [a word] meaning suddha 'pure': 'Purified from, not in contact with, things which are to be lusted for', and so on in the same manner. When there is usage of [a word] meaning pamocana 'liberation': 'I declare that he is liberated from suffering'; 'I am liberated from the bonds of

1 cf. 2.7.16.1 above.
2 For a full rendering of the rule, cf. 2.7.4 above.
Death; ‘these are not liberated from Death; ‘they are liberated from the bonds of Death’, and so on in the same manner.

I do not know of any parallel to this in Sanskrit sources, but a similar passage is met with in Kaccāyana. Apart from minor variant readings, the Kaccāyanavuttī (130) differs in offering the example mātīto ca pītto ca sūdho, ‘purified motherwise and fatherwise’. This is evidently an adverbial use of the ablative, and Aggavaṃsa was maybe wise in leaving it out.

2.7.16.8 hetuattthe


When there is the meaning of hetu ‘cause; reason’: ‘For what reason?’, ‘why indeed do your young ones not die?’, ‘why shall there be death on earth?’, ‘because of which some undetermined’; ‘since here, monks ... because of that here, monks’; ‘for the cause of which, for the cause of that’; ‘for what reason, mama, are you careless’. According to other rules, however, the first, the third, and the sixth [case suffixes] may apply when there is the sense of cause. Moreover, these [case suffixes] are understood when there is a relation to the action, but not when there is usage bereft of relation with the action in such [sentences] as: ‘What, venerable ones, is the reason, what is the cause, for the manifestation of the great earthquake’. ‘They do not speak’ a lie for their own sake’, ‘why is it that [re]-birth does not please you?’, ‘since I do not see children’, ‘therefore I ask you this, Gotama’, ‘why did he say [it]?’; ‘for which reason’; ‘for this reason’, ‘now, by what kind, or rather, for what reason, have you reached this vast forest?’; ‘by faith one crosses the flood’ — and in this respect the word saddhāya ‘by faith’ has the sense of cause, thus it has been stated by the teachers — ‘why, Kassapa, can you not stand the sight of a fool?’, ‘wherefore some people [say ...]’; ‘for that reason’.

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1 Ja IV 52,31.
2 Abhidhva 17,10.
3 cf. Sadd 731,13–16.
4 Dhp-a II 268,8, cf. Thi-a 111,25.
5 A IV 312,14, D II 107,19.
6 Ja V 146,15.
7 S I 132,25.
8 Ja VI 561,20.
9 S I 13,19, Vism 2,2.

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1 Ja VI 543,1–2.
2 Sn 184a.
3 Ja IV 241,2.
4 A II 159,35.
5 Ja I 3,25, Sv I 26,10.
6 M I 1,17.
7 Be ns bhaneti, Ja V 146,15 bhanāti.
‘therefore it has been stated’; ‘this is from the cause of what (= why is this)?’; ‘of what (= why) are you tired?’

The basis for this is A 2.3.23 hetau. This rule teaches that the third case suffix (A 2.3.18 kārtarāṇayos triyā) is added to a nominal stem when it denotes a cause, hetu. The Kāśikā offers the examples dhānena kulam, ‘a family lineage on account of wealth’, kanyayā śokam, ‘grief on account of a daughter’, vidyāya yaśah, ‘fame on account of learning’. This is straightforward, but when it comes to the usage of the ablative Pāṇini restricts the optional use of the fifth case suffix to instances where the cause is a property, except in the feminine. The subsequent rule A 2.3.24 akartary rne pañcamī teaches that a fifth case suffix is added to a nominal stem signifying a debt which acts as a cause (A 2.3.23) but not as an agent. The Kāśikā offers the example śatād baddhāḥ, ‘imprisoned because of [a debt of] a hundred’, as against satena bandhitāḥ, ‘thrown into prison because of [a debt of] a hundred’, implying that the debt has thrown him into prison and thus is to be considered an agent. A 2.3.25 vibhāṣā gune ‘ṣtriyaṁ then teaches that a fifth case ending is optionally — or, following Kiparsky (1979), marginally — added to a nominal stem denoting a cause which is a property, except in the feminine. This, in other words, applies to non-feminine abstract nouns. The Kāśikā offers the example jādyād baddhāḥ, ‘imprisoned because of stupidity’, as against dhānena kulam where the instrumental is used since the stem does not denote a property, and praṇjāyā muktaḥ, ‘released by knowledge’, where choice is restricted to the instrumental since the feminine gender is involved.

Pāṇini is thus quite strict when it comes to adding a fifth case suffix to a stem denoting a cause. It is interesting therefore to note a remarkable change in attitude already with Kātyāyana and Patañjali. The vārttika on A 2.3.23 hetau runs: nimittakāraṇahetuṣu sarvāsām prāya- darśanam, ‘a general seeing of all [case suffixes] when [there is usage of the words] nimitta, kāraṇa, or hetu’. All three words have meanings within the semantic sphere of ‘cause’, nimitta maybe more clearly distinguishable as the final cause for the sake of which an action occurs, thus tending towards such meanings as ‘purpose’ (prayojana) or ‘motive’. Patañjali comments on this vārttika as follows (Mbh I:454,19–455,2):

nimittakāraṇahetuṣu sarvā vibhaktayaḥ prayenā drṣyanta iti vaktavyam / kim nimittam vasati / kena nimittāna vasati / kasmī nimittaḥ vasati / kasmīnā nimittad vasati / kasya nimittasya vasati / kasmīn nimitte vasati // kim kāraṇam vasati / kena kāraṇena vasati / kasmī kāraṇāya vasati / kasmīt kāraṇad vasati / kasya kāraṇasya vasati / kasmīnā kāraṇe vasati / ko hetu vasati / kamen hetanā vasati / kasmī hetave vasati / kasmīd dhetor vasati / kasya hetor vasati / kasmī hetau vasati //

It should be stated that all the case suffixes are generally observed when [there is usage of the words] nimitta, kāraṇa, or hetu.

It does not make much sense to translate the rest of the passage, in that all the examples could be translated `what is the reason he is staying?’ or ‘for what reason is he staying?’ with minor variations. But Patañjali’s point is clear. One can use the nominative, accusative, instrumental, dative, ablative, genitive, or locative case suffixes to ask this question. This passage is Patañjali’s entire comment on A 2.3.23. He does not comment at all upon A 2.3.24 and 25.

Now Aggavamsa claims that according to other rules, in addition to the fifth case suffix, the first, the third, and the sixth may also apply when there is the sense of cause. Obviously, there is a lot of laxity here, but the Kātantra 2.4.30 hetvarthe allows only for the instrumental, and one may note that the rule there is formulated exactly as in Kaccāyana and the Saddanīti. Maybe more interesting is Aggavamsa’s statement that these case suffixes are understood when there is a relation
to the action, but not when there is usage bereft of relation with an action. Helārāja (Hel 250,22–23, on VP 3.7.24) points out that the third case suffix taught to denote the hetu is an akārakavibhakti, a case suffix which does not express a kāraka. He also says (250,23) that in the example adhyayanena vasati, ‘he is staying because of study’, adhyayana ‘study’ is the cause (hetu) and vāsa ‘the staying’ is the effect (hetumat, lit. ‘cause-possessing’). He adds (ibid.): tavoh sambandhe sēsasaṣṭhīyām prāptāyām hetau tṛtiyā, ‘one would expect a sēsa-saṣṭhī (a genitive prescribed according to A 2.3.50 saṣṭhī seṣe) to express the relation between them, [but in fact what we have here is] a third [case suffix] to express [the sense of] cause’. Could a statement like this one have prompted Aggavamsa to include the genitive kissa as a pronoun meaning ‘for what reason’ in its own right and illustrating genitive usage?

2.7.16.9 vivecanappayoga and pamānattha


When there is usage of [a word in the sense of (?)] vivecana ‘a setting apart; separation’: ‘Set apart from evil things’; ‘[I strive] separating [myself] from desire, separating [myself] from bad phenomena’, and so on in the same manner. When there is the sense of pamāna ‘measure; measuring’: ‘A yojana long and broad, a yojana deep and wide, [that] is the measure of the Candabhāgā [river]’; ‘the Midlands measure nine hundred yojanas in circumference’; ‘[a hut] having the measure of nine spans according to the span-measure of the Sugata is to be made’. Also the third [case suffix is used]: ‘A heap of mustard seeds a yojana long (lit. “by length”), a yojana broad, a yojana high’.

In the sūtra text Aggavamsa reads vivitta and not vivecana. This is the reading also in Kaccāyana (128) and the vutti (130). Why Aggavamsa has changed it, I am not able to tell. I can see no source for the two usages dealt with here apart from Kaccāyana. The wording of the vivitthathe section is identical with the one in the Kaccāyanavutti, while the pamāna one presents slight variations in readings, such as the addition of sugatasanghāti after kāretabbā. Most notably, the mention of an instrumental usage is not met with in Kaccāyana and is therefore probably Aggavamsa’s own observation.

2.7.16.10 pubbādyoga


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1 The context (Vin III 149,12; IV 279,11) says: ‘[a monk is having a hut (koṭi)] made which is to be constructed (kāritabbā) with the [proper] measure (pamānīkā, Buddhaghosa ad loc.: pamānayuttā): in length nine viddhatīs . . .’. Aggavamsa seems, oddly, to have taken one sentence and added the words pamānīkā kāritabbā from a previous one. There is no way of telling that 6ā is feminine without the word koṭi.
2 A I 258,24.
3 Smith: cf. Sn 955a.
“tato param paccantimā janapadā”,¹ tato apareṇa samayena, tato uttari² icc evamādi.

Also when there is construction with pubba etc. [The compound] pubbayoga [means] construction (yoga) with the word pubba expressing the sense of pathama ‘previous; first; prior to’, [and] in this respect the mention of pubbādi serves the purpose of mentioning words such as pubba which function in a non-directional sense, for thus construction with disā has been mentioned separately³: ‘Before my enlightenment, monks’; ‘prior to this it did not exist’; ‘beyond that are the border countries’; ‘in the course of time from then (= later on)’; ‘more than that’, and so on in the same manner.

This is met with in Kaccāyana but only the first example occurs in the vutti. I am not aware of any direct parallel in Sanskrit sources, but the fact that Aggavamsa here distinguishes this usage of pubba in the sense of ‘prior to’ from the meaning ‘east’, which would fall under disāyoga, brings us back to A 2.3.29 anyārāditaratedikṣabdāñcūttarapadājāhiyuLTE. Immediately after dikṣabda ‘words denoting directions’ we find añcūttarapada ‘[compounds] with -añc as the final member’. Clearly this is not what Aggavamsa is talking about, but it may nevertheless be worthwhile to consider the following remark on this in the Mahābhāṣya, which in fact is all Patañjali has to say on the entire rule (Mbh 1:456,7–8):

¹ Vin I 197,22; Sv I 173,11.
² Smith reads uttari<ṃ> and indicates that this is a quotation from Vin IV 80,18. Vin IV 80,18, however, reads: tato ce uttari paṭiganheyya, ‘if he (a monk) were to accept more [food] than that ...’.
³ cf. 2.7.16.4 above.

añcūttarapadagraharanam kim arthaṁ na dikṣabdair yoga ity eva siddham / saṣṭhy atasarthapratrayena [2.3.30] iti vakṣyati tasyāyaṁ purastād apakarṣaḥ //

What is the point in mentioning añcūttarapada ‘[compounds] with -añc as the final member’? Is this not in fact established by dikṣabdair yoga ‘when there is construction with words denoting directions’? [No.] He (= Pāṇini) is going to state [rule 2.3.30] saṣṭhy atasarthapratrayena ‘a sixth [case suffix is added to a nominal stem] co-occurring with [another stem ending in] a suffix with the sense of atasUC (A 5.3.28)’. This [statement, namely, añcūttarapada] is a prior removal¹ of that [rule].

Since many words ending in -añc denote direction, Patañjali asks if we cannot manage by the expression dikṣabda alone. The answer is negative in as much as the subsequent rule A 2.3.30 accounts for the fact that words ending in suffixes with the sense of atasUC, for example prāk or daksinataḥ, are constructed with words taking a genitive ending: daksinato grāmasya ‘south of the village’. Kaiyāṭa makes a relevant point in his commentary on the above passage from the Bhāṣya (MbhP II:800):

atha sadhyāṇa devadattenety adikṣabdārtham añcūttarapadagraharanam kasmān na vijñāyate? ucyate — dikṣabdasyah-caryād añcūttarapadasyāpi dikṣabdasyaiva grahanāṁ nānyasya //

Now, why is it not recognised that the mention of añcūttarapada is for the sake of [words] which are not direction-denoting words, as in sadhyāṇa devadatena ‘together

¹ Lit. ‘a drawing away; removal’. There is a v.l. apavādaḥ ‘exception’.
with Devadatta? It is replied that because of its association with [the word] direction-denoting words, one understands aṅcūttrapaḍa words as well, only if they are direction-denoting words and not other.

Could it be that a mere awareness that words which also have senses other than ‘direction’ have been dealt with under a separate heading made Kaccāyana include pubbayoga separately and that then Aggavaṃsa, using his skills and his knowledge of the canon, elaborated on this by inserting an ādi ‘etc.’ and adducing several more examples?

2.7.16.11 bandhanatthappayoga


When there is usage in the sense of bandha ‘binding; imprisonment’, [that is,] when there is debt which is the cause (hetu) of imprisonment: ‘Because of a hundred [pieces] the man was imprisoned by the king’. Also the third [case suffix is used]: ‘Through [debt of] a hundred the man was imprisoned by the king’, and so on in the same manner.

This is A 2.3.24 akartary ṛne paṅcamī. As mentioned above (2.7.16.8), this rule teaches that a fifth case suffix is added to a nominal stem signifying a debt which acts as a cause (A 2.3.23) but not as an agent. It is obvious that Aggavaṃsa has merely elaborated on the standard examples known from the Sanskrit tradition, such as śatād baddhah, ‘imprisoned because of [a debt of] a hundred’. With slightly less elaborate examples Kaccāyana (130) states in a similar fashion: satasmā bandho naro and tatiyā ca: satena vā bandho. This is a clear example of how cautious one must be in assuming that what we read in Kaccāyana and the Saddanīti is genuine Pāli usage. Not only have the rule and the examples been taken over from the Sanskrit tradition, the rule has also been distorted. The word akartari in the rule serves the purpose of contrasting the ablative usage against the instrumental: śatena bandhitah, ‘thrown into prison because of [a debt of] a hundred’. This usage implies that the debt has thrown the man into prison and accordingly is to be considered an agent. The usage of the instrumental would thus have nothing to do with the apādāna on the view of the Sanskrit grammarians.

2.7.16.12 guṇavacana


When there is expression of a property: ‘With his mind set on release because of [the fact that he has] wisdom’; ‘because of [his] being the lord, the king protects the people’; ‘they praise him because of [his] virtuous conduct’.

Again, Aggavaṃsa follows the order in Kaccāyana. This brings us back to A 2.3.25 vibhāṣā gune 'striyām, mentioned above (2.7.16.8). This rule allows for the optional — or, following Kiparsky (1979), marginal — addition of a fifth case suffix (A 2.3.24) to a nominal stem that denotes a cause (A 2.3.23) and expresses an attribute or property (guṇa), except in the feminine. According to Pāṇini, then, this applies to non-feminine abstract nouns. The Kāśikā offers the example jādyād baddhah, ‘imprisoned because of stupidity’, as against dhanena kulam where the instrumental is used since the stem does not denote a property, and praṇjayā muktaḥ, ‘released by knowledge’, where choice is restricted to the instrumental since the feminine gender is involved. This,

1 Kacc-v vimutta.
2 Benn na issariyā; Ce Kacc-v issariyā.
however, does not prevent Aggavamsa from adducing the example paññāya vimuttimano which contains the very same feminine noun paññā. Whether one ought to conclude from this that in Pāli, as indeed in classical Sanskrit, there is no such restriction, or that Aggavamsa and Kaccāyana before him simply had not fully understood their Sanskrit sources is hard to tell.

Of more interest is the odd fact that under the heading hetuatta (2.7.16.8, above) Aggavamsa seems to deal very strictly with hetu, the sole exception possibly being saddhāya, whereas under gunavacana he includes all other causal ablatives. In the Aṣṭādhyāyī they go together: optionally or marginally one adds an ablative case suffix to a stem expressing a hetu when there is a guna. The principle according to which Aggavamsa has selected his examples seems also a bit dubious. He has a thousand examples of ablatives in Pāli, but takes some and says they are ablatives because he is dealing with properties. In other words, he forces the map on to the terrain, the map being given by the Sanskrit grammarians.

2.7.16.13 pañhakathana

(708,1–15) Pañhakathanesu: kuto 'si tvām, kuto bhavām — Pāṭaliputtato; ettha ca kathanaṃ nāma vissajjanam, yāṃ pana Kaccāyanappakaranē pañhe tvālope kammādhikaraṇesā ti ārabhitvā abhidhammaṃ sutvā abhidhammā puccchanti abhidhammaṃ abhidhammenā vā, vinayāṃ sutvā vinayā puccchanti vinayaṃ vinayena vā, evam suttaṃ geyya veyyākaraṇā gāthāya udānā itivuttaka jātaka abhuddhatthā abhuddhatthā vedallā icc evamādī ti ca vuttaṃ, tathā kathane tvālope kammādhikaraṇesā ti ārabhitvā abhidhammaṃ sutvā abhidhammā kathayanti abhidhammaṃ abhidhammenā vā, vinayāṃ sutvā vinayā kathayanti vinayaṃ vinayena vā, evam suttaṃ geyya veyyākaraṇā gāthāya icc evamādī ti ca vuttaṃ, tam tvālope yeva vattabbaṃ, pañhe ti ca kathane ti ca tvāloparahitappayogavasena visum vattabbaṃ idha pana visum vuttaṃ.

In the case of questions and answers: ‘From where [have] you [come]?’ ‘From Pāṭaliputra.’ And in this respect [the word] kathana ‘telling’ [does] in fact [mean] ‘answer’. But since in the Kaccāyanappakarana — after it is first stated that ‘when there is elision of [the absolute-suffix] -tvā in a question [the fifth case suffix applies] to express the object or the location [of the action denoted by the elided verb]’ — it has been stated that ‘having listened to Abhidhamma, he asks from Abhidhamma (ablative), or about Abhidhamma (accusative), or by way of Abhidhamma (instrumental); having listened to Vinaya, he asks from Vinaya (ablative), or about Vinaya (accusative), or by way of Vinaya (instrumental); likewise, from Sutta, from Geyya, from Veyyākaraṇa, from Gāthā, from Udāna, from Itivuttaka, from Jātaka, from Abhuddhattham, [and] from Vedalla,¹ and so on in the same manner’; likewise — after it is first stated that ‘when there is elision of -tvā in an answer, [the fifth case suffix applies] to express the object or the location [of the action denoted by the elided verb]’ — it has also been stated that ‘having listened to Abhidhamma, he answers from Abhidhamma (ablative), or about Abhidhamma (accusative), or by way of Abhidhamma (instrumental); having listened to Vinaya, he answers from Vinaya (ablative), or about Vinaya (accusative), or by way of Vinaya (instrumental); likewise, from Sutta, from Geyya, from Veyyākaraṇa, from Gāthā, and so on in the same manner’, then one should only state tvālope ‘when there is elision of -tvā’, and pañhe ‘when there is a question’ and kathane ‘when there is an answer’ should be stated

¹ i.e., the nine divisions of canonical scriptures.
separately by force of usage free from the elision of -tvā; but here [in the Saddanīti] it is stated separately.

Aggavamsa here accuses Kaccāyana of having muddled things up by introducing the issue of tvālope, elision of -tvā, where it does not belong, that is, by stating panhe tvālope and kathane tvālope in the vutti under the heading panhakathana from the rule. This criticism may be just, but it is easy to see how Kaccāyana’s reasoning came about. First of all, Kaccāyana has already dealt with tvālopa separately, so the formulation of Aggavamsa’s criticism is not entirely accurate. Moreover, the fact that Kaccāyana reintroduces it in the context of ablatives in questions and answers is, as will be clear in a moment, fully logical although it rests on a misconception of what sort of questions and answers we are meant to be dealing with.

The whole pañhakathana issue has its basis in the third vārttika on A 2.3.28 apādāne pañcamī. Kaccāyana and, following him, Aggavamsa have previously dealt with the fourth and then the first and the second vārttikas.1 Why these appear in such a random order is hard to say. Now, the third vārttika on this rule states (Mbh I:455,9): praśnākhyānayoś ca, ‘also when there is a question or an answer’. Patañjali remarks (455,10): praśnākhyānayoś ca pañcamī vaktavyā // kuto bhavān / pātaliputrāt, ‘the fifth [case suffix] should be taught also in the case of a question or an answer. “From where [have] you [come] ? From Pātaliputra.”’ Patañjali later rejects this vārttika, as we have already seen him do with the others.

Turning, then, to the criticism levelled against Kaccāyana, let us first of all consider a statement from Kaiyāta’s commentary on the Mahābhāṣya here (MbhP II:798): kuto bhavān iti / kriyāā abhāvād anapādānattvam manyate, “[with regard to the example] kuto bhavān, “from where [have] you [come] ?”, [the author of the vārttika] thinks that because there is no [verb denoting an] action [here] there is no property of being the apādāna [either]”. So, because a verb denoting an action is lacking, these instances of question and answer cannot be accounted for by A 2.3.28 apādāne pañcamī since the apādāna definition (A 2.3.24) contains the requirement apāye ‘when there is movement away’. This, according to Kaiyāta, is why Kātyāyana has formulated the vārttika. This also implies that in order to do away with the vārttika all that is needed is to imagine that a verbal form has been elided. Patañjali does this by means of assuming the elision of a finite verb (Mbh I:455,22–23): idam atra prayoktavyam san na prayujyate kuto bhavān āgacchati pātaliputrād āgachāmi, “here that which should have been used is not used: ‘From where do you come?’ “I come from Pātaliputra” [would be the complete statement].

Instead of using a finite verb Kaccāyana solves his problem by supplying an absolutive form.1 It may in fact be the case that Kaccāyana has really understood Kātyāyana’s intention with regard to these vārttikas. The problem is that Kaccāyana tries to account for a usage of the ablative in a completely different type of question and answer, such as abhidhammā pucchanti ‘they ask from (about) Abhidhamma’. But if he wants to use the idea of the vārttika to account for this, and to explain the construction as one where a verbal form has been elided, it seems to me perfectly logical that he supplies an absolutive form: abhidhammam sutvā abhidhammā pucchanti, ‘having listened to Abhidhamma, he asks from (about) Abhidhamma’.

To sum this up, although Kaccāyana has failed to account for the type of question and answer intended by the author of the vārttika, he has tried to account for a type of question and answer where usage of the ablative, as well as the accusative and instrumental, occurs. It may even be dubious whether the ablative forms in his examples could be said to express the apādāna. The Mahābhāṣya passage is quoted verbatim in the

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1 In his edition Senart gives sutvā and ākaddhitā only as variant readings. Aggavamsa quotes Kaccāyana with the absolutive sutvā. Whether absolutive forms are actually stated or not does not make much difference since their inclusion is obviously Kaccāyana’s idea anyway.

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1 cf. 2,7,16.2 and 3 above.
Kāśikā where the vārttika is not rejected. The example kuto bhavāṇ etc. occurs in the Saddaniti but not in Kaccāyana, so Aggavamsa has most likely taken it over from some Sanskrit source and fashioned a similar example himself. This leaves us with a peculiar situation where Kaccāyana has made an attempt to account for a grammatical feature in the Pāli language by means inherited from the Sanskrit grammarians, whereas Aggavamsa, although he may in one sense be on firm ground in his criticism of Kaccāyana, has merely taken over a rule and an example from the Sanskrit and not adduced or explained anything that has to do with Pāli at all.

2.7.16.14 thokatthādi (thokakicchakatipaya)

(708,15–21) Thokatthādisu appathavacane pañcamī tattiya ca; yadā hi dhammamattam adhipetaṁ na dabbam, tadā thokādinam asattvavacanatā, yadā pana thokena visena mato ti ādinā dabbam adhipetaṁ, tadā tesam sațavacanatā: thokā mucciṭi, appamattakā mucciṭi, “kicchā laddho piyo putṭo”,¹ katipaya mutto, thokena appamattakena kicchena katipayena, icc evamādi.

When there are the senses of thoka ‘a little’, etc., the fifth [case suffix] and also the third [apply] to express the sense of alpa ‘a little’. For when a quality alone is intended, not substance, then the property of denoting a non-substance pertains to thoka etc., but when a substance is intended by such a sentence as ‘killed from a little poison’, then the property of denoting a substance pertains to these [words]: ‘is released easily’; ‘is released by a mere trifle’; ‘[our] dear son, obtained with difficulty’; ‘got off narrowly’; [or with instrumental case endings:] easily, with a mere trifle, with difficulty, narrowly, and so on in the same manner.

This is based on A 2.3.33 karane ca stokālpakrcchra-katipayasyāsattvavacanasya which teaches that to the stems stoka ‘a little’, alpa ‘a little’, krcchra ‘difficult’, and katipaya ‘some’ when they do not denote a substance, the third case suffix is optionally (A 2.3.32 prthavginānānbhis tritiyāyataraṣyb) added as well as the fifth (A 2.3.28) when it expresses the kāraka karaṇa ‘instrument’. The rule occurs also in the Candrayyākarana (2.1.87): stokālpakrcchratipayād asattvārthāt karaṇe. Aggavamsa has obviously borrowed from the Kāśikā here (Kāś II:190): yadā tu dharmamātram karaṇatāyā vividāya paṇa dṛṣṭvam, tadā stokādinām asattvavacanatā, ‘but when there is a wish to express a mere quality and not a substance through the property of being the instrument, then the property of expressing a non-substance pertains to stoka etc.’. This is followed by the examples stokān muktaḥ, stokena muktaḥ, ‘released easily’, etc. With regard to the requirement that these words be asattvavacana ‘expressing a non-substance’ for the third and the fifth to express the karana, the Kāśikā offers the example stokena viṣenam hataḥ, ‘killed by a little poison’. Here only the instrumental case is applicable. Aggavamsa has borrowed the example, but failed to understand its implication. He has also failed to take in the fact that the rule concerns the words mentioned when the fifth or the third case suffixes express the kāraka karaṇa and not the apādāna. Aggavamsa instead formulates the requirement that when there are the senses of thoka etc., the fifth case suffix as well as the third apply to express the sense of alpa. This does not exactly betray any deep understanding of what is at stake for the Sanskrit grammarians, nor does it convincingly account for anything genuinely characteristic of the Pāli language.

¹Ja VI 87,15 and 19.
2.7.16.15 **akattari**

(708,21–23) Akattari akāraka Ṉāpake hetumhi: katattā upacitattā ussannattā vipulattā uppanam hoti cakhhuviṅṅāṇam¹ icc evamādi.

[A fifth case suffix is added] provided [it is] not expressing the agent, [that is,] provided [it is] not expressing a kāraka, being [merely] something which serves to indicate, when [it is] expressing a hetu ‘cause’: ‘Visual cognition comes into being from the fact that [something (kamma ?)] is performed, heaped up, lofty, and extensive’, and so on in the same manner.

This is obscure, and I am not fully confident of my translation here. Kaccāyana has only the word akattari followed by the same example. Aggavamsa follows suit, but adds a few words with a morphology and a syntax which are not immediately clear. I am inclined to believe, however, that Kaccāyana felt he was left with ablative of cause he has to account for and a bit of a Pāṇini rule, namely A 2.3.24 akartary rne pañcamī. As mentioned before, this rule teaches that a fifth case suffix is added to a nominal stem signifying a debt which acts as a cause (A 2.3.23 hetau) but not as an agent.² Indeed, Kaccāyana is not talking about debts here, but he could easily have taken over the non-agency requirement and the implied hetau ‘when it expresses a cause’, which one necessarily has to read also into his own rule. It seems to me, then, that Kaccāyana and after him Aggavamsa must have reasoned something like this: We find usages of the ablative where it expresses a cause; but where it merely gives us an indication, there the cause does not participate as an agent in bringing something about and so the case suffix cannot be added to express a kāraka. It serves merely to explain that there are things which seem to have no direct cause but still come into being and that is indicated by the things which act as causes. There is no question of something being a kāraka or an agent, but rather of explaining that something comes into being. The framework provided by A 2.3.23–24 could easily be taken over to account for this.

Obviously Aggavamsa did not think the single word akattari made the picture sufficiently clear. To improve on this he heaps up certain key-words. The word hetumhi certainly refers to A 2.3.23 hetau. The words akārake and jñāpake are strongly reminiscent of the vocabulary used by Helārāja in discussing the hetu and the difference between hetu, kāraka, and lakṣaṇa. Vākyapadiya 3.7.24ab defines the hetu: anāśrite tu vyāpāre nimittam hetur isyate, ‘the final cause (nimitta) which is independent of [any particular] operation is accepted as the hetu’. In his commentary on this verse, Helārāja twice¹ uses the word akārakavibhakti ‘a case ending which does not express a kāraka’. This is in any case how I think the word akārake in the Saddaniti passage should be understood. The words jñāpaka and jñāpakatva each occur twice,² and Helārāja’s commentary on this verse ends (Hel 255,11): svarūpaḥvedena kriyānirvartakam kārakaṁ, sāmāṇya janako hetuḥ, jñāpake lakṣaṇam iti, ‘a kāraka is that which brings about an action by taking on different forms, that which is a progenitor in general is the hetu, [and] when it [merely] serves as an indicator (jñāpaka) it is a sign (lakṣaṇa). The word jñāpaka ‘something which serves to indicate’ is a technical term in vyākaranā. Based on supposed implications which result from internal analysis of the rules of grammar, a jñāpaka is a structural argument through which a valid interpretation can be inferred and justified. In other words, when seemingly conflicting features occur in the grammar, one should look for some other feature which indicates the valid interpretation on the basis of consistency and a unified system. I am not sure that the technical jñāpaka is all that relevant here; the question of lakṣaṇa, hetu etc. has to do with interpreting A 1.4.84 etc. All I want to point out is the

¹ Indicating this example as a quotation, Smith adds the following note: cf. (D III 146,1 +) Vibh 297,28 Dhs § 556.
² cf. 2.7.16.8 and 11 above.
2.7.16.16 Final remarks on the apādāna

(708,23–709,18) Ādisaddena ye amhehi anupadiṭṭhā apādānapayogā, te payogavacakkhanehi yojetabbā. Idāni tesam apādānāṇāṃ kāyasamānagapubbakādīvāsena pabhedaṃ kathayāma: gāmā apenti munayo ti ādisu hi kāyasamānagapubbakassā apagamanassā vijjamāṇattā gāmādi apādānāṃ kāyasamānagapubbakam nāma, pāṇāti pāṭatā viramati ti ādisu pana cītasaṃsānagapubbakassa apagamanassā vijjamāṇattā pāṇāti pāṭatā apādānāṃ cītasaṃsānagapubbakam nāma; tathā dhāvatā hatthimāḥ patito amkusagghato ti ādisu hatthiḥidā apādānāṃ calamariyādabhūtattā calavadhī nāma calaṅ ca tam avadhī cā ti athena, pabbatā otaranti vanacarā ti ādisu pabbatādi apādānāṃ niccalamariyādabhūtattā niccalavadhī nāma niccalāṅ ca tam avadhī cā ti athena, imehi dvīhi pakārehi vinimmuttam buddhassā pati Sāriputto, “kāmā jāyate bhaṅgan” ¹ ti ca ādisu buddhādi apādānāṃ n’evacalavadhīniccalavadhī² nāma avadhībhāvena agahatabbattā, evam apādānāṃ dāvidham tividhaṅ ca bhavati. Punā tam tividhaṅ ca niddiṭṭhvāsīyādīvāsena; tathā gāmā apagacchati ti ādi niddiṭṭhvāsīyām nāma apādānāvīsīyasassā

¹ Dhp 215b.
² Smith gives the text here as n’eva calavadhī na niccalavadhī, but compare this with 701,24–25 where he gives the three divisions as calavadhīniccalavadhīnevacalavadhīniccalavadhīvasena as a syntactic compound. If in the present passage we are not dealing with a compound, there are no problems, but the whole parallelism with the preceding would be lost.

By the word ādi ‘etc.’ [is everywhere indicated] that those usages of the apādāna which have not been taught by us should be included by people who are skilled in usage. Now, among these apādānas we proclaim a division according to [whether the going away] is preceded by physical contact, etc.¹ For in such [sentences] as ‘the sages go away from the village’ such an apādāna as the village is indeed preceded by physical contact since the moving away is found to be preceded by physical contact. But in such [sentences] as ‘he abstains from killing living creatures’ such an apādāna as shooting living creatures is indeed preceded by mental contact since the moving away is found to be preceded by mental contact. Likewise, in [sentences] such as ‘the elephant-driver has fallen from the running elephant’ such an apādāna as the elephant is indeed the moving starting point since it appears as an exclusive limit which is moving, in accordance with [its] meaning [as a karmadhāraya compound]: ‘it is moving and it is a starting point’. In such [sentences] as ‘the forest-dwellers come down from the mountain’ such an apādāna as the mountain is indeed the non-moving starting point since it appears as a non-moving exclusive limit, in accordance with [its] meaning [as a karmadhāraya compound]: ‘it is non-moving and it is a starting point’. Not included under these two categories is an apādāna

¹ cf. 701,23 foll., 2.7 above.
such as the Buddha in [sentences] such as ‘Sāriputta [taught the doctrine] as proxy of the Buddha’ and ‘fear arises from love’ which is indeed [the apādāna] where the starting point is neither exclusively moving nor non-moving because of the fact that it cannot be grasped as a starting point. Thus the apādāna is of two kinds and of three kinds. But it is also of three kinds according to whether the scope (i.e., the moving away) is directly stated, etc. In this respect, such [a sentence] as ‘he moves away from the village’ has indeed the scope (i.e., the moving away) directly stated because of the fact that a specific action which has the [particular] scope of the apādāna [namely, moving away] is directly stated. [In such sentences as] ‘he cooks from the granary’, ‘he asks from (about) Abhidhamma’, [and] ‘the lightning flashes from the cloud’ it is indeed the one where the scope (i.e., the moving away) is comprised. In this case a specific action must be comprised through such [a statement] as ‘having gone forth from the cloud the lightning flashes’. [In such a sentence as] ‘the people of Mathurā are more handsome than those of Pāṭaliputra’ it is indeed the one where the scope (i.e., the moving away) has to be inferred. In this case a specific action must be inferred [through such a statement] that ‘by some quality the people of Mathurā are elevated (ukkamsiyanti) from those of Pāṭaliputra’; nothing is specified as in the case of the one where the scope (i.e., the moving away) is comprised, [and] that is where this one differs from the one where the scope is comprised.

In these last remarks on the apādāna Aggavamsa first of all covers himself by pointing out that the word ādi ‘etc.’, so frequently resorted to, serves to indicate usages of the apādāna which he may have omitted but which should be included by people who know of such usages. To look for unknown usage is a sound principle in linguistics, explicitly resorted to by Patañjali among others. But to talk of usages of

the apādāna again betrays and indeed epitomizes the fact that he does not discern between the kāraka apādāna and the ablative case suffix.

The rest of the passage is devoted to repeating the various classifications of the apādāna and to fulfilling the promise he gave at the beginning that he was going to explain all these subdivisions one by one below (tam sabbam pabhedam upari ekato pakāsessāma). He has not mentioned them in the meantime, and although he gives some adequate examples one may wonder where he would fit in a lot of the material he has discussed in the meantime. The categories he makes fall in three groups: The first according to whether the apādāna has been preceded by physical or by mental contact (kāyasamyoagapubbaka and cittasamyogapubbaka), the second according to whether the starting point is moving, non-moving, or neither exclusively moving nor non-moving (calāvadhi, niccalāvadhi, and nevacalāvadhīni and niccalāvadhi), and the third according to whether the scope, the moving away, is directly stated, is comprised, or has to be inferred (niddīṭhavisa, uppatīvisa, and anumeyya-visa). These divisions and their possible origins have been discussed above (2.7), so I shall not repeat myself here.

2.8 The location: okāsa (adhikaraṇa)


1 Ce Be ns dhārayanti.
tathā hi koci ekam gehe pātyayatam khiram pāyetukāmo tvam geham pavisa, pavisivā khiram pivā ti vattabbā vacanasesam katvā pavisa khiran ti āha, sāsane pi dissati "yesam ayyānam sūciyā attho, aham sūciyā"1 ti ca yassa pañhena attho, so mam pañhena aham veyyākaranena ti; tasmā ettha samsayo na kātabbo.

‘That which is the support [in time and space], that [kāraka] is the okāsa.’ That which is the support (ādhāra), in the sense of that which is a supporter (ādhāraka) of actions such as sitting down or cooking which are inherent in the agent or the object, that kāraka is something to which the technical name okāsa applies. ‘Strongly (bhuso = ā) it supports (dhāreti) the action’, thus [it is called] ādhāra, [and] that very ādhāra is called the okāsa ‘occasion’ because it actually is an occasion [where something happens] in the sense of support of these actions, thus it is stated. For thus, with regard to [the sentence] ‘Devadatta sits down on the mat’, the mat supporting Devadatta supports the action of sitting which is inherent in him, [and] with regard to [the sentence] ‘he cooks rice in the pot’, the pot supporting the rice supports the action of cooking which is also inherent in it (= the rice). If so, since the possibility of supporting the action [exists] in a primary way only for the agent and the object, the name okāsa should be applied only to these? It should not be applied [only to these]. Why? Because

1 Smith: vide Vin IV 167,4 (cf. supra 344 note f).
2 The word bhuso is a problem. One thing is certain, namely that it is part of a nirvacana, semantic analysis, where it explains the preverb ā of ādhāra. This is clear from the Saddaniti itself: aggho ti c’ ettha āsaddo bhusatthe upasaggapadam (689,26-27), and ākāro pana rasso hoti, ā bhuso caritaban ti accharam (861,20-21). This implies that it ought to be an adverb, but it looks like a nominative adjective. I have taken it to be the equivalent of Skt bhṛṣa ‘strong; powerful’. One could explain it as bhusaso with a syllable lost, but this is not very convincing.
it is being used in a technical sense. Therefore, although indirectly, the mat etc. which is something that supports is indeed something with regard to which the technical name okāsa obtains; thus it should be understood. This okāsa is of four kinds: vyāpika ‘pervading; in absolute contact’, opasilesika ‘caused by [close] contact’, sāmīpika ‘caused by nearness’, and vesayika ‘belonging to a [particular] domain’. In this respect, vyāpika is indeed [where] the whole thing which is the support is coterminous with the thing to be supported, as in ‘the oil [is] in the sesame seeds’, ‘the juice is in the sugar cane’, ‘the butter is in the curds’; opasilesika is indeed where there is contact, that is, going near, of entities which are established individually, as in ‘he sits on the mat’; sāmīpika is indeed where, making up this term sāmīpika in the sense of samīpa ‘near; nearness’, the state of being the support is imagined, as in ‘he dwells in (= in the vicinity of) Sāvatthi’, ‘a cattle-fold on (= in the vicinity of) the Gaṅgā’. It has been stated also by Patañjali: In four different ways does [this word] so ‘this; that’ apply to something which is not that: [1] sometimes by force of [the relation of] standing in it, as in ‘the cots/benches are making a cry’; [2] sometimes by force of [the relation of] nearness, as in ‘the cow-shed is on (= in the vicinity of) the Gaṅgā’, ‘he dwells among (= in the vicinity of) the Kurus’; [3] sometimes through the condition of association with it, as in ‘fetch the sticks, fetch the spears’; [4] sometimes by doing the actions of it, as in the case of someone who is not Brahmadatta ‘this is Brahmadatta’.

vesayiko is indeed where there is imagination of a location, either by force of the condition of not existing elsewhere, or by force of being cut off from another region, as in ‘human beings are [located] on the earth’, ‘fish are [located] in the water’, ‘birds are [located] in space’. Nevertheless, all this is said to be okāsa, because there is support of an action either by force of its being primary or by force of its being imagined. But since in this respect it has been stated that it is the support of actions that are inherent in the agent or the object, then how does that obtain in the case of [a sentence such as] ‘more splendour in a sword’? It does indeed obtain. For just as in the usage ‘human beings are on the earth’ the action of dwelling, even though it is not met with [in the statement], is to be taken according to the convention that the rest of a statement [is to be supplied] as inherent in the agent [of the verb] vasanti ‘are dwelling’, likewise [in] this [statement] ‘more splendour in a sword’ here too the action inherent in the agent [of the verb] ahosi ‘was’, even though it is not met with, is to be taken according to the convention that the rest of the statement [is to be supplied]. For here in this world, in whatsoever domain of usage, one utters treatment. The well-known example is simho mānavaṁkāh, ‘the boy is a lion’. G. Gren-Eklund (1986) has pointed out the difference between the Aristotelian and Indian conceptions of metaphor. According to Aristotle, the word a meaning A is used in the meaning B. The Indian view is roughly that for the thing A is used not the word a but the word b. The transfer takes place in the denotation, that is, on the side of words. With regard to the passage from the Mahābhāṣya, in a sentence such as mañcāḥ kroṣanti, ‘the cots are crying’, mañcāḥ ‘the cots’ are tat ‘it’ and the children who are the ones really crying are atat ‘not it’, not with regard to reality, only with regard to the expressions used. As pointed out by Gren-Eklund (ibid. 91), Aggavamsa makes use of the Mahābhāṣya passage on tatata not to show upacāra, transfer of meaning, but in connection with the okāsa.

1 I take kunta to mean ‘spear; lance’, not ‘bird’ as in PED. Here the sticks and spears are used to indicate those who carry them.

2 There are several discrepancies between this passage and Mbh II:218,14–19. By way of example, instead of Kurusu vasati Patañjali offers the example kūpe gargakulam, ‘the Garga family lives on the well’, for tamkiriyācarānena Patañjali has tāddharmyānt ‘by the relation of the quality of it’ and offers a slightly more subtle example: jati brahmadattah ‘the man with the matted hair is Brahmadatta’, meaning that he is like Brahmadatta and worthy of the same

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1 I take etam to refer to the statement but it does not link up syntactically with the rest. It is almost as if he has changed construction before and after the quotation (evam etam ... etthā pi). It is of course possible to emend, but nothing falls in place easily; cf. v. II. indicated in the text above.
speech constructing the remainder (sesa). As for example, someone wishing to make [someone] drink some milk made ready in a house, when he should state ‘you go into the house [and] having entered drink the milk’, does state, constructing the remainder, ‘go in to the milk’. This is indicated also in the teaching [of the Buddha]: ‘Those noble ones for whom there is use for a needle, I [supply] with a needle’¹ and ‘he who is in need of [asking] a question, he [supplies] me with a question, [and] I [supply him] with an explanation’. Therefore, doubt need not be raised in this respect.²

First of all, one may wonder why he uses the term okāsa here and not adhikarana which is the term he has been using earlier in the work.³ The answer seems obvious in that the parallel rule in Kaccāyana (141) runs: yo dhāro tam okāsam. The second puzzling feature is that after the definition of okāsa has been given, Aggavaṃsa offers a nirvacana, semantic analysis, not of okāsa but of ādhāra, the word used to define it. This peculiarity has in fact been taken over from the Sanskrit grammarians.⁴ The word ādhāra was firmly established in the context of the adhikarana by Pāṇini’s definition A 1.4.45 ādhāro 'adhikaranam.

The discussion of whether the adhikarana can really be called a kāraka in that it does not directly participate in the action but is only connected with it by being the location of the agent or the object, goes back at least to the Vākyapadiya. Patañjali does not comment on A 1.4.45. The relevant verses read as follows (VP 3.7.148–49):

¹ Vin IV 167,4 sūcigahena ‘needle-case’ (of an ivory worker).
² That is, since one has to supply the remainder even in these cases.
³ e.g. Sād 10,28; 68,30.
⁴ Thus the Kāśikā on A 1.4.45 gives ādhriyante 'smin kriyā guṇah ity ādhārah, reflected in the Padamāñjari (KāśP I:560) ādhriyante 'smin kriyā ity ādhāra iti and the Nyāsā (KāśN I:560) ādhriyante kriyāguṇā asminn ity ādhāra iti.

kātrkarmavavahitām asāksād dhārayat kriyām /
upakurvat kriyāsiddhau śāstre 'dhikaranam smṛtam //
upāślesasya cābhedas tilākāsakatādīsu /
upakārās tu bhidyante samyogisamavāyinām //

That which [both] indirectly supports the action separated [from it] by the agent or the object, [and] assists in accomplishing the action is called adhikarana in the science of grammar. And there is no difference in [the type of] contact with regard to the sesame seeds, space, or the mat. But the ways of assisting [in bringing about the action] differ in [the contact being] samyoga ‘conjunction’ or samavāya ‘inherence’.

Helārāja offers the examples kate āste ‘he sits on the mat’ and sthālyām pacati ‘he cooks in the pot’, which are met with in the Saddaniti as well. In fact, there are striking similarities between what Helārāja says here and bits and pieces of the Saddaniti discussion. There is nothing like a quotation, nothing like a coherent identical statement, just a large number of identical words and a general flavour of similarity. This of course makes it hard to come up with any solid claims. By way of example, the Saddaniti has paramparāya pi kriyādāhakam, while Helārāja has paramparayā kriyādāhakāye (Hel 348,13). Helārāja (Hel 349,1) defines upāśesa as ādhārasyādheyena sambandhah, ‘the relation of the support with that is to be supported’. Discussing the vaiśayikam adhikaranaṃ he states (349,8): anayatrabhāvaś cātra viśayārthah / evam jale matsyā ity ādhārapraśeṣāpekṣaya ca itad aupaślesikam adhikaranaṃ, ‘and the sense of viśaya “domain” here is: being in that [domain] and in no other; thus “fish are in the water”, with regard to the place of support this is an aupaślesika-adhikarana’. This is similar to vesayiko nāma yathā aṁnatthabhābhavasena desantaraviaccinevasena va ādhāraparikappo, tam yathā: bhūmisu

¹ Emended from anayatrabhāva. I prefer to read this as a compound.
manussā jalesu macchā, 'vesayiko is indeed where there is imagination of a location, either by force of the condition of not existing elsewhere, or by force of being cut off from another region, as in "human beings are on the earth", "fish are in the water" [etc.]'. Helārāja even makes a distinction between a real contact and a mental or imagined one, referring to the latter as kalpita (349,7). Other significant terms occur as well, such as samaveta (Hel 348,10), samavāyin (Hel 349,2), and, not to forget, the term sāmīpya (349,11–12): gangāyām gāva iti gangāsabdaḥ sāmīpyāt pradesavrītirḥ ity aupāslesikam adhikaraṇam, 'in "the cows are [located] on the Gaṅga", the word gangā functions in the sense of place because of nearness, and thus [it is] an aupāslesika-adhikaraṇa'.

This leads directly to the fourfold classification of the okāsa suggested by Aggavamsa. Clearly it seems to have been taken over from Kaccāyana. Most Sanskrit sources suggest only three, leaving out sāmīpya. Thus Patañjali on A 6.1.72 samhitāyām states (Mbh III:51,8): adhikaraṇam nāma tripракāram vyāpaka aupāslesikam2 vaisayikam iti, 'the adhikaraṇa is indeed of three kinds, vyāpaka, aupāslesika, [and] vaisayika'. The same classification is met with in the Padamañjari (KāśP I:561) and the Nyāsa (KāśN I:562), with abhivyāpaka for vyāpaka. It is also met with in later works such as the Siddhāntakaumudi (on A 2.3.36) and its commentaries, the Bālamanorā and the Tatvabodhini. But Jñānendrasarasvatī,3 the author of the Tatvabodhini, remarks (SK I:694): nedyām āsta ityādyartham sāmīpakam adhikarṇam caturtham api ke cid icchanti, 'for the sake of such [statements] as "he sits on the river" some teach also a fourth [type of adhikaraṇa, namely,] the sāmīpika-

1 So read for vṛtir.
2 So read for aupāskēpiṃ in the third edition of Mbh, revised etc. by K.V. Abhyankar. This must be a mere misprint since Kilhorn's original edition reads as above with no v.l.
3 Probably early 18th century, although tradition has it that he was requested by Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita, the author of the Siddhāntakaumudi, to write a commentary upon it. Were this the case, Jñānendra would of course be a contemporary of Bhaṭṭojī.

sāmipika-adhikaraṇa'. The Prakriyākaumudi of Rāmacandra1 gives this fourfold classification (PK 80): aupāslesikaḥ sāmīpiko viṣayo vyāpta ity ādhāras caturthā. This could be what Jñānendra had in mind since Bhaṭṭojī heavily attacked Rāmacandra and therefore Jñānendra was most probably familiar with his work. As noted above, Helārāja merely brings up the notion of sāmīpya 'nearness' in the context of aupāslesika. The Rūpāvatāra of the pre-Aggavamsa Sinhalese Buddhist Dharmakirti2 suggests a fourfold classification of the adhikaraṇa (ed. M. Rangacharya 1916:162,12–13): sa ādhāraḥ aupāslesika-vaisayikavāpaka-pratyāsatti-bhedatvān caturvākāh, 'this ādhāra "support" is of four kinds, by being divided into aupāslesika, vaisayika, vyāpaka, and pratyāsatti "proximity"'. He adds (162,17–18): pratyāsattih sāmīpyam — gangāyām ghosah, 'pratyāsatti, that is to say, sāmīpya 'nearness', [as in] "a cow-shed on the Gaṅga"'. The term sāmīpika seems to have caused Aggavamsa some unease, since he comes up with the rather peculiar statement samipe sāmipikavohāram katvā, 'making up this term sāmīpika in the sense of samīpa "near; nearness"'.

Of linguistic importance is the fact that Aggavamsa interprets Sāvatthiyam viharati not as 'he dwells in Sāvatthi' but as 'he dwells in the vicinity of Sāvatthi', and Kurusu vasati not as 'he dwells among the Kurus' but as 'he dwells in the land where the Kurus live'. Helārāja (Hel 349,11–12) ascribes the Gaṅga in gangāyāṁ gāvah, 'the cows are [located] on the Gaṅga', to the category of aupāslesika but gives sāmīpya 'nearness' as the reason for this. Aggavamsa's latter example may have been inspired by Helārāja (Hel 349,9) gurau vasati, 'he lives with the teacher', where the teacher is ascribed to the vaisayika category.

1 Late 14th or early 15th century.
2 Cardona (1976:285) brings forward facts which suggest a date of about 1100 for Dharmakirti. Certain inscriptive evidence could push the date back even further. Dharmakirti was thus certainly earlier than Aggavamsa.
2.8.1 Magic locations

573 Yath‘ iddhi‘ antaradhāyati. Yasmin thāne koci iddhīyā antarahāyati, tam thanabhūtam kārakam okāsa-
saññam hoti: “sā devatā antarahiśa pabbate Gandham-
mādane”,1 Jetavane antarahito Bhagavā,2 “tato so dummamo yakko tath‘ ev’ antaradhāyatha”,3 app ekacce mam abhiprādetvā antaradāyimsu.4 Ādhāraṇaḷakaḷkaṇaṃ okāsa-
kārakam.

‘Where one disappears through magic powers.’ That location
where someone disappears by magic powers, that kāraka which
consists in the location is something to which the technical name
okāsa applies: ‘That deity has vanished on the Gandhamādana
mountain’; ‘the Noble One has vanished in the Jeta grove’;
then that discouraged Yaksa vanished on that very spot’; ‘and
again, having saluted me, they vanished on that very spot’.5
And the okāsa-kāraka has as its defining characteristic
ādhāraṇa ‘supporting’.

This is a peculiar little rule. Most probably it springs out of a
misunderstanding which goes back to sutta 570 (2.7.15 above). A 1.4.28
antarakhau yenādāsanam icchatī assigns the name apādāna to the one
the agent does not wish to be seen by when concealment is involved.
This is straightforward, and so are, as far as I can see, the locative usages
in the examples here which do not call for any special attention
whatsoever in as much as they are highly ordinary instances of the
adhikaraṇa and of the locative case suffix. But Aggavamsa thinks

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1 Ja VI 92,17.
2 Smith: vide A I 64,32.
3 Sn 449cd.
5 See below.

otherwise, probably puzzled by the word antardhi ‘concealment;
disappearance’ in Pānini’s rule and the usage of antardhayati in all the
examples. The semantic range of this verb should not make these
difficult to distinguish, but Aggavamsa seems to reason that since in the
Āstādhyāyi antardhi is mentioned only in connection with the apādāna a
special rule should be stated to account for the occurrence of the verb
antaradāyati in an adhikaraṇa context.

The example app ekacce mam abhiprādetvā antaradāyimsu
calls for a brief remark in that it seems at first hand more natural to take
ekacce as plural of ekacca in the sense of ‘some’ and not as a locative
singular. The text of the Digha referred to by Smith (D III 205,24 foll.),
however, adds several times the words tatth‘ eva ‘on that very spot’. But
one should note that the example given above is not identical with the
Digha reference. Moreover, according to the PTC the form antarad-
āyimsu occurs only here and at S I 148,10–11 in the entire canon. So
who made the changes, or how do we account for the discrepancy?

Here ends the kāraka-section proper. The rest of the
kārakappakarana deals first with what is expressed by the vocative and
the genitive, and then with the assignment of case suffixes in a manner
somehow similar to the vibhakti section of the Āstādhyāyi. But I should
like to include also as a final passage the one immediately following
Aggavamsa’s discussion of the apādāna in which he groups kārakas
according to common ranges of applicability.

2.9. Common domains of applicability

(711,5–23) Iti chakārakam pakāsitam hoti.1 Idāni
samānavissayan kārakahakkam vuccate: Yo yattha yena yam
vā karoti, tāni kattuokāsakaranakammāni: purīsa aranhe
hatthena kammam karoti, sabbatha kattā netabbo. Yama yassa
yattha vā deti, tāni kammaṃsampadān’okāsaṇi: dānām

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1 Smith has kept this sentence with the preceding paragraph. I think it should be
read together with the following sentence.

Garū pana sattamīvisaye purisassa bāhāsu gahetvā, bodhisattassa muddhāni cumbitvā ti udāharitvā kamanī sattam-vibhattappattiti vaddanti. Tam Maddim hatthe gahetvāna ti ādikāya pāliya dassanato purisam bodhisattan ti ca vibhattiṃ vipariṇāmetvā thāne yeva sattami ti gahetabbaṃ. Iti samāsato samānavisayaṃ kārakachakkāṃ pakāsitaṃ hoti.

Thus the group of six kārakas has been explained. Now it is stated that the set of six kārakas have common domains of applicability: The one which, where, by which, or on which one acts, those are the kattar, okāsa, karana, and kamma: ‘The man does an act in the forest with his hand’. Everywhere [here] the kattar is to be applied.9 That which, to whom, or where one gives, those are the kamma, sampadāna, and okāsa: ‘He gave a gift to the monk’; ‘he bestows a gift on the monk’; ‘where, when given, [a gift] bears great fruit’. That from which [or] where [something] arises, those are the apādāna and okāsa: ‘That from which that fire arises’; ‘fear arises from a thief’.

Exploring the Saddaniti

‘where that wise one is born’. That which, where, or from which one takes, those are the kamma, okāsa, and apādāna: ‘He takes a Brahman by the hand’; ‘taking Maddi by the hand’; ‘taking the elephant by the trunk’; ‘take the skills in the vicinity of the teacher’; ‘he takes the precepts from the Master and Preceptor’. But in the domain of the seventh [case suffix] the teachers proclaim the occurrence of the seventh case suffix to express the kamma, advoiding the examples: ‘taking by the man’s arm (= taking the man by the arm)’; ‘kissing on the head of the Bodhisattva’. Now, since a canonical teaching such as ‘taking Maddi by the hand’ is seen, and by first changing the case ending [in] puriss (accusative) and bodhisattam (accusative) [to purisassa and bodhisattassa], the seventh [case suffix] is understood to express location only. Thus, in a summary way, the set of six kārakas with common domains of applicability has been explained.

Aggavamsa here suggests a grouping of kārakas according to their common domains of applicability. They fall into four groups, but, as far as I can judge, in a rather arbitrary way. Is he talking about types of actions, like √kṛ, when those four kārakas especially appear, the agent always being present? The first group consists of the kattar, okāsa, karana, and kamma. Probably all he wants to say here is that the kattar ‘agent’ is always there. Otherwise one would have to assume that he points out four kārakas as basic and therefore belonging to one and the same group. I find this rather unlikely. I think this highlighting principle applies also in the remaining instances. The second group is formed when one is giving to or bestowing on, involving the sampadāna and the okāsa, as well as the kamma which I take to refer to the thing given here, and, of course, always the agent. Thirdly, things can arise from something or in a place, involving the apādāna and the okāsa. And fourthly, one can take something, the thing which participates as the kamma, in or from a place, involving the okāsa and the apādāna. This

1 Smith: (Cp I 2:7c).
2 Smith: (Cp I 4:9b).
3 Sn 191d.
4 Ja IV 26,17.
5 Dhp 193c.
6 Ja VI 570,9; Cp I 9: 50a.
7 Cp I 3: 5a; 9: 20a.
8 Smith: (Ja I 285,18).
9 i.e. puriso karoti, puriso araṇī karoti, etc.; cf. ns quoted Sadd 711, note 6.
must imply that he takes sonic ‘the trunk’ in the example nāgam gahetvā sonicāya, ‘taking the elephant by the trunk’, to be either the apādāna or the okāsa. One wonders whether such classifications were common in more popular grammatical works such as the kārakacakra literature.

According to Aggavamsa, then, there are alternatives. Sometimes you can have an ablative, sometimes a locative. He then points out a disagreement with the teachers, which I take to refer to earlier grammarians, Sanskrit or other. Someone says that you can have a locative case suffix to express the kamma ‘object’, because there are instances where the item we regard as the object is in the locative. The difference amounts to ‘kiss the head’ as against ‘kiss on the head’, or, more precisely, ‘kissing the Bodhisattva on the head’ as against ‘kissing on the head of the Bodhisattva’. Aggavamsa says we have to assume purissa and bodhisattassā are accusatives, only someone has changed the case endings. This is not exactly being attentive to varieties in usage. There is a considerable difference between explaining a phenomenon and explaining it away.

3. Conclusions

It hardly needs to be stated that drawing conclusions on the basis of a detailed examination of only a small part of the Saddanīti is hazardous. Still, some conclusions seem unavoidable. Since I have gone into considerable detail above, I shall limit myself here to some observations of a rather general nature.

What kind of a grammar is the Saddanīti, then? Judging on the basis of the kāraka-section, I find it hard to join the chorus of unrestrained praise. The technical framework of this section is unconvincing. There is no attempt at economy, and no rule here has any effect on any other rule so that material can be added endlessly. In this way it is open-ended and little distinction is made between what is really important and what is not. The situation may be different in sections dealing with morphology, where one would expect rules to feed each other so that stems are building up gradually. The kāraka-section, at any rate, does not betray much of a system. Aggavamsa has superimposed at random terminology, techniques, and material from the Sanskrit grammarians, more often than not in a rather confused and confusing manner. One need only point to the way he deals with the bhāvapravgya, the impersonal passive construction, which Aggavamsa claims requires a construction with a word in the nominative case, to the term kāraka itself and his confusing divisions of it, or to his vain attempt at providing examples of aūmanepada usages of the verb sapa ‘curse’ in order to conform to a distinction made by the Sanskrit grammarians.

For Pāṇini the introduction of kārakas is a technical device serving a distinct theoretical purpose in the derivation of correct linguistic forms. For Aggavamsa they serve no such purpose. The kāraka concept serves to give names to the various participants in actions as expressed in a sentence and in this way it could work as a useful tool in sentence analysis. This possibility, however, breaks down when Aggavamsa constantly blurs the distinction between kāraka and vibhakti. In fact, he treats kārakas as a subset of vibhaktis. In the Aṣṭādhyāyī the abstract syntactic level of kārakas is introduced in the derivational process to secure the correct distribution of vibhaktis, case endings and verbal endings. Aggavamsa’s lack of distinction here reflects his absolutely mechanical way of proceeding.

It is quite clear that the material presented in the Saddanīti is not very original, with the exception of instances where there is an apparent conflict with what the grammarians say and usages met with in the canon. The term original may in many of these instances be synonymous with peculiar.

This leads us to the question of sources. In addition to the non-Vedic rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, Aggavamsa has incorporated not only all the Kaccāyana rules but also most of the material from the Kaccāyanavatī. His outspoken criticism of Kaccāyana (2.7.16.13, above) seems off the mark and shows that for all his erudition Aggavamsa was not a very creative thinker. In this context he refers to the Kaccāyanappakarana by
name, and later also to Patañjali (2.8, above). Did he in fact have access to the whole of the Mahābhāṣya, though failing, as he did, to make good use of that storehouse of material? It seems quite likely that he did since he makes use of very different sections of that text for varying purposes, and incorporates several of the vārttikas into his own rules. Whether he knew the commentary of Kaiyāta is a more difficult question. He seems to have known some parts of it or of a very similar commentary. But there are problems here. Bhartrhari wrote a commentary on the Mahābhāṣya. Only a small part of this Mahābhāṣyadipikā has survived, and that in a single manuscript. We do not even know whether it was ever completed. But it is clear that Kaiyāta knew it and that he stood in a tradition intimately connected with Bhartrhari’s work. So, did Aggavamsa know of Bhartrhari’s commentary, did he know of it through Kaiyāta, etc.?

The influence of Bhartrhari’s Vākyapadiya, though, has been established beyond doubt. Aggavamsa draws heavily on this source, particularly, as we have seen, when he can make use of it for the purpose of classifications. But when that is said, one should remember that the Vākyapadiya is a storehouse of other people’s opinions. We therefore face the problem of what is original in the Vākyapadiya anyway. It seems clear, however, that Aggavamsa had access to the Vākyapadiya itself. This is evident from the fact that he knew of and made use of Helārāja’s commentary.

Aggavamsa was definitely familiar with a tradition going back to the Kāśikāvṛtti. It seems likely that he knew of the Nyāsa, possibly also of the Padamañjari.

Although Aggavamsa seems to have known of the Cāndrayākaraṇa of Candragomin, it is clear that he did not rely upon Buddhist Sanskrit grammars in any significant way. It should be kept in mind, however, that the Kātantra is said to have left traces on Kaccāyana. A much heavier task is to establish whether or not he was influenced by less known — or, for that matter, lost — works, as for example the Kārakasambandhoddyota by the tenth century Buddhist grammarian Rabhasanandin. Such random works might have come to him by coincidence, or views and ideas may even have been transmitted to him orally by his fellow monks.

Now it is impossible not to have some sympathy for Aggavamsa’s position, namely the fact that he had to cope with the expressions met with in a given corpus of texts, including postcanonical works. Aggavamsa knew his canon quite well, and the strength of his work is the vast supply of examples he provides. Still, we meet with the problem that many of his examples are constructed or taken over from the Sanskrit grammarians. In fact, he incorporates whatever he can from Sanskrit sources, be it grammatical problems or examples. He goes as far as making a rule out of two examples which occur in Helārāja’s Vṛtti, in Kaiyāta’s Pradīpa, and in Haradatta’s Padamañjari (2.7.2, above). Rich in material though it is, this makes the Saddanīti a dubious source for ‘un pali d’intérêt linguistique’ (Smith 1928:VI).

Instead of summing up, let me present my view of the situation by contrasting two passages, one from the Mahābhāṣya and one from the Saddanīti. Both passages deal with the relationship between words and meanings. For the Sanskrit grammarian Patañjali meaning determines usage, and grammar deals not with ontology but with things as they are spoken about (Mbh I:464,15–21):

nanu ca naśtenaivaṃ bhavitavyam / na hi śabdakṛtenā
nāmārthatena bhavitavyam / arthakṛtenā nāma śabdena
bhavitavyam / tad etad evam drṣyatām arthārūpaṃ evaitat
evamjātiyakam yenārātāntenāpi puruṣāsadbaprayogāṇaṃ rājani
so ‘ṛho gamyate / kim punas tat / svāmvitvam / kimkṛtāṃ punas
tat / svakṛtam / tad yathā / prāṭipadikārthānāṃ kriyākṛtā viśeṣā
upajāyante tatkṛtāḥ cākhyaḥ prādurbhavanti karma karaṇam
apādāṇam sampradānam adhikaraṇāṃ iti / tāś ca punar
vibhakāṇāṃ utpattau kādā cin nimittatvenopādiyante kādā cin
na /
But now this need not be like that.¹ For meaning should indeed not be fashioned by words, words should indeed be fashioned by meaning.² Let it be viewed like this: The very nature of meaning³ is of such a kind that even without usage of the word puruṣa ‘man’, that meaning [namely, rajah ‘of the king’] is understood with regard to [the word] rājan ‘king’. What, then, is that [meaning]? Ownership. [And] what, then, is that fashioned by? [It is] fashioned by sva ‘itself’. The reason is that special qualities of the meanings of nominal stems come into being fashioned by actions, and fashioned by those [qualities] designations arise, [namely,] karman, karana, apādāna, sampradāna, and adhikaraṇa. And these, again, are sometimes offered as the cause for the arising of case suffixes, [and] sometimes not.

Aggavamsa’s task, on the other hand, is to derive meaning from the usage encountered in a corpus of texts by analysing constructions on the basis of sādhana (= kārakas) (69,2–11):

Idha payogesv atthesu ca viññūnaṃ pātavattham sādhanaṃ pakāsitaṃ; tathā hi dunnikkhitasādhanehi padahe yojitā saddappayogā dubbodhatthā honti, sunikkhitasādhanehi padahe yojitā subodhatthā honti. Tasmā payogā sādhānamulakā; attho ca payogamulako. Payogānum-

¹ The specific context is the claim that in the phrase rājhah puruṣah, ‘the king’s man’, one should add a genitive ending also after the word puruṣa ‘man’ just as it is added to rājan ‘king’. The genitive case suffix indicates that rājan is the viṣeṣaṇa ‘qualifier’ in a ‘qualifier–qualified’ relationship. Details need not concern us here.

² Cf. also Mbh I:362,17–19. In that context Kaiyaṭa remarks (MbhP II:510): pratyāyayiṣṭāṭha pratipādanāyā sabdapravogati, [“words should be due to meaning”;] because words are used to communicate the meaning which is desired to be conveyed’.

³ The word arthārūpa, lit. ‘the form of meaning’ is glossed arthasabhāva ‘the nature of meaning’ by Kaiyaṭa (MbhP II:510).

rūpam hi aviparitaṃ katvā aththāṃ kathanasilā “yācito va bahulam cīvaram paribhuñjati appam ayācito”¹ ti evamādisu sādhana avasena gahetabbesu atthesu aṅgāsu c’atthesu paṭutarabuddhino paṇḍitā yeva ekantena Bhagavato paryatti-sāsanadhārā nāma honti ti veditabbam.

Here the term sādhana has been promulgated for the sake of the skill of the learned with regard to usages as well as meanings. For it is the case that linguistic usages have meanings that are hard to understand when they are constructed with words whose sādhana are badly laid down, while they have meanings that are easy to understand when they are constructed with words whose sādhana are neatly laid down. Therefore usages are rooted in sādhana, and meaning is rooted in usage. For those [learned] who are in the habit of analysing the meaning in that they make [it] adequate according to usage — only those learned, whose intellect is very sharp with regard to meanings that can be grasped by means of sādhana[-analysis] such as in ‘only he who is invited receives a robe often, he who is not invited, rarely’² and even with regard to other meanings,³ [only


² This seems to be the sense, bahulam going either with cīvaram in the sense of ‘plenty of’ or as an adverb with paribhuñjati, and so the sādhana expressed would be kamma, that is, yācito is to be interpreted as the object of the action denoted by the verb yācatti, although he appears as the agent of the action expressed by the finite verb paribhuñjati with regard to the rest of the sentence. The idea seems to be that only someone asked or invited enjoys or accepts something, whereas someone who is not invited or asked does not. The rather odd example — odd in the sense that kamma would be the interpretation of yācito which certainly comes to mind first — is probably chosen by Aggavamsa either because he simply wants to say that past participles are to be interpreted as kammaśādhanā in general, or because yācito is kammaśādhanā but seems to have no bearing on the rest of the sentence in as much as it appears as kattar with regard to paribhuñjati, or because past participles often have to be interpreted as active in late Pāli and hence as kattusādhanā.
those] are completely in possession of the teaching of the doctrine of the Blessed One; thus one should know.

Here Aggavamsa makes it quite clear that he has a canon to account for and that in fact one’s ability to do so determines the degree to which one is in possession of the Buddha’s doctrine. Aggavamsa’s relationship to the canon and what he considers the word of the Buddha is made even more explicit in the long excursus at the end of the sampadāna section (2.6.1.12, above). There, through a series of attacks on the views of the Sanskrit grammarians, Aggavamsa attempts to contrast the science of grammar with the word of the Buddha. These attacks are not terribly convincing, but nevertheless quite illuminating. They provide Aggavamsa with sufficient ammunition for him to make his claim that there is an opposition between the science of grammar and the canon. His conclusion is that the sole authority is the canon and the Aṭṭhakathās, and that grammar is practically useless.

So, if this is his attitude, why does Aggavamsa slavishly follow the Sanskrit grammarians when the issues they deal with do not really suit the Pāli language at all, when he has to hunt high and low in the canon to find something he can use, and when he discards grammar completely in favour of what is stated in the canon and in the Aṭṭhakathās? Indeed, such slavish parroting is not the ideal way of writing a grammar of the Pāli language. But here, I think, we have a clue to the question of what purpose was served in composing the Saddanīti.

Aggavamsa’s purpose is to show that the language of the Buddha, for him Pāli, is every bit as organised as the prestigious Sanskrit. But by applying the framework of rules developed by the

3 That is, the meanings of words which are not susceptible of sādhana analysis. The nissaya as quoted by Smith (69, note 2) gives the example yevāpana ‘whatever else’, an adjective formed as a syntactical or irregular compound from the phrase ye vā pana (ye as Māgadhism for yamī), that is, ‘those who go around saying ye vā pana’.

Sanskrit grammarians he tried to force a mould onto his Buddha-language which that language is not able to sustain.

Cambridge E.G. Kahrs

Abbreviations and literature:

For Pāli texts the abbreviations are those used in the Critical Pāli Dictionary.

A = the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini.
BORI = Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona.
1988, Pāṇini: his work and its traditions, vol. 1, Delhi.


dhp = the Pāṇiniya dhātupātha.


Hel = Helārāja’s commentary on VP, kāṇḍa 3, part 1, ed. K.A. Subramaniam Iyer, Poona, 1963. Ref. to page and line.


KāśN = Jinendrabuddhi’s Nyāsa on the Kāśikā, in Kāś.

KāśP = Haradatta’s Padamañjari on the Kāśikā, in Kāś.


1982, Some theoretical problems in Pāṇini’s grammar, BORI Poona.


WHY IS A KHATTIYA CALLED A KHATTIYA?
THE AGGAṆĀ SUTTA REVISITED

In a recent article¹ I have argued that the myth of the origin of society presented in the Aggaṅā Sutta² (AS) is satirical, and that the satire is based on Vedic texts. There is another instance of this which unfortunately I noticed too late to include it in that article.

The myth purports to account for the names of the four vaṇṇa, using etymological derivations which, I argued, parody the etymologies (niruki) found in the brahminical texts (where they reveal to initiates the hidden nature of things). The word khattiya is said (p. 93, para. 21) to originate from the expression khettānam pati, “lord/owner of the fields”. This seems a less than perfect fit to the story that has led up to it: the first ruler has been agreed on (sammata) to keep order, in exchange for which service he is to receive a share of the rice crop, but there is no suggestion that he will own the fields.

In the brahminical ceremony of royal consecration, the rājasūya, the anointing (abhiṣeka) of the king is performed to the accompaniment of several mantras. One of these sacred formulae is either kṣatrāṇaṃ kṣatrtrapatir asi, “Thou art the power-lord of the powers”, or the same in the imperative: kṣatrāṇām kṣatrtrapatir edhi, “Be thou the power-lord of the powers”. The AS has parodistically turned kṣattra, powers, into kṣetra, fields: further evidence for my theory that the Buddhist text is based on knowledge of brahminical texts, and satirises them.

The rājasūya mantra is found in at least five brahminical texts which might be as old as the AS: the Taittirīya Samhitā,³ the Taittirīya

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Brāhmaṇa,\textsuperscript{4} the Šatapatha Brāhmaṇa,\textsuperscript{5} the Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra\textsuperscript{6} and the Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra? (Of these, the Šatapatha Brāhmaṇa alone has the imperative version\textsuperscript{8}; the others have asi.) Is there any evidence to suggest which of these was the Buddha’s source? (Or the source of the Buddhist author, if we hesitate to ascribe authorship to the Buddha.) Since my article showed a reference in the AS to Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I and the Brhadāraṇyaka constitutes the last part of the Šatapatha Brāhmaṇa, the latter must be the strongest candidate. Moreover, the Šatapatha Brāhmaṇa is generally assigned to the relatively eastern part of Vedic India where the Buddha preached. Acquaintance with one Vedic text or tradition would of course not disprove acquaintance with others too. In my article I drew attention to a relationship between AS para. 22 and the Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra, though in that case the brahminical text shows awareness of Buddhists.

It is in the very next sentence after the one giving this etymology of khattiya that the word rājā is derived from the phrase dharmena pare raññjeti, “he pleases others by righteousness”. This new discovery bolsters my contention that that was intended as a joke.

PED gives two meanings for samā: “year” (< Skt samā) and “pyre” in agginisamā (Sn 668 670). The second of these seems to be an error, since it is more likely to be the word sama “like”. For the first meaning PED quotes Dhp 106 and Mhv VII 74 (misprinted as 78). It also occurs in the latter text at II 30, III 1 and V 120 (and probably elsewhere). Dhp-a seems to understand the meaning correctly, since it glosses: yo yajetha satam saman ti yo vassasatam māse māse sahassam pariccajanto lokiyamaññanassa dānam dadeyya (II 231,8–10), although the interpretation was probably helped by the presence of vassasatam hutam later in the same verse. There seems to be no doubt about the meaning in Mhv-ṭ. At Mhv-ṭ 137,25 (ad Mhv II 30) samā is glossed samvaccharā, at 215,25 (ad Mhv V 120) atthārasasamo is glossed atthārasavassiko, and at 267,12 (ad Mhv VII 74) samā khalu atṭhatimsā is glossed atṭhatims’ eva samvacchare. At 140,20–21 (ad Mhv III 1) the word is not glossed, but the cty clearly understands the structure of the compound (misleadingly divided in Mhv) and the word crasis, since it glosses: pañcaçattālisamasamo ti ettha hi pañcaçattālisamasamo asamo ti padacchedo hoti.

\footnote{1}{See K.R. Norman, “Pāli Lexicographical Studies IX”, in JPTS, XVI, pp.77–85.}
\footnote{2}{Abbreviations of the titles of Pāli and Sanskrit texts are as in the Epilegomena to V. Trenckner: A Critical Pāli Dictionary, Vol. I, Copenhagen 1924–48 (= CPD). In addition: BHS = Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit; PTS = Pali Text Society; PED = PTS’s Pali-English Dictionary; Skt = Sanskrit; cty/cties = commentary/ commentaries.}

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At Dhp 106 we find samam in apposition to satāṃ “one hundred years”, although it is not easy to analyse the form, since samam appears to be singular. In BHS at Udāna-v XXIVb (and elsewhere) we find the compound samāsamatam. This suggests that the original form in Dhp 106 was samāsamam, which developed to samamsamam by the common alternation of a long vowel and a short nasalised vowel. This compound was probably assumed to consist of two separate words samam satam, both apparently accusative singular forms, which could therefore be recited/written in the reverse order, since the scansion was the same either way.

We must presume that the fact that samam seems to be singular did not worry the tradition. This makes the inability of the commentarial tradition to understand the phrase sassatisamam (< Skt śāsvatīḥ samāḥ) at D I 14,14 foll. all the more strange. It appears in form to be an accusative singular used as an adverb “for eternal year(s)”, and Rhys Davids translates “(they are) for ever and ever”. The commentary, however, takes sama to mean “the same”: atīhī tv eva sassatisaman ti ettha sassati ni cccam vijjamānātaya mahāpāṭhavīm maññati, tathā Sineru-pabbata-canda-suriye, tato tehi samaṃ attānam maññamāno “atīhī tv eva sassati-saman” tvadati (Sv 105.26–29). This is translatable: “They remain the same, just like eternity itself”. A comparable explanation is given at Ps I 71,13–16 (ad M I 8.26): sassatisamam ti canda-suriya-samudda-mahāpāṭhavi-pabbatā lokavohārena sassatiyo ti vuccanti. sassatihi samaṃ sassatisamam. yāva sassatiyo tiṭṭhati tāva tathā eva ṭhassati ti ganhato evam diṭṭhi hoti. Similarly, Spk II 324,16–17 (ad S III 143,17): sassati-saman ti Sineru-mahāpāṭhavi-canda-suriyādihi sassatihi samam.

The correct interpretation is as sassati samā, two separate words, in the accusative plural, as the accusative of duration of time: “For eternal years”. It is possible that the ctv believed that this was a tatpurusā compound “equal to eternal (things)”, in agreement with a plural subject. This belief led to a shortening of the -i of sassati in compound, and then the subsequent change to a singular form: “(they exist) for that (time ?) which is equal to the eternal things”.

2. dvāṭhi “62”

At D I 54,4 Makkhali-Gosāla states: dvāṭhi patipadā. Sv 162,9 explains: dvāṭhi patipadā ti dvāśatī ti patipadā tvadati. Sv–pt I 290,2 explains: dvāśatī patipadā ti vattabbe sabhāvaniruttam ajānantvā dvāṭhi patipadā tvadanti. Bhikkhu Bodhi translates: “Not knowing the natural language correctly he speaks of sixty-two pathways as dvāṭhi patipadā when it should be dvāśatī patipadā”.

3 Dialogues of the Buddha, 1, p. 28.
PED lists the form (s.v. dvi) but offers no explanation or etymology. It seems to be the only numeral in Pāli in the 61–69 range which does not have -s-.\(^7\) We can compare it with Pkt sattaṭhi (= sattasaṭhi) “67” which shows the same loss of intervocalic -s-, doubtless after its development to -h-.

Since the other statements in this teacher’s doctrines include nominative singular forms in -e, and the emphatic form hevam, which are both non-Pāli (Eastern) forms,\(^8\) it seems very likely that dvaṭṭhi is also a non-Pāli form. The tikā’s comment is of great interest, because it shows that the author of the tikā recognised that dvaṭṭhi belonged to a dialect other than Pāli.

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\(^8\) See K.R. Norman, “Pāli lexicographical studies IX”, JPTS XVI, 1992, pp. 77–85 (p. 85)