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FOREWORD

In the second of his Hibbert Lectures, delivered in 1881, Mr (later Professor) T.W. Rhys Davids announced the foundation of the Pali Text Society, 'as the young Society will be called', an event therefore dating from a hundred years ago. The first of its many publications appeared in 1882 and also the first of its 23 issues of the Journal. These ceased in 1927 after almost consecutive publication from 1882.

As part of its centenary celebrations, in 1978 the Society brought out a facsimile reprint of this complete set, bound in 8 volumes. The rich variety of the scholarly topics contained in these Journals comprises editions of some 20 important smaller Pali works, too short, however, to be published separately in book-form. Also contained are original articles, learned notes and queries on difficult Pali words and passages, lists of Pali Mss in various leading Libraries in European and S-E Asian countries, indexes to works published by the PTS, and much else of service and interest mostly but not exclusively in the field of Pali studies. These contributions, all by eminent scholars, still command a high degree of respect throughout the world. Subject and Author Indexes in one vol., 1973, make their contents easy to find.

Also as part of its centenary celebrations the Society is now publishing a Journal for 1981. This, consisting of valuable articles by specially invited scholars in the fields of Pali and Theravāda Buddhism, while covering a wide variety of topics, maintains the high standard set by the contributors of half a century up to a century ago. Thus it amply shows there to be no lack of interest and broadly based, reliable research alive and active today in these two fields of study. Their treasures indeed become more accessible every time the Society makes a new publication, in roman letters, be it of text, translation, part of the Concordance, a Journal or some other tool.

October 1979  I. B. HORNER

ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations of the titles of Pali texts follow the system laid down in the Epilegomena to V. Trenckner and Dines Andersen, A Critical Pāli Dictionary, Vol. I, Copenhagen 1924–48. References are to PTS editions, unless otherwise stated.

Av-ā  Avadāna-sātaka, ed. J.S. Speyer (Bibliotheca India), 2 vols, St Petersburg, 1906
BD   Book of the Discipline (= trsln of Vin)
Be   Burmese edition
BEFEO Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient
BHS  Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit
BHSD  F. Edgerton, BHS Dictionary, New Haven, 1953
BHSG  F. Edgerton, BHS Grammar, New Haven, 1953
BMFEA Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities
BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
Ce   Sinhalese edition
ChS  Chāṭṭha-saṅgāyana edns, Rangoon
CPD  Critical Pāli Dictionary
CSM  Clarifier of the Sweet Meaning (= trsln of Bv-a)
cytes commentary/commentaries
DAṬ  Ee of Sv-𝑝, ed. Lily de Silva, London, 1970
DPPN Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names, ed. G.P. Malalasekera
edn(s) edition(s)
Ee   European edition
EFEO École française d'Extrême-Orient
EHBC E.W. Adikaram, Early history of Buddhism in Ceylon, Colombo, 1946
HOS  Harvard Oriental Series
IHQ  Indian Historical Quarterly
JA   Journal asiatique
JIABS Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
THE THERAVĀDINS AND EAST INDIA
ACCORDING TO THE CANONICAL TEXTS

The close relations between the Theravādins and east India in
the seventh century A.D. are well known through the concurring
testimonies of the two great Chinese travellers Hsüan-tsang and
I-ching.

The former, who visited India in the second quarter of the
seventh century, records their presence in Samatāṭa, that is, in
the Ganges delta, where together with two thousand recluses
living in more than thirty monasteries they formed the Buddhist
community. Unfortunately, he does not state to which school the
thousand or more monks, inhabiting more than ten monasteries,
belonged. He met them in the neighbouring region to the west,
around the famous port of Tāmrarāpiṭṭ from whence one could
embark for Ceylon. However, it can reasonably be supposed that
a good part of them, if not all, were also Theravādins. 2

According to Hsüan-tsang, the northern part of east India, in
particular the regions of Īrānpārvata (around the present-day
town of Monghyr) 3 and Karpasuvāraṇa (just to the north of the
Ganges delta) were, on the contrary, under the sway of the
Sammatīyas. 4

At the end of the same century, I-ching, whose information is
unfortunately much too general and imprecise, declared that the
Sthaviras, that is the Theravādins, were then living in east India
with the other great Buddhist schools, the Mahāsāṃghikas,
Mulasarvāstivādins and Sammatīyas. 5 This would seem to mean
that none of these four main groups which then comprised the
Community clearly prevailed over the others in the number of its
adherents in this region, the Theravādins no more than the others.

There is no serious reason to question the information thus
supplied by the two famous Chinese pilgrims, but it would be
helpful to know how long the Theravādins had been settled in
east India, in exactly which places, and what was the broad
outline of the history of their relationship with that region.

As ill luck would have it, the historiographers of this school,
who have preserved so many precious details for us about the
The Theravādins and East India

At the beginning of the famous story of the meeting between the Buddha and the two merchants Tapassu and Bhalluka in Uruvela, shortly after the Enlightenment, the Pali version states that these two men came from Ukkala, while the Mahāsākāra, Dharmaguptaka and Mūlasārivarṇīvādin versions breathe not a word about that. Only the Mahāvastu, which belongs to the Lokottaravādins, a branch of the Maññhikas, contains this same detail, but this work was completed much later than the Theravādin Vinaya-piṭaka and it can therefore be assumed that we have here a borrowing from the tradition which the Pali text had itself made use of much earlier. In other words, it is the story contained in the Pali Vinaya-piṭaka which is the oldest of our sources which have the two merchants come from the country of the Ukkalas.

Other Pali texts contain further information about these people. In the three suttas entitled Mahācattārītsaka, Paribbāja and Upādiyāmaṇa, the Buddha denounces the false opinions held by the Ukkalas, who denied the moral causality on which the fruition of actions is founded. In fact, only the first of these three texts has a parallel in the sūtras of the other schools and moreover it, preserved in Chinese translation, makes no allusion to the Ukkalas.

Consequently, of all the early schools which appeared before the beginning of the Christian era and of which we possess canonical works in their original language, Pali or Sanskrit, or in their Chinese version, that of the Theravādins is the only one to mention these people at the ancient time when these texts were composed. As we have just seen, the passages in which the Ukkalas are referred to are, even so, very few and this seems to indicate that the Theravādins still did not know that people and their country very well, that their relations with them were still recent and weak, and that the monks of this school were few in number. Perhaps also the beliefs of the Ukkalas were both too different from those of the Buddhists and too strong in the minds of those people, as is shown by the three Pali suttas mentioned above, for the monks' efforts at converting them to have had much success. This country would therefore seem to have been, for the Theravādin recluses, simply a region through which they had to pass in order to reach other more welcoming ones, a region where they evolution of the Theravādin community of Ceylon in the Dīpavaṁsa, Mahāvaṁsa and Cūlavāṁsa, remain completely silent about the events which must have stood out as landmarks in the life of the Theravādin monasteries established in other regions, particularly in east India. If learned monks residing in some of these establishments edited annals similar to those which distinguish Sinhalese Pali literature, their works have long since been lost and all memory of them obliterated.

Furthermore, while Buddhist epigraphy has furnished much precise information about the presence of various early schools in most of the Indian territory, such as Ceylon, up to the present it has remained silent with regard to east India. No document has yet been discovered which attests the presence of the Theravādins, or of any other school, in this vast region, so that, were it not for the testimonies of Hsüan-tsang and I-ching, it could be doubted that this part of India was converted to Buddhism before it was governed by the Pāla kings from the eighth century on.

We would therefore know nothing of the history of ancient Buddhism, and more particularly that of the Theravādins, in east India had the canonical texts, in Pali, Sanskrit and Chinese translation, not given us some indications. Certainly, these are few and the facts which they supply can in no way be accepted as solid historical evidence in the form in which they have reached us. However, by comparing the parallel texts belonging to different schools, Theravādin naturally, but also Sarvāstivādin, Mahāsākāra, Dharmaguptaka and others, by examining where they agree and differ, some information can be found about the presence of Buddhist communities in that part of India at the time when these canonical texts were gradually being compiled, that is, approximately during the last four centuries B.C.

The case of Ukkala, which corresponds to the northern part of present-day Orissa, is particularly clear. While the people bearing this name and the territory they inhabited are well-known to Hindu sources, to the two great Epics and the Purāṇas, the early Buddhist texts preserved in Chinese translation ignore them completely as do even those which have been handed down to us in their Sanskrit original, with perhaps one exception. Conversely, the Pali suttas mention them several times, which proves that the Theravādins knew of them.
came up against the indifference of the inhabitants, though perhaps not their hostility.

As we have seen above, the Mahiśāsakas and Dharmaguptakas, with whom the Theravādins were closely allied, seem to have been completely unaware of the Ukkalas before the Christian era, if one can judge from their versions of the episode of the merchants Tapassu and Bhalluka. Since the Mahiśāsakas, from whom would later emerge the Dharmaguptakas, separated from the Theravādins towards the end of the third century B.C., the addition of the mention of the Ukkalas in the Pali version of this episode is evidently later than this date, and it can be deduced from this that the Theravādins began to be interested in these people and their country at the beginning of the second century.

It is the same for the country of the Sumbhas, Suhmas in Sanskrit, which was seemingly to be found immediately to the west and north-west of the Ganges delta, therefore to the north-west of the territory inhabited by the Ukkalas. In fact, only the Chinese version of the Suttapatiyo-sutta, belonging to the Sarvāstivādin Samyukta-āgama, mentions it incidentally, alongside the regions peopled by the Puṇḍras and Kaliṅgas, by the Mallas, Magadhas and Aṅgas, among the countries which were successively crossed by the two laymen Ṛṣidatta and Purāṇa in search of the Buddha.11 Conversely, the Theravādins locate among the Sumbhas, more exactly in a town called Desaka, two scenes of the Blessed One’s life, narrated in the Udāyī-sutta and the Janapada-sutta,12 in which the Buddha teaches certain points of doctrine to some of his monks. This enables us to think that the Theravādins knew this region better than the adherents of other early Buddhist schools, and even that they established themselves there, notably in Desaka, during the last two centuries B.C., after they had separated from the other schools.

The town of Kajiṅgalī also seems to have belonged to the Sumbhas, or at least to have adjoined their territory. It was most probably to be found, as Cunningham thought, on the site of present-day Rajmahal, formerly called Kankjol, on the right bank of the Ganges, 85km to the east-south-east of Bhagalpur. According to the Vinaya-piṭakas of the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins, it marked the eastern frontier of the Madhyadesa, Central India as it was conceived by the Indians of antiquity.13 The Sarvāstivādins are in agreement with the Theravādins in locating two scenes of the Blessed One’s life there, as told in the Indriyabhāvanā-sutta14 and the Mahāpāṇa-sutta;15 in the one the Buddha has a discussion with a young heterodox recluse and, in the other, he praises the explanations given to the local laity by a pious Buddhist nun whose name proves that she inhabits the town in question. It can therefore be assumed that Kajiṅgalī was known to the Buddhist monks from before the reign of Aśoka, under whose rule the schism which divided the Sarvāstivādins from the Theravādins occurred. At that time, this town probably marked the eastern frontier of the advance both of Buddhism and of brahmanical civilization and, if the Buddha’s disciples did come there, they cannot have been many in number or their visits frequent. As for the rest, Kajiṅgalī was only a small township, established in a region which was still little inhabited and barely cultivated, where the monks would have found neither many laymen to convert nor plentiful supplies.

Kaliṅga, present-day Orissa between the deltas of the Mahānadi and the Godavari, first appears in the final stanzas of the Pali version of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sutta,16 which mention the possession of one of the Buddha’s canine-teeth by the king of that country. Even if none of the four versions of this sūtra preserved in Chinese translation, including that of the Dharmaguptakas, contains this verse,17 we find it again in the Sanskrit version of the same text, a version which belonged to the Mūlasarvāstivādin18 and which was completed very much later than the other five. The tradition according to which the king of the Kaliṅgas would have possessed one of the Blessed One’s teeth is therefore very late, after the schism which divided the Theravādins from the Dharmaguptakas, or more exactly from the Mahiśāsakas from whom the latter emerged a little later. It is later than the end of the third century B.C. and, with all the more reason, than the reign of Aśoka who conquered the country of the Kaliṅgas and opened it up to Buddhist propaganda. Furthermore, the same stanza, in both its Pali and Sanskrit versions, states that another of the Buddha’s teeth was preserved ‘in the town of the Gandhāras’, at the other end of the Mauryan empire, which was converted to Buddhism in Aśoka’s reign. Quite a considerable time, in fact several decades, must have elapsed between the
introduction of Buddhism to the Kāliṅgas and the Gandhāras, following their conquest, and the formation of the legend recorded by the stanza in question which locates sanctuaries containing particularly venerable relics in these two places.

The canonical texts, in Pali, Sanskrit and Chinese translation, contain other passages concerning the Kāliṅgas, but always in the form of legends in the very characteristic style of the Jātakas, recorded in a stupendously remote past. Some are narrated in the Pali and Chinese versions of the Mahāgovinda-sūtra as well as in the Mahāvastu, others are found in the much later collections of the Jātakas properly speaking.

Apart from the final verse of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra noting the presence of one of the Buddha’s canine-teeth among the Kāliṅgas according to a tradition which can scarcely go back further than the beginning of the second century B.C., this region is therefore only mentioned by the canonical texts in connection with legends situated in a fabulously remote past. Furthermore, this stanza and these legends were known to both the Theravādins and the other early schools: the verse was added to the Pali version of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra as well as to its Sanskrit one, which belonged to the Mūlasarvāstivādins; the legend of King Renu was inserted in the Theravādin and Dhammaguptaka versions of the Mahāgovinda-sūtra. Finally, no canonical text, Pali or otherwise, places the country of the Kāliṅgas in direct relation to the events of the life of the Buddha or of his great disciples; no story shows us the Blessed One or one of his monks coming to expound the Doctrine of Salvation to the Kāliṅgas, or one of the latter going to the Ganges Valley to hear their instruction.

So therefore, even in the last two centuries B.C., the Theravādins did not know that country or its inhabitants any better than did the other Buddhist schools. For the Theravādins as for the other Buddhists, the country of the Kāliṅgas was still a foreign region, where the religion of the Blessed One met with hardly any success and which merited only the setting of some legends of the Jātaka type there. We even get the impression that, for reasons of which we are unaware, the monks, to whatever school they belonged, neglected to convert its inhabitants and avoided going through it. Much later, when Hsüan-tsang travelled through that country, he noticed a similar situation, for in his time there were very few Buddhists among the Kāliṅgas who, on the contrary, showed themselves to be very devout towards the other religions, Hinduism and Jainism.

In short, the most prominent fact illustrating the presence of Buddhism among the Kāliṅgas was that of the Blessed One’s famous canine-tooth which, according to a post-canonical tradition, was said to be preserved in the capital, justly called Dantapura, ‘Town of the Tooth’. The existence of this celebrated relic is confirmed by the Cūlavamsa, according to which it was brought to Anurādhapura, the capital of Ceylon, in the ninth year of the reign of Sirimeghavaṇṇa, that is, in 370 A.D., by a brahman woman. Without wishing to cast a slur on the beliefs of Sinhalese Buddhists who since then have made it one of the main objects of their homage and the palladium of their ancient kings, it is reasonable to be sceptical about the authenticity of this object. In fact, no allusion to this canine-tooth is found in the six versions (including that of the Theravādins) of the canonical account of the distribution of the Buddha’s relics after the cremation of his body, an account which itself indeed appears to be based much more on legend than on history. It cannot be doubted that for many centuries the Sinhalese have revered a tooth which they attribute to the Buddha, and it can be accepted that it was brought to Ceylon in the year 370. What, however, can be doubted is that the tooth given to King Sirimeghavaṇṇa by the brahman woman was indeed the one which had been preserved in Dantapura, and there is room for much more scepticism over the origin of that canine-tooth, over its belonging to the Blessed One’s body, and over the circumstances which could have brought it from the Buddha’s funeral pyre to the capital of the Kāliṅgas, all matters about which only very late and highly suspect legends claim to inform us.

An examination of the canonical texts thus permits us to extract the following facts as to the relations between the Theravādins and East India in the last three centuries B.C. At the beginning of the third century, the small town of Kajaṅgala was the easternmost of all those where Buddhist monks, belonging to a Community still little divided by schisms, went to expound their doctrine, and perhaps they had already converted some of
of its inhabitants. A century later, the Theravādins, separated from the Sarvāstivādins and then from the Mahāyānakas, travelled through the regions situated to the south of Kajāṅgala, the country of the Sumbhas and that of the Ukkalas. They thus followed the new communication routes connecting the middle Ganges basin, where the Blessed One had lived and where the oldest and most revered places of pilgrimage were to be found, with the ports established in the Ganges and Mahānādi deltas, from whence one could embark for southern India and Ceylon, which were soon to become the main spheres of influence of those very same Theravādins. At that time, the countries of the Sumbhas and Ukkalas were doubtless still little cultivated or urbanized, where the teaching of the Buddhist doctrine had few chances of success. The situation was worse in the country of the Kaliṅgas, to the south-west of the Mahānādi delta, since, despite the conquest which Aśoka made over it at the beginning of his reign, Buddhism was never implanted or prosperous there. However, as that region was not crossed by such important routes for the pilgrims as the countries of the Sumbhas and Ukkalas, the Buddhist monks, and notably the Theravādins, seem to have neglected it.

PARIS

ANDRÉ BARLEAU

Notes

6 Vin I 3 foll.
7 T 1421, p. 103a; T 1428, pp. 781c-782a; T 1450, p. 125a.
8 Mvu III 303.
9 Mahācattāriṣaka-sutta, M III 78; Paribbāja-sutta, A II 31; Upādiyamāna-sutta, S III 72.
10 T 26, p. 735b.
11 T 99, p. 218c; Thapatayo-sutta, S V 348.
12 Udāyi-sutta, S V 89; Janapada-sutta, S V 169.
The further development of the religious traditions of Indian origin in Java and Bali saw the growth of a full-fledged syncretism of Buddhism and Śivaism and the doctrine of the identity of Śiva and Buddha. It is in this particular form that Buddhist elements survive in the modern religion of Bali. The religion is officially termed Agama Hindu. Buddhism has totally merged in this Balinese syncretism, and the Hindu elements in this religion proved to be much stronger than those of Buddhist origin. C. Hooykaas found that there were only sixteen Buddha priests (padanda) as against several hundreds of Śiva priests in Bali and Lombok when he studied the situation in 1967.

Against this background we understand that Buddhism was described as a religion of the past only in the contribution on Indonesia in the 2500 Buddha Jayanti Souvenir of 1956. It is only in the last paragraphs of that article that a short reference is made to recently formed groups ‘whose members call themselves Buddhists, though naturally they profess a special sort of Javanese Buddhism’.

At present, however, Buddhism or agama Buddha is one of the five officially recognised religions in Indonesia (panca agama di Indonesia), together with Islam (agama Islam), Catholicism (agama Kristen Katolik), Protestantism (agama Kristen Protestan) and Hinduism (agama Hindu). Buddhism in this sense is not to be confused with the Buddhist elements in the religion of Bali and Lombok, which is called the agama Hindu of Indonesia.

The revival of Buddhism in Indonesia seems to have had three roots: Buddhism of Chinese origin, Buddhist missions from the Therāvāda countries, and the reconversion of Javanese and Balinese to Buddhism which seems to have been influenced by the spread of the ideas of Theosophy and other systems of mysticism. Such influences have not, however, everywhere resulted in a revival of Buddhism. There exists a number of mystical sects in Java which remained in the wider realm of Islam. There can be no doubt, however, that ideas of the international Theosophical movement helped to prepare the ground for the acceptance of Buddhism by certain sections of the population of Java.

Notes on the revival of Buddhism in Indonesia can be found in several international Buddhist journals like World Buddhism.
The introduction of Theravāda in Indonesia is described as largely being the result of the activities of Ven. Jinarakkhita, an Indonesian who received upasampadā in Burma in April 1954. Already in 1953, Vesak was celebrated at Borobudur, and since then, the ancient group of Buddhist monuments in Central Java consisting of Borobudur, Candi Mendut and Candi Pawon, was again considered as the centre of Indonesian Buddhism. The Ven. Nārada Mahāthera of Vajirārāma in Colombo, who had carried out Dhammadūta work in Indonesia as early as in 1934, revisited Java in 1958 and laid the foundation stone of the Buddhist Centre in Semerang. Since 1955, a number of Buddhist organisations had been formed, and Perhimpunan Buddhis Indonesia (official abbreviation: Perbuddhi) was the most important of the Theravāda oriented groups. In 1962, already fourteen Buddhist Theravāda viharas existed in Sumatra, Java and Bali.

It is difficult to establish the number of Buddhists in Indonesia at present. In a report published in 1961, it is said that the adherents of Buddhism in Indonesia 'could only be counted in hundreds or in thousands', while a correspondent in Indonesia had written in 1960 that there were about 6 million Buddhists there. A more recent note even counts 'over fifteen million Buddhists scattered throughout the Indonesian islands'. More reliable information is available on the number of 'worship facilities' which is recorded in official statistics. For Buddhism, the number is 1267 (Java and Madura 362, Sumatra 342, Bali 80, Kalimantan 197, Sulawesi 157, other islands 129).

After 1965, Indonesian Buddhists had to formulate their views on the question of the existence of god. This had to be done in accordance with the principles of pancasila of May 29, 1945 which form part of the fundamental laws of the Republic of Indonesia. The first of these five principles is ketuhanan yang maha esa, i.e. belief in god. In 1966, a German publisher by the name of Gerhard Szczesniy issued a posthumous reprint of the book Buddhismus und Gottesidee (Buddhism and the concept of god) by Helmuth von Glasenapp (1891-1963) under the changed title Der Buddhismus, eine atheistische Religion which was in turn translated into English and published in 1970 as Buddhism, a non-theistic religion. The present author contributed a selection from Buddhist scriptures to this reprint, but he was not informed by the publisher that the book was to be published under a title different from the original book-title, nor was he informed when the English edition was being prepared. Later on, my attention was drawn to the fact that certain problems arose for the Buddhists of Indonesia when this book became known in Indonesia, because the recognition of Buddhism as a religion under the fundamental principles of pancasila was at stake if Buddhism was atheistic.

For the Buddhists of Indonesia who followed the Theravāda tradition there were two ways out of the dilemma: One group reinterpreted nibbāna as being maha esa. As a scriptural justification for this interpretation, the famous passage in Udana VIII, 3 about the nibbāna (atthi bhikkhave ājitaṁ abhitaṁ akataṁ asānkhetāṁ...) is being quoted. The followers of this group form the Agama Buddha Mazhab (school) Theravada di Indonesia, and their organisation is called Majelis Pandita Buddha Dhamma Indonesia (abbreviated: Mapanbuddhi).
There is, however, another group of Indonesian Buddhists with monks who have received their upasampadā from Theravāda tradition, viz. the followers of the afore-mentioned Jinarakkhita Thera. This group is organised as Majelis Upasaka Pandita Agama Buddha Indonesia (abbreviated: Muabi) or Majelis Agung Agama Buddha Indonesia. It was also called Buddhayāna, but this term has now fallen into disuse and was recently replaced by Agama Buddha Indonesia in their own publications. For the followers of this form of Buddhism, the ancient traditions of Javanese Buddhism can be combined with the traditions of Theravāda. According to their teachings, the concept of the Āśīvattavatā can be derived from these indigenous Javanese traditions and it can be proclaimed as the Buddhist concept of God. 20

For the knowledge of the teachings of Muabi we can rely on a number of publications, e.g. Buddha Dharma Samvacana of 1977, or the cyclostyled Doktrin Sanghyang Adi Buddha ed. by Sangha Agung Indonesia, Cipanas-Pacet, s.d. (ca. 1978). In both sources, three groups of books are determined to be the kitab suci, i.e. the holy scriptures of Agama Buddha Indonesia: 1. the Tripitaka of the Theravādin in Pali, 2. the Sanskrit Pitaka and 3. the Kawi Pitaka. Sanskrit Pitaka is then more exactly described as a number of Mahāyāna and Tantric works in Sanskrit. While a long list of titles is found in Doktrin Sanghyang Adi Buddha, the other publication lists only three: Ṣūryaśrī (i.e. Prajñāpāramitāśrīdayasūtra), Vajracchedikā and Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. ‘Kawi Pitaka’ is said to consist of the holy Buddhist scriptures in the Kawi or Old-Javanese language, viz. Sang hyang Kamahāyāni, Sang hyang Kamahāyāna Mantrāyan, Kujjarakarpa, Sutasoma etc. 21 The material which was actually used for the doctrinal statements in these works consists of a rather limited collection of texts, translations and secondary sources. 22 As far as I could ascertain, the Sanghyang Kamahāyāni (including the Kamahāyāna Mantrānaya which forms the first portion of the edited text) is the only Old Javanese Buddhist text which is in practical use with Javanese Buddhists today. It is available in a new edition issued by the Government of Indonesia. 23

The Agama Buddha Indonesia thus has followed the centuries-old tradition of religious syncretism in Indonesia, but this time not by combining elements of Hindu and of Buddhist origin as was the case with the Śiva-Buddhism of Old Java and Bali. Here, concepts and texts from different Buddhist traditions have merged. This new form of Buddhism proved attractive for several Buddhist communities including a considerable number of Buddhists of Chinese origin, because thereby they could adopt a form of Buddhism which declared itself to be genuinely Indonesian, and, at the same time, they could retain many of the traditions and practices of Chinese Mahāyāna. Chinese names of Buddhist monasteries were now officially replaced by Indonesian names which were largely of Sanskrit or Pali origin, e.g. Wihara Sakyawaram, Wihara Tri Ratna, Wihara Dharmayuga, Wihara Tunggal Dharma, Wihara Amerta Dharma etc. In these viharas, a small selection of Chinese Buddhist texts—mainly the Smaller Sukhāvatīvyūha, Vajracchedikā and the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśrīdayasūtra 24—is studied and used for chanting together with Paritta books of Indonesian Buddhist which mainly consist of Pali texts.

To give readers an impression of the contents of these Indonesian compilations, I shall now describe the contents of the booklet Ringkasan Pancaran Bahagia Paritta Mantram. This text was available to me in a cyclostyled copy of 42 pages from Wihara Kusalaratna in Jakarta. The whole book is composed in two scripts, the text being first written in Roman script and in the following line in a phonetic transliteration of the Pali or Sanskrit words in Chinese characters. The few words in Bahasa Indonesia are translated into Chinese. The collection consists of 32 short texts: 25

2. Vandanā, pp.1-2. TR, p.13; BDS, p.43. This passage runs as follows:

nama sanghyang Āśīvattavatā, nama tassa Bhagavato
Arahato Sammāsambuddhassa, nama Amitābha Buddhāya,
nama Avalokiteśvaro Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, nama
Mahāsthānaprāpta Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, nama Maitreyo
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, nama Kuvera Bodhisattva Mahāsattva, nama
Bhaisajyaguru Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva, nama sabbe
Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvāya. 26


5. *Pūjā*, pp. 4-5. *TR*, pp. 18-9; *BDS*, pp. 45-6. With minor variations in *Mirror*, pp. 9-10. Well-known pūjāgāthās in Pāli which are found in all editions of Baudhā Adahilla, Baudhā prati pattidipāniya and similar works. All Indonesian texts read bodhirāya nam’ athtu for bodhirājā nam’ athtu.


8. *Saṅghānusatti*, pp. 6-7. *TR*, p. 22; *BDS*, p. 49. *Mirror*, pp. 6-7. The formula supaṭipanno Bhagavato sāvakasāṇaṃgho . . . as found in D III 5 etc., and Vism 180; followed by the passages and stanzas namo tassa attaṅgatāya visampuggala-mahādhammassa etc. as in *Mirror*, pp. 6-7.


21. *Tanam kebaikan*, p. 27. Stanza Dhp 183 (cf. *BDS*, p. 151) and the often chanted stanza etena saccavajjena . . . (all pādas found in Mahāmāgalagāthā, though in different order).


23. *Namaksekara* (i.e. namaskāra), p. 28. Short formulas of homage in mixed language.


27. *Aku berlindung*, p. 33 (with musical notation; only first stanza). *TR*, p. 181; *BDS*, p. 149. Modern Indonesian Dharmagītā.


The collection consists of 21 Pali texts (no. 1, 3-12, 14-17, 20-22, 25-27), four dhārāṇīs and stotras in Sanskrit or hybrid Sanskrit (no. 18, 29, 23, 24), six poems in Bahasa Indonesia (no. 13, 28-32) and the mixed vandana (no. 2). Other collections of Buddhist texts that were published for practical use by Indonesian Buddhists show a similar picture. The influence of Pali Buddhism is by far the strongest element in this form of Indonesian Buddhism, but reference to Ādibuddha and to the various Buddhas and Bodhisattvas of Mahāyāna is always found in all vandana-formulas used by the followers of Buddhayāna or Muabi. The following formula now seems to have become the established vandana:  

namo Sanghyang Ādi Buddhāya, namo Buddhāya, namo sarve Bodhisatvāya Mahāsatvāya.

A number of viharas which were purely Chinese have also joined Perbuddhi or Muabi in recent years. Here, Chinese texts, of course, still play a major role for many rituals. However, the use of Pali gāthās has meanwhile been introduced not only here, but also in some of the monasteries of the Tridharma school which is the Indonesian variant of the well-known traditional syncretism of the three Chinese religions, viz., Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism. Though the name Tridharma still reflects the fact that this school originated from a syncretistic form of the three religions and though some non-Buddhist rituals are still being performed in its temples, Tridharma of Indonesia is on the way to becoming distinctly Buddhist at the expense of the other elements of its tradition. Together with the other Buddhists of Indonesia, Tridharma has joined the All-Indonesian Federation of Buddhist Organizations which was formed in 1978, the Perwalian Umat Buddha Indonesia (or Walubi).

The present contribution is meant to give preliminary information on the role of Pali in modern Indonesian Buddhism, and I hope to be able to collect and provide more information in the future.

The Buddhaayana of Indonesia

Notes
9 Soekmono, loc. cit., p. 104.
11 Bhikkhu Khantipālo, A Record of Journeys in Indonesia for the Ordination of five Bhikkhus at the Great Stupa of Borobudur by Phra Sāsana Sothana from the 6th of May to the 13th May 2513, Bangkok, Mahamakut Press, B.E. 2514.
12 Khantipālo, loc. cit., p. 2.
13 Cf. 'Birma at Borobudur', World Buddhism II, 8, March 1954, p. 2; 'Revival of Buddhism in Indonesia', ibid., VI, 9, April 1958, p. 3; U. Visakha Tjen, 'Buddhism in Indonesia', ibid., XI, 4, November 1962, p. 22.
17 Buku Saku Statistik Indonesia, Jakarta, Biro Pusat Statistik, 1977, p. 58.

20 Adibuddha was known in the tradition of Old Javanese and Balinese Vajrayāna. See, e.g., Buddhastava in T. Goudriaan and C. Hooykaas, Stuti and Stava (Buddha, Saiva and Vaigyava) of Balinese Brahman Priest, Amsterdam, Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1971, p. 412, no. 685:

pranamya satatam Buddhām Adibuddhanamakāram I
sattvasattvavakpunyakam vaksye vaksye dhanaṁ param II

The question of the actual sources for the Adibuddha concept in modern Indonesian Budhhayāna is, however, not yet answered by this statement.


22 Of the 39 titles quoted in the bibliographical list in Doktrin Sanghyang Adi Buddha, pp. 13–16, only one title represents a Buddhist kitab suri in its original language, viz. the Sang hyang Kamahāyanikā. The other books quoted are five English translations of Pali and Sanskrit texts, one book with selections from the Pali Canon (viz. Nyanatiloka, The Word of the Buddha), twenty-nine secondary works on Buddhism (14 in English, 11 in Bahasa Indonesia, 3 in Dutch and 1 in German), one Theosophical work and finally two general works on religious science.


24 The mantra from Prajñāpāramitāḍhayāsūtra is reproduced in TR (see below, note 25), p. 136.

25 Reference is made to parallel passages in two other Indonesian collections of short Buddhist texts, viz. Panjaraan Tri Ratna, published by Perbudhi, s.d. (abbreviated TR) and the above-mentioned (see note 21) Buddha Dharma Samvacana (abbreviated BDS). The abbreviation Mirror refers to Nārada Thera and Bhikkhu Kassapa, The Mirror of the Dhamma, Colombo, Vajirarama Publication Society, 1956. Other abbreviations follow the system used in the Critical Pāli Dictionary.

26 Text reproduced without corrections, but some diacritical marks are supplied.

27 Ven. Gitarakkhita is the presiding abbot of the Brahmadhārāma in Banjar, North Bali. His community belongs to Mapanbudhi.

28 Texts no. 18, 19 and 23 do not seem to have been handed down by the Baudhda Brahmas of Bali, so that Budhhyāna is definitely indebted to Chinese tradition for these texts which were
THE PAṬṬHĀNA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THERAVĀDIN ABHIDHAMMA

Vijñānavādin antecedents

Vasubandhu and a number of other Vijñānavādin writers defend the key idealist doctrine of the ālaya-vijñāna or store-consciousness from the charge of innovation by appealing to pre-existent notions among the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mahīśāsakas and also to the idea of the bhavaṅga-vijñāna.1 The first two of these are mentioned already by Asaṅga.

One of the principal functions of the concept of ālaya-vijñāna is to solve the two closely related problems of the continuity of personality and the mechanism of karma without postulating an unchanging soul or substratum of existence. It is not then surprising to find the pūdgala doctrine of the powerful Sāṃkṣerika school omitted from the list of predecessors. The equally numerous but historically more influential sect of the Sarvāstivāda had no need for a storehouse-consciousness; for it held that past and future dharma exist and accepted a physical manifestation of karma. Not surprisingly Asaṅga and his successors looked especially for support to ideas derived from the traditions of that considerable body of schools which had not accepted either the pūdgala or the so-called realist doctrine of sarvam asti.

Unfortunately the two sources cited by Asaṅga are among the early Buddhist sects whose particular doctrines are less well-known to us. It is therefore impossible to judge how far Asaṅga’s claims for the antiquity of the idea of the ālaya-vijñāna are really justified. Vasubandhu’s reference to the bhavaṅga-vijñāna is therefore of particular importance. He himself attributes it to the Sinhalese sect (Tāmrapaṇṭiya-nikāya), but later Vijñānavādin writers refer to this as a doctrine of the Sthaviras or Viśhajavādins. At least two of these names must in this context refer to the school known today as the Theravāda.

North Indian Buddhist sources do not often mention the Theravāda before the Pāla period. There are, it is true, a few indications of a measure of interaction. Chinese sources inform us that the Sinhalese monastery at Bodhgaya which was visited by Hsuan-tsang was founded during the reign of Samudragupta (latter half of the fourth century). Sinhalese monks are mentioned in an inscription at Nāgārjunakoṭa dated to the third quarter of the third century A.D. Further south the situation was perhaps rather different. The Ceylon commentaries give the impression that the Theravāda was well established in the Cola country in the time of Buddhadatta and Buddhaghoṣa (fl. c.430 A.D.). Indeed these works show that the Buddhists of the Theravāda school were reasonably aware of their mainly Mahāsāṃghika co-religionists in South India, but knew little of the North Indian systems.

We need not suppose that there was no connection at all between North and South India. This is quite obviously not the case with Buddhist art. More probably ideas and practices percolated slowly in both directions by means of intermediaries. In the present connection, however, it is possible that we should look more specifically to the Mahiśāsaka school for a means of transmission. Asaṅga in fact mentions their doctrine of the āsamsārika-skandha as a precursor of ālaya-vijñāna. Hsuan-tsang informs us that Asaṅga was originally a member of this school himself. Its geographical spread appears to have been particularly wide. Fa-hsien obtained a copy of their Vinaya in Ceylon, while the author of the Jñātaka Commentary states that he was invited to compose the work by a monk of the Mahiśāsaka-vamsa. If we are to believe the Visuddhimaggaṭhīpadā,2 Buddhaghoṣa cites a work of theirs entitled Peṭaka; this may or may not be the work known to us as Peṭakopadesa. If the two can be identified, this would tend to confirm Barea’s suggestion that the Mahiśāsaka were originally the mainland counterpart of the Theravāda.3

Origins of the term bhavaṅga

Whether there is any direct influence or not, only from Theravādin sources can we at present hope to investigate Asaṅga’s claim. The Pali term bhavaṅga first appears in this sense in the Paṭṭhāna and then in the Milinda-paṇṭha.4 Keith comments:
The bhavaṅga, or stream of being, is a conception barely known in the Abhidhamma, and there not explained, but it evidently has already here⁵ the sense of a continuum which is not conscious, but from which consciousness emerges, and which may therefore be reckoned as subconscious.⁶

With some qualification this is the position of the commentaries. It cannot, however, be taken as evidence for an earlier period. The relevant section of the Milinda-pañha cannot be dated with certainty much prior to the fifth century.

A rather different approach is taken by Sarathchandra in his study of the theory of the citta-vīthi. He writes: 'The word bhavaṅga, borrowed from the Sarvastivada Abhidharma, meant originally a link in the Causal Chain or pratītyasamutpāda.'⁷ This usage of the term is in fact not unknown to Pali literature. The formula of dependent origination is quite widely known as the wheel of existence (bhava). So it is quite natural for its parts to be referred to as factors of existence. Such a usage is explicit in the Netti-pakarana, which lists the various terms which make up dependent origination and concludes:

**Imañi bhavaṅgāni yadā samaggāni nibbatāni bhavanti, so bhavo. Taṃ sanśārasa padaṭṭhānaṃ.**⁸

When these factors of existence are conjointly produced, this is existence. Existence is the proximate cause of sanśāra.

Later in the same work it becomes clear that the term bhavaṅga is used in the sense of a factor which tends to produce existence. The term also occurs once in the Peṭakopadesa, apparently in the same sense.⁹

The dating of the Netti-pakarana and Peṭakopadesa is uncertain. Both were known to Buddhaghosa. The Peṭakopadesa seems to have influenced the Vimuttimagga, a pre-Buddhaghosa work, which only survives in Chinese translation. Nāṇamoli has, however, shown that the Netti-pakarana is in part based upon the Peṭakopadesa. He has also argued that the latter shows signs of being in origin an oral work.¹⁰ My own reading of it has left me with the same impression. Since it shows traces of influence from some of the earlier works of the Abhidhamma-pitaka, it may be appropriate to think of the second century B.C. for the work in its present form. Of course it is quite likely that it incorporates earlier traditions. The Netti-pakarana was dated by Hardy to 'about the beginning of our era or shortly later.'¹¹ An earlier date is not impossible.

On this basis it would seem that the use in these two works of the term bhavaṅga to designate the links of dependent origination is as old as its use in Sarvastivādin and Mahāyānist literature. No doubt it is best looked upon as part of the common stock of Buddhist technical terminology of the period. In fact it seems quite plain that this is the original meaning of the term, from which the use to designate a type of consciousness is derived.

In the commentarial literature bhavaṅga is explained as meaning cause (hetu) of existence. This is perhaps simply to say that the twelve anīgas of dependent origination are identical to the twelve paccayas (conditions) or twelve nidānas (origins) and are hence in fact causes. This would be reinforced by the widespread use of expressions such as ten anigena effectively in the sense of 'for this reason'.

The source of the term bhavaṅga used to designate or qualify a particular type of consciousness is then apparent. In the formula of dependent origination the third anīga is consciousness, but in this context it is often used specifically to refer to consciousness at the moment of conception. This would be a less active type of consciousness resulting from past actions. Just such is the bhavaṅga-citta of the commentaries. In fact the connection is not entirely forgotten. The later tradition relates the consciousness at conception (paṭisandhi) and at death (cuti) to the bhavaṅga mind. To a large extent these are treated as special terms for the first and last in the series of moments of bhavaṅga consciousness.¹²

**The theory of the citta-vīthi in the commentaries**

Perhaps at this point it would be useful to turn to the description of the process of consciousness given in the commentarial tradition. From here it may be easier to approach the origin and development of the system at an earlier period in the development of the abhidhamma. The system is set out in the works of Buddhaghosa, in detail in the Visuddhimagga and Āṭṭhasāliṅī,
more briefly in his Sutta commentaries; in the writings of Buddhaddatta and in the Chinese translation of the *Vimuttimagga*. Pali commentators and subcommentators after the fifth century A.D. add only a very little. The present account will be largely based upon the account of Buddhaghosa.  

The commentarial description of the consciousness process is highly complex. This is partly due to the abhidhamma attempt to cover all possible cases. So it can be made much simpler by excluding matters which apply only to non-human beings, to defective human beings or to normal human beings who are either experiencing some kind of higher consciousness or have attained some degree of sanctity. In this way a restricted account of the process as it applies to the ordinary person can be given.

Only forty five types of consciousness are then relevant. They fall into two groups:

a) *caused* - the cause will either be delusion or one of the possible combinations among delusion, greed, hate, non-greed, non-hate or non-delusion. Twenty eight types of caused consciousness are listed, divided into eight skilful, eight resultant and twelve unskilful.

b) *causeless* - i.e. not caused by any of the above. These number seventeen. This is made up of five sense consciousnesses which result from skilful action, five which result from unskilful action, the two mind elements (*mano-dhātu*) resulting from skilful and unskilful action respectively, mind consciousness element (*manoviññāna-dhātu*) resulting from unskilful action, two mind consciousness elements resulting from skilful action but differentiated by the accompanying feeling, the mind element which is purely activity (*kiriyā*) and the mind consciousness element (accompanied by neutral feeling) which is purely activity.

The term *kiriyā* designates a type of mentality which does not take part in the kammic process - it is neither the result of some previous action nor does it itself give rise to any result in the future. As the term applies most frequently to the state of mind of the arahat, it should not be translated by words such as 'functional' or 'inoperative', which have inappropriate connotations. The *kiriyā* mind is not mechanical, effete or unfeelingly robotic. Rather it is intended to designate the spiritual sensitivity of a man of developed wisdom, who responds to every situation with appropriate activity without partiality of any kind. Here of course it is occurring in a weak form accessible to all.

Each of the above types of consciousness represents an interlocking complex of phenomena, made up of the appropriate type of mind, a number of appropriate mental (cetasika) and groups of material phenomena of various kinds. The number of mental will vary from a minimum of seven in the simplest form of sense consciousness up to a maximum of thirty five in a developed skilful consciousness. They will also vary qualitatively according to the type of consciousness. So for example the feeling which accompanies a skilful mind is itself skilful and qualitatively different to the feeling accompanying an unskilful mind. The precise details of all this do not concern us here. It suffices perhaps to point out that the commentarial account of all this is firmly based upon the description given in the *Dhamma-saṅgani*. A few additional details have been added, but there are no changes of substance.

**Mind door process**

In fact this work gives a fairly static account of mentality and matter as they occur in particular moments - analogous let us say to a single frame in a motion picture. The theory of the *citta-vīthi* attempts to show their occurrence over a series of such moments - more analogous to a particular event in the film. Two types of process are described: [five door process and mind door process]. These may occur in succession to one another or the mind door process may occur independently. We will take the latter simpler case first. This describes the situation of the individual who is absorbed in thought or memory without any direct perception of his sensory environment.

In this mind door process we need only take account of four of the functions (*kicca*) of consciousness:

1. *Bhavanga* - this is always one of the eight kinds of consciousness which are resultant and caused. The same type of mentality will normally perform this function throughout the life of a given individual. Its precise nature will be determined either by previous actions recalled to mind at the end of the
previous life or by the manner in which death was met. Nevertheless it must be one of the above eight which result from some kind of skilful action or normal human birth could not have occurred. We may interpret its continuance throughout life as the natural mode to which the mind continually reverts as indicating its role of ‘carrying’ the essential features of the individual—those tendencies which remain apparently unchanged in a particular individual throughout a given life.

2. Adverting — this will always be a single occurrence of the kiriyā mind consciousness element (uncaused and accompanied by neutral feeling).

3. Javana — this will either be one of the eight skilful or one of the twelve unskilful consciousnesses. The term javana ‘running’ appears to be used to indicate the active nature of the mentality which performs this function. We may compare the simile given to differentiate skilful from resultant consciousness:

... the resultant is free from striving and like such things as the reflection (nimitta) of the face on the surface of a mirror; the skilful does involve striving and is like the face itself.14

Javana mind then makes up all the more active components of the individual. We may interpret its continual recurrence in different forms as indicating the everchanging manifestations of human personality—all those behaviour patterns formed by experience and habit in the course of life. 3

4. Tadārammanā — this is also called pitthi-bhavana ‘after-bhavana’ to indicate that a special kind of bhavana mind can occur immediately after a series of javana moments.15 The term tadārammanā ‘having the same object’ is used to indicate that this kind of bhavana retains the object of the javana mind. It may perhaps be seen as fixing the conscious experience of the javana stage in the unconscious mind. Bhavana however is only unconscious in the sense that the subsequent memory of it is unclear. We may perhaps rather see the tadārammanā as providing a substitute which can partially displace the original bhavana—not of course completely. This would be especially appropriate in the case of persistent unskilful activity. The function of tadārammanā is performed by eleven types of resultant consciousness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Bhavana</th>
<th>Adverting</th>
<th>Javana</th>
<th>Tadārammanā</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citta</td>
<td>caused</td>
<td>causeless mind consciousness element</td>
<td>skilful or unskilful</td>
<td>mind consciousness element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Cetasikas</td>
<td>up to 33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>up to 34 or up to 21</td>
<td>up to 33 (caused) or up to 11 (causeless)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kammic Status</td>
<td>result of action</td>
<td>neither action nor result of action</td>
<td>action</td>
<td>result of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>no definite limit</td>
<td>one moment</td>
<td>up to seven moments</td>
<td>one or two moments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This then is the normal flow of the mind when attention is not paid to the senses. If there is no particular activity, it remains in a state of rest: bhavana. This continues without interruption in deep dreamless sleep. If thought or memory occur, then the active javana stage has arisen. In vague musing or unclear remembering there may be continual alternation between these two modes; for the active mode has only a limited duration before the mind must lapse into its normal passive mode. Of course to refer to these as modes is not strictly accurate. Abhidhamma envisages a continual flow of consciousness arising and ceasing in every moment ‘as if it were the stream of a river’.16 We may note however that direct transition is envisaged from active mode to passive, but not from passive to active. In the latter case kiriyā mind must occur for one moment in order to turn bhavana towards the object.

But what is the object at the mind door? Traditionally it may be any kind of object—past, present or future, purely conceptual or even transcendent. In the normal case, however, it will be either a memory of the past or some kind of concept. The door of its arising will be ‘one part of the organ of mind reckoned as
bhavaṅga mind’. To be more exact it is disturbed bhavaṅga (bhavaṅga-calana) in conjunction with adverting which constitutes the door of mind, often treated in Buddhist thought as a sixth sense. Of course abhidhamma avoids describing consciousness as divided into parts; it always prefers a description in terms of successive moments.

1. Undisturbed bhavaṅga is described as clear or translucent. Evidently it is seen either as storing past experience or as having direct access to the past (or future). In the first case we might understand it as an unconscious storehouse. The mind as a whole is certainly envisaged as accumulating tendencies, but it is not clear how far this would include experiences. What is probably intended is a water metaphor. Just as an undisturbed pool or stream is clear and offers no obstruction to vision, so bhavaṅga mind is intrinsically clear and featureless. When the pool is disturbed it is no longer possible to see through it—the water which it contains is now visible. Similarly when bhavaṅga mind is disturbed, it is no longer translucent; some part of its content becomes visible. Possibly this would not be so much the mind’s content as part of its potential capacity to know becoming realized.

**Sense door process**

It is more normal to explain the process involving sense perception first. The reason, no doubt, is the predominant part played by the senses in our ordinary life. Abhidhamma evidently conceives of them as conditioning a great part of our experience in a largely mechanical fashion. Technically this would be expressed by saying that five door javana is the foundation of mind door javana. However sense door process involves a greater number of functions than mind door process and at first appears more complex in its operation. So it is appropriate to list these:

1. Bhavaṅga — this was described above, but without distinguishing disturbed bhavaṅga as a separate stage.

2. Disturbed bhavaṅga — this occurs for two moments only, due to the stimulus of a sense object. Strictly speaking the object enters the field of the mind sense. At exactly the same moment sensory contact takes place with a physical impact (ghaṭṭana) upon the subtle matter which is the physical basis for the operation of sense consciousness.

3. Adverting — the function of adverting to one of the sense doors is always undertaken by the kiriyā mind element, which has in fact no other function apart from turning the mind towards a sense. As was the case for mind door advertent, its duration is for one moment only.

4. Seeing — we will take this as our example for the senses. At this stage we are concerned with ‘seeing only’ with a minimal interpretative element. So this function is performed either by a visual consciousness which is the result of skilful action or by one which is the result of unskilful action. Which of the two it will be is determined by the nature of the object. If it is the result of skilful action the neutral feeling which accompanies it will be subtle and will shade towards pleasant feeling. If it is the result of unskilful action that feeling will be inferior and will shade towards unpleasant feeling. The same will be the case for hearing, tasting or smelling, but not for touching. Tactile sensation is conceived of as stronger. So body consciousness which is the result of skilful action is accompanied by a distinctive form of pleasant feeling, while unpleasant feeling invariably accompanies unskilful resultant body consciousness.

5. Receiving (sampāṭicchana) — this function is always performed by one of the two resultant mind elements. In fact mind element has only the role of enabling transit to and from a sense consciousness; the ‘twice five’ sense consciousnesses are invariably preceded by one moment of kiriyā mind element and invariably followed by one moment of resultant mind element. The point seems to be that the normal state of the mind is the flow of resultant consciousness. Sense consciousness is quite different to this. So an intermediary is required for the passage between the two. This is rendered very neatly by the simile of the thread. A ground spider extends thread in five directions making a web and settles down in the middle. When one of the threads is struck by an insect, it is disturbed and comes out from its resting place. It follows along the thread, drinks the juice of its prey, comes back and settles down in the very same place.

6. Examining (saṅťrāṇa) — this function is always carried out
by one of the three resultant mind consciousness elements. In effect the mind has returned to a weak form of resultant consciousness which is able to examine the object. This can also be expressed by saying that the mental of recognition (saññā) is prominent at this stage of the process.

7. Establishing (votthapana) — is carried out by the kiriya mind consciousness element. We may see it as enabling the arising of the active javana stage. The mind is now able to establish the nature of the object. It is often compared to smelling food prior to eating it. Establishing determines the nature of the mind’s response to the object which has been identified.

8. Javana — was discussed above. It is compared to the act of actually eating the food.

9. Tad-ārammana — was also discussed earlier. It resembles the act of savouring the taste of food after it has been eaten.

The most difficult part of the sense door process is probably to be found in stages four to seven, but it can perhaps be clarified by another of the traditional similes. Some village boys were sitting playing a game on the road with mud. A square coin made contact with the hand of one of the boys. The boy asked what it was that had touched his hand. Another boy said that it was pale (panḍara). One boy took firm hold of it together with the mud. Another said that it was square and flat. Yet another declared that it was a silver crown (kabāpaya). They took it and gave it to their mother, who used it for some task (kamma). Taking hold of the coin is compared to the mind receiving an object. Identifying it as square and flat is like the stage of examining, while the stage of establishing resembles the decision that it is worth one crown. The actual utilization of the coin (by the mother) is similar to the mind performing the function of javana.

What are we to make of this? The implication is clear. Visual perception involves not only seeing itself, but also fixing of the object in the mind, recognition of its general features and identification of its nature. These things are obviously very closely linked. In abhidhamma such a close relationship tends to be expressed in process terms as a succession of moments. A very close connection will be a rapid and constant succession. This is exactly what we have here. Each single distinct visual perception involves a separate advertting, a separate seeing, a separate receiving, a
separate examining and a separate establishing. Each of these occurs for one moment only. The five always occur together and always in the same logically required order of succession.

Some variations in the process

The same is not true for the five door process as a whole. Only for very great objects i.e. distinct percepts does the process complete all nine stages before lapsing back into bhavaṅga. If the sensory stimulus is weaker, then an incomplete process may occur. This is called a fruitless case (mogha-vāra). Three possibilities are allowed:

a) Innumerable objects occur at the sense doors without being strong enough to bring about adverting to one of the five doors. In this case only disturbed bhavaṅga will occur. Presumably the intention is to indicate that many of our sensory stimuli are not consciously registered.

b) The stimulus may be adequate to bring about adverting and the succeeding stages down to establishing. We are told that this is the kind of case in which one says: 'it is as if seen by me'. What is meant here is probably the type of occasion in which one might say: 'I thought I saw someone among the trees.' Something has been identified but is not yet clearly seen.

c) A stronger stimulus may be sufficient to bring about all the stages down to javana, but not enough to produce the last stage. This is illustrated by a simile. The damming of a river is compared to adverting which diverts the mind from the flow of bhavaṅga. The series of process consciousnesses is compared to the diverted water running in a great irrigation channel. Javana is like the water flooding the fields on both sides of the channel. Lapsing back into bhavaṅga without the occurrence of tad-ārammanā resembles water running away through fissures back down to the river. We are told that there is no way to count the number of consciousnesses which do this.

Only one variation is permitted for the mind door process. If the object is clear the tad-ārammanā stage will arise. If it is not clear the mind will go back down to bhavaṅga immediately after the javana stage. The reason for this difference between sense door and mind door process is apparent. Sense door process is aroused by the stimulus of a sense object and exists only in dependence upon such an object. It must then lapse if the object ceases to exist. The same is not the case for mind door process, whose object need not be of the present. The different forms of sense door process are due to variation in the duration of particular stimuli even if we experience this as varying vividness of perception. The two kinds of mind door process differ because of variation in the clarity of the object, the impulse as it were coming from within. In practice however the process which terminates with the javana stage must be experienced as a lack of perceptual clarity in either case.

Obviously this is a rather simplified account of the abhidhamma theory of mental process. By excluding higher states of being from consideration much of the intended significance is lost. In fact a hierarchy of different states is involved. This is partly described in numerical terms—weaker states have fewer accompanying mental states than stronger states; skillful states tend to involve more mental states than unskillful ones. Still more important are qualitative differences, often only indicated by a single terminological change. For example supramundane consciousness may not necessarily have more accompanying mental states than a given lokiya skillful consciousness. Nevertheless it is qualitatively superior. Moreover each of its accompanying mental states is qualitatively superior to the same mental associated with the corresponding lokiya consciousness.

Sequential structure of the process

The simplified account does however have the advantage that it makes much clearer some significant features of the process. This is best shown by setting out the distribution of the forty-five consciousnesses in grid form. In each section is given the number of possible types of consciousness together with the maximum number of accompanying mental states (in brackets).
If we now rearrange this material slightly we can use it to form a picture of the way in which the process of mind works:

![Diagram]

If we now set out the different possible sequences using the same numeration as before, we get:

A) Mind door process:

![Diagram]

B) Sense door process:

![Diagram]

C) Incomplete sense door process:

Two points of particular importance emerge. Firstly any change from the normal passive state of mind (i.e. resultant mind consciousness element) is brought about by kiriyā mind. This alone can bring about the arising of skilful or unskilful javana mind and only this can turn the mind to a sensory mode. Secondly mind element always intervenes before and after a sense consciousness. The consequence of these and some other restrictions is to sharply limit the number of permissible successions between moments. This can be set out in tabular form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mind consciousness element</th>
<th>Mind element</th>
<th>Eye consciousness element</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skilful or Unskilful</td>
<td>twenty (34)</td>
<td>none</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kiriyā</td>
<td>one (11)</td>
<td>one (10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resultant</td>
<td>eleven (33)</td>
<td>two (10)</td>
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**permissible succession**

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**impermissible succession**

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The consciousness process before Buddhaghosa

All of this amounts to a fairly complex and sophisticated theory of mental processes. Naturally the question arises as to its origin. Sarathchandra writes:

The theory is quite unique in the history of Indian thought, and it was probably the work of Buddhaghosa who came to Ceylon after having immersed himself in Sanskrit philosophy.26

This seems a very unsatisfactory statement of the position. The clearest evidence that the theory was well-established in the older Sinhalese commentaries prior to Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta is perhaps to be found in the Āṭṭhasālinī, the commentary to the first book of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka. Here we find a long passage reproduced under the title of Vipākuddhāra-kathā.27

Careful reading of this piece, which takes up just over twenty pages in the PTS edition, shows that it is reproduced directly from an old source, almost certainly a Sinhalese āṭṭhakathā. It commences with what it calls a mātiκā, which in this kind of context is in effect a table of contents. This gives three different enumerations of the various types of resultant mentality. These are attributed to three named Elders. It then immediately states: ‘In this place they took what is called the Sāketa Question’. This records the traditional response to the question as to whether one kamma could have more than one resultant citta or vice versa.

Immediately after this we read: ‘Again in this place what is called the Explanation of Prominence was taken. This is referred to by name in the Visuddhi-magga, where it is regarded as the authoritative decision following the thought of the Commentarial teachers (... Āṭṭhakathācariyānam matānusāreṇa vinicchayo).28

After the Explanation of Prominence follows the Explanation of Roots. As the passage continues it becomes quite evident that the Āṭṭhasālinī has simply taken a section almost verbatim or perhaps slightly condensed from a rather formalized earlier source. Careful analysis would, I think, show some distinctive stylistic features. An earlier passage in the same commentary—the Dwāra-kathā, shows some of the same characteristics and is specifically attributed to the Mahā-āṭṭhakathā.29

Since these passages are in any case authoritative and revered, we may suppose that their source is likely to be of considerably earlier date. The work of Adikaram would tend to suggest that little was added to the Sinhalese commentaries after the second century A.D.30 Even if Adikaram’s conclusion’s are not accepted it makes little difference in this case. Not only does the Vipākuddhāra-kathā contain a very detailed account of the citta-vīthi. Even the differences between the views of the three Elders imply an elaborate theory of the consciousness process forming the basis of their discussion.

The Elders concerned are not unknown to us from other commentarial sources. So it is probably safe to assume that they are historical figures who actually did hold the views attributed to them. In that case we should expect to find the fully elaborated theory of the citta-vīthi already developed in the early first century A.D. This appears to be the view of A.K. Warder.31

The consciousness process and the Paṭṭhāna

Should we then take it that the theory originated with these Elders and their immediate predecessors? Or does it have a basis in the canonical abhidhamma literature? Nāṇamoli writes: ‘An already-formed nucleus of the cognitive series, based on such Sutta-piṭaka material, appears in the Abhidhamma-piṭaka.’32 In support of this statement he cites passages from the Vibhaṅga and the Paṭṭhāna, but he does not appear to have attempted a serious analysis of the contents of the last-named—the final work of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka in the traditional order.

If this is undertaken, the result is rather unexpected. So far from being a later elaboration on the basis of the canonical abhidhamma material, the theory of the citta-vīthi appears as only a slight restatement of the Paṭṭhāna with minor changes in terminology. Obviously this needs to be argued in detail.

The format of Paṭṭhāna is somewhat forbidding, although some of the essential principles involved seem clear enough. The work introduces for the first time in Pali literature the twenty four types of relation (paccaya). These are illustrated by applying them to the twenty two triplets and one hundred
couplets of the abhidhamma-mātikā—the mnemonic key which structures the Dhammasaṅgani and is employed in the Vibhaṅga and Dhaṭṭu-kathā. The permutations and combinations involved are rather more complex than this. Warder calls it: ‘one of the most amazing productions of the human mind’. Fortunately most of the details are unnecessary for the present purpose.

We need only concern ourselves initially with two triplets, one couplet and one of the relations. The triplets are: 1. producing results; resultant; neither producing results nor resultant and 2. pleasant feeling; unpleasant feeling; neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling. The couplet is: caused; causeless. The only relation needed is the relation of succession (anantara-paccaya).

From the resultant triplet under the heading ‘resultant dhamma related to dhamma neither producing results nor resultant by succession relation’ we learn that ‘bhavaṅga is related to advert ing by succession relation’. From this it is apparent that bhavaṅga is some kind of resultant consciousness, while advert ing is some kind of kiriya mentality. The very fact that these terms are used indicates that they designate a group of cittas for which no alternative designation is available in the Paṭṭhāna. The commentarial usage of bhavaṅga which covers all kinds of resultant mentality except resultant mind element and causeless mind consciousness element with pleasant feeling would seem exactly suitable.

Adverting is already referred to as a function of mind element in the Vibhaṅga. So we might expect the kiriya mind element to be referred to here. However in the commentarial account given above we saw that the causeless kiriya mind consciousness element (with neutral feeling) performs this function in a mind door process. The Paṭṭhāna is clearly of the same view and therefore required a special term in order to exclude the same element with pleasant feeling; for according to the commentaries this does not perform the function of advert ing.

In the same triplet under the heading of ‘dhamma neither producing results nor resultant is related to dhamma producing results by succession relation’ we read: ‘Adverting is related to fivefold consciousness by succession relation’. This seems quite clear as it stands. From the same triplet and relation we learn that: ‘Fivefold consciousness is related to resultant mind element by succession relation’ and ‘Resultant mind element is related to resultant mind consciousness element by succession relation’. Here the commentaries restrict the resultant mind consciousness element concerned to the causeless types. From the same source we obtain: ‘Resultant mind consciousness element is related to kiriya mind consciousness element by succession relation’.

Later in the same portion of the Paṭṭhāna we find that: ‘Adverting is related to aggregates which are dhammas producing results by succession relation’, ‘Preceding aggregates which are dhammas producing results are related to subsequent aggregates which are dhammas producing results by succession relation’, ‘Aggregates which are dhammas producing results [are related] to emergence . . . by succession relation’ and ‘Preceding resultant aggregates are related to subsequent resultant aggregates by succession relation’. Nowhere does the Paṭṭhāna permit succession from resultant to producing results nor does it allow succession from producing results to neither producing results nor resultant. The similarity to the tables of permissible and impermissible succession given above is manifest.

Additional information can be added by turning to the feeling triplet. Bhavaṅga can have either pleasant or neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling, but advert ing can only have neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling. The resultant mind consciousness element which follows resultant mind element may have pleasant feeling. The kiriya mind consciousness which succeeds in turn must have neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling. Emergence (vuttaṅga) may have either pleasant or neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling.

From the caused couplet we can add: ‘Caused bhavaṅga [is related to] causeless advert ing by succession relation’, and vice versa; ‘Caused bhavaṅga [is related to] causeless bhavaṅga by succession relation’, and vice versa; ‘Caused aggregates [are related to] causeless emergence by succession relation’; ‘Causeless aggregates [are related to] caused emergence by succession relation’; [Causeless] advert ing to caused aggregates; ‘[Causeless] advert ing to the [causeless] five consciousnesses’.

In fact almost all the stages of the consciousness process are precisely specified in the Paṭṭhāna. So much so that it is clear that we should attribute the theory to the canonical abhidhamma.
tradition—if not to the earlier abhidhama then at least to the tradition or authors embodied in the Paṭṭhāna. Only a small amount of the technical nomenclature, some details and one significant development appear to be later.

The distinction between mind door and sense door process is known, although those terms are not used. Each of the separate functions is shown. This is best illustrated from the sense door process. Bhavaṅga is known by name, but that name is only used where it is needed to avoid ambiguity. In cases where the same statement can be accurately applied both to javana and to bhavaṅga the two stages are subsumed as ‘aggregates’ or they may be distinguished as e.g. ‘skilful aggregates’ and ‘resultant aggregates’. The theory of bhavaṅga is however fully developed.

The rootless kiriya consciousnesses with neutral feeling are already termed advertting. The succeeding sense consciousnesses are termed the five consciousnesses and succeeded by resultant mind element, which is in turn followed by resultant mind consciousness element with either neutral or pleasant feeling. After this comes kiriya mind consciousness element with neutral feeling, which when specified as advertting is rootless and succeeded by the variety of states which the later tradition calls javana. Apart from the last each of these lasts for only one moment. Indeed the Paṭṭhāna even allows for the fruitless case in which establishing is unable to bring about the arising of javana and simply repeats for one moment. It does not however specify the duration.

The specific names are absent for only three of the functions: receiving, investigating and establishing. Significantly the mahā-ṭīkā to the Visuddhimagga comments:

For those who do not accept the process cittas beginning with receiving as well as the heart base, the text (pāli) has been handed down in various places with the words beginning ‘for receiving, for eye consciousness element’; for the text cannot be set aside.

Unfortunately the text to which the mahā-ṭīkā refers is not known to us. The functions of receiving, investigating and establishing are not known from any surviving canonical work. In several commentaries there is a mnemonic verse listing the seven functions from bhavaṅga to javana; no doubt this belongs to the period of the old Sinhalese commentaries if not earlier. The term javana is taken from the canonical Paṭisambhidā-magga, where it is used in a similar sense. In any case the term adds little to the usage of the Paṭṭhāna apart from brevity. This is perhaps the significant contribution of the later terminology.

The Paṭṭhāna does not usually use the term tad-ārammana. Normally what the later tradition refers to in this way is simply designated bhavaṅga—the after-bhavaṅga of the commentaries. Often however the Paṭṭhāna employs the expression ‘emergence’ (vuttthāna) for bhavaṅga and tad-ārammana indiscriminately. This is obviously an extension of the older usage of vuttthāna to refer to emergence from jhāna. Such an extension is quite appropriate since the jhānas consist of a series of javana cittas; so emergence from jhāna constitutes the departure from javana par excellence. The Paṭṭhāna does however use the expression vipāko tad-ārammanatā uppañjadi in its treatment of object relation (ārammana-paccaya). This must be the source of the later usage. Clearly emergence or bhavaṅga would be inappropriate here.

By the time of the Sinhalese commentaries two kinds of tad-ārammana are distinguished under the names of root bhavaṅga and visiting bhavaṅga. The term root bhavaṅga properly speaking should refer to that specific type of resultant consciousness which constantly recurs throughout the life of a given individual whenever there is no process at either the mind door or one of the sense doors. It is here extended to include a tad-ārammana of the same type even although this would have a different object. However this is obviously closer to the usage of the Paṭṭhāna.

It is not in fact quite clear that the Paṭṭhāna knows the theory by which each individual has a single basic bhavaṅga mind throughout his lifespan. It is this theory which necessitates the distinction of a separate stage of tad-ārammana. Many of our earlier sources are a little inconsistent in this regard. The mnemonic verse mentioned above does not include tad-ārammana and neither do most of the traditional similes. There is even some uncertainty as to exactly how many moments of tad-ārammana can occur—the Visuddhimagga records two different traditions on the matter. It may well be the case that the debates recorded
in the Vipākuddhāra-kathā reveal the process by which the somewhat later theory of tad-ārammaṇa was finally formulated.

The Paṭṭhāna itself envisages only that kammically active stages arise and persist for a while. It does not specify seven moments as the maximum duration. It certainly envisages a return to a resultant consciousness. This may be one under the influence of the active aggregates which have just subsided or it may be one of a more long lasting kind. It does not however seem to specify the latter to be unchangeable or lifelong, but the possibility that this is what is intended cannot be ruled out.

Conclusion

It is clear that the theory of the consciousness process is well established in the Paṭṭhāna, a work which cannot be later than the second century B.C. To what extent it is to be found in earlier works such as the Vibhaṅga remains an open question, but the theory is not a product of the commentarial stage. It belongs rather to the classic abhidhamma.

With such a dating we need also to look again at its possible role in the development of Indian thought. If we assume that at least the idea of bhavaṅga mind was current also in other South Indian schools, then the question should be asked as to what influence similar ideas may have had on the early Viśaṅnavāda.

Notes

This article is a revised version of a paper originally presented in April 1977 at the Third Symposium on Indian Religions, Durham.

2 (Ce 1954) p.17.
A NEW THERAVĀDIN LITURGY

The texts so far published by the P.T.S. have all been derived from written sources. We shall here present a text acquired orally, though we have also made use of printed pamphlets. Theravāda Buddhist liturgical texts are few, and those used in Sri Lanka have hitherto been entirely in Pali. The text presented here is partly in Pali, partly in Sinhala. In content there is nothing radically new, but the religious service at which this text is used has a distinctive flavour which ever larger numbers of Sinhalese Buddhists find appealing.

The service has been invented and the text assembled, and in part composed, by a young monk called Pānadurē Ariyadhama. The service he calls an Ātavīsi Buddha Pūjā (‘Worship of the Twenty-eight Buddhas’), or simply a Buddha Pūjā, but it has become popularly known as a Bōdhi Pūjā, and we shall see that this reflects a misunderstanding. So far most of the public performances of this Buddha pūjā have either been conducted by the Ven. Ariyadhama himself or have used tape recordings of him, so that it is not yet possible to say whether the service can become popular without his participation as its leader. Not only does he have a most pleasing appearance and personal presence; his voice is extremely mellifluous and he chants in a musical way which contrasts strikingly with the usual clerical drone. When you mention the Ven. Ariyadhama to people, his voice is usually the first thing they talk of. Those who know him personally, however, are devoted to him for more solid reasons: he radiates calm and kindness, and appears in his conduct to come as close as possible to the Buddhist ideal. He does not collect possessions, and every month when he has been conducting Buddha pūjā and the congregations in homage have presented him with masses of goods (mainly sets of the eight requisites, the conventional offering to a monk on such an occasion) he gives it all away to other monks. He does not even own proprietary rights (ayittāsikama) in any monastery. He devotes himself to the religious life, both to preaching and to meditation (necessarily concentrating on the two activities in

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46 Sarathchandra, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
27 As 267-87.
28 Vism 103-4.
29 As 82-106.
32 Vism Trsl, p. 131 n.; cf. also p. 515 n.
33 Warder *op. cit.*, p. 309.
36 Tikap 324-6; CR I 338-40.
37 Dukap 45-6; Paṭṭh II (Ce 1954) 668.
38 Tikap-a 259-60; CR I 416.
39 Vism-mht (Ce 1930) 479: *Ye hadaya-ratthu viya sampāṭicchanādi-viṭṭhi-cittāni pi nāmujānanti, tesam: 'sampāṭicchanāya cakkhu-viṭṭhāṇa-dhātuyā' ti ādinā tathā tathā pāṭi ugaṭa; na hi sakka pāṭim paṭisedhetum.*
40 Sv I 194; Ps I 262; Spk III 191; Vībh-a 355.
41 Paṭis I 80-1.
42 e.g. Tikap 155; CR I 143.
43 As 270-1; 276; 285; 287; 360; Tikap 347; Spk III 71; Abhidhav 50-1.
44 Vism 547; cf. Vism 459; As 265.
45 Buddhaghosa (Kv-a 219) certainly attributes such views to the Andhakas. We should perhaps think of the mūla-viṭṭhāṇa which Asaṅga attributes to the Mahāsāṅghikas. It is not certain how far Buddhaghosa is correct in seeing Kv chap. X, 1 as referring to bhavantī.
daily for a fortnight or a month at about 6 p.m. This time coincides with the traditional hour for the evening offering (gilampasa pūjā) to the Buddha, but it is presumably chosen because it is convenient for people who have to go to work. The Ven. Ariyadhamma conducted such series of Buddha pūjā successively at Divulapiṭiya, in Kandy, Negombo, Chilaw, Nuwara Eliya, Matale and Galle. From Kandy on, these are all fair-sized towns, and the services were held not at monasteries (vihāra) but at Buddhist ‘centres’, such as the Y.M.B.A., or even at normal secular premises. This was necessary to accommodate the increasing crowds which assembled, despite the Ven. Ariyadhamma’s avoidance of newspaper publicity. (He does not allow his sermons to be advertised in advance in the daily papers, as are others likely to be of wide interest.) At Matale in 1977 the crowds reached fifty or sixty thousand; at Galle in 1978 the month-long series drew crowds which the police finally estimated at a hundred thousand.

It is time now to characterize the service, and in so doing to justify the use of the word ‘service’ and to explain its popularity. Traditional Theravāda Buddhism has certain ritual forms for the clergy, kammavāca, such as the higher ordination ceremony (upasampada) and corporate fortnightly confession (pātimokka), but nothing remotely analogous for the laity. An ordinary Buddha pūjā is an offering to the Buddha made by an individual. At every temple the incumbent is responsible for seeing to it that it is made thrice daily. The individual making the offering usually recites (murmurs) certain Pali verses. If others are present, they are supposed to participate in spirit; they empathize, and thus gain merit. But their empathy takes no liturgical form. When monks and laity come together for religious purposes, their roles are complementary. Thus, when people come to the temple to hear a sermon (bana), the monk preaches and the laity listen, participating only by occasional exclamations of ‘Sāhu!’ (which is often shortened to ‘Sā!’). The monk administers the five precepts to the laity by having the laity repeat them after him; he faces the laity, is seated on a higher level, and is treated with the greatest formal respect.

Against this background, the new Buddha pūjā has four striking features. First and foremost, there is constant active
cultivate. In recalling these qualities of the Buddha, he said to us, people's thoughts become broader and open out like a flower blossoming. The main message of the sermon we heard was that everyone should meditate daily on the qualities of the Buddha and practise maitri. The climax of his Buddha pūjā likewise expresses the receiving of consolation and the giving of love. The sermon leads into a pair of Sinhala verses, chanted three times, saying that the one consolation for life's troubles lies in the Buddha and ultimately in nirvana. In the first of the verses the word sānasāle, 'consolation', is anaphorically repeated in each line of the quatrain; the second verse culminates in the word sānasāma, 'consolation' again. Immediately after this the leading monk expresses in the most concise way possible, with four words of Sinhala prose, the essence of Buddhist maitri: 'May all beings be happy!' The congregation repeats the words. The monk, with superb histrionic insight, repeats them three more times, each time more quietly, and each time the congregation's response is more muted. The murmur of the fourth repetition is followed by profound silence, as everyone attempts to suffuse his own thoughts, and thence the whole world, with loving-kindness. The silence is finally broken, on the monk's cue, with a loud exclamation of 'Śāl!', and everyone breaks into a loud, fast repetition in a monotone of the Metta Sutta, the scriptural and thus the traditional liturgical form given to the same sentiments. Reciting the Metta Sutta in a monotone is a return to comparative banality, but after the deep emotion which preceded it the tone sounds triumphant and represents a return to the daily round with new vigour and confidence.

The first salient feature of the Buddha pūjā, the large part played in it by the congregation, is what impels us to call it a 'service', using a term with an originally Christian denotation. When we see the officiating monk facing the altar and merely heading the congregation, rather than addressing them de haut en bas, we are again reminded of the Christian form. The switch from the ancient language to the vernacular can remind us of Protestant Christianity, and indeed of Roman Catholicism since Vatican Two. And if we are set on such comparisons, we could even find analogues in Christianity to the heightened emotional tone. But the Ven. Ariyadhamma assures us, convincingly, that participation by the congregation, for they chant or recite the entire liturgy themselves, in unison, either with the monk conducting the service or after him. In the former case, of course, the monk temporarily appears but as a member of the congregation, and this is the second striking feature: the monk conducting the service sits as a member of the congregation, like them facing the Buddha image in an attitude of humility. Before the Buddha he thus appears merely as primus inter pares. A fortiori the same position is adopted by any other monks present, so that they simply participate as members of the congregation, whereas if any other monks besides the preacher attend a traditional bana they sit on the higher level facing the laity and do nothing at all.

The third feature of this Buddha pūjā is that not all of it is in Pali; it includes Sinhala. And the final feature to which we draw attention is the heightened dramatic content and emotional tone. Few preachers ever make the slightest effort to involve their audiences emotionally (unless it be to instil in them fear of the consequences of wrong-doing), and indeed one could well argue that since Buddhism stresses the danger of the emotions and the necessity for their careful control, it is absolutely appropriate for Buddhist events to take place in an atmosphere of calm, even flatness. But the Ven. Ariyadhamma is not all afraid of emotion. He told us that when Mahā Paṇḍita, the Buddha's stepmother, became a nun, she said to him: 'You are now my Buddha mother (Buddha ammā) and give me the milk of immortality (amā kiri)', the story makes him weep with emotion. The words which are constantly on his lips, as well as featuring prominently in his service, are such words as kindness (maitri), compassion (karunā), pity (dayā), and above all comfort, consolation (sānasānā, sānasālle). He also frequently mentions evenness of temperament (sāmanācchāvā), both as a quality of the Buddha and as a condition for others to aspire to. But it is perhaps his peculiar genius to realize that between the layman walking in off the street and this ideal state of calm there lies a gap which requires some emotional bridge. Not innovating, but bringing into unusual prominence an element from the tradition, the Ven. Ariyadhamma stresses maitri, both the parental love which the Buddha felt for all creatures and which we may legitimately still project onto him, and the love, of the same quality, which we in our turn must
there has been no direct Christian influence. He has never attended a Christian service and does not know what they are like. But in them, he says, people sing hymns to music (sangita), whereas he does not consider that in his service there is any music. The importance of this point for him presumably resides in the fact that music is forbidden to monks. He told us that in forest hermitages it is common for the monks to chant in unison, and he has merely extended the practice. We may comment that for monks in a hermitage to ignore status differences is quite another matter from giving such equality ritual expression when it comes to interaction between monks and laity; but that is a dimension with which he is not concerned. The use of Sinhala he likewise does not see as at all radical, perhaps with more justification, since Buddhism has no ideological opposition to the use of vernacular languages—quite the contrary. The attempt to bring religion nearer to the people, and especially to respond to demands by an educated urban middle class for more participation in the religion to which they are nominally affiliated has everywhere produced the same result. Finally, scrutiny of the text will show that its sentiments are indeed truly and distinctively Buddhist and that the Ven. Ariyadhhamma has merely chosen, notably in the Sinhala verses he has composed, to stress that side of the tradition which seems to him (no doubt rightly) to be most accessible to lay religiosity.

The service lasts two to three hours, but the set part (given below) takes up only about an hour. Most of the rest of the time is taken by the sermon proper, which always occurs at the same point in the service and ends by leading into the climax of the service mentioned above. Even during the sermon the monk maintains his untraditional position facing the Buddha image(s) with his back to the laity. The rest of the time is accounted for by other little speeches the monk makes. The main one of these comes after the first section of the service, the taking of the three refuges and eight precepts (though not the usual eight); in it the monk speaks about the occasion for the service and dedicates the merit accruing from it. A similar speech very near the end of the service distributes the merit to all participants and those connected with them, as is customary; it has the function of a kind of valedictory blessing.

It remains to comment on two points. The interest of the first resides in its illustrating an important principle of scientific method: that you cannot find what you are not looking for. This Buddha puja, as its full title indicates, is strictly for all the 28 Buddhas recognized in the Pali tradition. This multiplicity has no importance for the text or message of the service, and the Ven. Ariyadhhamma himself said that philosophically all the Buddhas were the same. When one of these Buddha puja is held, 28 pictures of the Buddha are put up in a row over a long flower-altar; devotees queue up to offer flowers on this altar just before the service starts; and even so long an altar can barely hold all the offerings. Thus the multiplication is useful in the ritual. But this was not its origin. We were told by lay supporters that making offerings to the 28 Buddhas was an old custom. In our research in the Up Country we had come across offerings only to the 24 Buddhas, never the 28. We asked scholarly Sinhalese friends, and they too knew of no such old custom. We then met a monk who was conducting an Atavisi Buddha puja on the Ven. Ariyadhhamma’s instructions. He too asserted that the 28 Buddhas were traditionally worshipped, and to corroborate this he said that every day at midday when food is offered before the Tooth Relic at the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy it is offered in 32 parts, for the 28 Buddhas plus the 4 Buddhas so far born in our eon (who thus figure twice). We had just read H.L. Seneviratne’s admirable book, Rituals of the Kandyian State, which gives a minutely detailed account of those very offerings but makes no mention of 28 Buddhas or 32 parts; we were accordingly sceptical. But we were able to go to Kandy and ask the official in charge of the daily offerings, the vattoruvala, himself. The monk was right. Every day 32 measures of rice (hali sere) are cooked for the morning and midday offerings (udhe and daval dané), and 32 curries prepared. Seneviratne could not see 32 portions because no doubt the figure is purely conceptual and rarely or never empirically observable. In our ritual too the number is essentially conceptual: despite what has been said above, at the first Buddha puja we attended there was restricted space for the flower altar and we counted only 12 Buddha images; at the second there were 29–28 pictures (identical prints) plus the main image (a statue).

The second point concerns the widespread misunderstanding
which somewhat irks the Ven. Ariyadhamma. Some of his Sinhala verses express the traditional worship of the Bō or Bōdhi tree which stands in the compound of nearly every Buddhist temple, often adorned with little pennants. The tree, being of the kind under which the Buddha attained Enlightenment, symbolizes that Enlightenment. The popularity of his verses about it has led some people to infer that he is laying stress on the cult of the tree. Not only have they misnamed his service Bōdhi pūjā, i.e. ‘worship of the Bō tree’; they have revived such extravagant customs as watering the tree with perfumed milk. For example, a layman whom we met at the house where the Ven. Ariyadhamma was passing the rains retreat in 1978 told us that his mother had seen in his sister’s horoscope that the sister was about to pass through an unlucky period, so every day for a week she had watered a Bō tree with cow’s milk with saffron and sandal in it and given the merit to her daughter, and all had passed off well. Watering the Bō tree was most meritorious in the dry season, when the tree most needed it, he added. Rather more sophisticated, a monk present on the same occasion said that these popular customs were beside the point, but the merit from this service was particularly offered to the deity living in the Bō tree. (Every major tree is thus inhabited by a spirit.) But the Ven. Ariyadhamma assured us that he envisaged no such special regard for the Bō tree deity; his attitude to all the gods is that there must be mutual respect, but he asks no favours of them and merely follows the normal custom of offering merit to all of them without distinction. As for watering the tree, he remarked that our respect is due to the Knowledge, not the Tree.

We have in our possession two somewhat different printed versions of this service, neither of them published commercially. One is a small pamphlet called Buddha vandanāva saha Budurūs kavi māḷāva; it says on the back that it has been produced in accordance with the Ven. Ariyadhamma’s instructions by certain tradesmen in Maradāna (Colombo 10) and is distributed free as an act of merit; the printer is Samayavardhana, Colombo 10, but there is no date. As the title implies, the booklet is in two parts: the Buddha vandanāva is our Buddha pūjā (pp.1-11), and the rest (pp. 12-20) contains a series of 54 Sinhala devotional verses, we assume also by the Ven. Ariyadhamma. The second pamphlet, by

the same printer, and likewise distributed free as an act of merit, is entitled Aṭavisi mahā Buddha pūjā samgrahaya and dated 14 January 1978. Its cover (= title page) says that it contains the form of service used by the Ven. Ariyadhamma on the occasion of the birthday of the Ven. Pātēgama Vimalasiri of the Jētavana Pirivena (monastic college), Colombo and is produced by those who supported that event. The Buddha pūjā, which inside is called Buddha vandanāva (as in the other pamphlet) is on pp.1-11; the only other item (p.12) is the Aṭavisi mahā Buddha pīrīta, eight Pali verses, seven just listing the 28 Buddhas and the eighth asking for their protection:

Tesām saccena sīlana khanti-metta-balena ca te pi mara anurakkhattu ārogyena sukhena cāti.

It is this latter pamphlet which contains the form of service closer to the one we heard, though there were some deviations from its text too. We attended two of these Buddha pūjā. The first, on 16 September 1978, was conducted at a house in southern Sri Lanka by another monk who was deputizing for the Ven. Ariyadhamma that day; we took notes against the printed version, but had no tape recorder. There were extra prayers for the Ven. Ariyadhamma, and at the end the merit of the service was transferred to him.

The version given here comes from our tape recording of a service conducted by the Ven. Ariyadhamma on 23 September 1978 at the International Buddhist Centre, Wellawatte, Colombo 6, on the occasion of the 79th birthday of the incumbent, who was unfortunately not well enough to attend.

Abbreviations

M – monk, i.e. spoken by the monk (here Ariyadhamma) only
C – congregation, i.e. spoken by the congregation only
U – unison, i.e. spoken by monk and congregation together
R – responses, i.e. spoken first by the monk, then repeated by the congregation
S – Sinhala
P – Pali
n – normal tone, i.e. with the cadence of normal speech
c — chanted in a melody pattern
m — monotonous chant

MSn Sādhu kiyanța.
C Sā.
MSn Nāmakārāya kiyanța.
(x3) CPC Namo tassa Bhagavato arahato sammā-Sambuddhassa.
MSn Nāyakaśvāmīndrayanvahansēpradhānā saṅghayā-vahansēgē samāva avasara ābēvā.
RPC (but Cmn) Buddhaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi
   Dhammaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi
   Saṅghaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi
   Dutiyaṃ pi Buddhaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi
   Dutiyaṃ pi Dhammaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi
   Dutiyaṃ pi Saṅghaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi
   Tatiyaṃ pi Buddhaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi
   Tatiyaṃ pi Dhammaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi
   Tatiyaṃ pi Saṅghaṃ saraṇaṃ gacchāmi.

MPc TisaraṇaṃgamaṃSaṃpurṇaṃ.
CPc Āma bhante.
RPC Pāṇāṭipātā veramaṇī sikkhāpadarṇaṃ samādiyāmi.
Adinādana veramaṇī sikkhāpadarṇaṃ samādiyāmi.
Kāmesu mīchācāra veramaṇī sikkhāpadarṇaṃ samādiyāmi.
Musāvāda veramaṇī sikkhāpadarṇaṃ samādiyāmi.
Pīsaūvācā veramaṇī sikkhāpadarṇaṃ samādiyāmi.
Pharūsāvācā veramaṇī sikkhāpadarṇaṃ samādiyāmi.
Sampahparalleleda veramaṇī sikkhāpadarṇaṃ samādiyāmi.
Mīcchā ājīvā veramaṇī sikkhāpadarṇaṃ samādiyāmi.
RSc Mē tisaraṇa-saḥitavū
   ājīva-aṭṭhamakā-sīlaya
   mārga-phala-nivāni piṣīma
   mētu vēvā.
MPc Tisaraṇena saddhīrṇ ājīva-aṭṭhamakā-sīlaṃ sammā sādhukuṇa surakkhiṇa katvā appamādena sampādethe.

Pause.

M gives 6½-minute address on the occasion; he praises the incumbent and especially dedicates the merit of this service to him and to another monk of the same temple who has recently died.
A new Theravādin liturgy

So Bhagavā iti pi arahantā Arahantā vata so Bhagavā
Arahantā saraṇaṇā gacchāmi Arahantā sīrasā
namāmi.

So Bhagavā iti pi sammā-Sambuddho Sammā-
Sambuddho iti pi so Bhagavā
Sammā-Sambuddhaṁ taṁ saraṇaṇā gacchāmi
Sammā-Sambuddhaṁ taṁ sīrasā namāmi.

So Bhagavā iti pi vijjā-carāṇa-sampanno
Vijjā-carāṇa-sampanno vata so Bhagavā
Vijjā-carāṇa-sampannāṁ taṁ saraṇaṇā gacchāmi
Vijjā-carāṇa-sampannāṁ taṁ sīrasā namāmi.

So Bhagavā iti pi sugato Sugato vata so Bhagavā
Sugataṁ taṁ saraṇaṇā gacchāmi Sugataṁ taṁ sīrasā
namāmi.

So Bhagavā iti pi lokavidū Lokavidū vata so Bhagavā
Lokavidūṁ taṁ saraṇaṇā gacchāmi Lokavidūṁ taṁ
sīrasā namāmi.

So Bhagavā iti pi anuttara purisa-damma-sārathi
Anuttara purisa-damma-sārathi vata so Bhagavā
Anuttara purisa-damma-sārathīṁ taṁ saraṇaṇā gacchāmi
Anuttara purisa-damma-sārathīṁ taṁ sīrasā
namāmi.

So Bhagavā iti pi sattha deva-manussaṁ
Satthā deva-manussaṇaṁ vata so Bhagavā
Satthā deva-manussaṇaṁ taṁ saraṇaṇā gacchāmi
Satthā deva-manussaṇaṁ taṁ sīrasā namāmi.

So Bhagavā iti pi Buddhho Buddhho vata so Bhagavā
Buddhaṁ taṁ saraṇaṇā gacchāmi Buddhaṁ taṁ
sīrasā namāmi.

So Bhagavā iti pi Bhagavā Bhagavā vata so Bhagavā
Bhagavantaṁ14 saraṇaṇā gacchāmi Bhagavantaṁ14
sīrasā namāmi.

RSc Māghe svāmīvā
Budurajānāvahansē
Kelesun keren duruvu sēkā.
Rahasinvat pav no kaḷa sēka.
Siyalu pāpayangen miduna sēkā.
Siyalu lō vāsiyagē
āmisa pūjā

pratipatti pūjā
siyallaṭama sudusu vana sēkā.
Budurajānāvahansēgē
karunā guṇaya
mahā āscaryaya.
Kotiyyak mavvarunge
kotiyyak piyavarrunge
karunā guṇaya
eka piyak kaḷa da
Budurajānāvahansēgē
karunā guṇaya
upamā kaḷa nohāka.
Mesē anantavū
apramāṇa guṇa āttāvū
asamavū
asamasamavū
deviyaṇṭa devivū
amaṭama svāmivū
magēma Budumāṇiyavū
magēma Budupiyavānū
mohaṇḍuraṭa lahiru maṇḍalakvū
keles gīnaṇṭa mahā mēghayakvū
gamanin sāntavū
pavātmen sarṇvaravū
anāṭha nāṭhavū
asaraṇa saraṇavū
Budurajānāvahansēta
Tañhaṇkara namvū
Budurajānāvahansē paṭan
Gautama namvū
Budurajānāvahansē dakvā
mesē aṭavisi Budurajānāvahansēlāṭa
mē pahan pūjā karami —
pūjā vēvā.
Mē suvaṇḍa dum pūjā karami —
pūjā vēvā.
Mē suvaṇḍa mal pūjā karami —
pūjā vēvā.
Mē lada pas mal pūjā karami —
pūjā vēvā.
mē sīsil pān pūjā karamī —
pūjā vēvā.
Mē gilan pasa pūjā karamī —
pūjā vēvā.
Mē catumadhura pūjā karamī —
pūjā vēvā.
Mē dāhāt pūjā karamī —
pūjā vēvā.
Mē behet pūjā karamī —
pūjā vēvā.
Mē sīyalu pūjāvō
nirvāṇa śāntiya patā
saṃsāra dūkīn atā midīmā patā
atavisi Budurajāṇanvahansēlātā
pūjā karamī.

(x3)
Pūjā vēvā.

UPc Namāmi sugataṃ Buddhāṃ lokajēṭhāṃ narāsabhaṃ
Namāmi sugataṃ Dhammaṃ niyānikaṃ sudesitaṃ
Namāmi sugataṃ Saṅghaṃ puññakhettaṃ
anuttaraṃ
Namāmi sugataṃ Bodhiṃ avatthatam lokapūjitam.
Vītataṅhaṃ vītadosaṃ vītamoḥaṃ anāsavaṃ
Vande nipuṇa-Sambuddhaṃ ananta-naya-desitaṃ.
Vandāmi cetiyaṃ sabbāṃ sabbaṭhāṇesu patiṭhitaṃ
Sārīrika dhātu mahā-Bodhiṃ Buddha-rūpaṃ sakalāṃ
sadā.
Yassa mūle nisinnvo va sabbāri-vijayaṃ akā
Patto sabbānṭhutaṃ sattha vande taṃ Bodhi-pādaṃpaṃ.
Ime ete mahā-Bodhi lokanāthena pūjitā
Aham pi te namassāmi — Bodhi-rājā, nam’ athu te.

MSn Anurāddhapurē śrī-mahā-Bodhi-rājāṇanvahansēgē
gauravein:

USc Ranvan pāṭin daḻu lana Bōdhiya
Nilvan pāṭin koḷa lana Bōdhiya
Gautama muniṇḍun piṭa dun Bōdhiya
Apit vaṇḍīmu jaya sīri maha Bōdhiya.
Darībdāvī talayē haṭagat Bōdhiya
Siri Laṅkāvaṭa vādamev Bōdhiya

Gautama muniṇḍun piṭa dun Bōdhiya
Apit vaṇḍīmu jaya sīri maha Bōdhiya.
Darībdāvī talayē haṭagat Bōdhiya
Saṅgamit terāṇin gena vaṭī Bōdhiya
Gautama muniṇḍun piṭa dun Bōdhiya
Apit vaṇḍīmu jaya sīri maha Bōdhiya.
Darībdāvī talayē haṭagat Bōdhiya
Maha Mevnāvē rōpita Bōdhiya
Gautama muniṇḍun piṭa dun Bōdhiya
Apit vaṇḍīmu jaya sīri maha Bōdhiya.
Darībdāvī talayē haṭagat Bōdhiya
Maha Mevnāvē rōpita Bōdhiya
Ran vaṭa atarē penenā Bōdhiya
Apit vaṇḍīmu jaya sīri maha Bōdhiya.
Darībdāvī talayē haṭagat Bōdhiya
Maha Mevnāvē rōpita Bōdhiya
Denō daḥak dena vaṇḍīna Bōdhiya
Apit vaṇḍīmu jaya sīri maha Bōdhiya.
Mama mē maḷuvaṭa yanavā enava
Bōmul Bōpat maṭa pāgenavā
Samāva dī mage pav aravanavā
Bō rajunē maṭa avasara denava.
Uḍa maḷuvē Bō raju vājaṁbenavā
Deveni maḷuva me pahan dīvenavā
Vāli maḷuvē maha senaga vaṇḍīnavā
Matu mattē apī nivan dakinavā.

Ghana-sāra-ppadittena ḍipena tamadhamsinā
Tiloka-ḍīpaṃ Sambuddhaṃ pūjayāmi tamoṇudaṃ.
Sugandhi-kāya-vaḍanaṃ ananta-guṇa-gandhinaṃ
Sugandhināḥam gandhena pūjayāmi Tathāgatāṃ.
Vaṇṇa-gandha-guṇopetaṃ etaṃ kusuma-saṃṭatim
Pūjayāmi munindassu sīrīpāda-saroruhē.
Adhivāsetu no bhante pāṇīyaṃ parikappatim
Anukampatim upādāya patiṅgahātu-m-uttamaṃ.
Here follows the sermon. It begins with a unison chanting of the three refuges, first in Pali (but not the standard chant) and then in a close Sinhala paraphrase; however, this does not form a set part of the service, so we omit it. The sermon concludes with a close Sinhala prose paraphrase of the following two verses, and their recitation follows without any break.

The above two verses are twice repeated; the third recital is in unison.

(x4) RSc (Siyalu satvayō
suvapat vetvā.
At each repetition the monk’s voice is lower both in pitch and in volume. There follows a complete silence, on this occasion lasting about 70 seconds.

MSn Sādhu kiyaṇṭa.

C Sā.

UPm Kāraṇṭiyaṃ atthakusalena . . . They recite the whole of the Metta Sutta (Sutta Nipāta 1, 8); the following verses follow without a break.


Dukkhappattā ca niddukkhā bhayapattā ca nibbhaya Sokappattā ca nissokā hontu sabbe pi pānino. Dānaṃ dadvantu saddhāya sīlaṃ rakkhantu sabbadā Bhāvanābhirata hontu gacchantu devatā gata. Sabbe Buddha balappattā Paccekānaṃ ca yaṃ balaṃ Arahantānaṃ ca tejena rakkhaṃ bandhāmi sabbaso. Ākāṣṭhaṃ ca bhumaṭṭhaṃ devā nāgā mahiddhiṃ Puṇṇaṃ taṃ anumoditvā ciraṃ rakkhantu sāsanāṃ. Ākāṣṭhaṃ ca bhumaṭṭhaṃ devā nāgā mahiddhiṃ Puṇṇaṃ taṃ anumoditvā ciraṃ rakkhantu desaṃ. Ākāṣṭhaṃ ca bhumaṭṭhaṃ devā nāgā mahiddhiṃ Puṇṇaṃ taṃ anumoditvā ciraṃ rakkhantu maṃ paran ti.

M distributes the merit accruing from the occasion to all participants and their relatives and wishes that all may attain nirvana; all assent with a loud ‘Sā.’

MPC16 Abhivādana-sīlīna nicaṃ vaddhāpacayino Cattāro dhammā vaḍḍhanti: āyu vaṇṇo sukhāni balaṃ. Āyu-rāroga-sampatti sagga-sampatti-m-eva ca Atho nibbāna-sampatti iminā te samijjhatau.

C Sā!

Summary translation

MSn Say ‘Sādhu’.

All do so.

MSn Say ‘Namo . . .’

CPc Homage17 to the Blessed worthy, the fully enlightened Buddha.

Twice repeated.

MSn May the venerable incumbent and the other venerable members of the great Order accord their gracious permission.

RPC I take refuge in the Buddha/ the Doctrine/ the Order (three times each).

MPc The taking of the three refuges is completed.

CPc Yes, venerable sir.

RPC I undertake the rule to abstain from taking life/ from taking what is not given/ from sexual misconduct/ from lying/ from malicious speech/ from harsh speech/ from idle chatter/ from wrong livelihood.

RSoc May these eight moral principles, ending with that of livelihood, with the triple refuge, cause us to enter the paths, attain the results, and see nirvana.

MPc Keep the eight moral principles, ending with that of livelihood, with the triple refuge, fully and well, and with full attention achieve it.18

* * * * * * *

UPc He broke through the tangle of defilements and their roots by the power of the unlimited perfections He attained, and by that He acquired worthiness and is called ‘Worthy’ (araho); placing Him in my heart I worship the immaculate Buddha.19

UPm Homage to the Blessed worthy, the fully enlightened Buddha.

Twice repeated.

Thus is the Blessed worthy, the fully enlightened Buddha, perfect in wisdom and conduct, well, knower of the word, supreme20 charioteer of men, who have to be broken in, teacher of gods and men, Buddha, Blessed. I take refuge in the Buddha for life, till I attain nirvana.
Well stated by the Blessed one is the Doctrine, plainly apparent, timeless, a thing to come and see, conducive, possible for the intelligent to realize themselves.
I take refuge in the Doctrine for life, till I attain nirvana.
Of good conduct is the Blessed one’s Order of disciples, of upright conduct, of proper conduct, of straight conduct; the four pairs of men, the eight individuals, they are the Blessed one’s Order of disciples; fit to be called upon, to be invited, to be given gifts, to be worshipped in gesture, the supreme field of merit for the world.
I take refuge in the Order for life, till I attain nirvana.

The Buddha’s knowledge is knowledge of ill/ of the arising of ill/ of the annihilation of ill/ of the path leading to the annihilation of ill/ of penetration of the truth/ of penetration of the Doctrine/ of penetration of etymologies/ of penetration of realization/ of the level of others’ spiritual attainments/ of latent tendencies/ of the miracle of the pairs/ of the attainment of great compassion/ of omniscience/ without impediment. I bow my head to the fully enlightened Buddha who has these Buddha-knowledges.

That Blessed one is thus worthy; worthy indeed is that Blessed one. I take refuge with the worthy one; I bow my head to the worthy one.

This formula is repeated for each of the Buddha’s qualities: for ‘worthy’ substitute in turn the fully enlightened Buddha; perfect in wisdom and conduct; well; knower of the world; supreme charioteer of men, who have to be broken in; teacher of gods and men; Buddha; Blessed.

My lord, the reverend king Buddha, was remote from defilements. He did no sin even in secret. He was free from all sins. He was worthy of all offerings, both objects and acts, made by all the world’s inhabitants. The great wonder is the quality of the reverend king Buddha’s compassion. Though one mass together the compassion of a million mothers and a million fathers, one can make no comparison with the compassion of the reverend king Buddha. Thus infinite, possessing measureless qualities, unequalled, equal to the unequalled, god to the gods, to me the lord, my own Buddha mother, my own Buddha father, the orb of dawn to the darkness of delusion, a great raincloud to the fire of the defilements, peaceful in His movements, restrained in His conduct, protector to the unprotected, refuge to those without refuge, to the reverend king Buddha, from the reverend king Buddha called Tārāṅkara to the reverend king Buddha called Gautama, thus to the twenty-eight reverend king Buddhas I make this offering of lamps—may it be offered. I make this offering of fragrant smoke/ of fragrant flowers/ of five items ending with puffed rice / of cool water/ of evening refreshment/ of four sweets/ of betel leaves/ of medicine—may it be offered. Aspiring to the peace of nirvana and liberation from the ill of worldly existence I make all these offerings to the twenty-eight reverend king Buddhas. (Three times:) May they be offered.

I bow to the good Buddha, senior in the world, bull among men.
I bow to the good Doctrine, leading out of the world, well taught.
I bow to the good Order, supreme field of merit.
I bow to the good Enlightenment tree, fig tree worshipped by the world.
Free of craving, free of hatred, free of delusion, without defilement, I worship the clever Enlightened one, who taught in many a way.
I worship every stupa, wherever it may be established, the corporeal relics, the great Bo tree, every image of the Buddha always.
Seated at whose foot the Teacher defeated all His foes and attained omniscience, that Bo tree I worship.
Here are these great Bo trees, worshipped by the world protector; I too will bow to them: king Bo tree, worship be to you!

Out of veneration for the glorious great reverend king Bo tree at Anuradhapura:
wonder the Enlightened one, lamp to the triple world, dispeller of darkness.

With fragrant perfume I worship the one who is Thus, fragrant of body and face, fragrant with infinite virtues.

At the blessed lotus feet of the lord of seers I offer this colourful, fragrant heap of flowers.

May the reverend one accept the water we have prepared; out of compassion may He receive the best.

**This verse is repeated in turn for evening refreshment/ medicine/ betel leaves.**

Forgive me transgressions committed through carelessness in body, word or thought, O Tathāgata of great wisdom.

**This verse is repeated, addressing in turn** O Doctrine plainly apparent, timeless and O Order of good conduct, supreme.

**RSc**
For all the faults which have occurred through the three doors of my mind, body and speech, from infinitely remote worldly existence until this moment, from the jewel of the Buddha, the jewel of the Doctrine and the jewel of the Order may I receive pardon. For the second time, may I receive pardon. For the third time, may I receive pardon.

**RPC**
May this merit of mine bring about the destruction of my defiling impulses.

**RSc**
May all the elements of merit I have accumulated—keeping the moral principles, worshipping in gesture, making offerings to the Buddha, worshipping the Bo tree, contemplating the virtues of the twenty-four Buddhas—accrue to my parents, my teachers, my elders, to all. And I empathize with all the elements of merit from everyone, with respectful veneration, with respectful devotion. And may there come to me through the power of all this merit release from decay, death and all the sorrows of worldly existence, and realization of the very bliss of nirvana. May I see nirvana.

**MSn**
Say 'Sādhu'.

*All do so.*
RSc  To see the Lord Buddha's image is consolation to the eyes;
To bow before the Lord Buddha is consolation to the limbs;
To think of the Lord Buddha's virtues is consolation to the mind;
To take the path the Lord took is consolation for becoming.
In life there is truly trouble every day,
And to death we approach ever a little closer;
Only doing good is at least some palliative;
Nirvana it is that is the comfort for us all.
Twice repeated.

RSc  May all beings be happy. Thrice repeated.

MSn  Say 'Sādhu'.
All do so. Then follows the Metta Sutta.

UPm  By this statement of truth may you always fare well; by this statement of truth may the world always be happy; by this statement of truth may the Teaching long endure. May there be every blessing; may all the deities afford protection; by the power of all the Buddhas may you always fare well.

This verse is twice repeated, substituting for 'Buddhas' first 'Doctrine', then 'Order'.

By checking evil influences of constellations, devils and ghosts by the power of protective texts, may they lay low your misfortunes.

May all living creatures who are ill be free from ill, who are fearful be free from fear, who are grieving be free from grief.

May they give gifts with trust, may they always observe the moral principles, may they take delight in developing their minds, at their passing may they become deities.

I bind comprehensive protection²⁴ by the power of all the Buddhas, who attained power, of the Isolated Buddhas, and the worthies.

May the gods of sky and earth and the nāgas of great power empathize with the merit and long protect the Teaching.

This verse is twice repeated, substituting for 'Teaching' first 'instruction', then 'me and others'.²⁵

* * * * *

MPC  If one habitually makes respectful salutation and always waits on one's elders, four things increase: one's length of life, good looks, happiness and strength. By this may you successfully achieve long life, health, heaven, and finally nirvana.

C  Amen!

OXFORD  RICHARD GOMBRICH

Notes

1  For what is normally entailed in a Buddha pūjā see our Precept and Practice (Oxford, 1971), pp.75-9 and 114-27.
2  Revisiting Sri Lanka in September 1979, we have heard of further series in Colombo and Ratnapura.
3  This means that even when the performance is 'live' (i.e., not a tape recording) electronic equipment is essential: the monk speaks into a microphone. Thus technology influences ritual.
4  The Ven. Ariyadhamma thought this was in the commentaries, but we cannot find it there. The nearest we have come to it in Pali is Therī-Apadāna 17 (Gotami), 31-3 (= Ap 532, 1-6); we translate: 'O Well one, I am your mother, and you, steadfast one, are my father, who give me the bliss of the true Doctrine, my protector; through you, Gotama, am I born. Well one, this physical body of yours have I nourished: my truth body, without sense organs [ dubious reading ], you have nourished. For a short while I suckled you with milk to quench your thirst; you have suckled me with the tranquil infinite milk of truth.' I take the last phrase to be tantamount to 'the milk of infinite tranquillity', i.e. the Ven. Ariyadhamma's 'milk of immortality'. See also our article 'Feminine Elements in Sinhalese Buddhism: 1. “Buddha Mother”', WZKO XVI, 1976, pp.67-78.

5  The word upekkhā, which with maitrī, karunā and muditā (sympathetic joy) makes a set as the four blessed states (brahmavihāra) commended by the Buddha, he seems to use less. We surmise that this is because the word means 'indifference', and though in this context the indifference is supposed to be a sublime one, a state of benign equanimity, the same problem with the word's connotations arises in Sinhala as in English. Moreover, besides denoting a state of mind, samādhi-matāva has the more active connotation of impartiality.

6  This version of the service's climax seems to have evolved gradually. Both the pamphlets in our possession (see below) reflect an earlier version: in them there are Sinhala verses between the silent meditation and the Karaniya Metta Sutta. The abbreviation of the
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service at this point has clearly been done, whether with conscious intent or not, to enhance its dramatic impact.

7 Though the chanting of the Buddha pūjā sounds ‘musical’ to us, it contrasts with Christian services in employing no instrumental accompaniment, and of course no harmony.

8 The 28 Buddhas are mentioned in a great many ritual texts; what is at issue is whether they ever receive offerings.


10 The verses refer explicitly to the particular Bo tree at Anuradhapura, but this is not important, for just as that tree is held to be a cutting from the original Bo tree, other Bo trees in worship in Sri Lanka are assumed to be connected with the tree at Anuradhapura.

11 ‘By their truth and morality and the force of their kindness and forbearance may they protect me in health and happiness.’

12 This last set of distinctions (n, c, m) is only roughly indicative, and refers primarily to the monk. The rhythmical distinction, between normal speech and chanting, is much clearer than the melodic distinction between what we have labelled c and m, where the line we have drawn is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. For example, the first time the monk recites Namo tassa Bhagavato . . . it is according to a well-known style which uses four notes, though mainly resting on one of them, and we have labelled this ‘chanting’, partly because the congregation too, for the most part, make some attempt to follow the style; but the second time the formula is used the effect is rather different, partly because it directly follows the more florid chanting of a verse, so that though the intention may be the same we have decided to label the style ‘monotonous’.

13 Sic.

14 Sic; but both printed edd. read Bhagavantam tam, keeping the pattern.

15 The rest of the service is a normal conclusion to a pīnakama, especially to a pirit ceremony, to which some of the verses specifically refer. For example, rakham handhami, ‘I bind protection’, refers to tying thread on one’s wrist as an amulet after the monks have recited the protective texts over it. The text from here on is not in the pamphlets, and one could argue that it is not part of the Buddha-pūjā proper; but some such conclusion to round off the occasion is indispensable.

16 These verses are commonly recited by monks to acknowledge any act of homage to them by the laity; all the monks present joined in its recitation, the only point at which there was a general monk/lay distinction.

17 No attempt to select English equivalents can convey the distinctions and overlap between nama, vandana and pūjā, and their cognates in both Pali and Sinhalese. All mean ‘worship’ and can often best be so translated. Nama, however, refers to physical obeisance (by prostration or at least a deep bow). Vandana is the most general

word, but it too tends to imply some physical gesture of respect. Pūjā tends to refer to making an offering; but to call the subject of this article an ‘Offering to the Buddha’ would quite misplace the emphasis.

18 ‘. . . with full attention achieve it.’ These last two words in the Pali echo the last words of the Buddha. Their meaning is very general, but in context the reference is to achieving nirvana.

19 This verse is from the Rasa-vāhinī.

20 Here, as everywhere, the translation aims to present the meaning of the Pali as now understood. Originally anuttaro may have qualified lokavidā or been an independent epithet, but we have evidence below that it is now understood to qualify purisa-damma-sārathi.

21 The other four items are mustard seed, arrow-grass, broken rice and jasmine buds.

22 The conventional ‘English’ translation for Bodhi is ‘Bo tree’, but it is good to be reminded of the metonymy. We revert to ‘Bo tree’ below because ‘Enlightenment tree’ is too cumbersome.

23 The context requires the past passive participle to bear an active meaning.

24 See note 15.

25 This translation of mam paraṁ we owe to the Ven. L. Siridhamma, who glossed the phrase as mam ca paraṁ ca. We are grateful to him for his help with the transcription of several gāthā.
THE GHOST WORD DViHITIKA AND THE DESCRIPTION OF FAMINES IN EARLY BUDDHIST LITERATURE

The word dvitiśṭhīka, called an ‘obscure term’ in the Critical Pāli Dictionary s.v. Thīta, occurs only in one and the same formula, which is used to describe places where it is difficult for monks to get food because of famine:

(Veranīja, Vajji, Nālandā) dubbhikkhā hoti dvitiśṭhīka
setaṭṭhikā salākāvutta na sukara uññhena paggahena
yāpetum, Vin III 6, 18-20 = 7,6-8 = 15,6 foll. = 87,5-9
= IV 23,17 foll.; S IV 323,3 foll. (without: na sukara . . )

‘(Veranīja, Vajji, Nālandā) was short of almsfood, which was difficult to obtain; it was suffering from famine, and food tickets were issued’ (I. B. Horner).

The note attached to this translation (‘the meaning of these four stock-phrases is doubtful’) shows that the terms dvitiśṭhīka, setaṭṭhikā and salākāvutta have been far from being understood since even before Buddhaghosa’s time, as will be shown later.

Among Pali scholars of modern times, H. Kern seems to be the first to discuss dvitiśṭhīka. On the whole Kern follows the explanation given in the atthakathā, leaving open the choice between ‘to have doubts about the possibility of getting food’ (dvī-thāti) and ‘to have difficulties in getting food’ (du-thāti). The PED quotes Kern but draws attention to duhitika, hesitantly translated by ‘infested with robbers’ and derived from the Sanskrit root duhuh. Quite a different suggestion was put forward by F.L. Woodward in his translation of the Samyuttanikāya: ‘I conjecture du-viti-tikā (where paddy grows badly)’ (Kindred Sayings IV 228 n. 1). Lastly the CPD offers a confusing rather than helpful discussion on dvitiśṭhīka s.vv. ihaṭ and Thā.

In the atthakathā the term dvitiśṭhīka is commented on in the Sarathapakkasining in the Samantapasadikā. The latter offers a long and elaborate explanation, which shows very clearly that at the time of Buddhaghosa the meaning and the correct grammatical analysis had fallen into oblivion:

tattha dvitiśṭhīka ti dvidhāpavattāthītikā. Thitam nāma iriyā: dvidhāpavattā cittairiyā cittathā: ‘ettha lachāma nu kho kicci bhikkhānā, na lachāma’ ti, āvītum vā sakkhisāma nu kho, no’ ti ayam ettha adhippāyo, atha vā: dvitiśṭhīka ti dujīṭhikā, Thīta, Thā, iriyanam, pavattanaṁ, āvītan ti-adhini padāni ekattahāni, tasmā dukkhaṇa Thitam ettha pavattati ti dvitiśṭhīka ti. ayam ettha padattho. Sp 174, 24-175, 1 = Sp (Be) I 143, 21-27.

‘Here dvitiśṭhīka means: endeavour being exercised in two ways. Endeavour is movement: the movement of thinking, the endeavour of thinking is exercised in two ways: “Shall we get something when begging, shall we not get [anything]? Shall we be able to live or not?” This is meant here. Or: dvitiśṭhīka means “difficult living”; endeavour, exertion, behavior, activity, life, etc. are words of the same meaning. Therefore dvitiśṭhīka means “here the endeavour [for living] goes on with difficulty.” This is the meaning of the word here.’

In this alternative explanation Buddhaghosa assumes different meanings for both parts of the compound dvitiśṭhīka: First it is split into dvī, supposed to stand for dvidhā, and Thīta equivalent to iriyā. As Thīta, Thā, and iriyā are to be understood as having the same or at least nearly the same meaning, it is difficult to assume that iriyā signifies ‘(good) conduct’, which is its usual meaning. It seems rather to be the agent noun of iriyati ‘to move, to live’. The second suggestion, to analyse dvitiśṭhīka as du(s)-Thītaka, does not offer such difficulties.

That Sāriputta in the 12th century was embarrassed to a certain extent by Buddhaghosa’s commentary is evident from the fact that he found it necessary to take up the problem again, and also from what he has to say:

Ghost word dvḥitikā and description of famines

"lacchāma nu kho ti idam duggatānaṁ vasena vuttam ṕūṭitaṁ vā sakkhisāma nu kho, no ti idam pana iṣārojanai vasena vuttam ti veditabbaṁ bhikkhānāṁ ti yācānāṁ. dvḥitikā ti pi pātho tatthāpi vuttayanen ev' attho veditabbo. dvisadassa hi dusaddadesenāyaṁ niddeśo hoti. dukkhaṁ5 vā thitam ettha na sakkā koci payogo sukheṇa kāṭun ti duhitikā,5 dukkarajñitappayogā ti attho. dusadde vā učārasa vākāraṁ kaivā dvḥitikā ti ayaṁ niddeśo ti aha: atha vā ti ādi. Sp-t (Be) I 426, 5-18.

‘He [Buddhaghosa] says “dvādhāpavattathitikā” showing that dvḥitikā is a compound, in which the middle member is omitted, and which is an adjective, meaning “here endeavour is exercised in two ways.” [The words] Thana and Thita [having the same meaning], and the word “endeavour” meaning “securing the existence”, he says “endeavour” means “movement”. Here “movement” means “activity”. [Answering the question:] “Whose activity is it?” He says: “movement of thinking”, which means activity of thinking, application of thinking. Therefore he says “endeavour of thinking”. [Answering the question:] “How is it, that there is a twofold exertion of the endeavour?” He says: “Shall we get etc.” Here “shall we get” is said with regard to the miserable people. “Shall we be able to live or not?” with regard to the rich, [thus] is the interpretation. Begging means “asking for”. There is also the reading duhitikā. Here also the meaning has to be recognised according to what has been said above. For this is indicated by substituting the syllable du for the syllable dvi. Or: duhitikā means: “here endeavour is difficult, not undertaking can be done easily.” The meaning is “where living is difficult to procure”. He [Buddhaghosa] says “atha vā” etc. indicating, that in the syllable du the sound u is changed into va optionally [which leads to] dvḥitikā.

Considering iriyā as the equivalent of kiriyā, Sāriputta shows that the interpretation of citta iriyā etc. was already problematic in his time. Whether Buddhaghosa really had in mind different social groups, when talking about a double endeavour of thinking, is open to doubt. He probably rather thought of the monks considering the question, whether they would get any food at all first, and then asking themselves, whether or not they might be able to subsist on what they received. Sāriputta, however, follows an older tradition. For Vajirabuddhi had already said: lacchāma nu kho ti duggate sandhāya vuttam, sakkhisāma nu kho no ti samiddhe sandhāya, Vjb (Be) 56, 3 foll. “shall we get” is said concerning the poor, “shall we be able or not” concerning the rich. Two points, not mentioned in Sp, are added to the explanation in Sp-t: there is a variant duhitikā, and this word shows that du- and dvi- were thought to be interchangeable without affecting the meaning.

Whether the variant duhitikā has any rooting in the Vinaya tradition is more than doubtful, for Sāriputta clearly draws from the commentary on the Sāmyuttanikāya:

dvḥitikā ti jivissāma nu kho na nu kho jivissāma6 ti evam pātho, ayam ev' attho. dukkhaṁ thitam7 ettha, na sakkā koci payogo sukheṇa kāṭun ti duhitikā.8 Spk III 106, 13-16 = (Be) III 143, 19-22.

‘dvḥitikā means: “shall we live, or shall we not live?” In this way the endeavour is exercised. There is also the reading duhitikā. The meaning is the same. “Here endeavour is difficult, it is not possible to undertake anything easily.” [This] means duhitikā.

It seems to be rather strange that, in comparison with the text given in the Samantapāsādikā, here dvi- is not explained at all. The reason for this becomes clear from ayam ev' attho introducing the explanation of duhitikā. Thus this commentarial tradition evidently did not know about any other interpretation for dvḥitikā than du(s)-hitikā. It is only the subcommentary that brings in dvādhā from the Vinaya commentaries: evam pāvattathitikā ti evam dvādhāpavattathitikā, dvḥitikā dukkarajñitappayogā. Spk-t (Be) II 382, 24 foll., where the first sentence is quoted from Sp and the second one is identical with Sp-t, both quoted above. Thus there was evidently at the time of the ttās a tendency to harmonize different views proposed in the attakathā. The older and correct opinion, that the word begins with dus- prevails in the commentarial tradition of the Sāmyuttabhaṅkas perhaps because of a second phrase occuring only in the Sāmyuttanikāya: sabhaya c' eso maggo. . . . ummaggo ca kummaggo ca duhitiko ca, S IV 195, 17 foll. ‘fearsome. . . . is this way. . . . a devious track, a wrong path, hard to travel on’ (Woodward).
Here the commentary explains: duhitika ti ettha ðhiti ti iringana, dukkhã ðhiti ettha ti duhitiko . . . dvhitiko ti pi pañho. es’ev’ attaho, Spk III 64, 21–27 = (Be) III 106, 9–14 ḍuhitika: here endeavour means living.11 Here living is difficult, [this] means duhitika. . . There is also the reading dvhitiko. The meaning is the same12.

Although the original reading duhitika is preserved here in both S and Spk, in the Sinhalese and the Burmese manuscript tradition, it is split up into dū-, accepted as correct by the Sinhalese, and dvī- thought to be the better reading by the Burmese tradition in the dubbhikkha formula (S IV 323 foll.) quoted above. As the commentary on that passage has dvī- in the pratikka against dū- in the mūla-text of the Sinhalese manuscripts, this proves again the independent traditions of the Samyuttanikāya and its commentary,12 and it proves that dvhītikā belongs to the Burmese tradition. Since the time of Aaggavansa, only dv̱hītikā has been considered to be correct, for he teaches, when demonstrating different kinds of sandhis, that dvhītikā can be split only into du-thitikā, although this word has two meanings: samānapadacchedaṃ asamānathathā Sadd 639, 12 foll., i.e. dustands either for dus- or du- (= dvī).

It is evident that dv̱hītikā was preferred to duhitikā once the interpretation of this word as containing -thitikā had found universal acceptance. This opinion prevails in the attha-kathā, which keeps duhitikā as a lectio difficilior with the usual laudable piety toward the text tradition. There can be hardly any doubt, however, that duhitikā is the original reading. It is not only the text tradition as we have it today that points in this direction, but also the highly artificial, and as far as duhitikā is concerned, grammatically impossible interpretation of the commentaries as well as the extremely simple correct analysis of duhitikā as du-hiti, the counterpart of *su-hiti. The word suhīta, though not very frequent, is well attested: jīghacchitānam pi na bhottukamyatā asa paśeva suhitānaṃ, M I 30, 31 foll. ‘those who had been hungry would have no desire for food, far less those who had eaten already’ (Horner). The commentary has suhītanāṃ: dhārānaṃ (Ps I 150, 14), and the Saddanta explains: titti tappanaṃ paripuṇṇatā suhītā, Sadd 449, 23. As the meaning ‘satiated’ for suhīta is certain one might infer a meaning ‘hungry’ for ḍuhita and ‘connected with hunger, stricken by famine’ or even only ‘difficult to live’ for duhitika.

It is very difficult to conjecture, however, why and how such an easy and transparent word formation could fall into oblivion, and how the fanciful etymology du(s)-Thiti-ka could arise. Perhaps the first step was a wrong analysis as du-hiti-ka leading to an unexplicable hiti, being connected with Thāti, Thīta13 just as brhamana14 was analysed as brahmaṇa anati (Sp 111, 12 = Sv 244, 10), bhikkhu as saṃsāre bhayaṃ ikkhati (Vism (HOS) 5, 6), ratana as ratim navatī vahati janavatī vaṭṭheti (Pj I 170, 5 foll.) and many others.15 The only thing that is certain is that the correct etymology had been forgotten by the time of the aṭṭhakaṭṭha, perhaps even much earlier. For other words of this stock phrase on famine were also misunderstood at a fairly early date as is shown by wrong Sanskritizations.

A formula similar to that in Pali occurs once in the Divyavāda: trividham dullhikṣam bhaviṣyati cācā cācā śākāvṛtti ca, Divy 131, 21 foll.

Edgerton lists in his Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary s.v. caça a parallel to this sentence from the Mūlasarvāstivādavīyā. As the edition of this text by Nalinaksha Dutt is notorious for its numerous mistakes, this passage is retranscribed here from the facsimile edition.16

It is not necessary here to dwell upon the deviations in wording from the Divyāvadāna. But it is noteworthy that here not caṇcu, but caṃca is found. This concurs with a second, as yet unidentified, text from Gilgit, which has been published by Sudha Sengupta only recently. As the transcript of this fragment bristles with misreadings to which quite a few printing mistakes have been added, it is useless to reproduce the text here, as no facsimile is available. Whereas caṇcu/caṃca²⁰ is said to signify samudgaka 'basket' in the Divyāvadāna and in the Mūlasarvāstivādinayāna, or za-ma-tog 'samudgaka, karaṇḍaka' in Tibetan,²¹ the Ujjain fragment seems to explain caṃca as a kind of disease: 'people fall down on the ground and are unable to rise. They die on the very spot': tac caṃcenāyāṃ puruṣāḥ kālagataḥ caṃcena kālagata iti 'therefore they say: “this man died of caṃca, he died of caṃca”'.

The possibility of explaining caṃca in two quite different ways indicates very clearly that the proper meaning was obsolete. Those who conceived the texts knew the formula relating to famine which had been handed down to them as a stock phrase without much caring about the exact meaning of its constituent parts. The same holds good for both the words common to the Sanskrit and the Theravāda tradition: śvetāsthī|setaṭṭhika and salākāvṛtti|salākāvutta. In addition to the material quoted already, there is another famine formula in Pali, in which dussaṭṭa replaces dvīhitika: dubbhikkhaṁ hoti dussassam setaṭṭhikam salākāvuttaṁ, A I 160, 15.²² ‘It is hard to get a meal. The crops are bad, afflicted with mildew and grown to mere stubs’ (Woodward).

This translation follows the commentary:

setaṭṭhikan ti sasse sampajjāmāne pāṇakā patanti, tehi viddhātā nikkhananikkhantaṁ sālivantāni setavaṇṇāni honti nissārāni. tam sandhāyā vuttaṁ setaṭṭhikan ti, Mp II 257, 20–22.

‘setaṭṭhika: when the crops are prospering, insects fall on them. Eaten through by them the sprouts of the rice coming up are white and barren. Because of this setaṭṭhika is said:²³

Although there is a uniform text tradition of setaṭṭhika, corresponding to śveta-asthika, in the Aṅguttaranikāya, the explanation of the Manorathapūrāṇī and the reading setaṭṭika in the prattika in Mp (Ce 1922) point in quite a different direction. In spite of the CPD, which sticks to the reading seta-attihka s.v. attihka, the correct analysis is setaṭṭi-ka, confirmed by setaṭṭikā sassaro-go (Abh (Be 1968) 454).²⁴ and by the attihakahā in the famous comparison demonstrating the disastrous effects of admitting women to the saṁgha:

seyathāpī Ānanda sampanne sālikkhette setaṭṭikā nāma rogaṇāti nipaṭati evan taṃ sālikkhettam na ciraṭṭhitikām honti. Vin II 256, 21–23 = A IV 278, 28–279,²² Five: ‘Even, Ānanda, as when the disease known as mildew attacks a whole field of rice, that field of rice does not last long’ (Horner).

The text of the commentary, which is identical for the Vinaya-piṭaka and the Aṅguttaranikāya, is re-edited here as the PTS editions are faulty in some places:

setaṭṭikā nāma rogaṇāti ti eko pāṇako nālamanjhatagamān kanḍham vijñātā. yena viddhātā nikkhantaṁ pi sālisuṁ khīraṁ gahetum na sakkoṭi, Sp 1291,5–7 = Mp IV 136, 16–18.²⁶

The kind of disease called setaṭṭikā: an insect eats through a part in the middle of the hollow stalk. Being pierced by it, the sprout of rice cannot draw any water, although having come out of the ground’. The manuscript tradition and the explanation do not point to any connection with atti ‘bone’ neither here nor in A I 160,15. Aṭṭi ‘disease’ is further corroborated as the original reading by the Samantapāsādikā commenting on the dvīhitika-formula. After explaining setṭhikā as ‘although having been begging during the day without receiving anything, [Verāṇja] is scattered everywhere with mushroom-coloured bones of dead poor people’, a variant is given:

setaṭṭikā ti pi pāţhā. tass' attho setā aṭṭi etṭhā ti setaṭṭikā. aṭṭi ti āturāti vyādhi rogo. tattha ca sassānaṁ gabbhagahaṇaṇakāle setakkaraṇena upahatam eva paccinna-khāram ahaṭṭhitaṇḍulaṁ pāndarapaṇḍaraṁ sālisuṁ vā yavagodhūnasam vā nik-khamati tasmā setaṭṭikā ti vuccati, Sp 175, 4–8.

There is also the reading setaṭṭikā. Its meanings is: “where there is the white disease”, that is setaṭṭikā. Disease means malady, sickness, illness. And there the sprouts of rice or the sprouts of
barley or wheat are infected at the time of the germination of the crops by the white disease and they grow up quite white without having produced grains, for the water is cut off. Therefore it is called “where there is the white disease”.27

This passage is of particular importance, because it separates sētaṭṭhi and sētaṭṭi very clearly, connecting both with different explanations, and because it shows how the reading sētaṭṭhi might have spread within the Theravāda tradition. Where the context in the canonical texts clearly points to a disease, there is no trace of aṭṭhi ‘bone’ to be found in the aṭṭhakathā. As soon as the idea of famine arose, the rare word aṭṭhi was subject to a reinterpretation as aṭṭhi. But for the Buddhist Sanskrit sēvāsthī one might have been inclined to think of aṭṭikā- as the only correct form of the word in Pali.

As the Divyāvadāna explains sēvāsthī as people collecting bones, cooking them till they are white and then drinking the broth, which is quite different from the Samantapāsādikā, this again points to an obsolete word, just like the two different interpretations of camca within the tradition of Northern Buddhism. Therefore sēvāsthī is suspect of being a wrong Sanskritization of sētaṭṭi.

The third and last word in this stock phrase on famine, sālākāvṛtti is explained in the same way in both the Divyāvadāna and the Mūlasarvāstivādinaya: ‘at that time people scrape together grains and brown sugar from the threshing floor and from spoons28 with the help of sticks. Having cooked this in a lot of water they drink it’. Here again the Theravāda tradition is of a different opinion:

sālākāvutta ti sālākāmattā vutta. yaṃ tattha vuttaṃ vapitām tam sālākāmattam eva ahosi, phale na janayati,29
Spk III 106,18-20.

’sālākāvutta: grown to mere sprout. What has been sown here, that became a sprout only. It does not bring forth fruit.’ Here, as at Sp 175, 8-10 and Mp II 257,23 foll., where the same explanation is given in different words, -vutta is derived from Sanskrit upta ‘sown’. Considering the meaning of the word, which is certainly defined correctly by the aṭṭhakathā, and taking into account its Sanskrit counterpart sālākāvṛtti, this can hardly be correct: sālākāvutta ‘having become a sprout’ is sālākā-vṛtta. As a rule vṛtta develops into vatta in Pali, but vutta is also possible.30 This rare, perhaps dialectical, form led the commentator to think of a derivation from vap.

The Samantapāsādikā further offers a second interpretation of sālākāvutta, supposing this word to signify ‘living on food tickets’. This again shows that there was no universally accepted interpretation of the term, the meaning of which had become altogether obsolete in the Buddhist Sanskrit tradition.

While the explanations of all three words camca, sēvāsthī, sālākāvṛtti in the famine formula as handed down in Northern Buddhism can be discarded as fanciful, the rather conservative Theravāda tradition on the other hand has preserved the correct meaning of the last two terms.

It is not, however, easily explained how, or if, the spelling sētaṭṭhikā instead of sētaṭṭikā intruded into the Pali tradition from outside. The latest date for this development and for the popular etymology connecting aṭṭikā with the word for ‘bone’ is the time of Buddhagosa.

At a first glance, one might even be inclined to suspect a fifth century Sanskritism. But the dual tradition of aṭṭikā besides aṭṭhikā could have sprung up at a much earlier date, and the frequent misspelling of inaṭṭha ‘indebted’ as inaṭṭha rather favours the origin of aṭṭhikā in Pali31 independent from the Sanskrit tradition.

As camca does not occur in Pali, the meaning of the word remains obscure. If, however, the ‘white disease’32 was really thought to be caused by insects, and if the crops were only growing as far as sprouts, perhaps because of the failing rains, camca might signify some kind of noxious animal, such as mice or rats, eating the crops. But as there does not seem to be any obvious etymological connection of this word, this guess may well lead us far astray.

Both Northern and Southern Buddhism have preserved this very old stock phrase on famine independently. At the time of the composition of the Divyāvadāna and the Mūlasarvāstivādinaya, the individual members of this formula were devoid of meaning. That is why their Sanskritization was successful in part only, and why their fanciful interpretation was invented. In the
South, on the other hand, a far more authentic tradition was preserved by the usual piety of Buddhaghosa and other commentators to old traditional interpretations, although these were outdated by their own 'modern' approach to the text. It is this respect towards the tradition which enables us in quite a few cases to recover the original meaning of words and to retrace the development of texts.

Notes


2. The Pāli Tipitaka Concordance by mistake gives Vin I 211 and II 175 as references s.v. dvāhikā.

3. Toev 122. The word is not listed in Childers' dictionary.

4. The text of Sp is given here according to the Burmese ChS edition, as the PTS edition is faulty in some minor points. This paragraph is also quoted from a Sinhalese manuscript by Oldenberg in the critical apparatus to his edition (Vin III 268, 4–9); the reading iriyānipavattanām shows, by misreading -nam as ni, that this manuscript or its source is a transcript from a Burmese manuscript and thus does not reflect a genuine Sinhalese tradition.

5. dukkham . . . duhhikā is quoted from Spk III 106, 15 foll.

6. This second jīvissāma is not in Be.

7. Ee: Thāti; Be: Thittī seems to be a misreading of -ram in the Burmese script. The quotation in Sp has Thītam; variants given in Be: Thāti (st), Thāmintī (syā).

8. Ee: payogena thārun ti dvēhikā is w.r.


10. The text is given from Be, as Ee is faulty. For Thittī perhaps read Thītam, cf. note 7.

11. Spk-pj (Be) II 345, 17: iriyāni ti vattanā paṭipajjanā.


13. A possible 'hyperpallism' *dīhitikā or even *dvēhikā, cf. the pairs diguṇa : dvuguṇa at Pj II 497, 31, dujivha, dujivha : dvivha, showing a misunderstanding as dus: duji-, or duvassa: dvivassa (cf. Sadd
31 Sanskrit influence, however, is evident in the Lokapaññatti 187,15 (ed. E. Denis, Paris 1977) dubbhikkhaṁ hoti sakalavutti, thus Denis: 'absence totale de pluie' (sic!); both manuscripts have setalavutti, read salākāvatī. -vutti instead of -vutta brings the word near to salākāvṛttī.

32 Probably 'mildew' or 'blight' (as suggested by Oldenberg-Rhys Davids, Vinaya Texts III 326) which is, however, not caused by insects, but by fungi.

KECI, ‘SOME’ IN THE PALI COMMENTARIES

The Pali Canon and its commentaries (cties) are interdependent in so far as the cties give as precise explanations as possible of the vast number of canonical words they comment on in the three piyakas: Vinaya, Sutta, and Abhidhamma. Both canon and cties are closed now and no further additions can be made to either. Any later explanatory work, such as ṭikās, anuṭikās, or anything more modern or contemporary,¹ does not rank as part of the genuine commentarial literature and is in fact post-commentarial.

The history of this genuine literature is somewhat complicated. It appears to have emanated from Jambudīpa (India), and was brought later to Sri Lanka by Mahā-Mahinda, son of the Emperor Asoka, there to be put into the Sinhalese language. This forms the source-material of the Pali cties as we have them today. For in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. these ancient cties were not only translated into Pali but organized and edited into a more scientific and sophisticated form principally by Buddhaghosa, Dhammapāla and, to a far lesser extent, by Buddhadatta. All these were bhikkhus living in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D., and all came from India to the Mahāvihāra in Anuradhapura to pursue their self-imposed editorial tasks there with the consent of the resident bhikkhus.

In spite of all that has been written and said, it cannot, so it seems, be repeated too often that not one of these so-called commentators is, strictly speaking, the author of any cty to which his name has been attached. Rather is it the case that all of them were translators and editors rendering into a more acceptable language and arranging in a more co-ordinated and rational order the commentarial material they found at the Mahāvihāra in the Sinhalese tongue. For this, for one thing, 'rendered no service to the bhikkhu-population living overseas'.²

In words attributed to Buddhaghosa, 'Removing the Sihala language from them (i.e. the cties) and basing it on the Mahā-āṭṭhakathā without discarding whatever are correct meanings and rulings that are given in the Mahāpaccārī and other famous commentaries such as the Kurundī that can be admitted to the
tradition of the Elders resident in the Mahāvihāra, I will make the meaning clear removing any repetitions and incorrect readings; giving up only a different tongue and condensing protracted exegesis, I shall render them into the faultless language (Māgadhī) suitable to the style of the canonical texts unmixed with and uncorrupted by the views of other sects. 3

It will be observed that in this verse-passage the ‘commentator’, here Buddhaghosa, proposes to work not only with extreme care and circumspection, but also refers to some of the early cities. Unfortunately none of these has survived and reasons for their disappearance can be merely guess-work.

Living perhaps even prior to the compilers of the old cities were the Porāṇas, scholars who were ‘undoubtedly revered teachers of old, and they must have played an important part in the formation and stabilising of the Theravāda school’. 4 Extracts from their teachings, expressed in both prose and verse, are scattered throughout the cities. The same material is sometimes quoted in more than one city. Therefore it would appear that these extracts were regarded as important and probably reliable enough to merit preservation.

Even as the cities knew of their predecessors, the ‘Ancients’ whom they called the Porāṇa, so too they knew of what I can only assume to have been some of their contemporaries. They refer to these as keci, ‘some’, sometimes also to aññe, apare, ekacce, eke, all meaning ‘others’. 5 Whether these ‘others’ were the same as or different from one another I cannot say. But I think it highly likely that they were not the same as keci. I think this partly because of the commentarial precision of words used, and partly because the wording of the views attributed, for example, to eke, is on the whole different from the type of wording used to record the statements attributed to keci. But only ‘on the whole’.

In this article I am not primarily concerned with any of these ‘others’ though they cannot be ignored. The names they are known by in the cities as aññe, apare, ekacce and eke are recorded by modern lexicographers only, as far as I am aware, in Helmer Smith’s Index to Pj I and II. 6 Here too is an entry for keci, but so far it is included in very few other indexes to PTS publications. But I can mention three exceptions. First there is Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli’s

The Illustrator of Ultimate Meaning 7 where in his Index of Words he includes an entry headed ‘“some” (keci, apare)’. Here he lists 24 occurrences of these two words. These amount to roughly the same total as Helmer Smith’s entries under keci and the four words for ‘others’. Secondly, and thirdly, references to ‘some’ appear in the indexes of words and subjects in The Clarifier of the Sweet Meaning 8 and in Peta-Stories. 9

Otherwise a certain amount of what I have found about ‘some’, and ‘others’, I have found as it were by chance and do not propose anything at all definite or final about them here. I merely put forward these matters hoping that some day some scholar will be sufficiently interested in these ‘contemporaries’ of the old commentators to compile a full critical index to these ‘undiscovered corners of Pali literature’. 10

An assertion which, however, may be made with some confidence is that these people, scholars, teachers perhaps, known as ‘some’ and ‘others’, whoever they were, had certainly on occasions views differing from those held by the Mahāvihārins. It is apparent that these latter did not despise all their views, but held a number of them to be valid, important, and constructive or interesting enough to be inserted in the commentaries, but they hardly can have foreseen that these would have been preserved and studied centuries later in far away Europe. The recorded views of ‘some’ may be given without comment, thus apparently signifying agreement, or by saying ‘the meaning is the same’, though the reading may differ; or by criticising or rejecting.

When this happens, when there is criticism or rejection, it can be expressed as pamādapātha, an incorrect or slovenly reading, as e.g. at Pj I 207 and Pj-a 25, of keci; as pamādalekha, as e.g. at Bv-a 230, poṭṭhakesu likhanti, so pamādaleko ti veditabbo: ‘they (unspecified) write in the books (manuscripts?) pabbajitam santan ti (for mayi pabbajite), this is an erroneous or slovenly writing’, as also noted at Sp 3.2 where scribes’ errors or careless writings, pamādalekha, will be discarded when Sp as it has come down to us was being prepared from the older cities that were in the Sihala tongue; as tam na sundaram, ‘that is not good, right or proper’, as e.g. at Ud-a 253 of keci; as tam pāḷyā na sameti, ‘that does not agree or tally with the text’, as e.g. at Bv-a 76 of keci; as tam na gahetabbam, ‘that is not to be adopted’, as e.g.
at Ud-a 374 of apare; as tam akāraṇaṁ, ‘that is unreasonable’, as Ud-a 34 of keci; also as n’atth’ idam kāraṇaṁ, as e.g. at Ud-a 431 of keci. Thus where the reading or writing was deemed to be careless or the views put forward to be erroneous, several ways in which the Elders could show their disagreement were to hand.

On other occasions, and perhaps the more frequent, the differing interpretations of keci may be given without any comment and neither agreement nor disagreement is expressed. Thus at Ud-a 44 have is said to be a particle here. But keci say (vadanti) ‘its meaning is āhave, in the battle’ (which might well be the case). This is not disputed.11

It seems that the views held by keci or the readings taken by them are nearly always expressed by the terms keci vadanti and keci paṭhanti, ‘some say’ and ‘some read’. But this is not a hard and fast rule or occurrence. For at e.g. Sv 662, 5 and Pj I 78,17 the word bhaṇanti is used instead of vadanti for what keci say, as it is at e.g. Pj II 226,21 to convey the views of eke. On the other hand eke vadanti occurs at Sv 150,8 and 152,3 as well as the less expressive ti pi eke and ti eke of Sv 84,19 and 437,19. Similarly there is ti pi keci at Pj I 46. In other Sv passages (e.g. 87,5; 184, 23) the more normal keci vadanti and keci pana vadanti are to be found. This too is the case at Pj I 165,15 and Pj II 26,11 where apare vadanti, ‘others say’. Thus it is very difficult to draw a distinction between ‘some’ and ‘others’, whether these be eke or apare, merely by referring to the commentarial terms used to record their interpretations. Thus much seems fairly clear.

The cities themselves appear to take keci for granted since they give no indication at all of who they were: editors, translators, research workers, or teachers, for example, or of where they lived. It is left to a fikā, that on Sv, to give the opinion that they were residents of Abhayagiri12 and therefore bhikkhus, rather than residents of the Mahāvihāra, usually regarded as the more orthodox seat of learning, and attracting Buddhaghosa and the other famous commentators to spend some years working there. Other fikās may well concur in the opinion that keci resided in the Abhayagiri.

Another question that arises is where do ‘some read’, keci paṭhanti? The answer appears to be potthakesu, ‘in the books’, presumably meaning ‘in the manuscripts’. Most probably these are the manuscripts of the ancient and now unfortunately no longer existent cities used by Buddhaghosa and the others. The writers of these ‘manuscripts’ are anonymous now, and simply appear to be denoted by the term likhanti, ‘they write’.

Besides the examples already quoted of passages speaking of keci, I will give now a few more, and will begin with Pva-13 since the index of words in its translation collects all the occurrences. Thus:

Pv-a 9. keci pan entha petā ti arahanto adhippetā ti vadanti. Tam tesam matimattam. Petā ti khūnāsavānam āgataṭhānass eva abhāvato, ‘but as to this “same” say peta is a synonym for arahant. This is only their imagination. For there is no possibility of return for those whose āsava are destroyed’. This interpretation of peta is therefore not acceptable and is rejected.

Pv-a 14. vēhāsayam tiṭṭhasi antalikkhe ti vēhāsayavasaiṇhite antalikkhe tiṭṭhasi. Keci pana vihāsayan tiṭṭhasi antalikkhe ti pāthaṃ vatvā vihāsayam abhāśento antalikkhe tiṭṭhasi ti vacanasena atham vadanti, ‘... some, taking the reading, “you are standing in the sky, in the air”, say the meaning is “you are standing in the air lifting up the sky”’. As no comment is made here, there is no reason to suppose the commentator took this ‘reading’ not as definitely wrong but as interesting or useful enough to be preserved.

Pv-a 24–25. In a short discussion on the meaning of pahūte, it is said ‘but some read bahuvel which is a careless reading’, pamaṇapāṭhā. Thus there is disagreement here.

Pv-a 33. Here for the reading kissa kammapavākaṇa ‘some’ read (paṭhanti) kena kammavitākana. No comment and the reading given by keci appears to be acceptable.

Pv-a 40. Ayaṃ gono samuṭṭhahe, to be interpreted commentarily as ‘because of this I have thought that this (dead) ox might rise, whereas “some” read (paṭhanti) “I think the ox might rise” because the notion might present itself that this ox might get up suddenly’. Again no comment is made.

Pv-a 58–9. Here, instead of reading sukhaṃ virāgāya, ‘some’ read (paṭhanti) sukhasa virāgāna. No comment.

Pv-a 70. The text’s reading of bhikkhūnam is for bhikkhuno and was said owing to a change in number. So when keci read alopam bhikkhuno datvā, it looks as if their reading were better and to be preferred.
Pv-a 75. Some say (keci vadamāri) that in each direction he produced 16 trees so that altogether there were 64 wish-granting trees, whereas the cty says he produced 8 trees in each of all the directions so that there was a total of 32 wish-granting trees. No comment, and perhaps of no importance whether 64 or 32 of these mythical trees appeared.

Sp 403-4 = Spk III 270 at both of which keci’s views are given though omitted at some comparable passages, e.g. Mp III 315, Thīa 61 168. In defining asecanaka our two cty’s say nāsā secanakan ti, anāsittakko abbokinno pātekkho āveniko... keci pana asecanaka ti anāsittakko ojavanti sabhāven’ eva madhuro vadamāri, ‘what is complete or perfect needs no addition, is un-interrupted, single, unique. But some say it needs no addition, is life-giving, sweet by nature’. These views cannot be objected to and so there is apparently complete concurrence.

Ps I 171. Here four defilements are to be got rid of by the third way, the anāgāminimagga. ‘But some herein are described as getting rid of them by the first way. This does not tally with what precedes and what follows. Some speak of, ti, getting rid of by discarding. This is no more than a desire of theirs: keci pana paṭhamamamaggena ev’ ettha pahānam vanāyanti. Tam pabbāparena na sandhīyati. Keci vibhāmanapahānan ti. Tami tesam icchāmattem eva.

Thus, in neither of these adjacent passages are keci agreed with or their views adopted. (Cf. Pv-a 9).

Ps II 351 = Spk III 95: ‘Therein some say the cessation of one who has attained is when the essentials or requisites of his mind are as though they have ceased to exist’; Tattha keci nirodhām samāpannassa cittasaṅkhārā va niruddhā ti. ‘But it should be said to them ‘His essentials for speech have also ceased to exist’’, vacīsaṅkhārā pa ’ssa niruddhā.

So here the statement made by ‘some’ is regarded as incomplete and the meaning as not adequate to cover ensuing developments.

Some examples from Pj I and Ud-a have been cited already. Others are:

Pj I 46. For jamghamamsaṃ tālapattaputabhantassā santhānaṃ, ‘the flesh of the calves (of the legs) is the shape of cooked rice in a palm-leaf bag’, we get avikasitaketa kiṃmakulasanṭhānaṃ ti pi keci, ‘some say the shape of an unopened ketaki bud’.

No comment and, apart from ti, no verb.

Pj I 154... tassa abhāvato asokan, keci nibbānam vadamāri, tam purimapadana nāsusandhīyati, ‘that is sorrowlessness; some say it is nibbāna, but that has no sequence of meaning with the earlier line’.

Rejection of keci’s views.

Ud-a 51 gives a reason for the origin of the name Ajapāla-nigrodha, while keci give another. There is, however, no verb here, not even ti at as Pj I 46, but simply keci pana yasā Clara... mahallaka- brāhmaṇa nivesanāni katvā sabbe vasiṃsu. Tasmā Ajapāla-nigrodho ti nāmaṃ jātān ti.

There is no agreement and in fact Ud-a proceeds to give three more possible origins. Perhaps therefore Ud-a welcomes keci’s contribution which at least it does not appear to reject or despise. Indeed the origin of the name seems to have been wrapped in uncertainty.

Ud-a 108. Here the cty, ascribing one meaning to the phrase taṇhakkhaya-sukhassa says that ete’s interpretation depends on a change in case, while keci ubhayaṃ pi sukhasatamathāna gahetvā etan ti paṭhanti, ‘some read this taking both as happiness through reclusehip. But this must be because of a very worthless reading of theirs’, tesam kalaṃ nāgghanti ti paṭhena bhavatābbaṃ.

Therefore rejection.

The cty’s are a most wealthy mine of all kinds of information. Now that it is hoped to mark the PTS centenary in 1981 by the translation of at least a few cty’s—other it is hoped will follow as the years go by—it will be not only appropriate but necessary that some of the riches in this body of information may be explored and exploited. For by this means it may become more possible to add to our precise knowledge of what the Pali Canon is intending to say and thus to our powers of interpreting it correctly.

Moreover it seems important to discover far more about the contents and methods of the cty’s themselves. For example the following topics spring to mind:

1. I have briefly discussed various commentarial methods of defining canonical words in CSM, pp.xvii foll.: by giving canonical quotations; by citing other readings (not necessarily those adopted
by 'some' or 'others'); by providing enumerations of different kinds of the same item or by saying that such-and-such words may have a varying number of 'folds', vidha, from two upwards, or by the device of ascribing multiple meanings to a word, sadda. Unfallingly it is asserted which one is intended 'here', that is in the canonical context being investigated and clarified in order to eliminate the substitution of a wrong meaning for the right one.

2. Interest in grammar, including conscious changes in case and grammatical terms used.\textsuperscript{15}

3. Knowledge of Sanskrit grammar and words.

4. Additions to and alterations from the Teaching of the Canon.

5. New words and new names not found in the Canon.

6. Number of times Buddhaghosa or the others gave their own views, and if this was done only when a city gives no explanation of a canonical term.

7. The religious and social history of Ceylon, its culture and customs as described in many of the cities.

8. The arts of story-telling and versifying.

9. Similes and metaphors used.

10. Style of writing, including assonance.

11. Lists of sayings and readings attributed to the Porānas, to 'some, and to 'others'.

12. Material concerning Gotama as bodhisatta and Buddha, and the meaning of the terms.

Many more points in commentarial literature would repay investigation, and I should think the total size of the findings would be vast. In this article I have only scratched a minute part of the surface of what future work on the commentaries might be and might yield.

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\textbf{Notes}


2 Sp I foll.
Tīrthaṅkara-prakṛti and the Bodhisattva Path

Among the many technical terms which have similar meanings in Buddhism and Jainism, the terms ‘Tīrthaṅkara’ (Pali tīthaka)¹ and ‘Buddha’ have a particularly large number of common connotations. The term ‘tīrtha’ (Pali tīthiya),² although it has been used rather pejoratively by the Buddhists to denote the non-Brahmanical ‘heretics’, conveys to the Jainas the very same elements that one associates with the terms ‘Buddha’ or ‘Samyak-sambuddha’.³ I shall mention briefly a number of points of similarity between the two terms.

Both ‘Buddha’ and ‘Tīrthaṅkara’ are applied only to the Teachers of the respective orders and not to the disciples, and at any given time only one Buddha or Tīrthaṅkara exists in any one lokadhātu.⁴ Both Teachers have achieved omniscience (sarva-jñatva), the Buddha by having removed all kleśāvaraṇa and jñeyāvaraṇa, and the Tīrthaṅkara by having destroyed the mohanīya and the jñāṇāvaraṇa karmas.⁵ Although in each religion there is an eternal line of Teachers, each Buddha or Tīrthaṅkara lays the foundation for a new order (called sāsana or tīrtha), which lasts for a certain number of years and then ends, to be renewed by another teacher in the series. And in each kalpa there are exactly twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras and twenty-five Buddhas.⁶

The first Buddha and the first Tīrthaṅkara of each age makes a prophecy concerning the identity of the last one. The first Buddha, Dīpaṅkara, prophesied that a Brahman named Sumedha would eventually become the last Buddha, Gautama. Likewise, the first Tīrthaṅkara of our kalpa, Rāṣṭhra, prophesied that his grandson, Mahāvīra, would become the last Tīrthaṅkara, Mahāvīra.⁷ Similar comparisons can be drawn between major occasions in the lives of Gautama the Buddha and Mahāvīra the Tīrthaṅkara: the dreams preceding their conceptions, their births, with gods in attendance; their renunciation, enlightenment, and first sermons; and finally their nirvāṇas. Buddhist and Jaina communities celebrate these events in almost identical ways.⁸

The similarities between Buddhist and Jaina conceptions of their Teachers and Founders of orders would suggest that the path leading to Buddhahood and Tīrthaṅkarahood are equally similar; nevertheless, there must be doctrinal and temperamental differences between the two paths, in as much as Jainism adheres to the doctrine of noninvolvement in the affairs of other souls, while Buddhism lays great stress upon the need to cultivate mahākāraṇa, the great compassion, so as to help other beings attain nirvāṇa. Consequently there are some major differences between the careers of a follower of a Buddha and a disciple of a Tīrthaṅkara. It is of great interest to the students of religion to examine these similarities and differences.

The path of the Buddha is known as the Bodhisattva path, to distinguish it from the path of arhat. An arhat is said to be the follower of a lower path as he remains content with the role of the disciple and who, although free from all moral impurities (kleśa), continues to have a residual ignorance. This ‘ignorance’ is a deficiency which, according to certain Buddhist schools, prevents the arhat from being a Teacher;⁹ the Buddha’s omniscience, on the other hand, enables him, indeed compels him to be a Teacher and the founder of a new Order. For the Jainas such a distinction between an arhat and a Tīrthaṅkara is impossible, since omniscience (kevalajñāna or sarvakjñatva) is a prerequisite for the Jaina nirvāṇa.¹⁰ In Jainism, therefore, the distinction between an arhat and a Tīrthaṅkara is based not upon the degree of knowledge attained, but upon the presence or absence of certain miraculous powers, notably the divya-dhvani (‘divine sound’) which enables certain omniscient beings to be Teachers.¹¹ Not all arhats need to be Teachers; only a few have practiced those virtues which are said to confer upon them the status of a Tīrthaṅkara (by endowing them with divya-dhvani) at the time of their first sermon after attaining the arhatship.

Bearing these conditions in mind one can now examine the significant features of these two paths. The prominent feature of the Bodhisattva path is the practice of the six pāramitās, viz. dāna, śīla, vīrya, ks̱aṇi, dhīyaṇa, and prajñā. The Bodhisattva traditionally produces the bodhicitta, the resolution to become a Buddha, in the presence of a Buddha, as for example, Sumedha, who made his resolution in the time of Dīpaṅkara Buddha. He then receives a prophecy from that Buddha, to the effect that he will become a Buddha at such and such a time. Thereafter he
practices the pāramitās for four (to sixteen) asamkhyeyas and one hundred thousand kalpas, serving different Buddhas, until he finally reaches perfection and attains to Buddhahood.\textsuperscript{12}

Three major elements stand out in this process. First, the Bodhisattva is fully aware that he wants to become a Buddha. Second, he practises the virtues repeatedly over the course of a number of births. Third, he undertakes each action with the resolution that it should accumulate such karmic forces that it finally will yield as its fruit the attainment of nirvāṇa on the part of all beings. Furthermore, the Bodhisattva is constantly aware of his future role as a Teacher.

The career of a would-be Tīrthaṅkara basically resembles that of a Bodhisattva, in that he practises virtues which roughly correspond to the six pāramitās. The Jainas list sixteen practices (bhāvanā) which eventually result in Tīrthaṅkarahood: (1) Purity of insight (darśana-viśuddhi); (2) reverence of one’s elders; (3) the observance of the vows; (4) the ceaseless pursuit of knowledge; (5) constant fear of saṃsāra; (6) charity (tyāga); (7) austerities (tapas); (8) removal of obstacles that threaten the equanimity of ascetics; (9) serving the meritorious by warding off evil; (10) devotion to arhats; (11) devotion to one’s preceptors; (12) devotion to the learned in scriptures; (13) devotion to the scriptures; (14) the practice of the six essential duties (daily confession of transgressions, etc.); (15) propagation of the teachings of the Tīrthaṅkara; and (16) fervent affection for one’s brother in faith.\textsuperscript{13}

Although this list is longer than the Buddhist list of the pāramitās, it can also be divided into the traditional Buddhist categories of śīla, samādhi, and prajñā. The Jainas emphasize tyāga and darśana-viśuddhi, just as the Buddhists emphasize dāna and prajñā, thus stressing the mundane and supermundane aspects of the path. The Jainas do not insist that all sixteen bhāvanās must be practised, or that they be practised to the same extent.\textsuperscript{14} This would indicate that the list of sixteen is an elaboration of an earlier list, which probably corresponded more closely to the list of six pāramitās.

These sixteen bhāvanās, severally or collectively, are said to cause the influx of karmic matter which must inevitably lead one to the state of being a Tīrthaṅkara, that is to say, an arhat who teaches. This karmic matter, therefore, is called tīrthaṅkara-prakṛti, karma which yields rebirth as a Tīrthaṅkara.\textsuperscript{15}

One would expect the Jainas to map out their path in greater detail as did the Buddhists in the Jātakas or in such sūtras as the Daśabhūmika or treatises like the Bodhisattvabhūmi. Strangely enough, not a single Jaina work deals exclusively with the path of a Tīrthaṅkara. Although Jaina literature is full of didactic stories which extoll the virtues comprising the sixteen bhāvanās, they are not set forth as stages of a career culminating in the birth as a Tīrthaṅkara. The Tīrthaṅkara-path seems here to have been subsumed under the path of an arhat, the mokṣa-mārga of the Jainas.

One can, however, follow the career of the Tīrthaṅkara by looking at the legendary biographies of various Tīrthaṅkaras in such works as the Ādiṣṭhūla\textsuperscript{16} of Jinasena (9th century) or the Triṣaṭṭhīṣaṇa-purusa-carita\textsuperscript{17} of Hemacandra (12th century). It is astonishing to find that in no case did the Tīrthaṅkara-to-be ever become aware of having initiated such a career. In other words, there is nothing in Jainism comparable to the idea of the bodhicittra-pāda, the bedrock upon which the entire career of the Bodhisattva was founded. According to the Jainas the karmic forces called tīrthaṅkara-prakṛti become attracted to the soul of the Tīrthaṅkara-to-be at a specific time when one of the virtues, probably charity or protection of ascetics, reaches its perfection. There is no conscious effort or resolution on the part of this soul to become a Tīrthaṅkara, nor is there any awareness that such karmas have been attracted determining his future status as Tīrthaṅkara. This can probably be explained on the grounds that any such wish to become a Tīrthaṅkara would itself constitute an unwholesome act and would render his virtues impure. The Jainas have maintained that the bartering (called nīdaṇa) of one’s virtuous deeds for the attainment of supernatural powers or rebirths in heaven, not to speak of Tīrthaṅkarahood, is the greatest obstacle on the path of salvation.\textsuperscript{18} It is, therefore, understandable that while a Jaina devotee, either lay or mendicant, might wish to lead a pure life and perfect his virtues, he would not entertain the thought that he might attain an exalted status, such as that of an arhat or a Tīrthaṅkara. One becomes a Tīrthaṅkara quite unawares, and that fact, in itself, is considered the perfect proof of one’s saintliness.
This is a major departure from the Buddhist point of view, and it explains the absence of a Jaina-bodhisattva path, since there can be no starting point like the moment of bodhicittaotpāda.\textsuperscript{19} Another important distinguishing feature is the element of the time required to become a Tīrthaṅkara. While the Buddhists tend to lengthen the period into many kalpas and countless births, the Jaina legends concerning the Tīrthaṅkaras consistently mention no more than a single intermediate lifetime between the birth during which the tīrthaṅkara-prakṛti was attracted and the (final) incarnation as a Tīrthaṅkara.\textsuperscript{20} This would be too short a time if the Tīrthaṅkara-to-be were required to practice the perfections in the Buddhist manner. The intervening birth is usually in a heaven\textsuperscript{21} from where the soul descends into the womb of his human mother and is immediately endowed with a body suitable to a Tīrthaṅkara-to-be. He then becomes recipient of the various honours (e.g. the celebration of the kalyāṇas) eventually attaining to kevalajñāna at which time the divya-dhvani will emanate from his person and he will be recognized by all as a new Tīrthaṅkara, the founder of a new tīrtha.

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Notes

1 The original meaning of the term, ‘the founder of a sect’, is well preserved in the following passage of the Sāmatthapalasutta: āyam, deva, Pūrṇa Kassapo saṅghī c eva gāthi ca genaśa ca na yassaśī tīrthakaro sādhusammato bhujanassa rattāthā cirappabbaṭīto addhaṇato vayo anupateto, D I 48 foll. It should be noted that Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Kesakambali, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Saṅjaya Belāthiputta, and Nigāthna Nāṭaputta, the contemporary śramaṇa leaders of Gautama Buddha, are also described in an identical manner in that sutta.

The Jainas take the term tīrtha to mean the scripturies: tīrthakṛṣṭaṁ sāṃsārottaranahetubhūtavāt tīrtham iva tīrtham āgamaṁ iha kṛtvātvaḥ (Quoted in Jinendra Varni, Jainendra-siddhānta-kosā, Delhi 1971, II, p. 372).

2 Edgerton quotes the following use of tīrthika as an exception: tīrthikā va bhavanti bhavasūdānāḥ (Mvu I 106,8) where the term tīrthika is said to refer to the Bodhisattva in the eighth bhūmi (F. Edgerton, BHSD, p. 254).

3 Compare, for example, the Śakrastava addressed to the liberated souls: namo 'tthu arihantarīgam bhagavantāgam āgārāgam tīrthayayarāgam sayamambudhayaṁ savadarīṣṭaṁ... .namo jñānam jñāyabhavyaṁ (Quoted in R. Williams, Jaina Yoga, London 1963, p. 193).

4 The Jainas divide the abode of human beings into the realm of enjoyment (bhogābhiṁ) and the realm of spiritual activity (karmabhiṁ) and contend that the Tīrthaṅkaras are to be found only during the third and fourth (out of a total of six) stages of the temporal half-cycles known as utsarpīṇī (progressive) and avasarpīṇī (regressive). Only one Tīrthaṅkara may appear in a given karmabhiṁ at one time. They also believe that there are certain karmabhiṁs (known as Vīdeha-kṣetras) which are free from such temporal changes and hence Tīrthaṅkaras are to be found there at all times. For details, see W. Schurbing, The Doctrine of the Jainas, Delhi 1962, § 12-15; § 120. The Theravādins, on the other hand, believe that the Buddhas are born only in the Jambudīpa and hence discount the possibility of a Buddha currently living anywhere in the Universe. See G.P. Malalasekera, DPPN, II, 298. The Northern Buddhists seem to disagree on the precise meaning of the term lokadhātu. The Vaibhāṣikas seem to favour the view that only one Buddha can appear in the entire universe at one time, whereas the Mahāsāṅghikas maintain that many Buddhas can appear simultaneously in different world-systems: sūtra uteda—‘asthānān anavākāśo yad apūrvacaramau dvau Tathāgatai arhatante sanyaksambuddhau loka utpadyeyatam. nedaṁ sthānaṁ vidyate. sthānaṁ etad vidyate yad ekas Tathāgataḥ. . . . idam atra sampadāhāyaṁ—kim atra tiraṁsamahāsasrahosā lokadhātur loka ṯaṭah, utaḥo sarvakadhaṭṭava iti? nayatra Buddhā utpadyanta ity ēke. . . . santi evaṇyakadhaṭṭaṁ Buddhā iti nīκāyantaṁ (Abhidharmakosabhāgya, (ed. P. Pradhan) Patna 1967, III, 96).


6 The following verses list the names of the twenty-four Tīrthaṅkaras of the present avasarpīṇī in the Bharata-kṣetra of the Jambudīpa:


(Quoted in R. Williams, Jaina Yoga, p. 195). For a list of the twenty-five Buddhas of the Theravāda tradition, see Ja I 44. The Northern
tradition seems to have expanded on this list, as can be seen from the Laliitavistara which enumerates fifty-four Buddhas, and the Mahāvīra, which lists more than a hundred Buddhas under whom the Bodhisattva is said to have attained the different bhūmis of his career.

7 It should be noted, however, that the prophecy regarding Marci was made by Rājabha in response to a question from Bharata (the first Cakravartin, the eldest son of Rājabha) and also that Marci became puffed up with pride and fell away from the true path; he is credited by the Jaina with founding the Śāhkhyas heresy:

atra kiṃ kaścid api asti, bhagavān, bhagavān iva,
tīrtham pravṛtya Bharaṭakṣetram yah pāryavisyati.
śāṃcā lha bhagavān evam, ya eṣa tava nandaḥ,
Marciś cārṇaṁcā kaśyapaḥ, parivaṛṣe kaśiḍaṁ...
.. cīrāṃ ca sanśyeta bhave, bhavīṣyataḥ atra Bhāraṭe,
aṃstaś Mahāvīrā ca tīrthakṛt tu santaḥ.

(Tīrṣṭāśālamāṇa-prakṛti (of Hemacandra), I, vi, 372–379
(Bhavanagar 1933).

8 For a description of the ceremony attending these sacred events known as the paṅca-kalīyānas (garbha-jāna-mādhukalīya-kalīya), see P.S. Jaini, The Jaina Path of Purification, Berkeley 1979, pp. 195 foll.

9 This is a view of the Vaiḥāsika school: ajīnāmaḥ hi bhūtārdharaṇān
pratipatibhāvand hiṇdākaraṇam, tac ca bhagavata Buddhāsyo
pratipakṣālāhahaṇyamānāṃ sarvathā sarvatra ityena punar
anupattidharmaṇaḥ hataḥ, ato 'sau sarvātma sarvahātāṁ hiṇdākaraṇo,
pratyakṣabuddhārāvaka api kāmā sarvatra hiṇdākaraṇo,
kiśiṣamahākṣyantaviṣaṃ, na tu sarvathā; tathāḥ ky eṣaṃ
duddhārṣaṁ ativipraṅkrṣaṇaḥ kāreṣu śaṃcārānabhradeśe
bhavaty evaṇkṛṣataḥ ajīnāmaḥ (Abhidharmakośabhaṣya, I, 1).

10 mokṣapratiprāśi kevalājñānātpratipākṣākaṇām ucceṣe:
moṅkāyaṁ jānānārādānāvaṛṇāntarāyaśyaṣe ca kevalam/
buddhāhatvahāvārjanāryaṁ yām kṣatramārvāpyanamo kevalaṁ/
(Sarvārthaśuddhi (Bhāṣya on the Tatvārthaśuddhi), X, 1–2).

11 The Tīrṭhakara is believed to speak in a human language that is
divine in the sense that men of all regions can understand it in their
own languages: Tīrṭhakarasya...samudbhūto divyadhvanīḥ...
yojanāntaraṁsarasmāpattāḥdāsaḥ-bhāgaḥ-saptasatkaḥbhāṣyātya-
itiyādyevamanyabhaṅkārāryānyādikahāvālītaḥ-madhuramahānaho-
gambhiṁravādyātītyasampanṇaḥ...Mahāvīro 'tīrkaratī
d(Quoted in Jindendra Varni, Jainendra-siddhānta-kośa, II, p. 430).

12 For details, see G.P. Malalasekara, DPPN, II, 324.

13 yad idaṁ tīrṇhakaranāmārcohārōnāmārcohāpaccāvah
acintyavibhūvīteṣa karaṇaṁ trilokayaviṣayākaraṇa
stasyārasvādhiśeṣe 'stītaḥ? yady evam ucayatērū kasyārasvāḥ.
ity ātā idaṁ ārahasyate darśanaviṣuddhibhāva
vinayasampannattā
from the Jaina lexicon. The parallel between the Jaina and the Buddhist paths was however noticed by one Jaina author, namely the celebrated Haribhadrasūri, the eighth century author of the Yogabindu. Haribhadra, rather boldly, asserts that the Jaina samyagdṛṣṭi can be called a ‘bodhisattva’ as the former has ‘all the characteristics of the latter’; ‘Like the Bodhisattva (as held by the Buddhists), the samyag-dṛṣṭi also may never commit a volitionally inspired evil act, will aspire to do good to others, and will become endowed with the “supreme bodhi”, or attain to the status of a Tīrthāṅkara.

ayam asyāṁ avasthāyāṁ bodhisattvāṁ bhūdhīyate, anyais tat lākṣaṇāṁ yasmat sarvam asyopapadhyate.
kāyāpātaṁ āveha bodhisattvāḥ paraṇorīdhaṁ,
na cītāpāṭīnāṁ tāthead etad arāpī yogyam.
pārārtharāsiko dhiṁmā mārgaṇāṁ mahāsāyaṁ,
guṇgran gatiḥ tathātāṁ ādi sarvam tulyāṁ dvayaṁ āpya.
īti samyagdārānām bodhis tat pradhāno mahādāyaṁ,
sattva ‘ṣtu bodhisattvas taddhantaṁ ‘narthato ‘pi hi.
varabodhisatvam eva tīrthakṛtyo bhaviṣyatī,
tathā bhavyatvam ‘sa ‘vi bodhisattvāṁ satāṁ mataḥ.
(The Yogabindu of Ācārya Haribhadrasūri, ed. K.K. Dixit, Ahmedabad 1968, 270–74). Notwithstanding the similarities noted above, Haribhadra’s comments should not be taken literally. A bodhisattva is destined to be a Buddha whereas a samyagdṛṣṭi may or may not become a Tīrthāṅkara; the fact that most of the samyagdṛṣṭis end their careers as ordinary (i.e. non-Teacher) arhats, albeit with omniscience, underlines the basic difference between the two careers.

20 Compare, for example, the story of king Nandana (Mahāvīra’s soul in a previous birth) who renounced his kingdom, became a Jaina monk, practised severe austerities, attracted the tīrthāṅkara-prakṛti, and was reborn in the Prāpata heaven. From there he was reborn, in his final incarnation, as Vordhamāna Mahāvīra. See Triṣaṭiṣaṭākā-puruṣacarita, X, 1. 217–84. As a matter of fact, the Jina has made a rule that one must become a Tīrthāṅkara in the second birth after being ‘bound by’ the tīrthāṅkara-prakṛti: pārāddhatīdhayaśaṁkhandhābhavāda tatātvaṁ tatātvasamāvatānāt mam kṣamakaṁ pujam (quoted in Jainendra Varni, Jainendra-siddhaṁ-kosa, II, p. 371).

21 Although all the twenty-four Tīrthāṅkaraśas of the present cycle have descended from heaven (as did Gautama from the Tuṣita heaven), the Jina believe that certain souls may come from purgatories (nāraka) and be born as Tīrthāṅkaras. King Śreṇika Bimbisāra of Magadhā is said to fall in this category. He was a great devotee of Mahāvīra and had by his devotion attracted the tīrthāṅkara-prakṛti, but he committed suicide and was born in the first nāraka. It is believed that he will be reborn as the first Tīrthāṅkara of the next kalpa. See ibid., IV, p. 71.
Ganges. They ask him why they are undergoing such punishment. Seventeen pretas relate their sufferings and to each of them Maudgalyāyana explains which sins he has committed in his previous life. Thereupon Maudgalyāyana sees a devakanyā sitting on a lotus a hundred yojanas long and wide. She tells Maudgalyāyana that she was rewarded in this way for honouring a statue of Buddha Kāśyapa with flowers. The following story tells how a servant washes Śāriputra’s clothes in the Mango park (Āmrāpāliyana?). He dies the same night and is reborn in the heaven of the Thirty-three gods. Indra sees this, goes to Śāriputra and honours him with flowers. Śāriputra teaches him the dharma and Indra obtains the state of srotā-āpanna. The next story concerns Maudgalyāyana. He sees a divine being whose body is immense. His hands are of golden colour and amrita drips from his fingers. He tells Maudgalyāyana that he is a great divine being and resides in the capital of the kingdom. In his former life he was a poor woman in the same capital Lo-lou(a) (Lā-lju). A śramaṇa-brahmana who was begging for food asked her how to find the house of a certain rich gṛhapati. She warned him that noon had passed and that therefore he could no longer ask for food.

The second part of the Tsa-tsang tells the story of king Udayana of the kingdom of Avanti (!). The queen ‘Light of the moon’ (Candrāprabhā?) enters the religious life and obtains the state of anāgamin. She dies in a village and is reborn in the rūpadhātu heaven. At night she appears before the king in the form of a rākṣasa and explains that she is his former wife. She exhorts the king to enter the religious life. The king entrusts himself to Kātyāyana and enters the religious life. He goes to Rājagṛha and has a conversation with king Bimbisāra. He preaches the dharma to him and Bimbisāra departs. Then the text continues abruptly with a question about the merit of exercising for one day and night, or seven days or one’s whole life, the three matters (vastu?) of a bodhisattva. The text does not explain who puts the question or who replies, the reply being that only the Buddha can answer this question. Then somebody tells the story of the king of the kingdom of the Yüeh-chih who wanted to build thirty-two stūpas. When the king had built thirty-one stūpas a bad man touched (insulted?) him. The king thought: ‘How can this bad man be converted?’ He gave up saṃsāra and directed himself towards nirvāṇa. He built the thirty-second stūpa and became an arhat. The text continues: ‘Therefore this monastery is called Prātimokṣa (a gloss adds: in Chinese ‘giving up saṃsāra’). Since then not yet two hundred years have passed. This monastery still exists. I also saw it. In all monasteries there are beautiful statues’. The text continues by relating how, after the death of the king, a man obtained the fruit of a mango tree. He wondered how much merit could be obtained by offering the fruit to a statue of the Buddha Śākyamuni. He put this question to three different holy men, who declared themselves incapable of answering his question. He then went to the Tusița heaven and put this question to Maitreyā, who told him to wait until he had become a Buddha. Here the text ends abruptly.

It is not possible to know whether the Tsa-tsang reproduces faithfully the manuscript brought back by Fa-hsien or if the Chinese translation has been badly preserved in China. The stories told by the seventeen pretas may have been part of a Pretavastu and this probably explains the title Kṣudrakapitaka. The story of king Udayana does not seem to occur elsewhere. The remaining part of the text is in a rather chaotic state, but the stories relating to the king of the Yüeh-chih kingdom and the visit to Maitreyā are quite interesting. In any case, there is no reason to doubt that this text was brought back from Ceylon by Fa-hsien and translated by him.

The Tsa-tsang contains only very few transliterations. Since almost all of them were in common use in Chinese translations of the fourth and fifth centuries, it is not possible to determine the language of the manuscript itself.

The manuscript of the Dīrghāgama which was brought back by Fa-hsien was not translated. This was probably due to the fact that in 413 a translation of the Dīrghāgama of the Dharma-guptakas was published by Buddhayaśas, a monk from Kashmir (T. 1). Waldschmidt, Bailey and Brough have studied the Chinese transliterations found in this text and pointed out a number of agreements with the language of the Gāndhāri Dhammapada. Chinese sources do not give any information about the manuscript of the Dīrghāgama brought back by Fa-hsien. It probably belonged to another school, but apparently the Chinese did not see any need for yet another Dīrghāgama translation.
According to the Kao-seng chuan (Shih, p. 150) and the Ch'u san-tsong chi chi (T. 2145, p. 105c) the Samyuktāgama (T. 99) was one of the first texts translated by Guṇabhadra, a monk from Central India who arrived in Canton in 435. According to the Li-tai san-pao chi, a catalogue compiled by Fei Ch'ang-fang in 597, the manuscript translated by Guṇabhadra was brought back by Fa-hsien (T. 2034, p. 91a). Fei Ch'ang-fang's source is the Sung Ch'i lu, a catalogue of translations made during the Sung and Ch'i dynasties (420–502), which was compiled by Chih Tao-hui (451–481) shortly before his death. The Li-tai san-pao chi refers several times to this catalogue (e.g. pp. 85a, 85b, 89b, 89c, 91a, 95b and 95c) and there is no valid reason to doubt the information from it that is given by Fei Ch'ang-fang. The fact that the Ch'u san-tsong chi chi does not say that Guṇabhadra translated a manuscript brought back by Fa-hsien does not prove the untruthfulness of the Sung Ch'i lu. In a later article Demièville wrote that the manuscript of the Samyuktāgama was brought back either by Fa-hsien or by Guṇabhadra himself (Demièville, 1953, p. 418) but he made no mention of the reference to the Sung Ch'i lu (cf. n. 5). However, even if the manuscript translated was not the one brought back by Fa-hsien, it is still possible that Guṇabhadra brought it back from Ceylon because his biography mentions that he visited Ceylon (Shih, p.149).

The Chinese transliterations of Indian words in this version of the Samyuktāgama are undoubtedly based upon Sanskrit originals. It is of course not surprising to find in a translation dating from about 440 many transliterations which had been in common use for rendering well-known Indian names. However, it also contains many transliterations of less common names which are not to be found elsewhere. The following examples, to which many others could be added, clearly point to a Sanskrit original: a-ch'i (g'yil)-ni-ta(d'at)-to(tāj)(b) = Agnidatta (p. 178a4); a-t'i-mu(mūk)-ta(c) = atimukta (kā) (p. 317a9); a-li-sö-si(e)-cha(t'o)a[j](d) = Arīṣṭa (p. 206b27); an-chia (g'jia)-t'o(d'aj)(e) = Aṅgada (p. 179c5); i-shih(jap)-po(pu̇)(du̇)-lo(lā)(f) = Īśvara (p. 236a23); yū-fu̇(jot)-ta(tā)-la(t'l)di(tā)-she(šia)(g) = Uttaradesa (p. 133b12); chia(g'jia)-na-chia(g'jia)-mou(mou)-ni(ih) = Kanakamuni (p.101b5); shih(si)-li-sha(šia)(h) = Śaṁśaka (p. 169b5); mi-ch'i(h) (t'i-lo(lā))(i) = Mithilā (p. 317b20); po(pu̇)-cha(t'aj)-li-fu(ju̇)-ta-lo(lā)(k) = Pātaliputra (p.59b17).

In 1904 Pischel published several Sanskrit fragments of a manuscript of a Samyuktāgama and in the same year Sylvain Lévi showed that they corresponded to the Chinese translation of the Samyuktāgama by Guṇabhadra. Many other Sanskrit fragments of the Samyuktāgama have been published since, and in most cases a corresponding text has been found in Guṇabhadra's translation. Akanuma pointed out that the quotations from the Samyuktāgama in the Mahāvibhāṣa, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, the Mahāprajāpāramitopadesa and other texts in general correspond to Guṇabhadra’s version. As these works usually quote Sarvāstivāda texts, there is, according to Akanuma, not the slightest reason to doubt that the Samyuktāgama translated by Guṇabhadra belonged to the Sarvāstivādins. The school of the Sarvāstivādins was particularly strong in Central Asia and it is therefore not surprising to see that many fragments of Sanskrit manuscripts of the Samyuktāgama of the Sarvāstivādins were found in Central Asia.

Fa-hsien's manuscript of the Mahāsūkasāvonīya was translated in 423–4 by Buddhajīva, a monk from Kashmir, Chih-sheng, a Khotanese śramaṇa, and two Chinese. Tao-sheng and Hui-yen (Shih, p. 119; T. 2145, p.12b). Both the Kao-seng chuan and the Ch'u san-tsong chi chi (p.21a) state clearly that Buddhajīva translated the manuscript brought back from Ceylon by Fa-hsien. There seems to be general agreement among scholars that the information given by these two works is correct. Several sections of the Mahāsūkasāvonīya have been translated. Jean Przyluski translated the narrative of the Rājagha council and Marcel Høfing that of the Vaisālī council. Jean Jaworski translated the sections on food and medicine. Høfing raised the question of whether the original had been written in Pāli, and Demièville subsequently took up the problem (Demièville, 1951, p.293). It is necessary to quote the relevant passage in full: 'Un coup d’œil sur ces transcriptions suffit: l’original du Vinaya des Mahīśāsaka, trouvé à Ceylan par Fa-hien en 410–412, et traduit après sa mort survenue en 420, n’était pas en Pāli. On sait du reste que, dès la fin du IVe siècle, ce Vinaya était répandu au Cachemire, centre de sanskrit, car les biographes de son traducteur, Buddhajīva, qui était originaire du Cachemire, nous disent qu’il y avait eu pour maître en Vinaya, dans sa jeunesse, un moine de l’école Mahīśāsaka
(T. 2059, iii, 339a). Voici quelques transcriptions prises au hasard dans le fragment du Vinaya des Mahāsāsaka traduit par M. Hofinger: p. 23, Vaisālī est transcrit Pi-chō-li, sur -ś et non -s-; p. 56, Kauṣāmbi = Keou-chan-mi, où chan <ṣiām, p. 82, Śālha (pāli Śālha) = Cha-lan, où cha <ṣa: p. 104, Kubjasobhita (pāli Kuṭajasobhita) = Pou-tchō-tsong, transcription abrégée où pou est pour le -b- de kubja; Vṛṣabha (pāli Vāsabha) = P'o-cha, avec s cliquetant.’ Demiéville does not say positively that the original was written in Sanskrit but his remarks on Kashmir as a centre of Sanskrit suggests that he assumed that this was the case. However, the fact that Buddhajīva came from Kashmir does not prove that the original must have been written in Sanskrit. Buddhayasás, the translator of the Dīrghāgama, was also a Kashmirian but the original of this text was certainly not written in Sanskrit. Édouard Chavannes who translated seven stories from the Mahāsāsakakāvavinaya drew attention to the fact that Chih-sheng, who translated the original (recited by Buddhajīva) into Chinese, was a śramaṇa from Khotan.12 Sylvain Lévi remarked that the Theras, the Dharmaguptakas and the Mahāsāsakas used Prakrit as their canonical language whereas the Sarvāstivādins and the Mūlasarvāstivādins had a canon written in Sanskrit.13 However, as far as I know, Demiéville is the only scholar to have examined some of the transliterations used by the translators of the Mahāsāsakakāvavinaya.

Of the five transliterations listed by Demiéville the first two were in common use. The remaining three (Śālha, Kubjasobhita and Vṛṣabha) are transliterations of names of monks who are mentioned in connection with the council in Vaisālī. An account of this council is found not only in the Vinaya of the Mahāsāsakas but also in the Vinayas of the Sarvāstivādins, the Dharmaguptakas and the Mahāsāṅghikas. All three of them were translated into Chinese before the translation of the Mahāsāsakakāvavinaya was undertaken. In this respect it is especially necessary to pay attention to the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptakas because it is closely related to that of the Mahāsāsakas. The transliterations of these three names in the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptakas are not exactly the same as those used in the Mahāsāsakakāvavinaya but they are very similar (cf. Hofinger, p. 105: Po-cheou-ts’uen, Cha-lieu and Pou-tchō-sou-mo). For instance, both Vinayas transliterate Kubja- in exactly the same way, both omitting the syllable ku-. Demiéville mentions another interesting example (1951, p. 290): to Pāli Sabbakāmi corresponds in the Sarvāstivāda-vinaya sa-p’o-chia-mo (Sarvakāma) but in the Vinayas of the Dharmaguptakas and the Mahāsāsakas we find i-ch’ieh-ch’iu (Sarvagāma or Sarvagāmin). Another example is the transliteration of the name of the Malla Roja (Roca in Sanskrit, cf. Edgerton’s dictionary). Both Vinayas have Lu-chief (l'u-chi).14 Skt. Roci (?), cf. T. 1421, p. 151c25; T. 1428, p. 873c17. However, in other instances different translations are found in both Vinayas. The Vinaya of the Dharmaguptakas has po-po (pp. 861b7 and 873c13) which transliterates Skt. Pāpā (Pāli Pāvā) but the Mahāsāsakakāvavinaya uses the transliteration po-hsin(m) (pu-tzuon) which is already found in earlier Chinese translations.15 E. Mayeda listed the various translations and transliterations of the nine and twelve aṅgas. According to his list the Mahāsāsakakāvavinaya is the only text to transliterate ityuktaka with yi[ñ]k-t[a]t-a-chia-(g’iu)n which corresponds to (it)yuktaka. In the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptakas we find hsiang-ying chang,(6) a translation of (it)yuktaka.16 In both Vinayas some transliterations are clearly based upon Sanskrit originals, others on Prakrit originals. For instance both Vinayas transliterate Viśabhū with stei(zwie)-yeih[shāp]n which corresponds to (z)Viṣyapa.17 Šy for sva is also found in other transliterations. In the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptakas the name Āśvājīt is transliterated as-shih[shāp]-pi(pje).3n In the Mahāsāsakakāvavinaya we find oh-at-pi(pje),(5) which is even more difficult to explain. The name of the nāgarāja Supassa (Mahāvagga VI.23.12) is translated in both Vinayas. The Dharmaguptakāvavina has sha-hsien9 ‘well-visible’ which probably translated Supaṣya. The Mahāsāsakakāvavina has shan-tzu-tsa(4) which Jaworski renders with ‘Bon-souverain’. However, tsu-tsa is also used to translate vaśiva, etc. Probably shan-tzu-tsa corresponds to Skt. Suvaśya.

The transliterations used by the translators of the Vinayas of the Dharmaguptakas and the Mahāsāsakas do not allow us to draw a definite conclusion as to the language in which the originals were written. In the case of the Chinese translation of the Saṃyuk-tāgama the picture is quite clear, but the situation is entirely different with regard to the two Vinayas. It will be necessary to undertake a much more thorough study of the transliterations.
and translations of names in both Vinayás. Perhaps even then it
will be difficult to determine the language in which their originals
were written. One has to keep in mind the methods used in
translating Indian texts. According to the Kao-seng chuan the
Mahítśasákavínayá was translated by four persons: 'Buddhájíva
tint the texte indien, un śramane khotanais Tche-cheng servit de
traducteur; Tao-cheng du Long-kouang (sseu) et Houei-yen du
Tong-ngan (sseu) y participèrent en tenant le pinceau et revisèr-
rent (la traduction)' (Shih, p. 119). Buddhájíva undertook this
translation four months after having arrived at Yang-chou. His
knowledge of Chinese must have been practically nil. His task
must have been to read aloud the text in its original wording.
Chih-sheng then translated the text orally sentence by sentence
and the two Chinese monks noted the translation and later
revised it. The transliteration of names which were not well-
known must have posed a particular problem. It is probable
that in revising the translation other translations, especially
those of Vinaya texts, were consulted. It is therefore always
necessary to examine whether a certain transliteration or trans-
literation is found in previous translations or not. This has often
been overlooked in the study of transliterations of Indian names
in Chinese translations. A systematic and historical study of the
transliterations used by different translators and in different
periods is an urgent desideratum.

At the time of Fa-hsien it was difficult to find manuscripts
of the Vinayas. According to Fa-hsien's account of his travels
in Northern India the Vinayas were handed down orally from
one Patriarch to another (Giles, p. 64). His main reason for going
to Ceylon was probably to obtain a copy of the Mahítśasákavínayá.
Indian Buddhist monks also visited Ceylon—for instance, Gunavar-
man (367–431) left his native Kashmir and went to Ceylon
shortly after his thirtieth birthday (Shih, p. 126)—while Ceylonese
monks travelled to India and even to China. In the year 269 of
an unspecified era the Ceylonese monk Mahánáman describes
the disciples of Mahákáṣyapa as Saṃyukta-gáminah'.19 Sylvain Lévi
remarked: ‘Ainsi les disciples de Mahákáṣyapa établis à Ceylan
se réclament du Saṃyuktágama; le trait n'est pas assez caracté-
ristique pour préciser leur école: les Mahásánghika, les Sarvásti-
vádin, les MūlaSarvástivádin sont d'accord pour placer en tête des

Notes

1 'The role of Pāli in early Sinhalese Buddhism', in Heinz Bechert (ed.),
Buddhism in Ceylon and Studies on Religious Syncretism in Buddhist
Countries, Göttingen, 1978, p. 39. On the meaning of jan and hu see
Shih, p. 173.
2 According to Sylvain Lévi Tsa-tsang corresponds to Kṣudrakāgama,
cf. Sylvain Lévi and Édouard Chavannes, 'Les seize arhats protecteurs
de la loi', JA, 1916 (II), p. 37, n. 1. However, Jean Przyłuski has shown
that in Tsa-tsong tsang renders pūjaka, cf. Le concile de Rājagha,
Paris, 1926–8, p. 90. Ét. Lamotte uses both Kṣudrakāgama and
Kṣudrakāpiṭaka, cf. Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, 1, Louvain, 1958,
3 The reconstructed Ancient Chinese pronunciation given in parentheses
is based on the works by Bernhard Harkonen: ' Prononciation ancienne
de caractères chinois figurant dans les transcriptions bouddhiques',
T'oung Pao, 19, 1918–9, pp. 104–21; Analytic Dictionary of Chinese
and Sino-Japanese, Paris, 1923; 'Grammaire Serica. Script and
Phonetics in Chinese and Sino-Japanese', BMFEA, 12, 1940,
pp. 50–4.
5 Cf. Paul Demiéville, 'Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha', BEFEO,
6 Akanuma attributes too much importance to the argumentum ex silentio, cf. Akanuma Chizen, Bukkyō kyōten shiron, Nagoya, 1940, p. 51, n. 8.
10 Cf. P. Demiéville, 1951, p. 293: Hirakawa Akira, Ritsuțo no kenkyū, Tōkyō, 1960, p. 142. In an article that I have not been able to consult Tachibana Shundō seems to have tried to prove that Buddhajīva's translation is not made from a manuscript brought back from Ceylon by Fa-hsien, cf. Bibliographie bouddhique, VII–VIII, Paris, 1937, p. 107, n. 357.
16 Mayeda Egaku, Genshī Bukkyō setten no seiritsu-shi kenkyū, Tōkyō, 1964, pp. 348 foll.
17 'L'or sui (zwìg) see P. Pelliot, op. cit., pp. 95 foll.; H. W. Bailey, 'Hvatanica IV', BSOAS, 10, 1942, p. 909, n. 2.
18 RO, 7, 1931, p. 65.
20 It is quite possible that the nuns arrived with the official mission sent from Ceylon to China in the year 435. It is recorded in the Chinese histories that in the first half of the fifth century four such official missions from Ceylon arrived in China, cf. Sylvain Lévi, 'Les missions de Wang Huen-Ts'e dans l'Inde', JA, 1900 (I), pp. 411–15.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN EARLY BUDDHISM

One of the main features of the early Indian civilization, repeatedly emphasized by scholars and also serving as a riddle for them for a long time, is the absence of any historical writings 'in the strict sense of the word'. There has been a general tendency to believe that the Indians had no history until the Greek historians taught them how to mark off historical periods by dates and to trace consequences to causes and so transform poetical and mythical accounts of the Indian past into histories. The lack of interest in handing down historical information is sometimes attributed to the ways of Hindu thinking, especially to the dominant theme of nirvana which is said to advocate the unreality of the space-time bound empirical world. This argument, though it may be valid in the context of the early Hindu thought, cannot be used to explain the lack of interest in historiography in the earliest Buddhist tradition, for early Buddhism did not emphasize the unreality of the empirical world of space, time and causation.

Yet, the earliest historical literature in the Buddhist tradition, nay, even within the realm of South Asian culture, came into existence in Sri Lanka and goes back only to the fourth century A.D. which is the period during which the oldest extant Pali chronicle, the Dīpanama, assumed its present form. During the next century the Dīpanama was followed by the more systematic chronicle, the Mahāvamsa. Heinz Bechert who examined the beginnings of Buddhist historiography has devoted himself to the task of 'searching for the motivation of the earliest historiographers instead of trying to explain the non-existence of an early Indian historical literature.' In the following pages I propose to examine the reasons for the absence of historical records 'in the strict sense of the term' in the early Buddhist tradition, even though that tradition did not adopt the traditional Hindu outlook regarding the empirical world.

Although there is ample literary evidence to show that history was studied during the pre-Buddhist period as an independent discipline, at least in the Brahmanical schools, no one knows for
certain the nature and scope of this discipline. References to the study of history are found in some of the earliest literary documents where it is referred to as *aithyā* or *itihās-. If so, the reason for the non-appearance of history, as conceived and studied in the West, at least in the early Buddhist tradition calls for a careful scrutiny. The philosophy of history in early Buddhism would undoubtedly provide valuable information regarding the non-appearance of such historical studies.

A brief statement about the different philosophies of history in the Western world would be useful in our analysis of the early Buddhist philosophy of history, especially in view of the fact that history ‘in the strict sense of the word’ is said to be found only in the West.

Philosophy of history in the Western world can be divided broadly into two as speculative and critical. Of these, the speculative philosophy of history has been the more dominant one. It is based on the recognition of an Absolute of one form or another such as Plato’s Form, the medieval Christian notion of God, or Hegel’s Spirit. The explanation of history as the unfolding of an Absolute is most evident in the Judaic and Christian tradition where the orderliness of historical cycles is perceived as the redemptive activity of God, the locus classicus of such a view being St. Augustine’s *City of God*. The nineteenth century witnessed the culmination of this speculative trend with the writings of G.W.F. Hegel, especially his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, where he declared ‘the theme of history to be the actualization of the Absolute in time, the self-development of Spirit itself, through the careers of a number of world historical peoples’. It is possible to maintain that even some of the positivist philosophers of that century, like Auguste Comte and Karl Marx, could not remain immune to the influence of such a view, primarily because of their conception of a law-governed universe. These views have undoubtedly left lasting impressions on the conception of history during the twentieth century.

The second dominant theme in the philosophy of history in the West is said to have been initiated by David Hume and came to be known as the critical philosophy. Hume’s famous argument against miracles, which is based upon the non-recognition of a uniformity independent of human imagination, seems to have influenced the view that historical explanation is a value-laden discipline. The speculative view of history, in this view, turns out to be a mere psychological description of the activities of the historians. It is based primarily upon metaphysical presuppositions which are not proved in terms of human experience. The critical philosophers of history, therefore, assumed their task to be merely a clarification of the conceptual structure of historical thinking.

It will become evident from the following analysis that the Buddha probably would be in *agreement* with the critical philosophers of history when he, after rejecting the metaphysical assumptions similar to those presented by the speculative philosophers, recognized that history *could* be a value-laden discipline. Yet, he would be in *disagreement* with them for confining the study of history to a mere clarification of concepts. Buddha’s agreement with the critical philosophers is clearly represented in the way he treated ‘views regarding the past’ (*pubbatānu-dīthi*), while his disagreement is reflected in his recognition of the importance of ‘knowledge of the past’ (*pubbante ṅaṇa*) for the successful conduct of man’s day-to-day life as well as the successful achievement of the goal of the religious life. The clarification of the distinction between ‘views regarding the past’ and ‘knowledge of the past’ would, therefore, not only provide a clear estimate of the Buddha’s philosophy of history, but also explain the non-appearance of historical studies in the early Buddhist tradition.

‘Views’ (*dīthi*), according to the Buddha, are products of human dispositions (*sāṅkhata*) or of intentions (*pakappita*). Human dispositions or intentions, are, for the most part, determined by excessive attachment (*rāga*) or aversion (*dosa*) or confusion (*moha*), while some are not so determined. Views, whether they be right (*sammā*) or wrong (*micchā*), are therefore evaluative in character. The evaluative character of views regarding the past, which is the result of their determination in terms of dispositions, may also become a necessary character because, in the formulation of views regarding the past, there is a need to fill in gaps for which evidence is not forthcoming from the reservoir of experience. Prompted by a lack of complete information regarding the past, and motivated by a desire to maintain
one’s identity, those who presented ‘views’ regarding the past (pubbantakappikā, lit. ‘those who constructed the past’) have, according to the Buddha, raised the following questions:

Did we exist in the past?
Did we not exist in the past?
What were we in the past?
In what condition did we exist in the past?
Having been what, what did we come to be in the past?8

Those who raised these questions were also the authors of metaphysical views (adhivuttipadāni) of various types, such as, for example:

The self and the world are eternal; this indeed is the truth, all else is false.
The self and the world are not eternal; this indeed is the truth, all else is false.
Etc. etc.9

Buddha’s analysis of the epistemological problems involved is beautifully summed up in the following passage from the Majjhima-nikāya:

‘Monks, as for those recluses and brahmans who speak thus and are of this view: “Self and the world are eternal, this indeed is the truth, all else is false”—this situation cannot occur that, apart from faith, apart from inclination, apart from tradition, apart from consideration of form, and apart from predilection for some view, they have personal knowledge, thoroughly pure and thoroughly cleansed. In the absence of such personal knowledge, thoroughly pure and thoroughly cleansed, even that mere fraction of knowledge that these worthy recluses and brahmans thoroughly cleanse, even that is pointed out as grasping on their part. Knowing that what is dispositionally constructed is coarse and that there is cessation of dispositions, the enlightened one, seeing escape from it, has freed himself from it’.10

The implication of this passage seems clear enough. It is recognized that regarding the past we can have at least a fraction of knowledge (nāyabhāgamattā), thoroughly pure and cleansed, i.e. without any intentional distortion. Yet, our dispositional tendencies in terms of which we try to fill in gaps, etc. could lead to views which are coarse or rough (olūrika) and the finer distinctions we need to make are lost on the way. The result is dogmatism. Buddha here does not claim that he ‘knows everything’, but merely points out the dangers involved in coming to rather dogmatic conclusions on the basis of inadequate evidence. Having realized such dangers, he remains free from such metaphysical constructions. Thus, the absolute frame of reference in terms of which historical experience is explained will be found to be a product of human disposition and not part of how things have come to be (yathābhūta). This seems to be a clear rejection of the most significant feature of the speculative philosophy of history.

The criticism and rejection of an absolute frame of reference does not mean the rejection of historical experience as such. ‘The baby need not be emptied with the bath’. Hence the Buddha’s recognition of the value of historical knowledge. Once an ascetic by name Sakuludāyī reported to the Buddha about the leader of the Jaina sect, Nīgāṇṭha Nātaputta, who claimed omniscience (sabbannihutā) and yet failed to answer questions regarding the past satisfactorily.11 Buddha’s advice to him was that he should leave alone such speculations regarding the past and the future and understand things in terms of causation or dependence, which the Buddha sets out in the following formula:

“When this exists, that comes to be; on the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, that ceases”.12

Unfortunately, Sakuludāyī was not able to appreciate the significance of this explanation and insists upon a recognition of an ‘ultimate state’ (paramo vanno) in terms of which everything else could be explained.13 In order to ridicule him, the Buddha utilized the famous simile of a man who is in love with a ‘beauty-queen’ (janapadakalyāṇī) whom he has never seen.14

Thus, the Buddha, considering the limitations of human experience and, therefore, of human understanding, posited neither an absolute frame of reference nor an ultimate first cause
in order to explain historical experience. For him, the beginning of the world process is ‘inconceivable’ (anamatagga) since the prior end is not manifest (pubbā koṭi na paṁhāyati). On the basis of whatever experience man has it is possible to indicate a process of dissolution (samvāta) and evolution (vivaṭa) operating in the world. Yet this continuous process of dissolution and evolution is not indicative of an Absolute unfolding itself, as it was understood in the speculative tradition in the West. This notion of a process of dissolution and evolution, when utilized to explain cosmic events, is merely an extension of the knowledge gained by the experience of individual phenomenal events; hence an inductive generalization.

A word about the Buddha’s theory of knowledge and how it differs from those of the critical philosophers like David Hume may throw further light on the distinction between their conceptions of history.

It becomes very clear from the early discourses that the Buddha was not very sympathetic to ontological speculations regarding ‘Being’ or ‘Thing-in-Itself’. Historical understanding of ‘being’ or ‘existence’ (bhava) was of extreme importance for him. For this reason, the best form of knowledge was ‘knowledge of things as they have come to be’ (yathābhūtāna), not ‘knowledge of things as they are’ isolated from the background. Knowledge of things as they have come to be would involve the past as well as present events conditioned by the past. In the case of Hume, human experience is primarily confined to impressions, the ideas being replicas or images of these impressions. A ‘perfect idea’, for him, is an idea of imagination far removed even from memory in terms of its vivacity. One such perfect idea of imagination is causal relation. Therefore, for Hume, what is given to human experience is a continuous series of discrete events, the human imagination providing the connecting links. On the contrary, the Buddha recognized the ability on the part of man to know things as they have come to be (yathābhūta), thereby emphasizing the possibility of historical or contextual understanding of events or phenomena. Such an understanding would be facilitated if memory constitutes an important component of experience. Assuming the very close relationship between sense impressions and memory, a relationship recognized even by Hume, the Buddha not only counted memory as an important component of experiential knowledge, but at times accepted memory alone as providing factual knowledge, as in the case of retrocognition or knowledge of past births (pubbenivāsānussati), one of the higher knowledges (abhiṁnā), which is based entirely upon one’s memory (satānusārt). Therefore, for the Buddha, causal connections are not the work of imagination, but are part and parcel of knowledge by experience, which includes memory. This knowledge is called ‘knowledge of phenomena’ (dhamme nāna), ‘phenomena’ being further defined as ‘become’ (bhūta), ‘dispositionally determined’ (saṅkhata) and ‘causally conditioned or dependently arisen’ (paṭiccasamuppanna). There need not be any doubt about the significance of the use of past participial forms in the above context. It explains why the Buddha presented causation or dependent arising as the cornerstone of his teaching, boldly declaring: ‘He who sees paṭiccasamuppāda, he also sees the dhamma’.

When causation of individual events becomes part of the experiential process, causal uniformity which explains the forgotten past and the unknown future receives more credibility than is accorded to it by David Hume and his followers in the analytical or critical tradition. It is for this reason that the Buddha, having rejected the notion of a first cause as well as an absolute frame of reference, two conceptions peculiar to the speculative philosophers of history in the West and those Indian thinkers who attempted to construct the past (pubbantakappikā), provided a causal account of historical events.

The causal principle (paṭiccasamuppāda) formulated by the Buddha which was verified in the light of ‘knowledge of things as they have come to be’ (yathābhūtāna) cannot, therefore, be interpreted as an absolute inviolable law (niyati). An unprejudiced knowledge of the recent past enabled the Buddha to make the assertion that ‘whether the Tathāgatas arise in this world or not, this element, this causal status, this causal orderliness, this conditionality, has remained’. And a similar unprejudiced inference (anvaye nāna) enabled him to make the inductive generalization that this may be valid in the future too. It is such an inductive generalization that is embodied in Buddha’s conception of a causal uniformity (dhammatā).
The philosophy of history in early Buddhism

The conception of causation as well as causal uniformity enabled the Buddha to explain the past, present and future events and their relationships without resorting to a notion of substance (atman). It is a radical theory of no-soul or no-substance (anatta), not a relative theory presented in the background of an ultimate framework or an absolutely real self (Atman, Brahman). Nirvana or freedom, which was understood in an absolute sense during the pre-Buddhist period, therefore, turns out to be primarily a freedom from attachment (rāga), aversion (dosā) and confusion (moha). It is not a state that transcends causation, but accounted for in the statement of causation, where the negative aspect is stated as: ‘When this does not exist, that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, that ceases’. In short, it is a mere pacification of dispositional tendencies (saṅkhārasamatha).

When dispositional tendencies are reduced to a minimum as a result of the complete elimination of the three roots of evil: attachment, aversion and confusion, a saint refrains from constructing metaphysical theories regarding both past and future. Therefore, according to the Buddha, one who knows things as they have come to be should not run after the past (pubbantam na paṭṭīlojanavāpāna), thinking: ‘Did I exist in the past’, etc., or have longing for the future (aparanātana dhamma), saying: ‘Will I exist in the future? etc.’ On the basis of a clear understanding of whatever can be known of the past (pubbante nāma), the saint eliminates the causes that lead to suffering in the present and remains unmoved even by the greatest calamity that can befall man in the future, namely, death. The manner in which the Buddha faced death, as reported by one of his immediate disciples, Anuruddha, bears ample testimony to this kind of achievement. Says Anuruddha:

‘When he who from all craving want was free,
Who to nirvana’s tranquil state had reached,
When the great sage finished his span of life,
No gasping struggle vexed that steadfast heart.
All resolute, and with unshaken mind,
He calmly triumphed o’er the pain of death.
E’en as a bright flame dies away, so was
the last emancipation of his heart’.

Sāriputta, another disciple of the Buddha, expresses a similar determination in most poignant terms:

‘Not fain am I to die nor yet to live.
I shall lay down this mortal frame anon
With mind alert and consciousness controlled.
With thought of death I daily not, nor yet
Delight in living. I await the hour
Like any hireling, who hath done his task.’

It is therefore clear that the adoption of a transcendentalist view of the world is not the sole reason for the non-appearance of a conception of history similar to the one found in the West. Even a non-transcendentalist or non-absolutist system of thought like early Buddhism, while recognizing the importance of historical experience, refrained from subscribing to a speculative philosophy of history and this was prompted by both epistemological and pragmatic reasons.

HAWAII

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Notes

3 Tattiriya Āraṇyaka 1.2.1.
4 Maitri Upaniṣad 6.33; D 188; A 1163; III 223; Sn 447: 1020.
6 Sn 784.
7 S IV 359, where asatkhata is defined as rāgakkhaya, dosakkhaya and mohakkhaya.
8 M I 265.
9 M II 233.
10 M II 234.
11 M II 31.
12 M II 32.
13 M II 32.
THE GĀRAVASUTTA OF THE SAṂYUTTANIKA YĀ AND ITS MAHĀYĀNIST DEVELOPMENTS

This small Sutta deals with the veneration (gārava) in which the Buddha held the Dharma, the doctrine which he had discovered on the night of his enlightenment and which he had chosen as his teacher. This text throws some light on the nature of the Buddha and the Dharma as they were conceived by the first Buddhists.

Shortly after his enlightenment, the Buddha Śākyamuni was in Uruvelā, on the bank of the River Nerañjarā, under the Goatherd’s Banyan. Absorbed in meditation, he began to reflect: ‘It is not good to live without respect or veneration for a teacher; if there exists a religious or a brahman in the world who is superior to me, I would like to take him as my teacher, to honour and serve him’. With his divine eye he surveyed the triple world, but he saw no-one who surpassed him. Consequently he resolved to attach himself to the Dharma he had discovered a few days previously. In the world of subtle form, the god Brahmā Sahampati had read the Buddha’s thought; he immediately descended from his heaven and went to congratulate the Blessed One: ‘Noble lord’, he said to him, ‘in the past, the present and the future, all the perfectly enlightened holy ones attach themselves to the Dharma in order to honour and serve it’. Then, having uttered some stanzas, Brahmā returned to his paradise.

The Indian exegetists do not understand in the same way the doctrinal significance of this Dharma chosen as a teacher, and the Gāravasutta which refers to it has been the subject of two interpretations, which are divergent if not opposed: a Sthaviravādin interpretation professed by the Buddha’s first disciples, and a Mahāyānist interpretation proposed by the adherents of the Great Vehicle.

Sthaviravādin interpretation of the Gāravasutta

The Gāravasutta is represented by four sources designated here by the abbreviations A B C D:
A. Gāravasutta of the Saṁyuttanikāya I 138–40.
B. Uruvelasutta of the Aṅguttaranikāya II 20-1.
D. Tsun-chung of the Saṁyuktâgama T 100, ch. 5, p. 410a3-410b9.

To my knowledge no Sanskrit fragment of this Sūtra has come down to us. The two Pali versions (A and B) are practically identical except for the final paragraph of B which seems to be a later addition.¹ The two Chinese versions (C and D) are extremely similar and locate the Sūtra under the Bodhi tree and not under the Goatherd’s Banyan as do the Pali recensions.

The Pali Gāravasutta (A) begins in the following way:

1. ‘Thus have I heard. One day the Blessed One was to be found in Uruvelā, on the bank of the River Nerañjarā, at the foot of the Goatherd’s Banyan; he had just acquired enlightenment.

2. Then, while the Blessed One was meditating in solitude, this mental reflection arose in him: “It is wrong to live without venerating or honouring anyone. To which saṁaṇa or brāhmaṇa could I therefore now attach myself in order to serve and venerate him?”

3. Then the Blessed One had this thought: “In order to perfect the still unperfected aggregate of morality, I would like to attach myself to another saṁaṇa or brāhmaṇa by respecting and venerating him. However, neither in the world with its Devas, Māras and Brahmas, nor in the populace with its saṁaṇas and brāhmaṇas, with its gods and men, do I see any other saṁaṇa or brāhmaṇa who is more perfect than myself in morality and to whom I could attach myself by respecting and venerating him.

4-7. In order to perfect the still unperfected aggregate of concentration. . . ., in order to perfect the still unperfected aggregate of wisdom. . . ., in order to perfect the still unperfected aggregate of deliverance. . . ., in order to perfect the still unperfected aggregate of the knowledge and vision of deliverance, I would like to attach myself to another saṁaṇa or brāhmaṇa by respecting and venerating him. However, neither in the world with its Devas, Māras and Brahmas, nor in the populace with its saṁaṇas and brāhmaṇas, with its gods and men, do I see any other saṁaṇa or brāhmaṇa who is more perfect than myself in [concentration, wisdom, deliverance], knowledge and vision of deliverance, and to whom I could attach myself by respecting and venerating him.

8. If therefore I were now to attach myself, by respecting and venerating it, to the Dhamma acknowledged by me at the moment of my enlightenment?’

On reading this Sutta there naturally come to mind certain questions an answer to which should be attempted by, if possible, assuming the viewpoint of early Buddhism which is separated from us by twenty centuries.

When and where does the episode alluded to here take place? The sources disagree over the period which intervened between the enlightenment and the discourse at Vārāṇasī.² Śākyamuni remained under the Bodhi tree or near it, dividing his time between meditation and walking and welcoming some visitors. According to the Pali sources,³ he spent the first week under the Bodhi tree, the second under the Goatherd’s Banyan (Ajāpacālanigrodha), the third under the Mucalinda, the fourth under the Rājāyatana; after which he returned to the Goatherd’s Banyan where he remained for some further time. It is there, during the fifth week, that he chose the Dharma as his teacher and that during the eighth he received the request from the Brahmā gods who begged him to expound the Law.⁴ As has been seen, the Chinese versions of the Saṁyuktâgama locate the Sutta under the Bodhi tree. Moreover, these particulars are of little importance: the hagiographers’ intention is not to inform us about the circumstances of time and place, but to describe the mental state of the recently enlightened Buddha (prathamābhisambuddha), who was experiencing the happiness of deliverance (vimuktisukhapratisamvedin).

There is nothing astonishing in his having sought a teacher. In India there is no religious life without a guru; a monk who has no-one to respect and venerate condemns himself to failure and excludes himself from the Good Law.⁵

The Buddha examines the world of form, the world of subtle form and the formless world in order to find a śaṁaṇa or
brāhmaṇa who is superior to him in five eminent qualities. In all truth, these qualities do not appear clearly in the ten epithets which are commonly applied to him and with which adherents are accustomed to recollect him: Tathāgata, Arhat, Samyaksambuddha, endowed with knowledge and practice, Sugata, knower of the world, supreme leader of those beings to be won over who are men, instructor of gods and men, Buddha, Bhagavat.

Before his enlightenment, Sākyamuni, like every human being, formed an assemblage of five aggregates (skandhas): form (rūpa) or bodily form (rūpākāya), the seat of the four formless phenomena: feelings (vedanā), perceptions (samjñā), karmic formations (samskāra) and consciousness (vijnāna). These Skandhas form a series (sāṁsthāna) which is endlessly renewed and which, by reason of passions and actions, passes from existence to existence. They are conditioned (samskṛta) inasmuch as they arise from causes and conditions and, as such, they have the characteristics of arising (utpāda), disappearing (vyaya) and enduring-changing (sāṁhitāntathāva). They are also impure (āsāra), in relation to the impurities which affect the triple world from top to bottom: 1. the kāma- and bhavāsāra respectively bind beings to the world of desire and to the two superior worlds; 3. the avidyāsāra or impurity of ignorance leads them into mental confusion which bars the truth from them. The worldling (loka) imagines that the five impure Skandhas constitute a Self or belong to a Self, but these transitory (anitita) and painful (duḥkha) phenomena only represent a pseudo-personality. Nevertheless, for innumerable rebirths, Sākyamuni had multiplied virtuous actions and accumulated knowledges which made him a Bodhisattva, close to enlightenment. The first half of his last existence was marked by wonders and his body was already adorned with the marks of the Mahāpuruṣa.

The psycho-physical entities are not those evoked here by the Buddha when he wants to compare himself to other sramanas and brāhmaṇas. He is taking into account another series of Skandhas, entirely pure and without any relation to the passions and ignorances. These are in fact abstractions: 1. morality (śīla), 2. concentration (samādhi), 3. wisdom (prajñā), 4. deliverance (vimukti), 5. the knowledge and vision of deliverance (vimuktijñānadarśana) which the Buddha brought to perfection (sampad) during his Abhisambodhi at Bodh-Gaya. Morality, concentration and wisdom which divert from the world are the constituent elements of the Path of Nirvāṇa; the wisdom which is a part of this Path is a holy right view (samyagdṛṣṭi), free from āsrasas and transcendental; it culminates directly in Vimukti, mental deliverance resulting from wisdom (cetovimukti and prajñāvimukti). The holy one’s mind is freed from impurities (āśreṇenaḥ cittaḥ vimuktaḥ) and, instantly, he has the knowledge and vision of that deliverance. He then declares: ‘I have understood the noble truths, destroyed rebirth, lived the pure life, accomplished the duty; henceforth there will be no more rebirths for me’. It is specified that the five pure Skandhas are identical for all the holy ones, be they Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas or Buddhas, for ‘between deliverance and deliverance there is no difference’. It should not be concluded from this that Prajñā is the same for all since the equipment of merit and knowledge varies according to the three types of holy ones: by simplifying the problem to a minimum, it can be said that the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas especially know the general characteristics of dharmas, namely impermanence, suffering and impersonality, while the Buddhas know them in all their particular aspects; the omniscience (sarvajñatā) of the Buddhas is a universal knowledge relating to all the aspects of things (sarvākāraṇa). The five Skandhas which have just been referred to are called pure skandhas (anāśravakaśandha), transcendental or supernatural skandhas (lokottarakāśandha), skandhas of those who have no more training to do (asaikṣaśandha), skandhas of the Law (dharmaśandha). It is they that form Buddhas (buddhakāraka), i.e. they by reason of which, in the main, a certain person is called ‘Buddha’. Joining the five impure Skandhas which constitute the pseudo-personality, they provoke a renewal of the psycho-physical organism or, according to the traditional expression, a revolution of the support (āśrayaparāvṛtti). The impure Skandhas will not be destroyed as such: they will continue to recur from moment to moment until the holy one’s death. Between his enlightenment and his death, the holy one experiences Nirvāṇa ‘with a remainder of conditioning (sopachiṣeṣa) in this world, since the elements of existence still persist in it and life continues.'
However, what counts henceforth for the holy one or for the Buddha (since the two notions do not differ here) are the five pure Skandhas, morality, etc., which form Tathanatas. Whatever his external appearances, fleshly body or glorious body, the Buddha after his enlightenment is not a god, or a gandharva, or a yaksa, or a man, since the impurities (asrava) which could have made him any of these have forever disappeared: ‘Know’, he said to Droña, ‘that I am a Buddha’.  

When the hour of death struck, the Buddha, just like the Arhats, casts off the five impure Skandhas which ‘conditioned’ his existence and enters Parinirvāna ‘without a remainder of conditioning’ (nirupadhiṣṭa). Does this mean that the series of the five pure Skandhas are protected? Not at all, as it is explained in connection with the death of Sāriputra, the holy one enters Parinirvāna without taking with him the elements of morality, concentration, wisdom, deliverance, the knowledge and vision of deliverance.  

Be they pure or impure, the Skandhas are conditioned (samśkṛta) dharmas, arisen from causes and conditions, and as such are doomed to disappear.

What then remains of the Buddha in Parinirvāna? Does he or does he not exist after death? This is a question which the Buddha himself refused to answer and this refusal excuses us from tackling the problem. Whatever the circumstances, just as a flame extinguished by a breath of wind goes towards stillness, passes from sight, so the Wise Man casting off his names and form (nāmarūpa), that is, the five impure Skandhas, enters stillness; no measure can measure him, to speak of him there are no words, what the mind might conceive vanishes. Thus every path is closed to speech.

In its Pali versions (A and B) the Gāravasutta has it that Śākyamuni searched for a teacher ‘to perfect in himself the as yet unperfected (pure) Skandhas’ (apariṇaṇṇassa stā. . . kkhandaṁ-assa paripūriyā), but this motive is passed over in silence by the Chinese translations (C and D), and it is difficult to see how the Buddha could have evoked it since the Abhisambodhi he won a few days previously had ensured him of the āsravakaṣayañjana and anuttadajñāna: he knew for a fact that he had destroyed the impurities and that these would not recur again.

Not finding any śramaṇa or brāhmaṇa who was superior to him in the triple world, the Buddha attached himself to the Dharma, that is, the Law, the Truth, acknowledged by him at the moment of his enlightenment (dhammo mayā abhisambuddho) and which he had penetrated to the point of identifying with it: hence the epithet dharmabhūtā sometimes applied to the Buddha.  

However, the Dharma is an abstract notion and not a person; it is only metaphorically the Buddha’s teacher. It is therefore with exactness of wording that, on the road to Vārānasī, the Buddha declares to the ājīvika Upaka: ‘I have no teacher (ācariya), none is like me; in the world with its Devas and men none is equal to me’.

What was the purport of that Dharma? The Gāravasutta is not very explicit: It is, it says, the Law acknowledged by the Buddha at the time of his enlightenment. The classical formula with which adherents recollect the Dharma is not much more instructive: The Law was well spoken by the Blessed One; it yields its fruit in the present existence; it is independent of time, it leads to the right place; it says ‘come and see’; it is knowable internally by the wise.

A more precise definition is provided by the Āyācanasutta (S I 136-8) which, in the Samyuttanikāya, precedes the Gārava-sutta and is closely linked to it. The Āyācanasutta relates how, at the request of the god Brahmā Sahampati, the Blessed One consented to expound the Law: a well-known episode in the life of the Buddha and told by an infinite number of sources. These are the terms in which the Buddha describes his Dharma.

‘This dhamma, won to by me is deep, difficult to see, difficult to understand, tranquil, excellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, intelligible to the learned. . . For a creation delighting in sensual pleasure, delighted by sensual pleasure, rejoicing in sensual pleasure, this were a matter difficult to see, that is to say causal uprising by way of condition (idappaccayata paticcasamuppāda). This too were a matter difficult to see, that is to say the tranquillising of all activities, the renunciation of all attachment, the destruction of craving, dispassion, stopping, nibbāna’ (tr. Miss I.B. Horner).

This short paragraph condenses the whole of the philosophy of early Buddhism.
The things (dhāraṇa) which are the object of mental consciousness (manovijñāna) are divided into two main classes: the conditioned (saṃskṛta) and the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta).

The Saṃskṛtas, also called Saṃskāras, arise from causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya-samutpanna). Each has its own nature or characteristic (svabhāva, svalakṣaṇa), the reality of which is not contested. As general characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), they all have arising (upādāya), disappearance (vyaya) and enduring (sthityamathāvatā). Arising and perishing from instant to instant they are impermanent (anitya), painful (duṣkha) and, by this fact, devoid of a self (anātman) and anything belonging to the self (anātmya). Their successive appearances and disappearances are regulated by the Pratītyasamutpāda, a dependent arising consisting of twelve limbs going from ignorance (avidyā) to old-age-and-death (jarāmarata) and in which intervene passion (kleśa), action (karma) and the fruits of action (karmaphala). The Pratītyasamutpāda is not an entity in itself, but a norm defining the 'dharm-nature of dharmas' (dharmatā) or, according to a tradition current in China, the True Nature of dharmas. It was not created by the Buddha or by anyone else, and whether the Tathāgatas appear or not, this Dharmatā remains stable.

In contrast to the Saṃskṛtas, the Asaṃskṛta is free from arising, free from disappearance and free from enduring-changing. It is exempt from the passions and in particular from those basic passions which are craving (rāga), hatred (dveṣa) and delusion (moha) which, by vitiating action, lead to the round of rebirth (saṃsāra). The Asaṃskṛta is the stopping of rebirth, the stilling of the mind, calm, Nirvāṇa. But neither in the Asaṃskṛta nor in the Saṃskṛtas nor elsewhere is there found a permanent, stable, eternal and immovable principle: there is no self and nothing belongs to a self.

The ideas suggested here by the Āyācanasutta can be summarized in a concise formula: All Saṃskāras (or conditioned dharmas) are transitory; all Saṃskāras are painful; all dharmas (whether conditioned or unconditioned) are not-self; but calm is Nirvāṇa.

The Dharma as it is conceived by early Buddhism pivots round an axis the two ends of which are arising (upādāya) and destruction (nirodha). To Saṃsāra, the world of contingency regulated by the dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda), it contrasts Nirvāṇa, the uncaused absolute. Saṃsāra is painful; Nirvāṇa is calm.

Mahāyānist interpretation of the Gāravasutta

Early Buddhism recognizes the reality of dharmas arisen from causes, but declares them to be impermanent, painful, empty of Me and Mine: it thus professes the emptiness of beings (sattva-sūnyatā) or the impersonality of individuals (pudgalanairātmya). It makes of the Pratītyasamutpāda, or dependent arising, the Dharmatā, that is the dharma-nature of conditioned dharmas. Faced with these, it posits an unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), a stopping of the Pratītyasamutpāda, in other words, Nirvāṇa. The knowledge which relates to these truths and from which deliverance (vimukti) is derived is qualified as Prajñā anāsravā, or pure wisdom.

Examining the notion of impermanence more deeply, the Mahāyāna notes that dharmas which are empty of Me and Mine, arising from other dharmas which are empty of Me and Mine, do not exist in themselves, do not exist through themselves and are devoid of a self-nature or own characteristic (svabhāva-sūnya svalakṣaṇasūnya): it thus professes the twofold emptiness of beings and things (sattva-dharmasūnyatā). Furthermore, dharmas without a self-nature do not, in reality, arise. It therefore follows that their supposed Pratītyasamutpāda is merely a non-arising and that the Dharmatā which defines it has the sole characteristic of the absence of any characteristic (ekalakṣaṇa yaduttālakṣaṇa). But if there were no conditioned dharmas, of what use would the unconditioned which is contrasted to them be? Things which do not exist cannot be eliminated; a non-arising presupposes an arising. Conditioned or unconditioned, dharmas do not exist, are not perceived. Consequently, valid knowledge is not a Prajñā attributing an arising (upādāya) and a destruction to dharmas arising from causes (pratītyasamutpanna), but a Prajñāpāramitā or Perfection of Wisdom not recognizing in things either arising or destruction. It relates to the twofold emptiness (sūnyatā) of beings and things; it penetrates the True
Nature of things (dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā) which is nothing but the absence of any characteristic (alaksana); it neither grasps nor rejects any dharma, whether conditioned or unconditioned, for the good reason that there is nothing to grasp or leave: the Prajñāpāramitā is merely the elimination of all the false views (dṛṣṭi),40 beginning with those of existence and non-existence.

The highest aspiration of the Mahāyānist is to accede, as a Bodhisattva, to the knowledge of non-arising (anutpādajñāna) or, in the words of the traditional expression, to the certainty that dharmas do not arise (anutpattikadharmaṃsanti).41 This conviction is definitively acquired in the eighth stage of the Bodhisattva’s career: without being deflected (ābhoga) by anything whatever, the mind is finally appeased.

The Gāravasutta maintains that the Buddha chose the Dharma as his teacher and, in the words of the Āyācanasutta, this Dharma has as its basic doctrine the Prajñāyasamutpāda. These two Suttas which appear in the Tipiṭaka are the words of the Buddha and to challenge them would be a serious offence (saddharmaṃ pratikṣepa). Those Mahāyānists who do not believe in the Prajñāyasamutpāda find themselves in an embarrassing position and to get out of it do not hesitate to retouch the original text by substituting the Prajñāpāramitā for the ‘Dharma acknowledged by the Buddha’ during his enlightenment. This modification is of cardinal importance since it culminates in the rejection of the principle of causality. It can nevertheless be justified if the Gārava- and Āyācanasuttas are considered as Suttas whose ‘meaning is to be interpreted’ (neyārthasūtra), which is in accordance with the rules of Buddhist exegesis.42

However it may be, the author of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadesa elaborated a revised and corrected version of the Gārava-sutta, this time in perfect agreement with the views of the Mahāyāna. This is how it is presented in the Chinese translation carried out by Kumārajiva in Ch’ang-an between A.D. 404 and 406 (T 1509, ch. 10, pp.131c16–132a2):

‘When the Buddha had just been enlightened (prathama-bhisambuddha) he said to himself: “Not to honour or serve anyone is not good. So who now, in the world of the ten directions, can be honoured and served? I want a master to serve”.

At that moment, the Devas, Brahmādevarāja, etc., said to the Buddha: “The Buddha is peerless (anuttara); no-one surpasses him”. The Buddha also, with his divine eye (divyacakṣus), saw that, in the worlds of the three time-periods (tryadhvan) and the ten directions (daśadīs), no-one was superior to the Buddha. He reflected and said to himself: “I, by practising the Prajñāpāramitā, have now reached Abhisambodhi: it is that which I honour; it is my master (śāstra); I should respect, venerate and serve this Dharma”.

There was a tree called Hao-chien (Very strong). That tree was to be found at the centre of the earth; it was a hundred years old; its branches and leaves were perfect. One day, it grew a hundred cubits. When that tree had grown, it looked for (another) tree under which to shelter. Then, in the forest, a deity said to the Hao-chien tree: “In the world there is no tree greater than you; all trees will shelter in your shade”.

For the Buddha, it is the same: for innumerable incalculable periods (asaṃkhyeyakalpa), he dwelled in the Bodhisattva’s stages (bhumi); one day when he was sitting under the Bodhi tree, on the diamond seat (vajrāsana), he in truth knew the Nature of dharmas (dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā) and realized Abhisambodhi. Then he said to himself: “Whom can I honour and serve as a master? I should hold him in esteem, respect and venerate him”. At that moment, the Devas, Brahmādevarāja, etc., said to the Buddha: “The Buddha is peerless; no-one surpasses him”.

This new version differs in several points from the Pali Gārava-sutta.

Like the Chinese translations of this Sutta, it no longer locates the event under the Goatherd’s Banyan, but under a tree called here Hao-chien, which everything indicates as being the Bodhi tree, in these circumstances the asvāththa (ficus religiosa) in the shade of which Sākyamuni won enlightenment.43 The myth of the holy tree is common to all ancient civilizations. In India, already attested to in the prehistorical period, it occupied a major place in vedic and brahmānic literature.44 According to Buddhists, it is inhabited by one of the forest deities and is to
Finally, according to the Pali Gāravasutta, the doctrine that the Buddha chose as his teacher is, essentially, that of the Pratītyasamutpāda or dependent arising constituting the Dhammatā, that is the 'Dharma-nature of dharmas'.

Conversely, for the Upadesa the Dhammatā is the True Nature of dharmas, the sole characteristic of which is the absence of characteristic and which excludes all arising (utpāda) and all destruction (niruddha). The Prajñāpāramitā is the only wisdom which can conceive of it, but knows it by not knowing it.

The Upadesa returns on practically every page to True Nature, and even while proclaiming it to be undefinable, formulates it in the following way:

The True Nature of dharmas (dharmānāṃ dharmatā) is unarisen and undestroyed, neither defiled nor purified, neither existent nor non-existent, neither grasped nor rejected, always stilled, perfectly pure, like space, indefinable and inexpressible; it destroys all the paths of speech; it surpasses the sphere of thoughts and mentals; it is the same as Nirvāṇa: it is the Dharma of the Buddhas.

The Dharma of the Buddhas is the True Nature of dharmas (dharmānāṃ dharmatā). This True Nature is without arising, without destruction, without interruption, without permanence, without unity, without plurality, without arrival or departure, without grasping, without disturbance, without attachment, without support, non-existent, the same as Nirvāṇa.

Thus formulated, the Mahāyānist Dhammatā is the exact opposite of the Pratītyasamutpāda as it is conceived by the Elders. It marks an important turning-point in the evolution of Buddhist thought, but this was not unexpected. After having denied impermanent dharmas all personality, it is good logic to refuse them any real arising. What is impermanent (aniittyā) is not-self (anātman) and what is not-self does not truly arise (anunippana). From the start, dharmas are unarisen (anunippana), undestroyed (aniruddha), the same as Nirvāṇa (nirvāṇasama) such is the last word of a Wisdom which eludes all views, destroys all speech and stops the functioning of the mind.

BRUSSELS

ÉTIENNE LAMOTTE
Notes

* I am greatly indebted to Sara Boin, who has been kind enough to provide the English version of this article.

Editions and works mentioned frequently in this article are quoted in abbreviated form as follows:

\[\text{Koša = } \text{L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu traduit et annoté par L. de La Vallée Poussin, 6 vols, Paris, Geuthner, 1923-31.}\]

\[\text{Košabhāṣya = Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu ed. by P. Pradhan, 2nd edn, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, VIII, Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1975.}\]

\[\text{Kośavyākyāyā = Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākyāyā ed. by U. Wogihara, Publishing Association of Abhidharmakośavyākyāyā, Tokyo, 1932-6.}\]

\[\text{Traité = Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgarjuna, tr. par É. Lamotte, tomes I et II (Bibliothèque du Muséon, No. 18), Louvain, 1944-9; tomes III et IV (Publications de l’Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, Nos 2 et 12), Louvain, 1970-6.}\]

\[\text{Upadesa = Mahāprajñāpāramitopadesa, T 1509.}\]


2 In this passage the Buddha demonstrates his great respect for the Samgha which, at that time, had not yet been founded.

3 \text{Vin I 1-4; cf. \textit{Nidānakathā} in Ja 177-8.}\]

4 According to Spk I 203,18 and 195,7.

5 A III 7: condemnation of the agāra and apparissa monk.

6 A III 285; V 329, etc.

7 S III 37; A I 152: \textit{Tīn’ imāni bhikkhave saṅkhatasta saṅkhatalak-}


9 The three or four ārasas vitiate all the conditioned dharmas with the exception of the dharmas of the Path (Kośa I 6); they are defined in M 17; S IV 256, etc.

10 According to the \textit{Traité} III 1340-62, the Buddhaṇasūṃśṭi should relate not only to the ten appellations (\textit{adhivacana}) of the Buddha, but also to the wonders of his birth, his physical marks and especially to his pure Skandhas and his omniscience.

11 On these five pure Skandhas, see D III 279; M I 145; 214; 217; S I 99-100; 139; V 162; A I 162; III 134; 271; V 16; It 107-8; Kośa VI 297, n.; Kośavyākyāyā, p.607.

12 These pure Skandhas had already been cultivated by Śākyamuni in the course of his long career as a Bodhisattva, but only became truly pure at the time of his enlightenment; they are then qualified as sampad, perfections. Cf. M I 145; A III 12-14.

13 These are the three asēkhakkhandhas. D II 81; A I 291; It 51.

14 M III 72, describes Pure Wisdom in the following way: There are, O monks, two kinds of right views (\textit{sammādītthi}). There is a right but impure (\textit{sāsāva}) view, having value only from the point of view of merit (\textit{puññabhāgīya}) and only yielding fruit in this world (\textit{upadhivepakkā}). There is a right view, noble (ariyā), pure (anāsāva), transcendental (lokuttarā), a limb of the Path (maggagata). The latter pertains to the noble mind (ariyacittā), to the purified mind (anāsavacittā), closely linked to the noble Path (ariyamaggassa samanā), and cultivating that Path: this is wisdom (paññā), the faculty of wisdom (paññādīrīya), the power of wisdom (paññābala), the limb of enlightenment discerning things (dhammavacayasambho-jñātha) the right view which is a limb of the Path (sammādītthi maggagata).

15 The Prajñā anāsāra is the only wisdom which culminates directly in complete and final liberation. This liberation is the deliverance of the mind due to Prajñā: cf. Kośa VI 297.


17 Provided one is freed of the impurities (Āravas) and has attained holiness (\textit{arhattvā)}, there is not the slightest difference between deliverance and deliverance. Cf. A III 34; M II 129; S V 410: \textit{Ettha kho paṇi esaṅham na kiñci nānakaraṇam vadāmi yad idam vimuttiyā vimutthi.}\]

18 There are quite a few other differences between the Prajñā of the Buddhas and that of the Śrāvakas who have become Arhats. The knowledge of the Buddhas is not derived from a teaching because they enlightened themselves (\textit{anupajjaṅgānām svayam abhisambodhanārtha})... it brings about not only the destruction of the passions, but also eliminates all the impregnations (\textit{vāsanā}): cf. Kośa VII 82-3.

19 See the references in Kośa VI 297, n.2.

20 Kośa IV 77; Kośabhāṣya, p.216: \textit{yo buddham saraṇaṃ gacchati \textasciitilde{a}saikṣaṇaṃ asa bodhakkharakān dharmaṃ charaṇaṃ gacchati yeṣam prādhānyena sa atmabhāvo buddha ity ucyate yeṣam vā lābhena sarvāvabodhisamārthāya buddho bhavati.}\]

21 Whoever takes refuge in the Buddha does not take refuge in his fleshly body (\textit{maṃsaśākāya}), but in the Arhat qualities—the five pure Skandhas—which form Buddhas. On this question see L. de La Vallée Poussin, ‘Documents d’Abhidharma; la doctrine des Refuges’ in \textit{Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques} 1, 1931-2, pp.65-109.

22 Kośa VII 81, n.1.

21 A II 37-9; *Samyuktāgama*, T 99, ch. 4, p. 28a20-28b18; *Ekottarāgama*, T 125, ch. 31, pp. 717c18-718a12. — Sākyamuni showed little respect for his fleshly body which he called body of filth (S III 120), and for his relics (D II 141). Although many epithets were justifiably applied to him (A III 285; V 329, etc.), he only held claim to one: that of Buddha (Vin I 9).


24 This is included among the fourteen difficult questions not settled by the Buddha (*avyākṛtavastu*): cf. D I 187-9; M I 157; S III 213-16; *Ṭaṭṭṭī* I 154-5.

25 Sn 1074 and 1076; cf. D I 146.

26 Kośa VI 240, 251.

27 D III 84,25; M I 111,13; III 195,6; 224,27; S IV 94,31; A V 226,25; 256,29.


29 A III 285; V 329, etc.

30 M I 167; Vin I 14-5: *Adhigato kho myāyam dhammo gambhīrouddaso duraṇudhodho santopītā atakākavacaro nipūto paṇḍitāvedanīyo... Ayālavāmāāyā kohpamājaya ayāvatiyā ayāyamuddalīyāuddasam idam thānām yad idam idappacayattā paṭīcasamuppaṭṭa; idam pī koh thānām suddhassa samuddhassa yad idam sabbasamkhārasamatho sabbuddhipaṭṭisassago taṇhakkhayo virāgā nirodho nibbaṇām.*

This long definition is also found elsewhere, with some divergences, in the *Mu* III 313, 18-314, 17, and in several Vinayas, except for that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins: see *Vin. of the Mahāsākas*, T 1421, ch. 15, p. 103c8-12; *Vin. of the Dhammaupakas*, T 1428, ch. 32, p. 787a1-5.

According to the Majjhima Commentary (Ps I 174) the Dhamma discovered by the Buddha is that of the four noble truths (*cattasacakādhamma*). It will be noted that the doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitā is not differentiated from the second of these truths.


32 These are the three ‘conditioned characteristics’ of the conditioned things (*samskrtaṇa samskrtaṁcaṇa*). Cf. A I 152; S III 37; Kośa II 223; *Kāvyākhyā*, p. 171. Other references in *Ṭaṭṭṭī* I 36-7; III 1163.

33 According to the formula: *Yam panāniccam dukkham viparītāma-dhammam...*. References in *Ṭaṭṭṭī* IV 1997.

34 Although certain schools consider it as an Asamkṣṭa, the twelve-limbed Prajñāpāramitāpada is not a subsisting entity since all its limbs are impermanent and doomed to destruction (S II 26). The problem is discussed in *Kośa* III 77.


36 A I 152; S IV 251; 261.

37 These are the three or four seals (mudrā) or summaries (*uddāna*) of the Law, often evoked in the two Vehicles. See the references in *Ṭaṭṭṭī* III 1369.

38 All these Mahāyānist theories are developed in the *Ṭaṭṭṭī* IV 2015-21. The formula ‘dharmas have only one characteristic, namely that of the absence of characteristic’ (*ekalakṣaṇam yad uttākṣaṇam*) is common in the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras: cf. Pañcavimśatisāhasikā, ed. N. Dutt, London, Luzac, 1934, pp. 164, 225, 244, 258, 261, 262, etc.

39 Pañcavimśatisāhasikā, p. 125,20: dhamma na vidyante nopalabhyante.

40 The Prajñāpāramitā is the non-grasping and the non-rejecting of all dharmas: cf. Pañcavimśatisāhasikā, p. 135,2: *yaḥ sarvadharmāṇām aparirghaḥ nusargaḥ sā praṇāpāramitāḥ.* It is the same as Empinness which is the relinquishing of all views: cf. Kāṣyapaprajīva, ed. A. von Staël-Holstein, Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1926, p. 97: sarvādṛṣtiṣṭhānam śīlātūtā nivedyāśgarām.


42 These rules are formulated in the *Catuprapītaramrṇa-sūtra* or Sūtra of the Four Refuges: cf. É. Lamotte, *La critique d’interprétation dans le bouddhisme*, *Annaudes de l’Institut de Philologie et d’Histoire orientales et slaves*, IX, 1949, pp. 341-54. Some schools, notably those of the Sarvāstivādins and Vaibhāṣikas, do not believe that all the Blessed One’s words were in accordance with the meaning (*yathārtha*): among the Sūtras, some are of precise meaning (*mārttika*), but others are of undefined meaning and need to be interpreted by exegetes.


44 See O. Wiennot, *Le Culte de l’arbre dans l’Inde ancienne*, Paris,
DEVAS AND ADHIDEVAS IN BUDDHISM

In a paper published in the Waldschmidt Festschrift¹ I have examined the text of what is said to be one of the only two suttas in the Pali canon in which the Buddha is specifically asked about the existence of the devas.² In that examination of the Saṅgārava-sutta (= M II 209-13)³ I have shown (I hope convincingly) that the existing editions and translations of the sutta are not satisfactory, with the result that the answer which the Buddha gave to his questioner has been misunderstood.

In the present paper I wish to examine the second of the two suttas, the Kaṇṇakaththa-sutta (= M II 125-33), since I believe that this too has been misunderstood. In this sutta Pasenadi, the king of Kosala, comes to the Buddha and asks him a series of questions. He asks first about omniscience, and then about the four castes. The Buddha answers his questions. Pasenadi then asks: kim pana, bhante, atthi devā. ‘But, sir, do devas exist?’ Instead of replying immediately, the Buddha repeats the question: kim pana tvām, mahāraja, evam vadesi ‘kim pana, bhante, atthi devā’. ‘But why, great king, do you ask this question?’

It seems that Pasenadi takes this counter-question as meaning, ‘Why do you ask? The question is unnecessary,’ for he then continues with his questioning. Buddhaghoṣa, when commenting upon this passage, places this interpretation upon the Buddha’s reply and states: kim, mahāraja, kim tvām ‘santi devā Catummahārājikā, santi devā Tāvatiṃsā . . . pe . . . santi devā Paranimmitavasavattino, santi devā tatuttarir‘ evam devānām atthihāvam na jānāsi yena evam vadesi (Ps III 359,22 foll.). ‘Are you unaware of the existence of such devas as the Catummahārājikā devas and the Tāvatiṃsā devas, that you ask this question?’

Pasenadi then continues: yadi vā te, bhante, deva āgantāro itthattam, yadi vā anāgantāro itthattam. ‘Will those devas return to this earthly state, or will they not?’ That is to say: ‘Will those devas come back to existence as men, or are they non-returners?’ It seems to me that Pasenadi’s question reveals some knowledge of the Buddha’s teaching, or at least something very similar to it. We find, for example, the Buddha saying: imē vā pana bhonto
Devas and Adhidevas in Buddhism

he wishes, good or bad?’ Viññāṇaṇa replies that the king is so able.

Ānanda then asks if the king can do this outside his kingdom, and Viññāṇaṇa states that he cannot. Ānanda then asks: pahoti rājā Pasenadi Kosalo deve Tāvatiṃse tamḥā thānā cāvetuṃ vā pabbājethuṃ vā. ‘Can the king banish the Tāvatiṃsa devas from their heaven?’ Viññāṇaṇa replies: dassanāya pi bho, rājā Pasenadi Kosalo deve Tāvatiṃse na pahoti, kuto pana tamḥā thānā cāvetuṃ vā pabbājethuṃ vā. ‘The king cannot even see the Tāvatiṃsa devas, much less banish them from their heaven’. Ānanda says: evam eva kho, senāpati, ye te devā savyāpajjha āgāntāro ithubbhaṃ te devā ye te devā avyāpajjha anāgāntāro ithubbhaṃ te deva dassanāya pi na pahonti, kuto pana tamḥā thānā cāves-santī vā pabbājessantī vā. ‘The malevolent gods who will return to this earthly state cannot even see the gods who are not malevolent, much less banish them from their heaven’.

Pasenadi is delighted with this reply, although Marasinghe in his analysis of the Kāṇkakathala-sutta thinks that the Buddha and Ānanda are at cross-purposes with Pasenadi and Viññāṇaṇa, and he consequently makes no attempt to explain the reasons for Viññāṇaṇa’s strange question and Ānanda’s equally strange reply.

Pasenadi then asks: kim pana, bhante, atthi Brahmā. ‘Does Brahmā exist?’ As before, the Buddha merely repeats the question, whereupon Pasenadi continues with the same query which he had about the devas: yadi vā so, bhante, Brahmā āgāntā ithubbhaṃ, yadi vā anāgāntā ithubbhaṃ. ‘Will Brahmā return to this earthly state or not?’ Again I would suggest that such a question was based upon some knowledge of the Buddha’s teaching, or something very like it: ‘Can someone who has reached the last stage before nibbāna by being reborn in the Brahmaloka as Brahmā himself, still be reborn as a man?’ The Buddha gives the same answer as before: ‘If Brahmā is not malevolent (avyāpajjho), he will not be reborn as a man’. We may assume that he is probably making a distinction between one who is on his way to arahant-ship, and one who, although not a follower of the Buddha, is nevertheless reborn in the Brahmaloka because of great merit acquired in previous births.

The discussion is then interrupted, when a servant enters to say
that the king's carriage is ready for his departure. Just as Pasenadi is leaving he thanks the Buddha for having answered his questions. He says: saṁbhaṁketaṁ mayāṁ, bhante, Bhagavanāṁ apucchimhā; saṁbhaṁketaṁ Bhagavā vyākāśi . . . cātuvaṁṣiṁ sudhimm mayāṁ, bhante, Bhagavanāṁ apucchimhā; cātuvaṁṣiṁ sudhimm Bhagavā vyākāśi. ‘We asked the Buddha about omniscience, and the Buddha answered us about omniscience . . . we asked about the purity of the four castes, and the Buddha answered us about the purity of the four castes’. The syntax of his speech then seems to change, and he says: adhideve mayāṁ, bhante, Bhagavan-taṁ apucchimhā; adhideve Bhagavā vyākāśi. adhibrahmānaṁ mayāṁ, bhante, Bhagavan-taṁ apucchimhā; adhibrahmānaṁ Bhagavā vyākāśi. ‘We asked the Buddha in respect of devas, and he answered us in respect of devas. We asked the Buddha in respect of Brahmā, and he answered us in respect of Brahmā’. The syntax then reverts to the earlier pattern: yaṁ yad eva ca pana mayāṁ, bhante, Bhagavan-taṁ apucchimhā, tasmā tad eva Bhagavā vyākāśi. ‘Whatever we asked the Buddha, that he answered us’.

I say, ‘The syntax of his speech then seems to change’. This is to adopt the explanation of the words adhideve and adhibrahmānaṁ given in CPD. Although PED lists them (with this reference) s.v. adhideva with the meaning ‘a superior or supreme god, above the gods’, and s.v. adhibrahmā with the meaning ‘a superior Brahmā, higher than Brahmā’, CPD explains both adhideve and adhibrahmānaṁ as indeclinables made up of two elements: the preposition adhi followed by an accusative plural or locative singular deve, and an accusative singular brahmānaṁ (although s.v. adhi CPD states that both are accusative). One hesitates to differ from Helmer Smith and Dines Andersen, who were probably the finest Pali scholars that Europe has produced, and yet one would be very surprised to find a construction like adhi deve apucchimhā in any Pali context. To find it after two occurrences of the usual construction of the root pucch- with two accusatives, one of the person asked and one of the question asked, and before another occurrence of the same construction, seems to me to be so unlikely that we can disregard it as a possibility. The natural way of taking adhideve Bhagavan-taṁ apucchimhā in this context is to translate it as: ‘We asked the Buddha about adhidevas’.

It may be that the editors of CPD did not accept this obvious translation because they did not believe that the word adhideva was likely to occur in a canonical text with the meaning ‘superior deva’. Where the word occurs again in the canon at Sn 1148, they suggest the same interpretation of adhi + deve, although the canonical cty on the final vagg of Sn (i.e. the Cula-niddesa) takes adhideva in the sense of ‘superior deva’. The āṭṭhakathā explains: adhideve abhiṁnāya ti adhidevakare dhamme rūpā (Pj II 607,8 = Nidd-a II 94,31), and strangely enough CPD translates adhidevakara as ‘leading to the position of a super-god’. It is possible that this seeming inconsistency may be the result of a conscious attempt to see a difference between the commentarial and non-commentarial meanings.

It is possible that Smith and Andersen were thinking of the Skt adverbial phrases adhidevam (quoted without reference by Monier-Williams), and adhidevam (quoted from the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, where it occurs in the context ity adhidevam, which Eggeling translates as ‘thus as regards the deities’). Both of these phrases, however, are examples of adhi + an accusative singular, and if the Pali words were really archaisms of this type then we should have expected adhidevam as well as adhibrahmānaṁ.

Possibly the editors of CPD had in mind a type of tmesis like that found in the Vedas. A few examples of the separation of the prefix from the verb are found in Pali, and also in Ardhā-Māgadhi, there is even one example quoted from BHS. Clearly it would be possible to take adhi deve apucchimhā as standing for deve adhi-apucchimhā, although the verb adhi-pucch- does not seem to occur elsewhere in Pali, nor adhi-prcch- in Skt. To adopt the same explanation for Sn 1148, however, where we find adhideve abhiṁnāya, creates difficulties, since deve adhi-abhiṁnāya would seem to be unlikely.

Since, however, the word adhideva is old in Skt, occurring first in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (VII.30), and since I have shown in my examination of the Saṅgārava-sutta that it not only occurs in a Pali canonical text, but actually in the same text that we are now discussing and moreover in the nominative plural form adhidevā, where any idea of deve being governed by adhi can be ruled out, I hope that it will be agreed that the editors
of Vol. I of CPD were being unnecessarily cautious in adopting the interpretation they did.

If, then, it is accepted that Pasenadi was indeed thanking the Buddha for having answered about adhidevas, then we can without difficulty reconstruct the original question which Pasenadi asked. He must have said: *atthi adhidevā*. ‘Do adhidevas exist?’ The corruption which led to the text developing into the form which we have today was therefore identical with that which I have shown occurred in the *Sāṅgārava-sutta*, i.e. the loss of adhi- after the word *atthi*. The same applies to the question: *atthi adhibrahmā*. ‘Does an adhibrahmā exist?’

If it is accepted that these two emendations to the text are correct, then we have to try to understand what the words *adhideva* and *adhibrahmā* mean, and why Pasenadi asked questions about them. We can get some help about their meanings from the grammatical texts. We find in the *Saddantīti*: *attike ca adive ca*, *evaṃ adhidevo* (Sadd 752,28), and in the *Payogasiddhi*: *adhiko devo adive ca*, *evaṃ adhidevo*. ‘A deva who is superior is an atideva; similarly adhideva’. We have information about atideva in an earlier text, for in his cty on Dhs Buddhaghosa, when explaining the meaning of the prefix *abhi*- in the word *abhidhamma*, states that it has the same meaning as the prefix ati-. He says: *yo āyava-vāṇa-issariya-yasa-sampatti-ādhi atirekatara c'eva visesavatataro ca devo adive ti vaccati; tathārūpo Brahmā pī ati-Brahmā ti vaccati* (As 2,24–27). ‘The deva who is specially distinguished and surpasses others in age, beauty, dominion, pomp, and other attainments is called atideva “the peerless deva”; similarly Brahmā is called ati-Brahmā “the peerless Brahmā.”’

Or as Taylor translates it: ‘The king who exceeds and is distinguished from his fellows in long life, beauty, and dominion, is called the “pre-eminent” king, and a superior Brahmā is called an ati-Brahmā.’

The word atideva is used in the Pali canon. In the *Theragāthā* we find it used of the Buddha himself (Th 489). In the *Samyutta-nikāya* it is used of an arahant who is spoken of as *atidevapatto* (S I 141,18*). This is glossed as: *atidevabhāvam pattu* (Spk I 207,11), and translated as ‘a man who past the gods hath won his way’. In the *Culla-niddesa* it is also used of the Buddha: *Bhagavā sammuti-devānāṃ ca upapatti-devānāṃ ca visuddhi-devānāṃ ca devo ca atidevo ca devātidevo ca* (Nidd II 173,16–18). ‘The Buddha is the deva and the atideva and the atideva of devas of the devas by convention and the devas by rebirth and the devas by purity’.

Outside the canon the word *atideva* is used in Mil of a king, in the list of titles which will be his as a result of his outstanding dāna: *so rājā . . . rājunaṃ atirājā bhaveyya, devānāṃ atidevo bhaveyya* (Mil 277,9). ‘That king would be the pre-eminent king of kings, the pre-eminent deva of devas’. The list continues: *Brahmānaṃ ati-Brahmā bhaveyya*. ‘He would be the pre-eminent Brahmad of Brahmas’. The gloss about the arahant quoted above from Spk I 207 continues: *Brahmānaṃ ati-Brahmabhāvam patto*. ‘Arrived at the status of ati-Brahmā of Brahmas’. Similarly in Vism Buddhaghosa uses the word ati-Brahmā of the Buddha: *[Bhagavā] . . . devadevo Sakkānaṃ ati-Sakko Brahmapanaṃ ati-Brahmā* (Vism 2,7–8). ‘The deva of devas, the ati-Sakko of Sakkas, the ati-Brahmā of Brahmas’.

In a stock phrase describing the Tathāgata found several times in the cit, we again see the word ati-Brahmā: *[Tathāgato]. . . attu appameyyo anuttaro rājarājā devadevo Sakkānaṃ ati-Sakko Brahmapanaṃ ati-Brahmā* (Ps I 51,15 = Mp I 111,4 = Ud-a 132,3). ‘The Tathāgata is unweighable, immeasurable, incomparable, king of kings, deva of devas, ati-Sakko of Sakkas, ati-Brahmā of Brahmas’.

If atideva can be used of the Buddha, or a Tathāgata, or an arahant, or a generous king, as in these quotations, and if adhideva means the same as atideva, then we may not be far wrong in thinking that adhideva may also be used of the Buddha. We find some support for this view when we consider that the Buddha’s knowledge and insight are referred to as adhidevañāṇa-dassana (A IV 304,23). Although CPD translates this as: ‘A knowledge comprehending even all that concerns the gods (adopting the same interpretation of adhideva as mentioned above), and Hare translates: ‘Knowledge and vision of the higher devas’; it makes better sense to take it as ‘the knowledge and insight of an adhideva’, i.e. a Buddha. Similarly, if adhi-Brahmā is the equivalent of ati-Brahmā, then we are probably justified in thinking that adhi-Brahmā can also be used of the Buddha.

What light does this throw on the *Kanṭakathala-sutta*? I said
above that Pasenadi’s questions about the possibility that devas and Brahmā might be reborn as men seemed to be based upon some sort of knowledge of the Buddha’s teaching, or something very similar to it. Now that we can see that his questions were actually about adhidevas and adhi-Brahmā we can be even more certain that they were based upon some partially misunderstood Buddhist teaching. If he had heard something of the descriptions of the Buddha as atideva and ati-Brahmā, which are quoted above, or heard the Buddha’s reply to Saṅgārava that he knew that adhidevas existed, then it is not unreasonable that he should ask the Buddha about this. I say ‘partially-misunderstood’, because there is no hint in his questions that he understood that the terms applied to the Buddha.

Moreover, this enables us to suggest a solution to one problem in the discussion. It seems very likely to me that the Buddha repeated Pasenadi’s question, which (as we have reconstructed it) was ‘Do adhidevas exist?’, simply because he was not certain what Pasenadi was getting at. After all, he was (probably unconsciously, but in effect) saying, ‘Do you and other Buddhas exist?’ As soon as Pasenadi took the Buddha’s counter-question as a signal to continue, and went on to ask about heavenly adhidevas, then it was clear that he was not asking about Buddhas but about superior devas of the heavenly type.

Once we see that Pasenadi’s original question was about the existence or otherwise of adhidevas, not devas, then the form which the subsequent questions took becomes more intelligible. The Buddha, for the reason just given, repeats Pasenadi’s question. Pasenadi takes this to mean: ‘Why do you ask? Of course they exist’. He then asks: ‘Are they, because of their pre-eminent deva nature, assured of rebirth as devas or better, or is there a chance that they will be reborn as men?’ The Buddha replies that if they have performed bad deeds they will fall from their position as adhidevas.

Pasenadi’s son then asks about the superior nature of the adhidevas in a different way. ‘Does their superior nature mean that they have power over other devas? If they are malevolent and desire to hurt other devas, can they compel them from the deva-world?’ Ānanda answers the question by making use of the different meanings of the word deva, which is reminiscent of the way in which the Buddha answered Saṅgārava’s question in the Saṅgārava-sutta. Since the devas by convention (samma-devā) are defined as: rājāno ca rājakumāro ca deviyo ca, ‘kings and princes and queens’, then it follows that Pasenadi himself is a deva, and since he is king of Kosala with subordinate kings beneath him he is by implication (although this is not actually stated) a pre-eminent king (adideva). Does he have power as a deva, in his own kingdom, to expel both the good and the bad? Yes. Does he have power outside his kingdom? No. Does he, as a deva by convention (sammauti) have power over the Tāvatiṣsa devas by rebirth (upapatti)? No, certainly not. He cannot even see them. Ānanda states that, in exactly the same way, adhidevas who are malevolent have no power over other devas; they cannot even see them.

If our reconstruction of the text is correct, Pasenadi then goes on to ask about the existence of adhi-Brahmā. Once more the Buddha hesitates, presumably wondering whether the question refers to himself. Again Pasenadi makes it clear that he is referring to a heavenly Brahmā, and he asks whether the superior nature of an adhi-Brahmā will safeguard him from rebirth as a man. As before, the Buddha replies that it will depend upon his kamma. The announcement that the king’s carriage is ready is made before Pasenadi can ask about the power which an adhi-Brahmā has over other Brahma.

My reconstruction of the dialogue in the Saṅgārava-sutta was aided by the existence of the v.l. adidevā for attih deva in the text of the sutta, which gave a hint as to the way in which the passage was to be emended. There were also glosses in the cty which were consistent with such a reading, and helped to confirm the correctness of my suggestion.

In the case of the Kangakathā-sutta, however, no manuscript tradition of either the sutta or the cty retains any trace of the original forms of the questions attih adidevā and attih adhi-Brahmā. The absence of any hint from the cty strongly suggests that the corruption of the text had taken place before Buddhaghosa’s time, and in fact long enough before his time for there to be no trace of the correct reading in the Sinhalese aṭṭhakathās upon which Buddhaghosa based his cty. We are, however, able to reconstruct the text of the sutta because of the existence of
the words adhideve and adhi-Brahmāṇam in Pasenadi’s speech of thanks to the Buddha.

From the questions and answers in the Saṅgārava-sutta, I concluded that the Buddha conceded that there were on the earth princes who were by convention called devas (sammuti-devā), but there were others, Buddhas like himself, who were superior (adhidevā) to these. From the questions and answers in the Kaṇṇakatthala-sutta, I conclude that the Buddha conceded that there were adhīdevas of the rebirth type (upapatti-devā), but he refuted (or rather Ānanda speaking on his behalf refuted) that their pre-eminent nature was of any importance.

In these two suttas, therefore, the Buddha conceded the existence of devas and adhīdevas of the convention and rebirth types, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that when the Buddha spoke of adhīdevas he was referring to pre-eminent devas of the purity type (visuddhi-devā), i.e. Buddhas like himself.

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Notes

3 Abbreviations of the titles of Pali texts follow the system laid down in CPD. References are to PTS editions unless otherwise stated.
4 Marasinghe, op.cit., p. 135, seems to assume that this happens after the malevolent devas have been reborn as men. This can hardly be correct, as Richard Gombrich points out in his review of Marasinghe’s book (Journal of Asian Studies, 36/1, November 1976, pp.175-76).
5 Marasinghe, op.cit., p. 126.
6 An anāgāmin is born in the Brahma-loka, but one born in the Brahma-loka is not necessarily an anāgāmin. See DPPN II 336, s.v. Brahma-loka.
7 See CPD Vol. I, s.vv. adhi-deve and adhi-Brahmāṇam.
HUMOUR IN PALI LITERATURE

When one reads verse 146 of the Dhammapada:

‘What laughter, what joy,
When the world is burning (with passions)?
Will you not seek a light,
You who are shrouded in darkness (of ignorance)?’

one is likely to come to the erroneous conclusion, if one does not know the context of this statement, that the Buddha categorically condemns all enjoyment in life. According to the Commentary, these words were spoken by the Buddha on an occasion when a heedless group of women in a state of drunkenness visited him and began to dance and sing shamelessly in his presence.

There is a short sutta in the Aṅguttara-nikāya which indicates that the Buddha did not appreciate immoderate laughter, guffawing, and showing one’s teeth (ativelaṁ dantavidāmsakaṁ hasitaṁ), that he considered it childish (komārakaṁ) in the Discipline of the Ariya (ariyassa vinaye). But he remarked that ‘it is proper (sufficient) if you smile, just smile (sitam sitamatiya), when you are delighted with something (dhammapamodita).’

The Commentary explains that when there is a reason for smiling one should smile showing the tips of the teeth, just to express one’s delight. Further, it reminds us that the Buddha spoke these words as an admonition to the notorious group of six monks (chabbaggiya), when they went about singing, dancing and laughing boisterously.

The king of Kosala once told the Buddha that unlike many a disciple of other religious systems who looked haggard, coarse, pale, emaciated and unprepossessing, his disciples were ‘joyful and elated (hattha-pahattha), jubilant and exultant (udaggudagga), enjoying the spiritual life (abhiratarīpa), with pleased faculties (ptewithāriya), free from anxiety (appussukka), serene (panna-loma), unconcerned (depending on others) (paradavutta) and living with a gazelle’s mind (migabhūtensi cetasā), i.e. light-hearted’. The king added that he believed that this healthy disposition was due to the fact that ‘these venerable ones had certainly realized the great and full significance of the Exalted One’s teaching.’

This indeed is so. If one is truly ‘religious’, morally, spiritually and intellectually, then one is surely happy and joyful. A refined sense of humour is to be found in such people. Buddhism is quite opposed to a melancholic, sorrowful, pessimistic and gloomy attitude of mind, which is considered a hindrance to the realization of Truth. On the other hand, it is interesting to remember here that joy (pīti) is one of the Seven Factors of Enlightenment (bojhārīga), essential qualities to be cultivated for the realization of Nibbāna.

During the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, Christian missionaries and many Western Buddhologists, who failed to understand correctly the first Noble Truth (dukkha-sacca), wrote and spoke about Buddhism as a pessimistic religion. Their misconception and prejudice might probably have influenced the minds of most of the subsequent Western students of Buddhism. They evidently assumed that Buddhist literature was always serious and gloomy, bereft of any kind of sense of humour or joy in life. Consequently they failed to notice the subtle and serene sense of humour often found in the Pali texts. On the contrary, present-day visitors from the West to such Buddhist countries as Sri Lanka find there people happy, cheerful and light-hearted—often disconcertingly so.

Material relating to this lighter side of life, revealing a sense of humour at different levels, scattered throughout Pali Literature—canonical, commentarial and folklore—would fill a fair-sized book. In this short article a few examples, mostly summarized, only from the Pali Canon and Commentaries are provided.

* * * * *

A few weeks after his Enlightenment, when the Buddha was seated under a banyan tree known as Ajapāla-nigrodha in the vicinity of the Bodhi tree, a brāhmaṇa visited him. The original Pali texts which relate this story do not give the real name of the man, but introduce him as anītara hulunja-jātiko brāhmaṇo ‘a certain brāhmaṇa in the habit of saying hulun’. Out of conceit and arrogance, he would utter this sound contumuously, in order to belittle others and whatever they said.
parts exist today). The English expression ‘to pooh-pooh’ would render it effectively.

The Buddha lived in Uruvelā for a fairly long period prior to his Enlightenment. This brāhmaṇa might have been a native of the region. So they might probably have known each other earlier. He asked the Buddha to what extent one was a brāhmaṇa and what qualities went to make a brāhmaṇa. The Buddha, in answer, enumerating a few qualities such as abstinence from evil, absence of impurity in character, self-control, living the holy life, included indifferently in the list ‘not uttering hūmaṇi (not pooh-poohing).

* * * * *

Once at Rājagaha a wandering ascetic (paribbājaka) named Dīghanakha (Long-nail) went to see the Buddha and asserted: ‘Venerable Gotama, I say this, I hold this view: “Nothing (no view) is pleasing to me”’. Then the Buddha observed: ‘But this view of yours “Nothing is pleasing to me,” is it too not pleasing to you’?

(After this humorous remark and Dīghanakha’s evasive reply that if this view were pleasing to him, it would also be so, the Buddha proceeded to give him a deep philosophical and spiritual exposition of views (diṭṭhi). At the end of this discourse Dīghanakha became a sotāpāna (Stream-enterent) and Sāriputta (Dīghanakha’s uncle and the Buddha’s Chief Disciple) who was fanning the Master standing behind him, became an arahant).

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As the Buddha was completely free from ideas of self and conceit, he could receive any insult without being mentally hurt and could meet it with good humour without a touch of bitterness, often making use of it to benefit his insulter.

Again at Rājagaha, a brāhmaṇa of the Bhāradvāja clan, incensed that his brother had become a disciple of the Buddha and entered the Order of the Saṅgha, went to see the Master and insulted and abused him. When the brāhmaṇa had finished vilifying the Buddha to his heart’s content, the Compassionate One quietly asked him:

‘Do you sometimes receive visits from your friends and relatives?’
‘Yes, sometimes I do’.
‘Do you offer them foods and drinks?’
‘Yes, sometimes I do’.
‘But if they do not accept your foods and drinks, then whose property do those things become?’
‘Then those things are for ourselves’.
‘Now, in the same way, Brāhmaṇa, you have offered me abuse and insult, but I do not accept it. So now, Brāhmaṇa, it is for yourself; it is for yourself!’

* * * * *

Another brāhmaṇa called Veraṇja (in Veraṇjā) went to the Buddha and attacked him with studied derogatory phrases, imputing evil and ‘irreligious’ dispensation and attitude to him according to the brahmanic lore:

‘Master Gotama propounds the theory of inaction (akīrtavyāda)’.
‘Yes, Brāhmaṇa, one might rightly say so. Brāhmaṇa, I declare inaction of (absence from) physical, verbal and mental misconduct, inaction of all kinds of evil and bad things. So one might rightly say that the recluse Gotama declares inaction’.
‘Master Gotama is an annihilationist (ucccheda-vāda)’.
‘Yes, Brāhmaṇa, one might rightly say so. Brāhmaṇa, I declare the annihilation (cutting off) of lust, hatred, and ignorance, annihilation of all kinds of evil and bad things. So one might rightly say that the recluse Gotama is an annihilationist’.

In this manner, whatever term Veraṇja intended as insult, the Buddha quietly and dispassionately turned it aside to signify something spiritually and morally important.

At the end, after a lengthy discussion, Veraṇja was so satisfied that he became a lay disciple (upāsaka) of the Master.
One day at Kapilavatthu, the capital of the Sakyas, the Buddha, after his alms-round and meal, went to the Great Wood (Mahāvana) near the city and sat down under a tree for his mid-day siesta. A Sakyan, introduced in the text as Daṇḍa-pañī (Stick-in-hand), was also out walking in the Great Wood and came to the place where the Buddha was seated. (Daṇḍa-pañī was related to the Buddha, and most probably they knew each other. According to the Commentary, this prince was partial to Devadatta, the Buddha’s cousin and enemy, and was unsympathetic towards the Exalted One). Having greeted the Buddha, he stood on one side leaning on his stick and asked the Buddha:

“What is the theory of the recluse (samaṇa, referring to the Buddha)? What does he teach?”

Now, at that time in North India, it was considered impolite and discourteous to talk standing to a venerable person who is seated (usually on the ground), or to talk seated to such a person who is standing. So, the attitude of Daṇḍa-pañī—not only did he stand but he also leant on his precious staff—talking to the Buddha who was seated, was surely haughty. The Buddha undoubtedly knew that the man put him the question, not with a desire to learn, but to show his arrogance. So the Enlightened One answered him in a fitting manner:

‘Friend, if some one propounding a theory in this world with its devas, mãras, brahmás, its population of samaṇas and brähmanas, of devas and inen, does not come into conflict with anyone else, and how the perceptions do not obsess the person who lives not fettered to sense-pleasures, without wavering doubts, with no remorse, without craving for all forms of becoming, Friend, I propound such a theory; I do teach such a doctrine’.

This was all Greek to Daṇḍa-pañī. He shook his head, waggled his tongue, knitted his wrinkled forehead and walked away—with stick!

(Bhikkhus, who heard about this incident from the Buddha, also could not perceive the meaning of the Master’s reply and desired to learn it. The Buddha clarified it very briefly. But later, at the request of those bhikkhus, Mahā-Kaccāna Thera, foremost among analytical exponents of the Dhamma (A I 23) gave a detailed explanation. His exposition was approved by the Buddha. The whole narrative is now called Madhupiṇḍikā-sutta ‘Ball of Honey’, No. 18 of the Majjhima-nikāya).

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The Mahāsthānāda-sutta, ‘The Great Discourse on the Lion’s Roar’ (No. 12 of the Majjhima-nikāya), is awe-inspiring. In it, various virtues and powers of the Buddha are described as well as the terrible austerities he practised during the period of self-mortification before his Enlightenment. The discourse was delivered to Sāriputta, his chief disciple. The Buddha related that as there were some religious teachers who believed that spiritual purity could be achieved through the control of food, he lived for a period on one jujube berry (kola), or a grain of rice, a day. Then he interjected lightheartedly: ‘Sāriputta, it may occur to you that the jujube berry might perhaps have been bigger at that time. Sāriputta, you should not think so. At that time too the jujube berry was of the same size as it is today’. (The same was said of a grain of rice).

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When the above discourse (Mahāsthānāda-sutta) was being delivered, the Venerable Nāgasamāla was standing behind the Buddha fanning him. (It must have been hot that day at Vesālī). At the end of the discourse Nāgasamāla told the Master: ‘Wonderful, Sir; marvellous, Sir. But Sir, when I listened to this discourse, my hair stood on end! What is the name of this discourse?’

The Buddha simply said: ‘Then, Nāgasamāla, remember it as the “Hair-standing Discourse” (Lomahaṁsa-pariyāya)!’

(But in the Majjhima-nikāya it is always known and titled as Mahāsthānāda-sutta ‘The Great Discourse on the Lion’s Roar’).

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Once the Buddha was staying in the Pāvārika Mango Grove near Nālandā, when Sāriputta came to the Master and made this affirmation:
‘Sir, such faith have I in the Exalted One that I think that there never has been, nor will there be, nor is there now any other recluse (samaña) or brāhmaṇa who is greater in Super-Knowledge (abhiññā), that is to say, with regard to Enlightenment (sambodhi)’.

The Buddha had very high regard for Sāriputta whom he considered the most intelligent of all his disciples. But the Master did not, it seems approve or appreciate this kind of faith or praise, yet at the same time he did not like to censure his chief disciple out of respect for him. So the Enlightened One gently observed:

‘Sāriputta, you have uttered great and bold words. You have taken a definite stand. You have roared the lion’s roar. . . . So, Sāriputta, you have known all those Exalted Ones, fully enlightened, arahant Buddhas who lived in the past, perceiving their minds with your mind, comprehending that they were of such virtue, of such nature, of such wisdom, of such conduct and of such emancipation?’

‘No, Sir’.

‘Then of course, Sāriputta, you know all those Exalted Ones, fully enlightened, arahant Buddhas who will come in the long ages of the future, perceiving their minds with your mind, comprehending that they will be of such virtue, of such nature, of such wisdom, of such conduct and of such emancipation?’

‘Certainly not, Sir’.

‘But then, Sāriputta, perhaps you know me, now an arahant, a Fully Enlightened One, perceiving my mind with your mind, comprehending that the Exalted One is of such virtue, of such nature, of such wisdom, of such conduct and of such emancipation?’

‘Indeed not, Sir’.

‘Then, Sāriputta, you have no knowledge penetrating the minds (cetopariyāṇa) of the arahant, fully enlightened Buddhas of the past, future or present. Why then really, Sāriputta, have you uttered such great and bold words? Why did you take up such a definite stand? Why did you roar the lion’s roar. . . .?’

(But Sāriputta gave a long explanation justifying his position).20

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One day the following question occurred to a certain bhikkhu: ‘Now, where do these four Great Elements, namely, solidity (paṭhavi), fluidity (āpo), heat (tejo) and motion (vāyo) cease, leaving no trace behind?’

Then with his supernatural iddhi powers the bhikkhu went to the Heaven of the Four Great Kings (Cātummahārājika) and put his question to the gods there. They confessed that they did not know the answer, but said that the Four Great Kings (Rulers of that heaven) who were more exalted and superior to them would know it. So the bhikkhu approached them. But they too admitted their ignorance and directed him to the gods of the higher heaven, still more exalted and superior. They, too, in their turn, admitted their ignorance and sent him on to still higher and superior heavens. In this manner the bhikkhu, being directed to higher and higher heavens, arrived at the sixth heaven (Paranimmīma Vasavatī), highest in the sphere of sense-pleasures (kāmāvacara). But the gods in this heaven too admitted that they did not know the answer to the question, and sent him on to the Brahma-world which is still higher and superior. When the bhikkhu reached the Brahma-world and put his question to the gods of the Retinue of Brahma, they admitted their ignorance and said that there was the Mahā-Brahma, the Great Brahma, more exalted and superior to them and that he surely would know the answer. (According to Brahmanic lore, Brahma is the Creator of the world, the Supreme God).

The Great Brahma appeared and the bhikkhu put the question to him: ‘Now, friend, where do these Four Great Elements. . . cease, leaving no trace behind?’

The Great Brahma, in answer, made an impressive but irrelevant declaration: ‘Bhikkhu, I am Brahma, the Great Brahma, the Conqueror, the Unconquered, the Omniscient, the Ruler, the Supreme, the Maker, the Creator, the Chief, the Assignor, the Master, the Father of all that are and are to be’.

The bhikkhu, obviously unimpressed, said quietly: ‘Friend, I do not ask you whether you are the Brahma, the Great Brahma . . .
the Father of all that are and are to be. But I ask you where the Four Great Elements... cease, leaving no trace behind'.

Again the Great Brahma repeated his boastful bluster, and the bhikkhu, for the third time, calmly repeated his question. Then the Mahā-Brahma took the bhikkhu by the arm and led him aside and whispered: 'These gods of the Retinue of Brahma hold me to be such that there is nothing I have not seen, nothing I have not known, nothing I have not realized. Therefore I did not answer in their presence. I, too, Bhikkhu, do not know where these Four Great Elements—solidity, fluidity, heat and motion—cease, leaving no trace behind. Therefore, Bhikkhu, it is your own fault, your own mistake that you, disregarding the Exalted One, went out in search of an answer to your question. Go now, Bhikkhu, approach the Exalted One yourself and put this question to him and learn as he explains it'.

So the bhikkhu returned to the Master and put the question to him. The Buddha with a touch of humour referred to a practice of ancient navigators: Sea-faring traders in the past used to take with them a land-sighting bird. When the ship got far out of sight of the shore, they would let the land-sighting bird free. The bird would fly in all directions, and if it caught sight of land, it would fly there. If no land was visible all round in any direction, it would come back to the ship. 'Even so, after all these wanderings, right up to the Brahma-world, you came back to me!' the Buddha said.

Then the Enlightened One pointed out to the bhikkhu that his question was wrongly worded, and after formulating it correctly, gave him the answer: 21 (We hope that the bhikkhu understood it!)

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If one asks why a fool is like the spoon and an intelligent person is like the tongue, this may be taken as a humorous modern quiz, a puzzle or riddle. But one should not overlook, nor fail to appreciate, the Buddha's sense of humour when one reads the Dhammapada verse 64:

'Though a fool all his life associates with a wise man, he does not perceive the Truth (Dhamma), just as a spoon (does not perceive) the taste of the soup'. 22

and the verse 65:

'If an intelligent person associates with a wise man even for a moment, he quickly perceives the Truth (Dhamma), just as the tongue (perceives) the taste of the soup'. 23

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Brāhmaṇas always claimed that only they were the genuine sons of Brahma (God) (brahmaṇu puttiṇa orasā), born of his mouth (mukhato jātā), the offspring of Brahma (brahmaṇa), created by Brahma (brahmaṇimmitā), heirs to Brahma (brahma-dāvādā).

With regard to this famous conceited claim of the brāhmaṇas, the Buddha told Vāsetṭha, one of his brāhmaṇa disciples:

'Surely, Vāsetṭha, brāhmaṇas have quite forgotten the past when they say that they are the genuine sons of Brahma, born of his mouth... Certainly, Vāsetṭha, brāhmaṇa wives of brāhmaṇas (brāhmaṇa) are known to have their seasons, to have been pregnant, have given birth to children and to have been suckling them. Yet these brāhmaṇas themselves born of the womb itself (voniţa va) like everyone else, speak thus: “...only brāhmaṇas are genuine sons of Brahma, born of his mouth, the offspring of Brahma,”... And so they slander Brahma, they speak untruth and earn much demerit’. 24

The Commentary makes this subtle humour obvious when it explains that if the word of the brāhmaṇas were true, then the mouth of Brahma would be 'the path of flowing' of brāhmaṇa women (brāhmaṇiṇiṇaḥ passaṇamaggo brahmaṇu mukham bhaveyya). 25

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Once in Sāvatthi many recluse, brāhmaṇas, various ascetics, holding different philosophical and metaphysical views, each claiming his to be the only truth and the rest nonsense (idam eva saccam, mogham aññam), were quarrelling, wrangling and disputing among themselves, wounding one another with 'the weapons of the tongue' (mukhaṣatthi). 26 Some bhikkhus reported this to the Enlightened One.
Then the Buddha said that these recluses, brāhmaṇas and ascetics were blind (andhā), without eyes (acakkhukā), and that they did not know the Truth (Dhamma) or what was not-Truth (a-Dhamma). He then related the following story:

Once upon a time there was a king in that very city of Śāvatthī. He called a man and ordered him: ‘Go and gather together all those in Śāvatthī who are born blind’.

The man got them together and reported it to the king. Then the king said: ‘Go and show them an elephant’.

So the man went and showed an elephant to those who were born blind: to some he showed the elephant’s head saying ‘this is the elephant’; to some, the elephant’s ears; to some others, the elephant’s tusks; to still others, the elephant’s trunk, foot, back, tail and so on, and told the king that an elephant had been shown to all those who were born blind.

Then the king went to the place where those blind men were gathered and asked them: ‘Have you seen the elephant?’

‘Yes, Sire’, they replied.

‘Then tell me, what sort of a thing is the elephant?’

Those who felt the elephant’s head said: ‘Sire, the elephant is like a pot’. Those who touched an ear said: ‘The elephant is like a winnowing-basket’. Those who felt a foot said that the elephant was like a pillar, and those who touched the tail said that the elephant was just like a broom and so on and so forth, according to what they had touched and felt. Then the blind men began to quarrel and fight among themselves, shouting: ‘It is not so’. ‘Yes, it is so’. ‘The elephant is not that’. ‘Yes, it is like that’.

The Buddha then explained that so were those recluses, brāhmaṇas, wanderers who wrangled and quarrelled about the Truth. They had seen only a fragment of it (ekārṇa-dassino).27

* * * * *

Philosophical, spiritual and psychological humour, all rolled into one, is found in the Buddha’s criticism of the brāhmaṇas’ (for that matter, of all peoples’) attitude towards emancipation, liberation, ‘salvation’ through mere faith and belief without direct knowledge and experience, as recorded in the Teviṅga-sutta (No. XIII) of the Dīgha-nikāya.

Brāhmaṇas claimed that they knew and declared the Path, the Direct Path (ujumagga) leading to the union with Brahma (God) (brahmasahayavatā). The Buddha inquired from his interlocutor Vāsetṭha, a young brāhmaṇa, whether there was even a single one of the brāhmaṇas versed in the three Vedas who had seen Brahma (God) face to face, directly (brahmā sakkhi-dīṭṭho).

Vāsetṭha said: ‘No’.

‘Then, Vāsetṭha, was there even any one of their teachers who had seen Brahma face to face?’

‘No’.

‘Not one of the teachers of their teachers?’

‘No’.

‘Not even a single one up to the seventh generation of their teachers?’

‘No’.

‘Well then, those ancient Rishis (pubbakā āsaya), the authors of the sacred hymns (mānānam kattāro), did even they say: “We know it, we have seen where Brahma is, whence Brahma is, whence Brahma is?”’

‘Not even they’.

‘Now, Vāsetṭha, neither any one of the brāhmaṇas versed in the three Vedas has seen Brahma (God) face to face (directly), nor any one of their teachers up to the seventh generation, nor even any one of those ancient Rishis who were the authors of the sacred hymns which are recited and recited by the brāhmaṇas. Then what the brāhmaṇas versed in the three Vedas say amounts to this: “We declare the way to the union with that state which we do not know, which we do not see. This is the direct way to union with Brahma (God)”’.

‘Vāsetṭha, this is not possible, this is senseless talk (apātiṭhTrakaṭatām bhūṣitaṁ). This is like a string of these blind men clinging to one another: neither the foremost, nor the middle one, nor the last sees. Even so, the talk of the brāhmaṇas versed in the three Vedas is, it seems, blind talk. Neither first, nor the middle one, nor the last sees.
So this talk of those brāhmaṇas versed in the three Vedas becomes just ridiculous, mere words—empty and vain'.

Then the Buddha relating various humorous similes goes on to ridicule this attitude of the brāhmaṇas: It is like a man who desires to get the janapada-kalyāṇī (the beauty queen of the country), but does not know anything about her; or like a man building a staircase to climb to a mansion which he does not see; or like a man who wants to cross a river which is full and invokes the further bank saying: ‘Come hither, O further bank! come over to this side!’, or simply sleeps on the bank (sleep of ignorance), and so on and so forth.

* * * * *

After these few examples from the Pali Canon, let us now take some from the Pali Commentaries too.

The story of a quarrel of two ascetics, Devala and Nārada, both of whom had supernatural powers, provides a fine piece of humour. Devala decided to spend a night in the atelier of a potter. Nārada, who arrived later, also decided to spend the night in the same place. After formal greetings and conversation, when they were about to go to sleep, Nārada carefully noted where Devala was going to sleep and also where the door was. But later, during the night, Devala changed his mind and slept across the door.

In the night, Nārada going out trampled on Devala’s head. Devala angrily scolded him: ‘You false ascetic, you trampled on my head’. Immediately Nārada apologized politely saying, ‘Please excuse me, Master, I did not know that you were sleeping here’, and went out.

Devala thought that Nārada would trample on his head again when he returned and changed his position, this time putting his head where his feet had been earlier. Nārada entering the shed, in order to avoid trampling on Devala’s head again, walked slowly on the side of his feet, but this time trampled on his neck!

Devala became furious and yelled that he would curse him. Nārada apologized, expressing his deep regret and asserting that he did not know that Devala had changed his position, that he never trampled on him knowingly, and that the whole thing was a mistake.

But Devala would not listen. ‘False ascetic’, he shouted, ‘I will curse you’.

‘Please, don’t do it, Master’.

In spite of Nārada’s apology and entreaty, Devala cursed him uttering that Nārada’s head would split into seven pieces at sunrise!

‘Master’, said Nārada solemnly, ‘while I was affirming that it was not my fault, you cursed me. But, may the head of him who is guilty, and not the head of him who is innocent, split into seven at sunrise!’ This was in effect a curse.

Now Nārada had power of seeing the past and future. He saw that Devala’s head, and not his, would split into seven when the sun rose in the morning. So he took pity on this capricious ascetic and stopped the sunrise by his supernatural power.

This petty personal quarrel between two ascetics in a potter’s shed plunged the whole world into catastrophe. When sunrise was mysteriously delayed, people became restless, and went to the palace gate and appealed to the king. It was discovered that this unnatural phenomenon was due to the curses of these two ascetics. The king, with a retinue bearing torch lights, hurried to the potter’s shed. Nārada explained the whole episode. Now, the only way to avoid Devala’s head being split into seven at sunrise was for him to apologize to Nārada. But Devala was adamant. He would not apologize to Nārada even at the request of the king. So the king ordered his men to hold Devala by force and bend his head down at the feet of Nārada. ‘Please, get up, Master’, said Nārada, ‘I pardon you’. But Nārada knew that the apology was not genuine, as it was not voluntary. So the danger remained.

But Nārada suggested an expedient. The king should take Devala into the lake adjoining the city, order him to plunge in the water up to his neck, with a lump of earth on his head representing another head. Then Nārada would release the sun, but exactly at the appearance of the sun’s rays, Devala should immerse himself in the water, emerge in another place and so escape. When the sun rose, the lump of earth, the ‘false head’ on Devala’s head, split into seven, and Devala immersed himself in
the water and escaped. Thus a great universal catastrophe was averted.28

* * * * *

On another occasion the sun was obliged to suspend its course for a short while just to allow a little sāmaṇera (novice) sufficient time to attain arahantship and then to have his meal before noon, i.e. before it crossed the zenith of the sky.

Paṇḍita Sāmaṇera, the little pupil of Sāriputta Thera (the Buddha's Chief Disciple), was seven years old and had entered the Order only a week previously. On the eighth day, the child decided to meditate and become an arahant. So without going alms-begging, he sat down alone meditating in his teacher's room. Sāriputta Thera went out alms-begging.

Sakka, the king of gods, was moved, as usual on such occasions, by this stupendous determination, virtue and piety. He took every precaution to help Paṇḍita attain arahantship and have his meal before the sun crossed the zenith of the sky. So, among other things, Sakka asked the Sun-God (Suriya-Devaputta) to suspend the course of the sun. Before noon the sāmaṇera had attained to the first three stages on the way to perfection, namely, sotāpatti, sakadāgāmi and anāgāmi stages. But arahantship had still to be attained. So the sun had to remain standing just at the zenith without crossing it, till the sāmaṇera attained full perfection and had his meal, however long all this might take.

Sāriputta Thera, who was out alms-begging, had his meal in a house where he was invited and was hurrying back with some food for his little disciple as it was rather getting late. But the Buddha who knew that Paṇḍita Samaṇera would attain arahantship before his meal, but was still trying for it, intercepted Sāriputta and began to put some questions to him in order to allow time for the sāmaṇera to attain his goal undisturbed.

By the time Sāriputta Thera arrived and knocked at the door, his little pupil had just attained arahantship. When Paṇḍita Samaṇera had finished his meal and washed the alms-bowl the sun quickly crossed the zenith and covered at one stretch the distance it had to. Suddenly the shadows lengthened, and people wondered what had happened.29

* * * * *

Once, more than fifteen centuries ago, there seems to have taken place at Anurādhapura in Sri Lanka something like a 'beauty contest', not between girls but between a monk and a minister's son. Abhaya Thera and the minister's son (his name is not given) were equally handsome, and there was discussion in the city as to who was the handsomer. With the idea of seeing them both together, the relatives of the minister's son dressed him elegantly and took him to worship at the Mahācetiya (modern Ruvanvīlī-sāya) at Anurādhapura, while the therassia's mother sent her son a beautiful robe, requesting him to shave his head and put on the new robe and go to the Mahācetiya followed by monks. Abhaya Thera met the minister's son at the courtyard of the Mahācetiya and observed: 'Having thrown away the rubbish that the old monk had swept, you now come to compete with me!'

This mysterious remark goes back to a previous existence. The old monk mentioned was Abhaya Thera himself in a previous birth. In that life the therassia had swept the courtyard of a cetiya (dāgāba) and collected the rubbish in a heap. The minister's son at that time was an ordinary layman in the village and took and threw away this heap of rubbish.30 (The physical beauty of the therassia was one of the results of the meritorious deed of his cleaning a holy place. If the man who threw away the rubbish swept and collected by the monk became so handsome, then the monk himself who had swept and cleaned the sacred place must have, obviously, been still handsomer).

* * * * *

Pali Commentaries on the Tipiṭaka speak of thousands of arahants living in different monasteries, forest dwellings and caves in ancient Sri Lanka. An arahant (khisthāsava) therassia, who lived at Cittala-pabbata (modern Situl-pavva) in the Southern Province of Sri Lanka, had as his companion and attendant a monk who had entered the Order of the Sangha in his old age. Obviously, this old monk must have heard people talk of arahants living in the country. He desired to meet one of these holy men. One day he was following the arahant therassia, carrying his alms-bowl and robe, and asked: 'What sort of people are ariyas?'31

'Ariyas are difficult to recognize, my friend', said the therassia.
'Now, certain old people, even attending on ariyas, going about with them carrying their alms-bowls and robes, do not recognize them'.

Even then the old monk could not catch the point of the remark.32

* * * * *

Sometimes young monks were far too jovial and light-hearted. There is a story of certain young monks at a monastery called Bherapāsana-vihāra in Rohaṇa, Sri Lanka, who played a practical joke on a half-wit named Uttara who lived with them in the monastery.

The young monks told Uttara that the aggi-sālā (fire-hall) was leaking, and went out with him into the jungle to bring some grass to thatch the roof. When the grass was cut and tied into small bundles, the monks inquired from Uttara whether he could carry fifty bundles. He said 'no'. Then they asked him whether he could not carry 'even eighty'. Uttara refused that too.

'But, then, surely you can take one hundred bundles?' the monks inquired.

'What I can', said the idiot and carried the heap of one hundred bundles to the monastery with great hardship.

Other monks at the monastery observed that Uttara looked tired. 'Yes, Sirs', he admitted. 'These young monks tried to deceive me. When I could not raise even this one hundred, they wanted me to carry fifty bundles of grass!'

'Yes, Uttara, they have deceived you!' was the sympathetic remark of the monks.33

* * * * *

The Jātaka Commentary is rich in humour and satire on social and individual vices and follies (Mātanga-jātaka, Mahā-ummagga-jātaka, etc.). A healthy sense of humour is abundantly evident both among monks and lay people in Pali folk literature such as Sahassa-vatthu, Sthala-vatthu and Rasavāhīnti. The discussion of material available in those sources has to be deferred.

The traditional sense of humour occurs not only in written records in Pali but also in the ordinary daily life of the people. There is in Sri Lanka a small circular cake known as koḍa-kāvum. It is made of rice flour, palm honey, and other ingredients, fried in coconut oil, and is served on all important occasions. The centre of this cake, called the buriya or 'navel', which is made to stand out like a lump, is supposed to be its sweetest part. As such, people usually eat it last. Once at an alms-giving at the royal palace during the Kandyan kingdom (18th century), a Buddhist monk called Kunkunāve, known for his dry humour, ate the buriya first. This was most unusual. The king, who was personally serving the monks, asked him why he had done this. The monk quietly answered in a serious tone: 'Life is impermanent!'34

LONDON

WALPOLA RAHULA

Notes

1 Ko nu hāso kim ānando, niccaṃ pajjalite sati?
Andhakārena onaddhā padipam na gevassatha?

2 Dhp a III 100 foll.
3 A I 261 (No. 103).
4 M II 366.
5 M II 121.
7 Vin I 2: Ud 3.
8 jātiko here does not mean 'of the class' or 'belonging to a group', but 'having the nature of', 'in the habit of', like mukhara-jātiko which means 'of talkative or garrulous nature'. See also F.L. Woodward, Verses of Uplift (Udāna), SBB VIII, London 1948, p. 3, n. 1, and I.B. Horner, BD IV (Mahāvagga), SBB XIV, London, 1964, p. 3, n. 3.
9 M I 497, Diṭṭhanakha-sutta (No. 74).
10 In the Pali text (S I 161) this bhārmaṇa is named Akkosa-Bhāradvāja 'Reviling Bhāradvāja'. The Commentary (Spk I 229) says that this sobriquet was bestowed on him by the Members of the Council (sāṅgiti-kārekehi).
11 S I 161 foll. The sutta goes on to report that after further discussion with the Buddha, Akkosa-Bhāradvāja was so pleased
Humour in Pali literature

that he himself became a disciple of the Compassionate One, entered the Order and became an arahant.

A IV 172 foll. Kasībhāradvāja-sutta (Sn p. 12) Vasala-sutta (Sn p. 21) relate similar stories.

M I 108.

Dāṇḍa-pāṇi, lit. meaning ‘Stick-in-hand’ or ‘Staff-in-hand’ is evidently a nickname, and not his real name. He was so referred to because he always carried a stick or a staff. The Commentary says it was a golden staff, suvaṇṇa-dāṇḍa (Ps II 73). Such nicknames were not uncommon in ancient India, and they indicate a healthy sense of humour among the people. Huhumka-jātika, Dīgha-nakha, (both already mentioned above), Kuṭa-danta ‘Pointed-tooth’ (D I 127), Dīgha-jānu ‘Long-knee’ (A IV 281), Ānūlī-mālā ‘Finger-garland’ (M II 97), Tambā-dāṭhika ‘Copper-coloured-beard’ (Dhp-a II 35; 203) are some examples.

See G.P. Malalasekera, DPPN, s.v. Dāṇḍapāṇi.

Ps II 73.

See D I 90.

Ps II 73 describes vividly how he planted his stick in front like a ‘cow-herd’ (gopāla-dāraka), put his palm on it pressing his jaw on the back of his palm.


Sampasādaniya-sutta, No. 28 of the Dīgha-nikāya.

Kevaṭṭa-sutta, No. 11 of the Dīgha-nikāya.

Yāvajīvan pi ce bālo paṇḍita paṇjapūsati, na so dhammaṃ vijhāti daddhī sūpāyaṃ yathā.

Muhuttam apī ce viṇṇa paṇḍita paṇjapūsati, khippam dhammaṃ vijhāti jīvha sūpāyaṃ yathā.

D III 81-2.

Sv III 862.

Harsh, insulting, offensive words are considered ‘weapons of the tongue’. Cf. Sn 657: Purissasā hi jātassa, kutthātī jāyate mukhe ‘Indeed an axe is born in the mouth of any person born’.

Ud 66-9.

Dhp-a I 39-43. Mātanga-jātaka (No. 497) also relates a similar episode.

Dhp-a II 138 foll.

Sp 1336-7.

Ariya means ‘Noble One’, but the term is used in opposition to puthujjana ‘worldling’. In this sense, the term ariya refers to any person—monk, nun, layman or laywoman—who has realized one of the eight stages of ‘holiness’. For details, see s.v. ariya, Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, Colombo, 1972. But in our story, ariya evidently signifies an arahant.

Ps I 22,1-8.

Mp II 347.

This story is orally transmitted.

A FURTHER NOTE ON PALI GOTRABHŪ

In an interesting article entitled ‘Gotrabhū: Die sprachliche Vergeschichte eines philosophischen Terminus’, published in 1978, O. von Hinüber has contributed to the discussion of the Pali term gotrabhū, which usually designates a person achieving the spiritual stage of an Ariya or Saint on the path.1 And comparing for the etymology the word vatrāhā ‘Vtramahā’ (i.e. Śakra = Indra) appearing in S I 47 and Ja V 153, he has suggested that the element bhū corresponds to han and that gotrabhū accordingly meant ‘das Geschlecht vernichtend’ (p. 331).2 The same interpretation has also been put forth by O.H. de A. Wijesekera in a short article, published in 1979, entitled ‘The etymology of Pali Gotrabhū’; there the term is translated as ‘killer (i.e. destroyer) of the gotra’ (p. 382). Both writers compare also bhūnahu = bhrūnahan ‘embryo-killer’.

The explanation proposed by these two scholars is attractive inasmuch as it could indeed account for the use in M III 256 of gotrabhū in an unfavourable context.4 As noted in my earlier article, this usage—which diverges from that found elsewhere in the canonical and commentarial Pali literature—is isolated; and it raises a difficulty so long as one supposes the element bhū to be related to the root bhū ‘to be’. Their suggestion appears moreover to find support in the explanation given by a Pali exegetical tradition which interprets bhū as equivalent to abhībhū ‘to conquer, overcome’.5

However, it is not altogether clear how this proposed explanation can account for the overwhelming majority of attestations of the term in the Pali scriptures and commentaries where the term is on the contrary used in a favourable meaning, and where a Pali exegetical tradition interprets bhū also as meaning bhāveti ‘cultivates’ (= nibbatteti ‘develops’).6 Following Wijesekera (op. cit., p. 382), it seems that we are to understand here that the spiritual aspirant by destroying the gotra transcends his worldly—and worldly (puthujjana)—status in order to accede to a higher spiritual status. Yet not only is this clearly not the meaning of gotrabhū in the M passage referred to above where the context is
unfavourable, but we cannot even be certain that such destruction is precisely what was intended in the case of the other attestations of the term in the canon. As far as I can see, v. Hinüber’s treatment of the matter does not clear up this difficulty either; and I know of no reason for supposing, as suggested by him (op. cit., p. 332), that the gotrabhū was mistakenly (aus einem Missverständnis) inserted between the puthuñjana and the Ariyan stage of the sotāpanna.7

Apart from this problem connected with the explanation ‘das Geschlecht vernichtend’ and ‘killer (i.e. destroyer) of the gotra’, it is curious to find beside the (apparently MIA) form bhū = han not the usual MIA form gott, but gotra which is phonetically irregular in terms of the Pali standard (though the cluster tra is of course attested in several other Pali words). In vatrabhū vatra no doubt provides a parallel (though it of course contains the MIA change r>a); and it may thus suffice to set aside any phonological difficulty. But the above-mentioned semantic difficulty in interpreting gotrabhū as gotrahan seems not yet to have been fully resolved. In any case, for the purpose of etymology in the strict sense, complete reliance cannot be placed on the Pali exegetical tradition’s nirukta-type explanation which interprets the element bhū as meaning abhibhavati, especially in view of the fact that this same tradition has also given the hermeneutical interpretation by bhāveti. (Nor does the proposed etymology explain the word gotrabhū found in Buddhist Sanskrit.)8

Though ingenious and attractive in the case of the M passage, v. Hinüber’s and Wijesekera’s proposal hardly accounts then for the majority of attestations of gotrabhū in the Pali canon and its commentaries. Could it be that we have here in Pali a trace of the other meaning of gotra found in Sanskrit, namely ‘matrix, vein-stone, gangue’,9 the Saint at the very outset of the Ariyan Path destroying this gangue and thereby freeing himself for progress on his Path? (This meaning of gotra would not, however, easily fit in the M passage. And although well-attested in Buddhist Sanskrit, it does not seem to have been so far recorded for Pali).

Notes
2 Another equivalence, gotrabhū = gotrabhṛt, has been rejected, no doubt correctly, by v. Hinüber, p. 331.
   The article by v. Hinüber refers back to the discussion by the present writer ‘Pāli gott/gotra and the term gotrabhū in Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit’ in: Buddhist studies in honour of J.B. Horner, Dordrecht, 1974, pp. 199-210. Wijesekera, who does not seem to know this article, passes over in silence an important part of the Pali tradition alluded to in it.
4 See D. Seyfort Ruegg, ‘Pāli gott/gotra...’, p. 200.
5 See ibid., pp. 205-6, 208 note 3.
6 See ibid. This fact has been left unmentioned by Wijesekera, who refers only to the explanation by abhibhavati.
7 On p. 329 of his article v. Hinüber appears to imply that gotrabhū if interpreted as ‘being in the gotra’ is hardly understandable as a designation for a monk on the first stage of the path; if this is in fact what he means, I can see no reason for this statement, which its author does not amplify.
8 ‘Pāli gott/gotra...’, pp. 206-7. Evidently v. Hinüber is prepared to accept that gotrabhū may be a Sanskritism in Pāli, following the suggestion made by the present writer in the article cited above, and also even that the Theravāda doctrine underwent influence from the Māhiyāna (ZDMG 128, 1978, pp. 329, 332).
The Khmer Empire, for which historians over the centuries searched, had cradled the most brilliant cultured and advanced civilization of South-East Asia, and stretched from the South China Sea to the Gulf of Siam, including modern Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand.

The Khmer capital of Angkor was founded by Jayavarman II in 802 A.D. and reached the zenith of its development between the tenth and twelfth centuries, the period during which the temples to the gods of the Hindu trinity: Brahma, Viṣṇu, Maheśvara, and later to the Buddha, were built. Cambodia had been subject to strong Indian religious and cultural influences from Fu-nan between the second and sixth centuries A.D. In 503 A.D. King Jayavarman of Fu-nan sent an embassy to China with valuable presents, including an image of the Buddha. An inscription by his son, Rudavarman, begins with an invocation to the Buddha and from this time onward the prevalence of Buddhism is proved by it, although a setback occurred in the seventh century when the epigraphic records indicate that Saivism, not Buddhism, was the predominant religion of the country. This is borne out by the fact that the very few kings of Cambodia of whom we possess any epigraphic records were followers of Buddhism. However, the Emperor Yasovarman, who ruled at the end of the ninth century, established a large monastery called Sugataśrama for the Buddhist monks and elaborate regulations were laid down for its smooth running. Suryavarman I, in the eleventh century, was a Buddhist, because he held the posthumous title Nirvāṇapāda, but his inscription on a temple in Prakhanā begins with an invocation to Śiva in the first verse and to the Buddha in the second.

Several inscriptions on the temple known as Prasat Ta Keo in honour of Yogiśvara Pañjita, the guru of King Suryavarman, begin by invoking Śiva and Viṣṇu and refer to offerings made to those gods. Jayavarman VII (1181-1201), perhaps the greatest king of Cambodia, was a Buddhist and the Ta Prohm inscription, dated 1186, gives a detailed list of his magnificent donations to this Vihāra. The merits of these wholesome deeds were transferred to the king’s mother so that she might benefit from the power of the blessings of the Buddha. In addition to the kings mentioned above, ministers like Kavindrārimathana and Kṛti-pañḍita both belonged to the tenth century and were ardent Buddhists. The latter claimed to have ‘lighted again the torch of the True Law... which the evils of the world had extinguished’. The form of Buddhism referred to is early Mahāyāna, but if we take the epigraphic data as a whole, it is clear that Buddhism never became a dominant religion until the time of Jayavarman VII. He was a devout Buddhist who received the posthumous title Mahāparamasugata and who held a record for the founding of religious institutions.

During the reign of King Śrīndravāmadeva, in an inscription dated 1308 and written in Pali, reference is made to the Theravāda form of Buddhism. The state of religion in Cambodia is described by Cheu Ta-kun who visited the country in 1296 and recorded that Theravāda Buddhism was in a flourishing state at this time. This position directly resulted from the influence of Siam that gradually transformed the Buddhism of Cambodia. Although the Mahāyāna continued as a powerful sect up to the end of the thirteenth century, the political dominance of the Siamese in Cambodia established the supremacy of the Theravāda which remained the only religion of the people until the Vietnamese-backed invasion in 1975.

Cambodian Theravāda Buddhism was sustained and influenced by Burma, Ceylon and Siam and became inseparable from Pali literature. Although Buddhism had first been introduced to Indo-China in the fifth century, literary works in both Sanskrit and Pali did not penetrate into Cambodia until the twelfth century. The Khmer brought books and copied from their former subjects, the Siamese, who had already adopted Pali as their religious language. In addition to these works, indigenous scholars began to compose original treatises or produce local recensions of traditional Pali books. A large collection of such works and some of their translations are now preserved in Paris and my intention is to elucidate some of them in this paper. Without precise details of their provenance, however, it is impossible to ascribe these works to wholly Khmer authors. A majority of them
may well have been composed in Siam, but we must await more ample information to enable any doubts regarding origins to be resolved.

I. Biography

The *Pathamasambodhi* describes the life of the Buddha in considerable detail from the time of hermit Sumedha when he received the first 'prediction' (*vyākaraṇa*) from the Buddha Dīpāṅkara until his last birth as Prince Siddhattha when he attained to enlightenment (*sambodhi*), carried on his preaching ministry for 45 years and entered *parinibbāna* at the age of 80. The work has been divided into fourteen chapters beginning with the *Tusitavagga* which describes how the Bodhisatta was invited to take birth in the human world when he was in the Tusita ('contented') heaven, and ends with the *Parinibbānakathā*, which describes how the Exalted One attained to *parinibbāna*. It has further explained how the Elder Upagupta obtained release from the spell of Māra.

The style is weak and the materials have been borrowed from the *Nidānakathā* of the *Jātakatthakathā*, *Buddhavamsa* and *Mahāparinibbānasutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya*. The authorship has been ascribed to a therī named Suvaṁparī, although the text was substantially revised by the seventh Saṅgharāja of Siṃh, Phra Paramanuchit Chinoros (d. 1853). An alternative title is *Pāṭhamābhisaṁbobdhiviṭṭhānakathā*.

The *Vivāhaṅgala*, also called *Maṅgalavīha* or *Vivācamangala*, though a work in itself, appears as the first chapter of the *Pathamasambodhi*. It opens with the life of the Buddha with special reference to the wedding of Prince Siddhattha and Princess Yasodharā. Then follows a copious description of the First Council (*saṅgīyanā*) which was held at Rāja-gaha immediately after the Buddha’s demise, for the settlement of Dhamma and Vinaya. The last section deals with an apocryphal story of two kings, Janādihipati and Shatanu by name, who accompanied their queens on a pleasure-trip to the great kingdom of Devasaṅkara. The author’s name has been given at the end as Mahāsena.

The *Sampiṅḍita-Mahānīdāna*, which is known in Sri Lanka as *Mahāsampiṅḍitanīdāna*, deals with the inception in the remote past (*dīrenidāna*), the inception in the near past (*avidūrenidāna*), and the inception in the present (*santikenidāna*) of the life of the Buddha. This work is based on the *Nidānakathā* of the *Jātakatthakathā*. The biography continues until the *Mahāparinibbāna*, followed by an account of the distribution of the Buddha’s relics. The author then describes how the Arahant Mahākassapa passed away at the age of 120 and how his body will remain lying in the Kukkuṭasampāta mountain until its cremation at the time of the future Buddha Metteyya. This story is not extant anywhere else in *Theravāda* literature.9

The *Bimbāḥilīya (Sutta)* (or *Bimbāḥihilābhaṅgana*) relates the story of Bimbādevī,10 the consort of Prince Siddhattha. It says that the Buddha paid a first visit to Kapilavatthu, mainly for the purpose of discoursing with Bimbādevī on the dangers of harbouring selfish desire (*lobha*), hate (*dosa*) and delusion (*moha*). It further tells how Prince Siddhattha was so loving to Princess Bimbādevī that he renounced his palace in order to search for the truth, which was regarded as the true gift for her. Having found it, he presented it to her (in the form of this ‘sutta’) through which she finally experienced supramundane happiness.

The *Amatarasadhāra*11 (‘bearing the stream of nectar’, i.e. Nībbāna) is a *ṭikā* on the therī Kassapa’s *Anāgatavamsa*,12 a poem of about 150 stanzas giving an account of the future Buddha Metteyya.13 The *Gandhavamsa*14 mentions an Upatissa, a monk from Ceylon, as the author of the *Anāgatavamsaṭṭhakathā*; Malalasekera has identified this Upatissa with the author of the *Bodhivamsa*15 until more evidence is forthcoming.16 The colophon of the *Amatara-sadhāra*, the commentary on the *Anāgata-Buddhavamsa* written by Upatissa, is ended’.17 This statement leads us to the conclusion that the author of this work is definitely the author of the *Bodhivamsa*, which has been assigned to the tenth century.18 Possibly what we have here is a different version of the same *Anāgatavamsaṭṭhakathā* prepared in Cambodia under the title of *Amatara-sadhāra* based on Upatissa’s commentary.

The *Mahāratanabimbavamsa* (Epoch of the Great Jewel Image) begins with a short biography of the therī Nāgasena who was born 500 years after the Buddha’s *Mahāparinibbāna*.19 It is
disclosed in this history that a Cambodian emerald (marakata) Buddha image (at present in Thailand) was made by Nāgasena, a celebrated Buddhist teacher whose famous discussion with the Greek king Menandros (Milinda) is recorded in the Milindapañha. This chronicle states that the image was first brought to Ayuthia, thence to the city of Pakar, from there to the city of Jirāya or Janrāya, and then eventually taken to the city of Puriya or Puñjaya. The work ends with Nāgasena’s prediction regarding the marakata Buddha image.

II. Works on Vinaya

The Ādi-kamma (‘Original Offences’), the provenance and authorship of which are unknown, is concerned with the gravest offences (garikāpatti) of the pārājika beginning with the story of the monk Sudinna. Duly ordained, Sudinna returned to his former wife and, in order to fulfil her eagerness to procure a child for their inheritance, at her request he had intimate relations with her. In due course a son was born who was called Bījaka. Thus Sudinna committed this pārājika offence for the first time in the Saṅgha. Sudinna, however, was not considered to be guilty of the offence because he was an ādi-kammika. The topic of one of the dilemmas in the Milindapañha is the Buddha’s censure of Sudinna. The Ādi-kamma deals extensively with this first and foremost Vinaya rule and also with other stories related to the subject.

The Catupārisuddhastā is a short work which gives an exposition of the four purificatory virtues: i. those of the Patimokkhā restraint (Pātimokkhastā); ii. restraint of sense faculties (indriyasamvarastā); iii. purification of livelihood (ājīvapārisuddhastā); and iv. those concerning the requisites (paccayasannissastā). The author has taken his materials mainly from the Suttaṇḍesa of the Visuddhimagga.

The Mahāvīpaṭṭa begins with an explanation of the four purificatory virtues (catupārisuddhastā) one by one, and ends with an interpretation of the monastic rules (āpattis) illustrated in the Pātimokkhā. The title of the book was so called because banishment from the monastery by its supporters would be another grave consequence of transgressing the rules.

The Ovādānuśasanā deals with basic advice and admonitions for newly-ordained novices (sāmaneras) and bhikkhus as a memoria technica of the Vinaya. It vividly explains how to use the necessary requisites (paccaya), such as robes, begging bowl, etc., and how to perform the Kaṭhina ceremony. In the colophon it is said that this was written at the request of Phra Vanarat, the Saṅghārāja of Siam (fl. 1720). Although the author is not known he must have been a member of the Order well-versed in the Vinaya-piṭaka.

The Suddhantaparivāsa is a concise manual composed by a monk presumably well-versed in the Vinaya-piṭaka for the benefit of the monk who remembered neither the number of days he had concealed the saṅghādīsesa nor the number of saṅghādisesas he had committed, but wished to ‘clean’ (suṭṭha) himself by undergoing the parivāsa and mānatta penances. The text formulates the ecclesiastical ‘acts’ necessary for the ‘expiation’ of the monk, and ends with the following aspiration: ‘In case I have, today, wronged in aught through eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, speech or mind, I will never do it again. May all offences be vanquished’.

The Saṅsanayuppakaraṇa deals with the disciplinary code (Vinaya) of monks and the duration of the Buddha’s dispensation (sāsana). It consists of two parts, the first written in Pali at the beginning, and the second having the same text with a literal paraphrase in Burmese. It also contains an explanation of the system of dividing the Saṅgha’s property: when the Saṅgha receives a field, estate, bequest or garden, it should be divided into three portions, one for the Saṅgha, one for the head of the Saṅgha and one for the cetiya.

The Saṅgtrikathā throws light on the first Council (Saṅgīyanī) held near the Sattapāṇi Cave in Rājagaha immediately after the parinibbāna of the Buddha. It met under the presidency of Mahākassapa and with the full patronage of King Ajātasattu. A detailed description is given in the book as to how five hundred monks, competent in the Dhamma and Vinaya, were selected for the Council. The work ends with the following verse: ‘So long as Vinaya remains, the Sāsana will last’. 
III. Doctrinal works

The *Bojjhangaśatābhāvāna*, which deals with the seven factors of enlightenment, is based on the *Mahākassapabojjhangacakka Sutta*. It is greatly influenced by the commentary on the *Śārathasamucayā* which in turn is a commentary on the *Cattabhānavāra*. After elucidating the seven factors the *Cullahattihipadopama Sutta* is quoted. The text ends with a narrative describing how Emperor Asoka listened to the Buddha’s teaching as discoursed by sāmaṇera Nigrodha and how, as a consequence, he became a Buddhist.

The *Caturārakkha* is a short Pali poem of twenty-nine stanzas describing those meditational exercises which are known as the four protections, as the title precisely denotes: i. the recollection of the Buddha (*Buddhānussati*); ii. loving-kindness (*mettā*); iii. the impurities of the body (*asubba*); iv. mindfulness of death (*maraññussati*). Although these stanzas, along with some other *suttas*, are recited daily by monks in Sri Lanka, neither the author of the poem nor its date is known. In Cambodia and Thailand, however, and though unsubstantiated, it has been attributed to Buddhaghosācariya, the celebrated commentator on the Pali Canon, who lived in the fifth century A.D. Undoubtedly, the author was a member of the Order—probably a Sinhalese monk well-versed in the *Piṭakas*. The stanzas show a great depth of religious and metaphysical learning. They also constitute an earnest exhortation to monks, encouraging them to lead a pious and contemplative life. Their setting is exquisite and the style of the poem is clear. I give below the first couple of verses which exemplify the style and subject-matter of the poem:

*Buddhānussati mettā ca asubbaṃ maraññassati,*

*iti imā caturārakkha bhikkhu bhāveyya sīlavā.*

*Anantavitthāragnunāṃ gunato 'nuttaran muniṃ bhāveyya buddhimā bhikkhu Buddhānussatim ādito.*

The *Caturārakkha-aṭṭhakathā* is a short commentary on the *Caturārakkha*, possibly originating in Cambodia. In commencing this commentary with four verses the author pays homage to the Buddha and states that he will explain the four protections (*caturārakkha*) in brief which should be listened to attentively by good people. At the conclusion of their explanation, the author aspires thus: ‘By the diligent practice of these four protections one may renounce the world and embark on fulfilling the perfections (*pāramitā*). An exposition of the ten perfections immediately follows. The style and language are not at all elegant and the authorship of the work has been attributed to a member of the Order, Phra Nāṇāmangala by name.

In the *Dasapuṇṇakiriyavattu* the author, so far unidentified, presents the tenfold group of meritorious deeds (*dasakusala-kamma*). This group is explained under ten headings as follows: i. charity (*dāna*); ii. morality (*śīla*); iii. mental culture (*bhāvanā*); iv. reverence (*apacāya*); v. service (*veyyāvaca*); vi. transference of merit (*pattidāna*); vii. rejoicing in others’ merits (*anumodanā*); viii. listening to the doctrine (*dhammasavana*); ix. teaching the doctrine (*dhammaṃdaṇā*); x. straightening one’s views (*dīṭṭhi-jukkama*).

The *Dasavatthu* is a long metrical work divided into ten sections dealing with the good results (*anisamsa*) of generously giving the following ten things: i. food (*anāna*); ii. drink (*pāṇa*); iii. clothes (*vattīha*); iv. seats and vehicles (*yāna*); v. garlands and flowers (*mālā*); vi. unguents (*vilepana*); vii. perfumed smoke (*dhūpagaṇḍa*); viii. beds (*sayaṇa*); ix. residences (*āvāsa*); x. lights (*padīpa*). The unknown author opens the work by saluting the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha with three elegant verses, of which the first runs as follows: ‘I salute the Buddha of infinite knowledge who is supreme in the world and who attained complete enlightenment, defeating Mara with his great army.’ This text sheds considerable light on the merits of practising generosity based on the *Nikāyas* and the good results of liberal giving (*dāna*) illustrated with a number of stories from the commentaries.

The *Anisamsa* is a short work which illustrates the efficacy of chanting *paritta*, especially the *Maṅgala Sutta*, and describes Mahāmoggallāna’s visits to the Aṭṭicī hell and the Devalokas by means of his miraculous powers, the results of chanting, preaching and practising the Dhamma, the results of wholesome and unwholesome deeds. It ends with an interpretation of the eight miseries of life (*aṭṭha saṃvejantīyatvathā*).

The *Indasāva* is a kind of short *dhāraṇī* which consists of a number of syllables beginning with *Indasāva*. It concludes with an explanation of the ten perfections (*dasapāramitā*).
The Kāyanagara, sometimes called Kāyanagara Sutta, is a treatise dealing with some teachings of the Buddha. To begin with, the author compares the body to a city, hence the title Kāyanagara (City of the Body). The threefold training (rīvadhasikkhā): higher virtue (adhisīla), higher consciousness (adhisīla), higher understanding (adhipānā) are also set forth together with mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasati), the movement of wind in the body, such as pain in the limbs, pain in the stomach, pain in the back, etc. After explaining the defilements (kilesas), the author next shows how to overcome them by practising charity (ādana), morality (stīla) and meditation (bhāvanā). The defilements are compared to formidable warriors and the nineteen ‘beautiful-common’ (sobhanaśādhāraṇa) mental states to wise men. The text concludes with an explanation of mind (citta) according to the Abhidhamma.

The Mahābuddhagūna is a short work in praise of nine great virtues of the Buddha. The second part is devoted to an exposition of the ten perfections (dassapāramitā).

The first part of the text entitled Mahākappālakosaṇṭhānapaṇḍati explains that the Exalted One expounded the impermanence (anicca) of conditioned things in the world while he was dwelling in a pavilion in the Mango Grove near the city of Vesāli. The second part deals with the threefold division of the sphere of the Buddha (Buddhakkhettra).

The Maṅgala-atṭhatthasārā-atṭhakathā is a short commentary on the Lakkhana Sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya which deals with the thirty-two marks on the body of the superman which were possessed by the Buddha. Following this the author gives an exposition of the seven noble treasures (sattāriyadhana). The third section of the book deals with the seven factors of enlightenment (sattabhojñā). In the colophon the author calls himself a king, Buddhāpādamaṅgalamahādeva by name, who wrote it with the aspiration to become a Buddha (Idam Buddhāpādamāṅgalamahādevarājena likhitam Buddhābhāvanam patthentena). At the end, the name of the scribe of the present manuscript is given as Mahāsuvanḍa.

The Pañcagatidīpanī, also known as Pāḷipañcagati, is a description, with relevant quotations from the Tipiṭaka, of the five destinies (pañcagati) of sentient beings after death: i. purgatory (niraya); ii. animal kingdom (ťiracchānyoni); iii. ghost-realm (pettivisaya); iv. human world (manussaloka); v. heavenly world (devaloka). It consists of five khanda (chapters), such as nirayakhaṇḍa, etc. Neither the date of composition nor the author’s name is given.

The Pañcagatidīpaniyatṭhakathā, also known as the Pañcagatiṭā, is a commentary on the Pañcagatidīpanī which gives a vivid account of the five destinies. The work ends with an explanation of wholesome (kusala) and unwholesome (akusala) deeds.

The Tiṇṇakavatthu, also called Tiṇṇapālakavatthu, deals with the ‘privileges’ (ānisaṃsa) bestowed on the giver of kaṭhina, which is a special robe (cīvara) offered to a monk in an ecclesiastical ceremony held at the end of the rainy retreat (vassa). This offering is regarded as a supremely meritorious deed (puṇnakamma). The ‘privileges’ are illustrated with the story of a devotee named Tiṇṇaka who was a weaver at the time of the Buddha Kassapa and who was fortunate enough to be able to offer a kaṭhina-cīvara to the Buddha whenever he wished. Hence the work is called Tiṇṇakavatthu, and ends thus: Kaṭhinānisaṃsakathā niṭṭhitā.

The Trailokavinisīcaya is now extant in Khmer as well as Thai. However it is conjectured by some scholars that it is a translation of an original work entitled Tilokavinicchaya which was composed in Pali by pandits called Phraya, Prijā and others in 1790 at the command of Rama I of Siam. It opens with a description of the Buddha’s virtues, teaching and the Order of monks. Then follows a cosmic interpretation of the three worlds: the world of form (rūpaloka) or earth (bhūmiloka), the world of beings (sattaloka) and the world of space (ākāśaloka). The author then describes the havoc in the world (lokavināsa) resulting from the gradual appearance of seven subsequent suns at the end of the aeon (kappa). This section is presumably based on the Sattasuriya Sutta. At the end of the work, the results (vipāka) of good and bad kammas are given.

The Yasasassatha opens with a dhāranī including syllables such as paṭhaman dānapāramī, dutiyan stāpāramī and so on, referring to the ten perfections. This text concludes with an explanation of the Three Refuges (tisārana).

The Cullaṭṭkā-Visuddhimagga is an explanatory annotation of
difficult words and passages in Buddhaghosa’s encyclopaedic work, Visuddhimagga. In Thailand, this ṭīkā is called Sāṅkhepatthajotant-Visuddhimagga-Cūlaṭīkā, and the title of this work is Sāṅkhepatthajotant according to the following verse, which comes at the beginning of the colophon:

Yāyaṃ Visuddhimaggassa āradhā athavāyaṁnā ettāvatā gata niṭṭham sā Sāṅkhepatthajotant.

The text ends with a line which also refers to the title, as follows: Iti Sāṅkhepatthajotant Visuddhimaggaṭīkā samatta. Here the unknown author says: ‘Just as I have accomplished this work at the request made by fellow-monks, may all beings fulfil aspirations in their minds’.

The SamāsārāpadīpanT, also known as Yojanāsamāsa, is a grammar dealing with nominal compounds (samāsa).

IV. Jātaka literature

The Jātaka stories from the Khuddaka-nikāya of the Pali Canon were very popular in Cambodia after the establishment of the Theravāda Sāsana. Some of them were presented in dramatic form, thereby impressing upon the people the importance of a moral life and the exemplary career of the Bodhisatta in his previous births, while offering entertainment by means of music and dancing. Examples of such jātakas included the Bhūridatta (543), Mahosadha (or Mahā-Ummagga, 546) and Vessantara (547). Some monks even wrote commentaries in order to elucidate the original stories, one example having been preserved in the form of the Mahāvessantara-āṭṭhakathā.53

A collection of fifty apocryphal jātakas called Paṇṇāsajātaka,54 composed in Pali in northern Siam (15th and 16th centuries), was published with a Cambodian translation (Phnom Penh 1953). The original text of the first twenty-five stories was subsequently printed by the Siam Society (5 vols., 1952–62), which also produced parallel booklets containing the Cambodian translation.55 Apart from these, a number of popular jātakas were also composed in Siam, Laos or Cambodia, e.g. Sīla- (or Sīlavimamsaka- or Sīlavanāga-), Sudhakamama- and Vijādhara- (or Vijādharmama-) jātakas.

The Dhanañjayajātaka describes the former life of the Bodhisatta when he was a king called Dhanañjaya, a tale which also occurs in the Vidhurapāṇḍitajātaka.56 On the basis of this prose work, a Pali poem in ten chapters (khaṇḍas) has been composed entitled the Gāthālokaneya. It begins with the chapter called ‘Entering the city’ (nagarapavesakhaṇḍa) and ends with a chapter on the ‘twelve questions’ (dvādasapāṇḍhakhaṇḍa). The last chapter contains a copious description of the norm of kingship, usually given as a set of ten undertakings (dasa-rajadhama): i. generosity (dana); ii. morality (sīla); iii. liberality (paricāga); iv. straightforwardness (ajjava); v. gentleness (maddava); vi. self-restraint (tapa); vii. non-anger (akkodha); viii. non-violence (avihimsa); ix. patience (khanti); and x. non-aggression (avirodhītā).57

The Mahāvessantara-āṭṭhakathā (or Mahāvessantara-Jātaka-āṭṭhakathā) is a commentary on the Vessantara-jātaka,58 the final and most popular jātaka in the canonical collection. Dated 1351, the commentary follows the original thirteen sections, beginning with the Dasavaraṇadhā, and was used when preaching sermons. Chapters 10 and 11, Sakkapabbaṃ and Mahārājapabbaṃ, were often employed as separate texts.

The Sivijayajātaka is a biography of a king (Sivijaya by name), divided into fifteen chapters (khaṇḍas), which comprise a certain number of questions dealing with the ‘perfection of charity’ (dānapāramitā). The first chapter tells of the search for a wife (dārapariyesana) and shows Sivijaya’s exemplary life. This work was written either at the latter end of the seventeenth century or the beginning of the eighteenth. It seems that in the eighteenth century an abridged version was written as a drama by some foreign missionaries.59 At the close of the work there is mention of the devadhama,60 whilst it ends with the following words: Sivijayanatikam niṭṭhitām.

The Mahājambupatisaṅgā, also called Jambupati Sutta in Thailand,61 is an apocryphal story about a king named Jambupati. Its gist is as follows: Once the Exalted One was dwelling in the Bamboos Grove near Rājagaha. Then there was a king called Jambupati. At the time of his birth a golden pillar eighteen hands in height arose. On the day when he was taken out of the chamber where he was born pots of treasures arose from the earth. One day he went with his royal retinue to the Buddha and,
by listening to his discourse, all of them attained to the four paths and fruitions, and the members of his army who were guarding the palace learnt of the five powers (pañcabala) and followed them.

A manuscript of the Milinda-ṭīkā, also known as the Madhurathapakāsīnī, was acquired by the Danish scholar, Poul Tuxen, during his visit to Thailand in 1922-4 and subsequently deposited in the Royal Library, Copenhagen. Of the 188 leaves in Khmer script, only 46 actually comment upon the post-canonical text, Milinda-pañha. The remaining leaves concentrate on the jātakas and have no special value. That section referring directly to the Mil, however, resolves a number of problems concerning canonical sources utilized by the unknown compiler of the latter and, significantly, is the only Pali work to enumerate the 80 minor marks of the Buddha apart from the Jīnālākāra-ṭīkā. The author is mentioned as being Mahātipitaka Cūḷabhāyatthera. The place and date of composition are difficult to determine but, from internal evidence, it might just possibly have been written in Ceylon in either 1250 or 1328. In view of a specific location being mentioned, i.e. Bingaraṭṭha, identified with Chiengmai, it is more likely to have been composed there, in 1474, under the influence of the Śthalasāsana. What does remain in doubt is whether the author was Cambodian or Siamese since the latter would have used Khmer script at the time.

V. Devotional texts

Apart from the traditional collection, there is a different kind of ‘book of protection’ (paritta) intended to be recited for the purpose of obtaining protection from all misfortunes and dangers. It contains a collection of apocryphal suttas such as Mahākūmaṇa-phala-paritta, Mahācakkavāḷapaṇa, Soḷasamaṇa-gala-paritta and so on, composed by teachers of old in Cambodia and neighbouring countries. The work comes to an end with a dhāranī invoking the names of certain deities.


Possibly connected with the foregoing is the Bāhumśahassa, the first word of the first stanza among eight collectively entitled Buddhajaya-ramagala. This describes the Bodhisatta sitting on the jewelled seat (ratanapallaṅka) under the Bodhi tree where he defeated Māra.

The palm-leaf manuscript of the Mahādībbamanta was located by P.S. Jaiṇī in the National Museum, Bangkok in 1961, and it is worth recalling that this text is no longer used in either Cambodia or Thailand. Consisting of 108 verses on 48 folios, all in Khmer script, it is undated with no mention of author or scribe. Its title is indicated only once in the colophon whilst dībbamanta occurs in the text on only a single occasion. The language is corrupt with the addition of unusual spellings, Sanskrit and hybrid words. The metre is anusṭubh with a single verse in upajāti. The verses are divided into the following themes: 1-4. salutations to the Triple Gem; 5-9. proclaiming victory to arahants, pacceka-buddhas and (named) gods including the Four Guardians of the Quarters; 10-13. glorification of the Buddha’s 108 auspicious marks; 14-17. glorification of the ten perfections and the Buddha’s victory under the Bodhi tree; 18-20. description of a manḍala consisting of the Buddha and eight chief disciples; 21-26. the same but comprising ten Buddhas; 27-33. the Candapaṁrittta; 34-37. the Sūriya-paṁritta; 38-39. a mantra made up of the words hulu hulu hulu svāḥ; 40-52. enumeration of the nine ghṛhas (planets), twelve Indian māsas (months), twelve animals indicating the Chinese twelve-year cycle (naśkaras), twenty-seven constellations (naśkaras) and the twelve signs of the zodiac (nāsīs)—the only complete list to appear in a Pali text; 53-55. invocation to eight devas occupying the eight points of the universe; 56-62. a prayer for the rain of wealth that benefited Jotika, Meṇḍaka, Dhanañjaya, Uggata, Jāṭila, Cittaka and Māndhātu (who were renowned for their wealth and merit); 63-77. miscellanea; 78-89. invocation to certain gods (including Hara, Harihara and Rāma); 90-98. description of the efficacy of the dībbamanta resulting from its recitation, particularly when marching into battle or in counteracting the enemy’s magical devices; 99-108. concluding valedictory verses.
The Cambodian origin of this text can be inferred from such facts as the popularity of the cult of Hariharā in Cambodia prior to the introduction of Buddhism; the similar popularity of Dharani (Earth goddess), current only in Cambodia and Siam, in the former of which she was known as Phra Thorni and was often depicted on Buddhist sculpture—this is the only Pali text to refer not only to her but also to Venateyya (Garuḍa) whose cult was particularly important in imperial Angkor; the reference to the Chinese twelve-year cycle, the earliest evidence of which practice is found in a Khmer inscription by Sūryavarman I (1039) and which was subsequently adopted by the Siamese (where the earliest evidence is found in an inscription of 1183, again in Khmer). The text may be ascribed to the late mediaeval period in view of the incorporation of six verses (17, 21–23 and 107–8) discovered in a collection of non-canonical parīṭṭa texts popular in Burma and Ceylon.

As intimated in the Introduction, further research needs to be undertaken before we can have a complete picture of the indigenous Buddhist literature of Indo-China. In this connection it is worth recalling the meagre researches that have been made by French nationals, virtually the only scholars to have taken any interest in classical Khmer studies. The ‘Résident Supérieur’ in Cambodia, Adhémard Leclère (1853–1917) collected indigenous lives of the Buddha and of Devadatta (Prās Pathama Sāmpoththian and Le Sūtra de Ṭevaṭṭa) and local recensions of the Mahā-Jinaka (Prās Moha-Chīṇok), Nivarāṇa (Nīma-Rēac- Chēadak) and Dimī (Prās Dimī Chēadak) jātakas and translated these under the title Les Livres sacrés du Cambodge.

The late François Martini was Lecturer in Cambodian at l’École des langues orientales vivantes in Paris. Specialising in non-canonical or apocryphal Buddhist literature, he translated the Dasabodhisatva-uddeṣa and Anāgata-buddhavāṃsa. Until her retirement his wife, Ginette Terral-Martini, taught Pali at l’École pratique des hautes études (the Sorbonne) and continued in his footsteps by translating the Velāmājātaka, Pañcabuddhabvyākaraṇa and Pamsukulādnāmīsānākārāṇ. L’École française d’Extrême-Orient in Hanoi (now situated in Paris) encouraged general research into the field of Indo-Chinese studies. Its Bulletin (BEFEO) continues to reflect this interest although Buddhist, especially the local Pali, texts have rarely attracted the attention of scholars.

There is, therefore, an urgent need to conduct such an investigation. Indo-China is virtually forbidden territory to outside scholars, whilst little interest has been evinced in Thailand. However, the facilities exist in Paris and other western European university libraries (and possibly in private collections) and I earnestly hope that the present paper, will encourage the pursuit of independent research into this fascinating, but hitherto unknown, sphere.

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Notes

1 R.C. Majumdar, Inscriptions of Kambuja, Calcutta, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1953, p. 360.
2 Ibid., pp. 351 foll.
3 Ibid., pp. 459 foll.
4 Ibid., p. 479.
5 439 erudite pāndits were appointed and 970 scholars studied under them. The food and other necessities of life were supplied for educational and similar institutions. Ibid., pp. 460 foll.
6 Ibid., p. 533.
7 E.g., in the Bibliothèque Nationale and the library of the École française d’Extrême-Orient, Paris, where I consulted the following catalogues: A. Cabaton, Catalogue sommaire des manuscrits sanscrits et pāli, II, 1908; Au Chiang, Catalogue du fonds khmer, 1953.
8 Ven. Dr. H. Nāgāvāsa of Sri Lanka is in the course of editing this text for the PTS.
10 Bimbādvī: Ja II 392 foll; Sv 422. She was also called by descriptive epithets which were regarded as her names: Rāhulamātī (Vin I 82); Bhadakkacānā (Bv XXVI 15; Mhvs II 24); Yasodhārā (Bv-a 245, Divy 253); Bimbāsundarī (Ja VI 478), etc. See DPPN.
11 In Thailand this is called Amatadārāñjata-buddhavamsa-vaṇṇā. An alternative title is Amatarañjata-Buddhavamsa-varṇa.
12 Kassapa was a poet who lived in the Cola country according to the Sāsanaṃsaṇḍita (V 204). The Mohavicechedanī, Vimatechedanī
and Buddhavamsa (which is different from the canonical work with the same name) have been ascribed to him. According to the Burmese tradition, he was a native of Ceylon. See JPTS, 1910, p. 126, and Bode, Pali Literature of Burma, London, RAS, 1910, repr. 1966, p. 76, n. 2.

13 For details of the Metteyya cult, see DBK, 27-44.

14 Gv 67; 72.


16 Ibid., p. 160.

17 Iti Upatissathera cettā Amataraśadhārānāgata-Buddhavamsattha-kathā niṭṭhitā.

18 Pali Literature of Ceylon, p. 143.

19 It is said in the Mil, but not anywhere else in Pali literature, that the Buddha on his death-bed prophesied that the discussion between Milinda and Nāgasena would take place about 500 years after his parinibbāna, Mil 3.


21 Over 40 years ago (c. 1930) the Adikamma was translated into Khmer and published by the Khmer Tipitaka Translation Committee. See Khmer Vinayapitaka, vols I and II. In Thailand this is called Adikammapāli.

22 This offence causes whoever commits it to fall from the state of bhikkhu by making him defeated, the penalty being expulsion from the Saṅgha. For details see BD, I, pp. XXV foll.

23 Vin III 11-21; See Sp 270. Āṭikammika: the original doer of the offence of ‘defeat’ (parajīkāpatti), who was instrumental in causing the Buddha to enjoin this rule. As such he was not guilty of the parajīkā of the act of intercourse (methunadhamma).

24 Mil 170 foll.

25 Rules of the Community of monks. The Suttavibhaṅga contains 227 rules for bhikkhus and a further 84 rules for bhikkhunīs. They are known as the 'Two Codes' (dve mātikā) or the Pātimokkha. The Pātimokkha is recited by bhikkhus on Uposatha days of the full- and new-moon.

26 Vism 1-58.

27 Tr. into Cambodian by Praj Dhammalikkhita Mung-Ses. In Thailand this work has been incorporated into the Vuttaṭhānavidhi as a separate section.

28 The second grade ‘offence’ in order of gravity. There are altogether thirteen saṅghādisesas. The infliction of penalties such as parivīsa and māṇatta and revocation (abhīhāra) requires the Saṅgha both in the beginning (ādī) and the end (sasa) to administer the stages of penalty and ultimately rehabilitation. Hence it is called saṅghādisesa.

29 In the case where a monk conceals the offence of saṅghādisesa for some time, he is required to undergo a parivīsa for the period he has concealed it in addition to the six nights of māṇatta for his 'expiation'.

30 For the ‘expiation’, the monk who commits an offence of saṅghādisesa should inform the Saṅgha and undergo a penance which debarrs him from enjoying the usual privileges as a monk for a period of six nights. This penance is called māṇatta.

31 This kind of verbatim translation is called sanne in Sinhalese and nissaya in Burmese.

32 The cetiya is an hemispherical dome of solid masonry which is also called stūpa, pagoda or dāgaba.

33 S V 79 foll. This is called Mahākassapatherojñāha in the Cudināñavaśī which is known in Sri Lanka as Parittapothaka or Piruvānapota, ed. Kotmale Dhammānanda, Colombo, 1930, pp. 30 foll.

34 ed. Doranāgoḍa Nāgasena, Colombo, 1929.

35 MI 27; 175.

36 For details see Mhv V 37-72; DP v 34 foll.; VII 12, 31; Sp 45 foll.

37 This is given in the anthology called Kāmekvāsa sāha Bāṣadhamapota ed. by Maṅgalle Sidhattha, Kandy, 1921, reprinted Colombo, M.D. Gunasena, 1959, pp. 27-9.

38 In Sinhalese these are called Satārakamattāna, i.e. four meditation subjects (kammaṭṭhāna). For a detailed study see Vism, Ch. VII, Buddhānuussati; Ch. IX, Metti; Ch. VI, Asubba; Ch. VIII, Maranānuussati.


40 Briefly mentioned in the Gv, another Burmese text, the Phakāṭhamain, states that this work was composed in Ceylon by the 15th century. See Le Depatthunupakaraṇa, ed. and tr. J. Ver Eckee, Paris, Publ. de l'EFE, vol. CVIII, 1976.

41 Notwithstanding the foregoing, this text is still claimed to be of Khmer or Siamese origin in certain quarters.

42 Yo sanninno varabhodhimūle/Mārassa senaṃ mahatim viṣaya// Sambodhīm āgaṇi anānantāna/Kollattum tan paṇamāṇi Buddhām.

43 According to J. Ver Eckee, op. cit., this is a type of popular Buddhist literature peculiar to Sri Lanka and S.E. Asia. For detailed examples of 'advantages' accruing to meritorious deeds, see entry in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Fasc. 4, Colombo, Govt. of Ceylon, 1965, pp. 676-8, where details of the Anāṇasama Sutta and (two) vaggas from the Aṅguttara-nikāyā are also given. Of unknown authorship is the Suttajātakaniḍanāṇasamā, an anthology of such literature.

44 Sava means a letter, syllable or historic document in Cambodian.

45 A mnemonic composed of the salient syllables of a recited sutta enabling the devotee to remember its essence (from dharati,
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46 M I 37; A III 285. For details see Visrn, Ch. VII.
47 Threefold division: i. the sphere extending to 10,000 world-systems (cakkavāla) which quakes at the moments of conception, birth, enlightenment, first sermon and parinibbāna of the Buddha is called the realm of origin (jātikhettha); ii. the region extending to a billion world-spheres where the power of the Buddha and his discourses, specially paritta-suttas, prevails is called the realm of influence (ānākhettha); and iii. the Buddha’s mass of sublime teaching which pervades his omniscience (sabbaññuteñāna) is called the realm of object (visayakkhettha).
48 i. Confidence (saddhā); ii. morality (śīla); iii. shame (hīri); iv. fear (ottappa); v. learning (suta); vi. charity (cāga); vii. wisdom (pañña). See A IV 4 foll: 6 foll.
49 i. Mindfulness (sati); ii. investigation of phenomena (dhammavicaya); iii. energy (viriya); iv. joy (pīri); v. calm (passaddhi); vi. concentration (samādhi); vii. equanimity (upekkhā). See A IV 148; S V 71 foll.: 86.
50 Ed. I. Feer, JPTS, 1884, p. 152 foll.
51 See M I 73; D III 234; A IV 459; Nidd II 550; cf. S V 474–7; Vism 552.
52 This suttta is also called Sattasuriyagamana Sutta (A IV 100 foll.).
53 A. Cabaton, op. cit.
56 Ja No. 545.
57 Cf. Ja I 260; 399; II 400; III 320; V 119; 378; A I 159; II 33; III 108; Vin III 89 passim. Another set of three mentioned at Ja V 112.
58 Ja VI 479–593 (No. 547).
59 According to another source, however, the Cambodian version, Lōokek Sirivijaya, is attributed to a writer named Srī (1858).
60 Shame (hīri) and fear (ottappa) are the divine nature. See Devadhama Jātaka, Ja I 126 foll. (No. 6): C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Stories of the Buddha, London, Chapman & Hall, 1929, p. 8: ‘Those who are modest and discreet/ On things that are pure intent/ The holy men, the lovely men./ These the world calls divine’. For ‘Divine nature’ (devadharmikó), see A III 277.
61 Possibly related to the Jambudīpavannānā.
62 i. Confidence born of knowledge (saddhā); ii. energy (viriya); iii. mindfulness (sati); iv. concentration (samādhi); v. wisdom (pañña).
64 See Pali Literature of Ceylon, pp. 110–12.
65 This is an anthology of twenty suttas from the Suttapiṭaka known as Catusaubhānañārappāli by the teachers of old. It is known to Sinhalese Buddhists as the Pīt Pota, Book of Protection, ed. Kotmalē Dhammānanda, Colombo, Mahābodhi Press, 1950; tr. Piyyadassi Thera, Kandy, BPS, 1975.
66 This has been listed under the title of Choix de Paritta, see Au Chhieng, op. cit.
68 v. 17 = v. 2, of the Mahājāyamahalalakāśāthu; vv. 21–3 = vv. 2b–5a of the Cūḷājānapaṭīra; vv. 107–8 = the final two verses of the Jaya-paritta. These paritta texts appear in the appendix, Upagranthaya, of the Pali-Sinhala-pātita-pota, ed. K. Śri Prajināsāra, Colombo, 1956. This composition is based on the Sārathasa-muccaya (see Simon Hewavitarne Bequest Series, vol. XXVI), a commentary on the Catusaubhānañārā where twenty paritta-suttas are enumerated, as opposed to only six in Mil (150–4). The fourteen apocryphal suttas probably originated in 15th century Ceylon and were thence introduced to the mainland by Sinhalese dhammadātās.
69 Annales du Musée Guimet (Bibliothèque d’Études), Paris, 1906.
70 BEFEO, Hanoi, 1936.
71 BEFEO, Saigon, 1959.
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Because of the records in the Mahāvamsa and elsewhere, the Pali writers of Ceylon, or in Ceylon, from Buddhaghosa onwards, can mostly be given fairly precise dates. Even so, there is a few authors whose dates are not established, such as Upatissa, who according to late tradition wrote the Mahābodhiyamsa, and the anonymous author of the Telakaṭṭhagātha. These two kavis are usually dated in the +10, on stylistic grounds and in the former case because there is a tradition that Upatissa wrote at the request of a Dāthānāga. But it is not at all certain that this Dāthānāga is the same person as one mentioned in the Cūlavamsa. The Pali writers of Burma and elsewhere in South East Asia similarly are mostly given definite dates on the basis of the extant historical traditions of those countries.

In the case of Indian writers in Pali, however, the situation is entirely different, because Buddhism disappeared even from South India, presumably during the Turkish rule in Tamilnadu in the +14, and almost all its literature was destroyed, especially local chronicles of which no copies had been taken elsewhere. Only texts which had been taken to Ceylon, Burma and so on have been preserved from South Indian Buddhism. Only in rare cases can the date of an Indian Pali author be determined from his own statement in a colophon or introductory verse, through a reference to a datable person or event. For example, Kassapa, author of the Mohavicchedanī, can be dated thus on the basis of Cośa history.

The most conspicuous problem here, and one which has given rise to a rather desultory controversy over the last hundred years, is that of Dhammapāla. Dhammapāla, or a Dhammapāla, ranks next to Buddhaghosa in Theravāda exegesis, in the quality and also the quantity of his output. Indeed, some would rate him superior to Buddhaghosa in scholarship and as a philosopher, on the ground that, whereas Buddhaghosa merely translated the old Atthathāthās from Sinhalese into Pali, with, fortunately, a minimum of his own comment, Dhammapāla on the other hand seems to have written very original works, though based perhaps on older notebooks or Gaṇthipadas and the tradition of his teachers. He also shows his mastery of various śāstras and of certain non-Theravāda schools of Buddhism.

In the early days of modern research on Pali, the suggestion was made that Dhammapāla was the same person as the Yogācāra author Dharmapāla. This now seems absurd, yet it has persisted in the secondary and tertiary sources on Pali literature and left the +7 as a widely accepted date for Dhammapāla (in fact Dharmapāla probably lived in +6, but that does not concern us now).

Ignoring such guesswork, we are at the outset faced with the question whether there was one Dhammapāla or two. Some scholars seem to think that there were as many as three different Dhammapālas, responsible for the very extensive works preserved under that name. The Gandhavamsa has four, but at least one is a later Burmese author.

Following Buddhaghosa’s commentaries, perhaps also following the Pali commentaries on the Jātaka, Dhammapada, Niddesa, Paṭisambhidāmañña, Therāpadāna and Buddhavamsa, a Dhammapāla wrote commentaries on the remaining books of the Khuddakanikāya (except apparently the Thertapadāna). He also wrote a commentary on the Nettippakarana, which is regarded as canonical in Burma but not in Ceylon. Then a Dhammapāla wrote sub-commentaries on the Visuddhimagga, Dīgha, Majjhima, Samyutta, Jātaka, Buddhavamsa and Nettippakarana. A certain Ānanda having written a sub-commentary on the entire Abhidhamma, a Dhammapāla wrote a sub-sub-commentary (Anuṭṭkā) on this. Finally a Dhammapāla wrote a manual of Abhidhamma, the Saccasamkhepa. Is this great corpus, more than thirty volumes, the work of one author, as some think? Or is the author of the Īṭkāś different from the Dhammapāla who sought to complete the Atthakathā? Is the author of the Saccasamkhepa different from both these? Rather uncertain tradition mentions a ‘Culladhampāla’, presumably different from a hypothetical ‘Mahā- dhammapāla’ and indicating that two authors of the name were known. But some have suggested that ‘Culladhampāla’ wrote only the Saccasamkhepa (as stated in the Gandhavamsa) and the other Dhammapāla everything else.

The colophons to Dhammapāla’s atthakathās usually name the vihāra where he wrote, Badaratittha in Nāgapāṭṭana, but this
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gives us no help in establishing the date (this vihāra is said to have been established by Dhammāsoka, thus in the 3rd century). The tīkā on the Visuddhimagga, on the other hand, states that the work was written at the request of a therī named Dāthānāgī, of the Sīthagāna vihāra. But as in the case of Upanissa, mentioned above, there is nothing to establish that this Dāthānāgī was the one named in the Cullavamsa as a contemporary of King Mahinda IV (+10). The manuscripts of the other sub-commentaries and of the Saccasamkhāsaka seem not to mention even the name of the author in their colophons and give us no help.

The Sāsanavamsa, a very late source, appears to distinguish two Dhammapālas, giving the commentaries in one list as by 'Ācārya Dhammapāla' and the sub-commentaries in another as by 'Ācārya Dhammapāla'. It ascribes the Saccasamkhāsaka to 'Ananda'. This last seems to be a mistake, but as the author of the Saccasamkhāsaka is designated 'pupil of Ananda' (in the Gandhavamsa) the confusion might have arisen quite easily. It seems probable that the author of the Anuṭṭākā likewise was this pupil of Ananda, the latter being the author of the Mūlaṭīkā. Apart from the doubtful connection with Mahinda IV, the only limit on the date of Ānanda and this Dhammapāla seems to be, so far, the fact that Sāriputta and other authors of the +12 refer to the Mūlaṭīkā and Saccasamkhāsaka (also to the tīkās of Dhammapāla). The Gandhavamsa, a rather unreliable source, states that the author of the Mūlaṭīkā was born in India and ascribes the commentaries and the sub-commentaries to the same Dhammapāla.

It would be possible to distinguish the author of the commentaries from the author of the sub-commentaries on grounds of style and especially of scholarship, of the works known to them (e.g. the author of the tīkās knows the works of Bhartṛhari and Dīnāgī or Dhammakīrti), but this large research task has not yet been attempted, particularly as most of the tīkās are so far available only in Burmese editions, which moreover are liable to inaccuracies where sāstras unfamiliar to their editors are concerned, as Dr. de Silva has shown. Two observations may be made bearing on this question, however.

Commentators in the Indian tradition plagiarise each other freely, often without acknowledgment. Usually their aim is the

quite modest one of codifying the doctrines handed down in their school, not writing anything original. In the present case there is a very striking example of such borrowing in that a long passage, about 40 pages, in the Commentary on the Carīyāpiṭaka, on the topic of the perfections of the bodhisattva, reappears in the Sub-commentary on the Dīgha Nikāya. This and some shorter passages common to the commentaries and sub-commentaries has been taken by Dr. de Silva (Introduction to her edition of the Dīgha Tīkā, p.xliii) as evidence for common authorship. But it is more likely that the Tīkākāra, finding Buddhaghosa deficient here, simply drew an authoritative statement from another commentary. Such identical passages in commentaries are not evidence either for the identity or for the difference of their authors, however, and no conclusion can be drawn from them. Also the knowledge of the methodology of the Nettīppakaraṇa on the part of the Tīkākāra proves nothing in the case of such a learned interpreter, who moreover himself wrote a Tīkā on the Nettīppakaraṇa. Dr. de Silva has further argued (pp.lxi-lxv) that Sāriputta in his Vinaya Tīkā, stating that by 'Ācārya Dhammapāla' he everywhere refers to the author of the sub-commentaries on the Suttanta and then calling the commentator of the Udāna, Carīyāpiṭaka, etc., also 'Ācārya Dhammapāla', held that these were one author. However, this does not necessarily follow. When Sāriputta refers to the commentaries he always names them as well as their author, but where he refers to the sub-commentaries he sometimes names only the author and not the work, though at other times he names both. It would seem that his preliminary statement, probably added after writing the main text, is intended to explain who he means when he names 'Ācārya Dhammapāla' but not any work, otherwise there would be no point in making such a statement. This rather suggests that he knew there were two (or more) Dhammapālas and carefully distinguished between them.

Our second observation is that the Netti Atṭhakathā is ascribed in its colophon to the Dhammapāla of Badaratittha. Now there is a Tīkā on this work, also ascribed to a Dhammapāla. Is it likely that a Theravādin commentator would first write a commentary and then proceed to write a sub-commentary on his own commentary? Most probably not, and this fact would
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It seems to confirm the distinction made in the Sāsanavāṃsa between the two Dhammapālaś, the commentator and the sub-commentator.

The dates of these two Dhammapālaś remain uncertain. The commentator some time after the early +5 aimed to complete the work of Buddhaghosa, but it is a matter of conjecture when such an aim was proposed. Had there been old Sinhalese commentaries on the works Dhammapāla commented on, the aim would have existed immediately after Buddhaghosa ceased work. But there is no evidence, it appears, that any old Sinhalese commentaries existed beyond those on the works covered by Buddhaghosa, and also on the Jātaka and Dhammapada. The other Khuddaka texts, being evidently late and apocryphal, were probably not covered by the ancient Aṭṭhakathā. In that case the idea of completing a cycle of Aṭṭhakathās on all the works of the Suttanta Piṭaka may have arisen only centuries later than Buddhaghosa. If the commentators on the Niddesa and Patissambhidāmaṇga lived in the +6, as generally supposed, that would seem to be the most likely date for Dhammapāla the commentator also.

For the sub-commentator we have so far only the +12 as limit and the very reasonable, but unconfirmed, proposal to date him in the +10. One would expect a fairly long interval between the period of composition of commentaries and that of sub-commentaries, but that of course gives us no definite date. It is quite likely that the Anuṭṭkā on the Abhidhamma and the Saṭṭhasaṅkhēpa were written by the Āṭṭikāra, but there seems to be no evidence to confirm this. The Sāsanavāṃsa states (de Silva p. xxxv) that Āṇanda's Mūlaṭṭkā was the first (read ādi-) of all the ṭṭkās to be written. Thus, whatever his date, it appears likely that his pupil Dhammapāla continued his work by writing ṭṭkās on the Visuddhimagga and Suttantapiṭaka as well as by writing a sub-sub-commentary on Āṇanda's ṭṭkā. Vajirabuddhi, whose date is unknown, is likely to have written his Vinaya ṭṭkā immediately afterwards. Incidentally the fact that the author of the Saṭṭhasaṅkhēpa has been called 'Culā' Dhammapāla does not imply that he wrote fewer works than the earlier Dhammapāla, any more than the title Culavāṃsa implies a shorter work than the Mahāvaṃsa. In such cases it seems to have been the convention to call a later teacher 'culā' or 'cūla', probably implying greater respect for a more ancient teacher, regardless of his output.

There is one further possible indication limiting the date of the Āṭṭikāra Dhammapāla. According to Dr. Saddhatissa (Upasaka janalankāra Introduction, p. 51), the anonymous Patippatissāṅgaha refers to the Saddhamanettiṭṭkā. Although Saddhatissa appears to think this may be a reference to some earlier work, it seems likely that the sub-commentary on the Nettippākaṇa in question is in fact Dhammapāla's. Tradition, as we have seen above, knows of no ṭṭkās earlier than those of Āṇanda and Dhammapāla. Now according to Saddhatissa this Patippatissāṅgaha was written at the suggestion of Yuvarajā Kassapa, who probably was King Kassapa V of Ceylon (+914 to 923). If that is correct, and if the Patippatissāṅgaha refers to Dhammapāla's ṭṭkā, then Dhammapāla must have written not later than the beginning of the +10 and could have had no connection with King Mahinda IV of Ceylon. The +9 therefore becomes the most likely period for Āṇanda and Dhammapāla, the earliest authors of ṭṭkās, and probably for Vajirabuddhi also. The +8 also is possible, but would rather prolong the interval before the renewed composition of ṭṭkās by Sāriputta and others.

Turning from these sub-commentaries to the strictly literary or kāvya works in Pali in this period, we again find chronological difficulties, as mentioned above. Apart from the Mahāvaṃsa, which lies only on the borderline of kāvya from the stylistic point of view as well as that of aesthetics, the earliest Pali kāvyas of the medieval period appear to be the prose Mahābodhiyaṃsa and the verse Telakahāgāthā. Upatissa's kāvya in stylistic prose, though sometimes embodies matter from commentaries with only a minimum of assimilation, may be classified as a biography or ākhya-yikā, having the Bodhi Tree as its heroine. In figuratively united with the Buddha at the time of his Enlightenment and then her offspring is brought to Ceylon to establish the doctrine there, a living presence of Enlightenment. The anonymous poem of approximately a hundred verses is a kind of lyric, a sūyaka, presenting Buddhist philosophy in poetic form in the vasatattālaka metre as a meditation on dying, impermanence, conditioned origination and related themes. The dates of
both kāvya are uncertain, the śatakā being ascribed to a legendary monk of ancient times, but there is a consensus of impress in favour of the +9 or +10 for both. Without offering anything new on the precise dates, it may be useful to speak of stylistic matters to confirm the approximate period and also to dissipate certain misconceptions about this movement to create new kāvya in Pali so long after the earliest kāvya literature known to us, which happens also to be in Pali.

Scholars have often spoken, with something like scorn, of ‘Sanskritized’ Pali in works like these, as if their style of composition is not really legitimate or natural. Vocabulary is of course a prominent feature of style and innovations in it are commonly found in the greatest authors of the world’s literature. No doubt some of these Pali authors read Sanskrit kāvya by Bāna and others, but it should be recognized that kāvya was far from being merely a department of Sanskrit composition. Just as the earliest kāvya now available happens to be in Pali, so from that early period onwards Prakrit languages were always used in kāvya, no doubt far more extensively than the few works preserved would superficially seem to suggest. Thus we may mention the Bṛhatkathā, Saptāsatt, Setubandha and so on, not to speak of dramas in a mixture of languages, and then the numerous Jainā kāvya in Māhārāṣṭrī and Abhṛṣṭa, especially from the +8 to the +10. It would be more correct to speak of the specifically kāvya vocabulary, the poetic vocabulary, cultivated in all these works, than of ‘Sanskrit’ vocabulary, though of course Sanskrit kāvya shared the common heritage of poetic vocabulary. Thus it is unjustifiable to object to such words as soma, ‘the Moon’ (Telakaṭṭhagāthā verse 43), as artificial because apparently not found in the earlier Pali literature extant.

Another aspect of this prejudice among scholars is that, according to the editors of the PED, they omitted from their dictionary 900 words (including soma) given in Childers’ Dictionary on the authority of Moggalāṇa (“Afterword” p. 734) but according to the editors not found in Pali literature and therefore merely borrowed from the Sanskrit lexicon of Amara-sūtra. It is very strange that a considerable number of these words is found in the Telakaṭṭhagāthā and Mahābodhiśvanāsa (e.g. kanti, ‘beauty’ or ‘grace’; sikara, ‘spray’; āśāra, ‘shower’; all on p. 2 of the latter), both works which were published by the Pali Text Society itself three or four decades before the Dictionary and which should have been covered by it. That they were ignored shows a prejudice against them as in some way not proper Pali. Moggalāṇa and following him Childers have thus been condemned unjustly as giving words which were not Pali, though in fact they are found in standard Pali authors.

Another aspect of style with which late Pali kavi have been unjustly reproached is the use of long compounds and long sentences. The early Prakrit inscriptions of the Śātavāhana period show that these were current features of Prakrit before we have them actually attested in Sanskrit, therefore they might be regarded as features of Prakrit later imitated in Sanskrit, rather than the reverse, but of course with such limited materials available no conclusion can be established. Moreover in the Kuṇāla Jātaka we find very long compounds even in ancient Pali of about the –2, as well as long sentences. Thus these criticisms of medieval Pali kavi are of the same kind as the all too numerous hasty, superficial and prejudiced remarks made about kāvya literature in Sanskrit and other languages by the scholars of about three quarters of a century ago. They were good philologists, but as far as literature, and also philosophy, were concerned they were mostly superficial, narrow-minded and uneducated. What all these scholars missed was the subtler differences and developments of style, which for example differentiate Śūra and Bāna from the early Prakrit inscriptions and from each other. It is by observing these finer features of sentence construction, of vocabulary, of figures of speech and also of the aesthetic organisation of longer literary works that we can really distinguish stylistic movements and periods in kāvya and thus suggest approximate dates for works whose precise dates are not recorded.

The lesson for us in all this is humility, the quality which the scholars of a century ago and their pupils, with rare exceptions, so blatantly lacked. Though we know so much more than they did, because we have access to such a greater range of Indian literature and especially literary criticism in the Indian tradition, we must practice humility, because that is the only way to learn easily and to discover the truth.

The Anāgatavāna or Anāgatabuddhavaṇṇa is traditionally
ascribed (in the Gāndhāravāṃsa) to Kassapa, author of the Mohavicchedanī, mentioned above. Here we have a different kind of problem, namely the authenticity of a text, particularly one which seems to be badly preserved (see Minayeff’s edition in the JPTS, 1886). The text is not philosophical and hardly literary, but purports to be historical, if such a text can be applied to the future. Minayeff edited the text from two manuscripts of Burmese origin, which he calls A and B. A apparently formed the main basis of the edition and is in verse, B is mixed with prose, which Minayeff is inclined to regard as commentary and does not edit. He also had a commentary by an Upatissa of Ceylon, in a fragmentary manuscript (C), also Burmese, and gives some extracts from it. Finally he had a manuscript which he calls D of a quite different text on the same topic, which he does not edit but of which he gives an extract. He notes that there is another manuscript of this D text in Paris, in Cambodian script. It has separate chapters on each of ten future Buddhas. In fact this text is the Dasabodhisattappattikāṭhā edited by Saddhatissa, PTS 1975, from Sinhalese manuscripts.

Returning to manuscript A, we find from Minayeff that it has a colophon, which he prints separately from the text since it is not found in manuscript B, which mentions a dynasty of King Rājarāja though not the name of the author. Now Kassapa in his Mohavicchedanī (p. 359) names a dynasty of Rājadhirāja, thus it appears that the Anāgatavāṃsa colophon refers to the same Cōḷa patronage. Rājadhirāja might be merely a metrical variation, but we have Rājarāja I in +985 to 1014, Rājadhirāja I in +1044 to 1052, etc., both names being popular in the Cōḷa family. This evidence, though rather tenuous, supports the statement in the Gāndhāraṇa about Kassapa’s authorship of both texts. There is another piece of evidence, still more tenuous but also agreeing with Kassapa’s authorship of both texts. According to the Anāgatavāṃsa, Buddhism must disappear before the future Buddha Metteyya restores the Doctrine. The prose text in B gives a detailed account of this (pp. 34–6). A similar detailed account (based on Mp I 87–90) is found in the Mohavicchedanī (p. 202), concerning the gradual disappearance of the Pali texts. This elaboration seems not strictly necessary for the subject matter of this Abhidhamma manual, but suggests that Kassapa had a particular interest in this question of the disappearance of Buddhism. Until further evidence comes to light, we may tentatively accept Kassapa’s authorship of the Anāgatavāṃsa. Its date thus falls at the end of the +12 (see Mohavicchedanī Preface p. xvii) and it was written in the Cōḷa Empire of Tamilnadu.

The Anāgatavāṃsa as edited by Minayeff briefly describes the Bodhisatta Ajita, a contemporary of the Buddha Gotama, and then gives a more detailed account of his future life as the Buddha Metteyya. A verse at the end of manuscript B gives the names of ten bodhisattas who will be future buddhas, apparently the same as the buddhas named and described in the Dasabodhisattappattikāṭhā, though there seem to be some corruptions and alternative names in the text. In manuscript B the text appears to be a sūtra. It is supposed to have been spoken by the Buddha after the Buddhavaṃsa. Of course, the tradition about the future is supposed to be based on matters revealed by the Buddha Gotama. Manuscript B seems to deny Kassapa’s authorship, in order to make the text a sūtra, but of course we cannot accept that. Kassapa used various sources in tradition, in the Canon and commentaries and perhaps others not known to us (cf. the texts on the anāgata preserved in Tibetan), and put together a short narrative on the Buddha Metteyya. Presumably some later author elaborated the traditions about nine more future buddhas in the Dasabodhisattappattikāṭhā. We need a new edition of Kassapa’s work, preferably based on more manuscripts and including the whole of the prose text and also Upatissa’s commentary.

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Note

1 Lecture given at the Meeting of the Society for Pali and Buddhism in Nagoya on May 23rd 1980. Thanks are due to Mr. G. Schopen of the Reijyukai Library, Tokyo, for drawing attention to the publication of the Dasabodhisattappattikāṭhā by the PTS and to two short Tibetan texts on the anāgata. ‘+’ and ‘-’ are used for ‘A.D.’ and ‘B.C.’ or the ‘Western Era’.