Journal of the Pali Text Society.
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Pali Text Society.

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REPORT OF THE PALI TEXT SOCIETY
FOR 1915.

In an interim Report for 1914 issued last year to our subscribers, mention was made of a forthcoming first edition of that canonical commentary on a great part of the Sutta-
Nipāta, entitled the Niddesa. Of this we publish this year the first half of the main division, or Mahā-Niddesa, edited jointly by Professor L. de la Vallée Poussin and Mr. E. J. Thomas, of the Cambridge University Library. The remainder is ready for press, as is also Dr. W. Stede’s edition of the sequel, or Culla-Niddesa, prepared on a special system. The basis of both editions was a transcript made some years ago by Miss G. Noakes from the Siamese printed edition, and collated with Singhalese and Burmese MSS. by the Misses Dibben and Mrs. Powell Brown. The issue of this venerable exegesis coincides, as it happens, with that of the medieval commentary on the Sutta-Nipāta, edited by Mr. Helmer Smith, and forming a continuation of the commentary on the Khuddaka-pāṭha, published by us last year.

Of other works referred to in our last Report, we publish three, two of them in this Journal. The former is a first edition of one of those nine medieval compendia of Abhidhamma, enumerated in the Editor’s Preface to “A Compendium of Philosophy,” and entitled in Burma, Let-than, little finger manuals, the last-named being the most famous of the nine. This makes the fifth that we have published, the other three having appeared, one in the
Journal for 1913-14, and two independently last year. The Editor, a young bhikkhu of Ceylon, has also sent us an edition of a sixth manual—the "Sacca-sankhepa," by Dhammapāla the Less, author of the "Visuddhi-Magga Tikā." For these we offer him our grateful acknowledgment.

We would also testify to our gratitude for three letters on "Paccaya-naya," the Buddhist theory of Relations, or mutually-conditioned dhammas, received from Ledi Sadaw, revealing interesting points of connection with modern European thought existing in the early traditions of Abhidhamma. These letters, forming a more or less connected treatise, have been translated by the kindness of Mr. S. Z. Aung, and should usefully prepare the student of Abhidhamma for the forthcoming editions of the Commentary on the Paṭṭhāna, and the first division of that work, the Tika-paṭṭhāna.

This year's publications also include, as the sixth in the Translation Series, Mr. F. L. Woodward's rendering, from Pali and Singhalese, of the curious little work, edited twenty years ago by Rhys Davids, and entitled by him "A Yogāvacara's Manual." A contribution towards the expenses of publication was offered by H.H. the late Rajarshi Raja of Bhinga, and confirmed by the Rani Sahiba, hence the priority of position given to this unique and unclassified palm-leaf MS. over more classical works that need translation.

Many other editions and translations are either ready for press or well advanced in preparation. Dr. Stede is devoting himself entirely to the work of the Dictionary. In Burma, Professor Maung Tin, M.A., successor to Professor C. Duroiselle at the College, Rangoon, now represents the Society in Burma, and is preparing an edition of the Commentary on the Paṭisambhidā-magga.

Among our issues in the near future we announce the first part of an edition of the Commentary on the Anguttara-Nikāya, by the late Edmund Hardy. The MS. of this was returned to us late in July, 1914, by Dr. M. Walleser, to
whose editing we had entrusted a portion of Hardy's unfinished work, and who recommended that this first part, marked by Hardy himself as ready for press, should be published independently as edited by Hardy alone.

The Society has now entered on the testing stage of its power to stay during the present cataclysm, and so far is staying valiantly. Unsolicited donations have arrived, and although there is a falling off under the head of subscriptions for the current and past issues, this is not because there have been fewer subscribers—the reverse being true—but because, during 1915, we had not the good fortune to be asked for a single complete set—an event that usually happens once or twice during a twelvemonth. A subscription for our output of thirty-five years is equal to as many annual subscriptions. With the recent inflation in prices, notably of paper, we are as yet by no means out of the wood, but we have reason to be hopeful.

THE EDITORS.
I

NĀMARŪPASAMAŚO
Bhadanta-Khemācarīya-therena viracito

LANKĀDIPE
Galunagare Paramavīcitrānanda-Vihāravāsinā Brahma-
colagāmajena Dhammārāna-nāmiṣkena Bhikkhunā
Lekhaka-dosa-dūsita-khalitaṭṭhāna-vikhalīkaraneṇa
Saṃsodhito

NĀMARŪPASAMAŚA-VIṆṆATTI.

Bhadanta-Khemācarīya-viracito paṇāyaḥ Nāmarūpasam-
āso ito sattavassānaḥ upari Laṅkādipe Baṭapalagāme
Subhaddarāmādhivāsinā Dhammapālattherena Sihalattha-
vaṇṇāya saha muddāpito hoti. Tasmiy pana muddāpano
imassa ganthassa puttikāyō (copies) dullabhatarā ahesuṇ.
Marammaraṭṭhato pariyesityā pi na labhiṣu. Ekaṇ eva
Sihalakkharehi likhitapotthakaṇṭha tena laddhaṃ. Imassa
ṭīkā pi tena na laddhā. Tato pana pacchā Ambalāuṇgoḍa-
gāme Aggārānavāsi bhadanta-Buddhadattabhikkhu Ma-
rammaraṭṭhaṇ patvā tattha Bernard Free Library potthā-
kālaye poraṇapotthakāni olokeṇto imaṇḍ pakaraṇāṇaḥ addasa
Khemappakaranānīmena vohariyamānaṇaḥ.¹ Disvā taṇ
Sihalapotthakaṇṭha tena saha saṃsandesī. Puna so imassa
ṭīkaṃ ca tambhā yeva potthakālayato likhitvā Sihaladīpaṇ
tesesi. Sā pana ṭīkā imasmiṣṇ pariṣodhane bahūpakārā
jātā.

Imassa pana kattā tipiṭakapariyattidharo Khemācarīyo

¹ Referred to in footnotes as B.
Khemācariya


Khemācariyassa pana nāmaṃ Sāsanavaṃsādisu c' eva Nikāyasaṅgraḥa - Saddharmaratnakarādi - Sihalapottahakesu ca ganthakārācariyānaṃ nāmavaliyaṃ dissate; taṃ eva pamānaṃ imass' ācariyassa pandiccajānane ca imassa ganthassā garubhāva-jānane ca. Tasmā mayaṃ tadatthāya papañcañ nā karoma.


July 11, 1915.

1 Bambaredda ca Bambaroṇḍa Lankāyaṃ Rōhanē paṭiṭṭhito poṭhakesu āgato porā aka-gāmo.
NĀMARŪPASAMĀSA

NAMO TASSA BHAGAVATO ARAHATO SAMMA SAMBUDDHASSA

1. Gambhīraṇ nipuṇaṇ dhammaṇ, marūnaṇ¹ yo pakāsayi, Sahassakkhasa uyyāne, vasaṇ vassaṇ narāsabho;
2. nemassitvāna taṇ Nāthaṇ, Dhammaṇ Saṅghaṇ ca sādhukaṇ
Samāsaṇ nāmarūpassa, bhanānānaṇ sunātha me.

Tattha samāsato ekūnanavuti cittāni.
Catubbidhāni kusalāni, kāma-rūpā-locutta-bhūmi-bhedena, aṭṭha kāmāvacarāni, pāṇca rūpāvacarāni, cattāri arūpāvacarāni, cattāri locuttaraṇi ceti.

Tattha somanassasahagataṇ ānaṇasampayuttaṇ asaṅkhārikam ekaṇ, saṅkhārikam ekaṇ; somanassasahagataṇ ānaṇavippayuttaṇ asaṅkhārikam ekaṇ, saṅkhārikam ekaṇ; upakāhaḥ sahagataṇ ānaṇasampayuttaṇ asaṅkhārikam ekam, sasaṅkhārikam ekaṇ; upakāhaḥ sahagataṇ ānaṇavippayuttaṇ asaṅkhārikam ekaṇ, saṅkhārikam ekaṇ ti imāni aṭṭha kāmāvacarakaśicusacittāni.


¹ B. madhuraṇ.
Upekkañcitttekaggatā sampayuttañ duvaṅgikañ pañca-
mañjījanīn ti imāni pañca rūpavacarakañusalacittāni.

Ākasañcācayañanañ, viññāñañcācayañanañ, akiñcñāñcaya-
ṇanañ, nevasaññānanāsaññācayañanīn ti imāni cattāri arūpā-
 vacarakañusalacittāni.

Sakkāyadiṭṭhi - vicikicchā - silabbataparāmāsatodasappā-
hanakarañāñ, sotāpattimaggacittāñ, Kāmarāgabyāpādānañ, tanuttakañ,
sakadāgāmimaggacittāñ, Kāmarāgabyāpā-
dānañ, niravasesapahānakarañ, anāgāmimaggacittāñ. Rū-
parāga-arūparāga-māna-uddhaccya-avijñānañ anavasesapa-
hanakarañ arahattamaggacittānī ti imāni cattāri lokuttara-
kusalacittāni.


Akusalacittānī tividhāni, atthā lobhasahagatacittānī, dve-
patighasampayuttacittānī[3], dve ekahetukacittānī.

Tatthā somanassasahagatañ diṭṭhipañ sampayuttañ,
asaṅkhārikam ekā, sasaṅkhārikam ekā; somanassa-
sahagatañ diṭṭhipavippayuttañ asaṅkhārikam ekā, 
sasaṅkhārikam ekā; upekkhā-sahagatañ diṭṭhipañ-
sampayuttañ asaṅkhārikam ekā, sasaṅkhārikam ekā;
upekkhāsahagatañ diṭṭhipavippayuttañ asaṅkhārikam
ekā, sasaṅkhārikam ekā ti imāni atthā lobhasahagata-
cittānī. Domanassasahagatañ patighasampayuttañ asaṅ-
khārikam ekā, sasaṅkhārikam ekan ti imāni dve patigha-
sampayuttacittānī. Vicikicchāsahagatañ ekā, uddhacca-
sahagatem ekān ti imāni dve ekahetukacittānī.

Imāni dvādasa akusalacittānī.

Vipākacittānī catubbhidhāni, kāma-rūpārūpa-lokkutta-
rbhūmivasena, tevisati kāmāvacaravipākacittānī, tāni duvi-
dhāni honti: kusalavipākāni akusalavipākāni ceti. Kusa-
lavipākāni solasa, akusalavipākāni satta; kusalavipākāni
duvidhāni ahetukāni sahetukāni ceti. Ahetukāni atthā,
sahetukāni atthā.


Upekkhāsahagataṃ akusalavipākaṃ cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, tathā sotaviññāṇaṃ, ghānaviññāṇaṃ, jivhāviññāṇaṃ, dukkhasahagataṃ kāyaviññāṇaṃ, akusalavipākāhetukamano-dhātu upekkhāsahagataṃ sampāticchanaṃ, akusalavipākāhetukamanoviññānadhātu upekkhāsahagataṃ santirāṇan ti imāni satta akusalavipākāhetukacittāni.

Pañca rūpāvacaravipākacittāni kusalasadisāni yeva uppajjanti.

Cattāri arūpāvacaravipākacittāni kusalasadisāni yeva uppajjanti.

Cattāri lokuttaravipākacittāni: Sotāpatti-phalacittāṇa, sakadāgāmisphalacittāṇa, anāgāmisphalacittāṇa, arahattaphala-cittāṇa ceti: imāni cattāri lokuttaraphalacittāni.

Imāni chattijja vipākacittāni.

Kiriya-cittāni bhūmivasaṇa tividhāṇi honti, kāmāvacarāṇi, rūpāvacarāṇi, arūpāvacarāṇi ceti. Ekādasa kāmāvacarāṇi, pañca rūpāvacarāṇi, cattāri arūpāvacarāṇi. Kāmāvacarāṇi duvidhāṇi, ahetukāni sahetukāni ceti, ahetukāni tīni, sahetukāni aṭṭha.

1 B. omits.
Tattha kiriyāhetukamanodhātu upekkhāsahagataḥ pañ-cadvāravajjanaḥ, kiriyāhetukamanovinnaṇadhātu somaṇas-sasahagataḥ hasituppādacittāḥ, kiriyāhetukamanovinnaṇadhātu upekkhāsahagataḥ votthapanaṁ ceti imāni tīṁ ahetukakiriyacittāṁ.


Imāni visati kiriyācittāṁ.

Evaṁ samāsa ekūnanavuti cittāṁ honti.


Catupaṇṇāsa kāmāvacarakacittāṁ, paṇcadasa rūpāvacaraca-cittāṁ, dvādasa arūpāvacarakacittāṁ, aṭṭha lokuttaracittāṁ, Aṭṭhārasa ahetukāṁ, dve ekahetukāṁ, bāvisa duhetukāṁ, satacattāḷisa tiheṭukāṁ, paṇcapanṇāsa javanacittāṁi.


Kusalavipākaṁ cakkhuvinnaṇaṁ akusalavipākaṁ cakkhu-vinnaṇānaṁ tī imāni dve dassanacittāṁ; evam eva dve
savanacitti, dve ghayanacitti, dve sayananacitti, dve phusanacittiiti veditabbâni.

Kusalavipâkahetukamanodhâtu upekkhâsahagatañ sampaticchanacittañ, akusalavipâkahetukamanodhâtu upekkhâsahagatañ sampaticchanacittañ ceti imâni dve pi sampaticchanacitti. Kusalavipâkahetukamanovînâna-dhâtu somanassasahagatañ santiranañ, kusalavipâkahetukamanovînânadhâtu upekkhâsahagatañ santiranañ, akusalavipâkahetukamanovînânadhâtu upekkhâsahagatañ santiranañ iti imâni tiñi santiranaçacitti.

Kiriyâhetukamanovînânadhâtu upekkhâsahagatañ, idam ekâj votthhapacittan pañâcadvâre votthapanañ manodvâre âavajjanañ ca karoti. Kusalavipâkahetukamanovînâna-dhâtu somanassasahagatañ pañâcadvâre santiranañ chadvâre tadârammañ ca karoti. Imâni dve dviñthânikâni.

Pañca rûpâvacaravipâkacittâni cattâri arûpâvacaravipâkacittâni brahmaloke pâtisandhi bhavañgaç cuti ca honti. Imâni nava tiñthânikâni.


Añtha kâmâvacara-vipâkacittâni dve upekkhâsahagata-vipâkahetuka-manovînânadhâtuyo ca kâmâvacara-kammañ1 va kammamimittag va gatinimittag va gahetvâ pâtisandhi honti. Pañca rûpâvacaravipâkacittâni cattâri arûpâvacara-vipâkacittâni2 yassa yassa kulassa jhânassa yan yan ârammañ, tañ tañ ârammañ gahetvâ brahma-loke pâtisandhi honti, imâni ekûnavisati pâtisandhi cittâni honti. Etâni yeva pavâttikkhâne bhavañgâni cutikkhâne cuti ca honti.

1 S. 8 vacare kammañ.  2 B. inserts ca.
Attha kāmāvacaravipākacittāni tissu vipākāhetuka-manoviniṇṇānadhātuyo ca jāvanacittānaṃ anantarā tadārammanāṇi huvā kāmāvacara-sattānam eva jāyanti; imāni ekādasa tadārammanacittāni. Kāmāvacarakusalamāni cattāri somanassasahagatāni, akusalāni cattāri somanassasahagatāni, pañca kiriya-cittāni somanassasahagatānīti imāni terasa hasanacittāni; tesu puthujjanānaṃ atṭhasu kusalākusalesu hasanaṇaṃ uppa-jjati; sekkhānaṃ dve diṭṭhigatāni apanetvā chasu hasanaṇaṃ uppa-jjati; arahantānaṃ pana pañcasu kiriya-cittesu hasanaṇaṃ uppa-jjati.


Dvipaṇcaviṇṇāṇāni, tissu manodhātuyo, pañca ahetukamanoviniṇṇānadhātuyo cāti imāni atṭhārasa ahetukacittānī.

Pakīṇṇakajñ niṭṭhitajñ.

**CITTA-CETASIKÂ-KATHĀ.**


Dukavaggādisu yasmā, saṅghaṇa ca na yantīti; cittassa ca puthuhāvaṇ, dipetuṇ ca apaṇṇakaṇ, tasmā yevāpana dhammā, Munindena pakāsitā ti.

Rāsito sattarasa rāsi honti: phassapañcakarāsi, jhānapañcakarāsi, indriyatṭhakarāsi, maggapañcakarāsi, bala-sattakarāsi, hetuttikarāsi, kammaphattikarāsi, lokapaḷadukarasi, chayugaladukarasi, upakāradukarasi, yuganandhadukarasi, viriyasamathadukarasi ceti.


Tattha cittaṇ phassapañcake cittaṇ, indriyatōhe man-indriyaṇ. Vitakko jhānapañcake vitakko, maggapañcake sammāsaṅkappo. Saddhā indriyatōhe saddhindriyaṇ, balasattake saddhābalaṇ. Hiri balasattake hiribalaṇ,

1 Dhs., § 1. 2 B. o sādhi-cittapassaddhādayo.

Cittaḥ vitakko saddhā ca, hirottappaḥ duhetuyo, ime dvīṭṭhāniṁ satta, tiṭṭhāniṁ ca vedanā, viriyaḥ satī catuṭṭhānā, caṭṭhān'ekaggatā pi ca sattaṭṭhānā mati vuttā, bhinnā dvādasadhā ime ti.

Pathamacittaḥ niṭṭhitaḥ.

Dutiye "sasaṅkhārikan" ti viseṣe. Tatiye somanassa-sahagate ēñāvippayutte asaṅkhārike padavibhāgato ekūnapaññaṣa-pañḍi honti; asambhinna-pañḍi ekūnatiyās honti; tesu avibhattikāni atṭhārasa, savibhattikāni ekādasa; satatṭhānākā pañña parihinā; ettakañ nānakaranā. Catutthe "sasaṅkhārikan" ti viseṣe. Pañcane upekkhā-sahagate ēñāsampayutte asaṅkhārike pañcapaññaṣa-pañḍi honti, yathā: phasso vedanā sañña cetanā cittaḥ vitakko vicāro upekkhā cittass'ekaggatā saddhā viriyaḥ sati samādhi pañña manindriyaḥ upekkhindriyaḥ jīvit-indriyaḥ sammādiṭṭhi evam ādayo paṭhamacittasadisa. Jhānapaṅcake pitiparihinātta caturaṅgikaḥ jhānaḥ hoti.¹ Asambhinnapañḍi ekūnatiyās honti, avibhattikāni satta-

¹ B. Pitiparihinā tathā caturaṅgajhānaḥ hoti, parihinā tathā caturaṅga sambhinnapadāni.

*Kāmaracara-cittakathā nīttihitā.*

Rūpāvacara-paṭhamajjhānaḥ kāmaracara-kulasalacittasadisaṃ.

Dutiyajjhāne catupaññāsa padāni honti. Dvīṭhāni-kassa vitakkassa parihinattā caturaṅgikāṇaḥ jhānaṃ hoti. Caturaṅgiko maggo hoti, asambhinnapadāni ekūnatiṃśā honti; avibhātikāni atthārāsa; savibhātikāni ekādasa.

Tatiyajjhāne tepaññāsa padāni honti. Vitakka-vicāra-

parihinattā tivaṅgikāṇaḥ jhānaṃ hoti. Asambhinnapadāni

atthavīsati honti; avibhātikāni sattarasa, savibhātikāni

ekādasa.

Catutthajjhāne dvēpaññāsa padāni honti. Pitiyā ca

parihinattā duvaṅgikāṇaḥ jhānaṃ hoti. Asambhinnapadāni

sattavīsati honti; avibhātikāni sulasā, savibhātikāni ekā
dasa.

Imesu catusu jhānesu cattāro niyatayevaspanakā sabbadā

uppaṃjanti; karuṇā muditaṃ aniyatayevaspanakā appamaṇṇā-
bhañanakāle nānaṃ uppaṃjanti.

Pañcamajjhāne dvēpaññāsa padāni honti, vedanaṃ jhā-

naṃgesu upakkhā hoti, indriyesu upekkhindriyaṃ hoti; asambhinnapadāni sattavīsati honti, avibhātikāni sulasā, savibhātikāni ekādasa, niyatayevaspanakā cattāro yeva sabbadā uppaṃjanti.

*Rūpāvacara-kusalacetasikā nīttihitā.*

Arūpāvacarāni cattāri jhānañ ¹ rūpāvacara-pancakaj-

jhānasadisacetasikāni; ārammaṇam eva ākāśādi tesāṇaṃ

nānakaranaṃ.

Sotāpattimaggacittena sahajātadhammā samassaṭṭhipa-

¹ Ādāsapotthake: Rūpāvacarāni pañcakajjhānasadisāni cetasikāni.

*Kusalacetasikå nîṭṭhitå.*

Somanassasahagåte dîṭṭhigatasampayutte asaṅkhârike dvattiyåsa dhammå honti, yathå: phasso vedanå saññå cetanå cittañ vitakko vicåro pîti sukhañ cittekkaggata viriyindriyañ samådhindriyañ manindriyañ somanassindriyañ (jivitindriyañ) micchådåttthi micchåsaṅkappo micchåvåyåmo micchåsåmadhi viriyabalañ samådhibalåhåhå ahirikabañ anottappabalåhå lobho moho abhijjha micchådåttthi ahirikåhå anottappåhå samatho paggåho avikkhepo ceti.


Tattha cittañ phassapañcake cittañ, indriyapañcake manindriyañ. Vitakko jhånapañcake vitakko, maggaçatukke micchåsaṅkappo. *Micchådåttthi* maggaçatukke micchådåttthi, kammapathaduke micchådåttthi. *Ahirikåhå* balacatukke ahirikabañ, kañhaduke ahirikåhå. *Anottap-

Cittaṅ vitakko diṭṭhi ahiṅikaṅ anottappan lobo cetti ime cha dvīṭhānikā, vedanā tiṭṭhānikā, [viriyaṅ catuṭṭhānikāṅ, ekaggata paṅcaṭṭhānikāṅ,] 1 dutiya “sasanakhāriṅ” ti viseso. 2

Somanassasahagatesu dvīsu diṭṭhigata - vippayuttesu dvīṭhānikā diṭṭhi pariṁhā tiṣapadāni honti, paṇnarasa asambhinnapadāni honti, avibhattikāni satta, savibhattikāni aṭṭha, phasso saṅga cetanā viċāro piti jīvitindriyaṅ moho cetti ime satta avibhattikā dhammā; vedanā cittaṅ vitakko ekaggata viriyindriyaṅ ahiṅikaṅ anottappan lobo cetti ime aṭṭha savibhattikā dhammā.


Dvīsu domanassasahagatesu ekunatiṅsa padāni honti: phasso vedana saṅga cetanā cittaṅ vitakko viċāro dukkhaṅ cittass’ekaggata viriyindriyaṅ samādhindriyaṅ manindriyaṅ domanassindriyaṅ jīvitindriyaṅ micchāsaṅkappo micchāvāyāmo micchāsamādhi viriyabalaṅ samādhibalayaṅ ahiṅikabalaṅ anottappabalaṅ doso moho byāpādo ahiṅikaṅ anottappan samatho paggāho avikkhepo cetti. Cuddasa

1 Ādāsapotthake: Catuṭṭhānekaggataṅ. Ādāsapotthake: sampayuttesu.
2 B. adds the verse:
Viriyāṅ catuṭṭhānikāṅ, chaṭṭhān’ ekaggata pī ca,
nava dhammā ime vuttā, saṃbhinnā hi Mahesinā ti.


Uddhacesahagate aṭṭhavisati padāni honti: phasso vedanā sañña cetanā cittaṇ vitakko vicāro upekkhā cittekkaggatā viriyindriyaṅ samādhindriyaṅ manindriyaṅ upekkhindriyaṅ jivitindriyaṅ micchāsaṅkappo micchāvāyāmo micchāsamāḍhi viriyabalaṅ samādhibalaṅ ahirikabalaṅ anottappabalaṅ uddhaceaṅ moho ahirikaṇ anottappaṅ samatho paggāho avikkhepo ceti. Cuddasa asambhinna-padaṇi honti: phasso vedanā sañña cetanā cittaṇ vitakko vicāro cittassekkaggatā viriyindriyaṅ jivitindriyaṅ uddhaceaṅ moho ahirikaṇ anottappaṅ ceti; satta avibhattikāni, satta savibhattikāni. Phasso sañña cetanā vicāro jivitindriyaṅ uddhaceaṅ moho ceti ime satta avibhattikā dhammaṃ; vedanā cittaṇ vitakko ekaggatā viriyindriyaṅ ahirikaṇ anottappaṅ ceti ime satta savibhattikā dhammaṃ.

Chando adhimokkho uddhaceaṅ manasikāro issā mac-

¹ B. omitis.
² P. adds micchāsamālhi.

Akusalacetasikā niṭṭhitā.


Kusalavipākacetasikā niṭṭhitā.

1 Ṭīkāyaṁ: Itarāni manoviśīṇānadhātu-santīranacittāni manodhātu sadisāni.
2 B. Arahattaphale.

Akusalavipākacetasikā nīṭṭhitā.


Kiriyaḥacetikā nīṭṭhitā. 3

1 B. "mahāvippakesu.
2 S. B. cha.
3 Tīkāyaḥ: Cittacaketasikakattā nīṭṭhitā.
1. Paṭhav’ āpo tejo ca, vāyodhātu tath’ eva ca, mahābhūtāni etāni cattāritis pavuccare.
2. Cakkhu sotaṅ ca ghānaṅ ca, jivhā kāyo tath’ eva ca, vānno saddo raso gandho itthipurisindriyaṅ tathā,
3. jīvitaṅ ceva viṁśatti ākāso lahutā pi ca mudu kammaṁñatā ceva upacayo santatī jarā.
4. aniccatā ca ojā ca, vatthurūpaṅ tath’ eva ca, catuvissati etāni upādā ti pavuccare.
5. Balā sambhavā jātī ca, rogarūpaṅ ca yaṅ mataṅ1 vāyo-vāri-dvaya2-bhedehi saṅgaḥitāni yathākkamaṅ.
6. Rūpaṅ saddo gandharasā, paṭhavī ca tath’ eva ca, tejo vāyo ca etāni paṅca cakkhādikāni ca;
7. sappatīghāni vuccanti, tathā oḷārikāni ca; solasā avasesāni sukhumāpattīghāni ca.
8. Cakkhādikāni paṅce eva ajjhātikāni vuccare, tevisat’ avasesāni3 bahiddhāṅ eva honti hi.
9. Rūpaṅ sanidassanaṅ vuttaṅ, avasesā nidassanaṅ, sattavisavidhaṅ hoti, taṅ sabbaṅ paripuṇḍitaṅ.
10. Aṭṭh’ indriyaṅi vatthuṅ ca kammene eva bhavanti hi, viṁśattīyo tathā dve pi citten’ eva bhavanti hi.
11. Saddo utuṅ ca cittaṅ ca upādā jāyate hi so; lahutā ceva mudutā, kammaṁñatā tath’ eva ca. utuṅ cittaṅ ca āhāraṅ, upādā pabhavanti hi;
12. Vānno gandho raso ceva paṭhavī tejo ca māluto, upacayo santatī āpo oj’ ākāsaṅ catūhi tu.
13. Cittaṅ cittaḷajārūpaṇaṅ uppade hoti paceayo; cittassa tikkhāne kammaṅ utu ojā thitikkhāne.
14. Kammene visatī honti, cittena dasa satta ca; paṇṭharaṇa utunā ca, āhārenā catuddasa; Jaratāniccatā ceva na kehici bhavanti hi.
15. Yāni kammena cittena, arūpeḥ etāni4 honti hi; Āhāraja5 utujani rūpehi tu bhavanti hi, na sambhonti rūpārūpehi6 jaratāniccatā pi ca.
16. Oḷārikāni vatthuṅ ca ojā tīṇindriyaṅi ca, āpodhātu ca etāni rūpārūpan ti vuccare;

1 Tīkāyaṅ: sammatatā. 2 B. caya.
3 B. tevisa avasesā. 4 S. B. arūpe tiṇi (na yujjati).
5 B. aṅkāja. 6 S. B. rūpārūpe (na yujjati).
17. Viññattiyo duve ceva lahutā kammanñatā pi ca, mudutā upacayo ceva santati ca tathā puna; vikārarūparāt etanti satī eva tu bhavanti hi.


19. Catudhā honti kāmānañ, rūpiñañ ca tiḍhā pana, asaṇñinañ tathā dvihi bahiddha utu neva tu.

20. Samatiṃsātī rūpiñi jāyanti paṭisandhiyā, ṭhitikkhane ca bhede ca tiṣṭa tiṣṭī eva honti hi;

21. Kāyadasakañ bhāvadasakañ vatthudasakam eva ca evañ navuti rūpiñi kammajān eva sandhiyā

22. Yathā paṭicca bijāni jāyate aṅkuro paro, tathā paṭicca sukkādi kalala jāyare ime.

23. Sandhicittassa dutiyañ bhavañgan ti pavuccati, ten aṭṭharūpā jāyanti utu oja hi solasa.

24. Kammajā navuti ceva, evañ jāyati ācayo sabhuttāharañ nissaya, mātuujāhatanissitañ, eka-dvīhañ atikkamma aṭṭha rūpāni jāyare, vatthudasakañ kāyadasakañ bhāvadasakam eva ca.

25. Cakkhumhi kammajā honti sambhārā catuvīsati, catupaññāsa sabbāni piñḍitāni bhavanti hi.

26. Tato sote ca ghāne ca, jivhāvatthumhi jāyare, Kāyamhi tu dve dasakā tisambhārāni honti hi; Caturcattālisa sabbāni piñḍitāni bhavanti hi.

27. Cakkhādikāni cattāri, vatthurūpañ tath' eva ca, Ekaṭṭhāninkarūpāni pañce eva tu bhavanti hi;

28. Kāyo itthipumattān ca, jīvitindriyam eva ca sabbatṭhāninkarūpāni imāni tu bhavanti hi.

Nāmarūpasamāso samatto.

1 B. and Ṭika: kāmānañ. 2 B. bhaṅge.
3 B. cakkhudasakañ. 4 B. and Ṭikā: tatāā.

Note.—Pages 9, 14 nn.: Ādāsapothake ti Śhalakkharehi mud-dāpite Nāmarūpasamāse atthi Abhidhammapakarañāgata-pothakh-sūti maññe.
II

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIONS

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TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH AND ANNOTATED BY S. Z. AUNG.¹

EDITED BY MRS. RHYS DAVIDS.

I.

We understand from S. Z. Aung's letter that the Hon. B. Russell in his philosophy attaches the greatest importance to relations. These in his view are neither physical nor mental, but more ultimate than either. Hence relations, in his view, are in some respects like Plato's "ideas" (or universals).² Relations (paccayā) are no less important in our philosophy. By "relations," with us, is meant that by which the connection between things—as between a cause and its effect—is marked. As marks (lakkhanā) are but features which characterize things, we may say that these marks pertain to things themselves. In other words, we may consider them as objective.

There are several kinds of marks common to things in general (sāmañña-lakkhanā), such as (1) marks of Immanence, Ill or Unsubstantiality; (2) marks of conditioned things (saṅkhata-lakkhanā); (3) marks of causation (idapaccayata-lakkhanā).

By marks of conditioned things the Buddha meant arisings and ceasings of things—i.e., changes from one state to

¹ The translation of Part I. of this paper was begun by Maung Myo, B.A., and revised by me.—S. Z. A.

another. "Bhikkhus!" said He, "there are three marks of conditioned things. Which three? Arising is apparent; ceasing is apparent; the other state of interval (between these two events) is apparent." These happenings are, like impermanence, etc., common to all conditioned things. By marks of causation we mean the relation by which we are enabled to say, "On this existing, that must have been. On this happening, that must have arisen." These causal relations are important not only in philosophic thought, but also in popular and scientific knowledge. It is by them that scientists are enabled to infer cause from effect or vice versa. Again, we know that abundant rainfalls produce a prosperous harvest, while scanty rainfalls result in the failure of crops. If the harvest be successful, prosperity would accrue to the people; but if it fail, poverty and starvation stare them in the face. Plenty of food is conducive to a healthy and happy life, but privation of food causes suffering and distress. Even lower animals may be accredited with the power of discerning some of these causal relations, as when they apprehend danger from a threatening attitude adopted by men. Our knowledge of relations may be scientific or unscientific. The causes of the diseases and the effects of medical treatment are best known to physicians. Astronomical relations are best known to those versed in astronomy, and chemical relations to chemists. This knowledge of relation is either superficial or profound, according as we know little or much of the different sciences. All kinds of relations in the universe of existence are treated of in the Great Book of Paṭṭhāna. But as the Buddha expounded them in terms of philosophical language, it is not easy to express them in popular language.

Buddhism has expounded relations by two methods:

1 The law of happening through a cause (Paṭiccasamuppāda-naya);

2 The system of correlation (Paṭṭhāna-naya). Such a statement of causal relations, as "Because of ignorance, volitions arise," and "Because of (past) volitions, arises

1 Anguttara, i. 152.
(future) consciousness,” illustrates the former method. It is simply stating that B happens, because A happens. But when we say that A as “condition,” “object,” etc., relates itself to B, we get an illustration of the latter method.

A thorough understanding of the causal relation by the law of happening through a cause is sufficient for the purposes of our salvation—i.e., for the attainment of the “fruit” and Nibbāna by, and through, the intuition or penetration of the Path into reality. But the system of correlation was enunciated by the Buddha with the sole intention of exercising his omniscience in order to spread knowledge. It is useful to disciples in developing their analytic insight, and it puts ordinary folk in the way of acquiring such insight in future.

Now, in any relation, a thing, A, which, as a causal term (paccaya), relates itself to another, B (paccayuppanna), must be one or other of these four: (1) a mental fact; (2) a physical fact; (3) a concept (paññatti); or (4) Nibbāna. But B is either physical or mental; concept and Nibbāna, which are absolutely exempt from becoming (or jāti), being excluded from the latter category. If a mental fact, A, relates itself to its correlate, B, its relation to B may be said to be mental, because it is principally derived from the influence of the mental A. Take the case of a notoriously ill-tempered man hated by the rest of the villagers. His illwill, A, relates itself to the hatred, B, of the villagers. Here he has not actually injured his fellow-villagers by hurt or abuse. But the influence of his illwill pervades the whole village and evokes a widespread reaction. The relations set up by illwill are decidedly mental. So are the relations of goodwill, in the same way as light and heat are necessarily included under the concept of Sun. Similarly the relations of physical things are physical; those of concepts, conceptual; and those of Nibbāna, Nibbānic. As the universe is without an apparent beginning, so it is not possible to say which of the two factors of existence—mind and matter—is more ultimate
than the other, still less to say so of their respective relations.

Now, we gather from S. Z. Aung’s letter that Plato's “ideas” correspond to our *Atthapaññatti*, while what are called “universals” correspond to *Saddapaññatti*. I might just as well explain what we mean and understand by these two terms. *Saddapaññatti* is the name of a thing, as expressed in a word, or represented by a sign. *Atthapaññatti* is the idea or notion of that thing, as signified by that word or sign. For example, when clay is shaped by a potter’s hand into a vessel, the peculiar form, figure, or shape gives rise to our idea of it as “jar,” and we attach the name “jar” to it. This name will adhere to it so long as it retains that shape. But as soon as the jar is broken up into pieces we no longer call it a jar. In this example matter is one thing and form another. Clay is not made by the potter’s hand. It is a component, constituent part of the earth. It is a natural product both before and after the potter’s manual labour, and retains its nature through various stages of transformation. On the other hand, the form (*saṃsthāna*) of the jar is just a concept derived from a combination and arrangement of clay in a certain manner. It is not inherent in clay. It is artificial and is not a constant element. The name “jar,” too, is applicable only when clay remains in that form. Inasmuch as the same clay may be made to assume different forms—e.g., the form of a cup—all these forms are temporary phenomena, or mere appearances. The Buddha likened our consciousness to a professor of legerdemain, or, as moderns would say, to an expert hypnotist. A skilled professor can hypnotize his subject into an illusion that the void space, or an expanse of water, is *terra firma*, so that a false jump may result in a death either by a fall or drowning. The empty or void space here corresponds to our formal concepts. It is through the hallucination of our mind that we mistake the mere forms of animate and inanimate objects for realities. So much for our explana-
tion of concepts and names of mere forms. But as we cannot avoid the use of concepts and names even when dealing with realities (paramattha-dhamma’s), we have recourse to such concepts and names to denote our mind and mentals (cetasikā, such as “contact,” “feeling,” etc.), matter and qualities (such as “extension,” “cohesion,” etc.). Now, the Real, with the sole exception of Nibbāna, is impermanent because it is subject to a ceaseless flux of change involved in becoming. But even as space is regarded as permanent, general concepts and ideas may be said to be also permanent, in the sense of exemption from the phenomena of becoming (i.e., arising and ceasing). How? Although the name “jar” is no longer applicable to a particular jar when it is broken up into pieces, yet the general concepts or notion of jar still remains in our mind to denote other individual members of that class of vessels.

Relations, however, are not permanent, as are general concepts of relations.

In our illustrations of illwill and goodwill the particular relations cease with those mental dispositions, though in the cases of their relations as object, sufficing condition, and Karma, their after-effects may subsist long even after the influence of the causal correlates is withdrawn. So also the relations of concepts (not the concepts of relations) and those of Nibbāna continue in existence only as long as persons who conceive the former and realize the latter are existent.

We have pointed out that things which relate themselves to others are either physical, mental, conceptual or Nibbānic, and their relations partake of their nature. Confining ourselves to the conditioned, we have further shown that both correlates in a relation are themselves impermanent, and that they cannot possibly maintain a constant relation. Our conclusion, therefore, is that relations themselves are not permanent in the way that concepts of relations are permanent.
II.

We now propose to explain (1) the exact import of the two terms "Paṭṭhāna" and "Paccaya," (2) their mutual connection, and (3) their application to particular forms of existence.

1. Thāna (lit. a station) may be defined as that thing in which, or that event by which, the "fruit" or effect is established.¹ Hence it comes to mean the cause by which an effect is occasioned.² The intensive prefix "pa" has the sense of "padhānamī," meaning predominance or pre-eminence. The term Paṭṭhāna therefore means the principal or pre-eminent cause among causes. The reader of Pali is referred to our work, Paṭṭhānuddesadīpanī, in the concluding pages whereof we explain the same term. From the above definition of Paṭṭhāna, the "Great Book" called Paṭṭhāna (of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka) must be understood as treating of only principal causes.

Effects of such causes are either direct or indirect. The one well-defined sort of event which bears an indispensable relation to a given cause is said to be a direct effect. All other outcomes of this direct effect are indirect effects. Given the sole, adequate cause, its direct effect invariably happens. But the indirect effects may, or may not, take place. There is no necessary connection between a cause and these indirect effects. In the Paṭṭhāna, principal causes are shown as relating themselves to their direct effects only. Hence the Paṭṭhāna treatise is devoted only to principal relations between invariably causes and inevitable effects.

¹ Thāna is defined as titṭhati phalay etha, etenāti vā thānay.
² I have introduced the terms "cause" and "effect" in the sense used by the Hon. B. Russell: "A cause is an event or group of events, of some known general character, having a known relation to some other event, called the effect, the relation being of such a kind that only one, or at any rate only one well-defined sort of event, can have the relation to a given cause" (Bertrand Russell’s Lowell Lectures, 1914, p. 226). The italics in the quotation are mine.—Tr.
For example, greed (lobha) relates itself to its concomitant mental and coexistent physical properties by way of "special condition" (or hetu). Here these properties directly spring into being along with their paṭṭhāna or cause. That is, whenever greed occurs, they inevitably occur, or wherever greed is found as a cause, they are invariably found as effects. But the matter does not always stop short there. Greed may give rise to a series of actions in deed, word, or thought, even after its stimulus is withdrawn. These sequences, then, are mere outcomes or results of direct effects.

We have not yet explained the term Paccaya. It may be defined as that event by which a fruit or effect derived from itself occurs.  

2.

Now, the difference between the two terms is that "paṭṭhāna" is limited to non-transitive relations to its direct effects, whereas "paccaya" covers not only non-transitive relations to direct effects, but also transitive relations to indirect effects. The relation of parents to their direct offspring represents the non-transitive relation of paṭṭhāna, while the relation of the same parents to their grandchildren represents the transitive relation of paccaya. The system of correlation treated of in the Great Book must therefore be interpreted, after its title Paṭṭhāna, as dealing with the non-transitive relations, and not with the transitive relations of paccaya's.

Commentators paraphrase the word "paccayo" by "upakaraka," meaning "rendering service." A mother renders service to her child by her function of conception, gestation, etc., and by her ministering to its wants. Here the mother, as a paccaya, relates herself to her child, as a

1 Note that effects need not always be later than a cause. The relation between a cause and its effect may be one of succession, or coexistence. Compare Russell's Lowell Lectures, 1914, pp. 215, 216, 217, 220, 226.—Tr.

2 Aṭṭānaṃ paṭiccā phalam ayati, pavattati etenaṃ paccayo.
paccayuppanna, by way of conception, gestation, parturition, and ministrations. But when an adult filially-minded son supports his mother in her old age, he, now become a paccaya, relates himself to his mother, now become a paccayuppanna, by way of gratitude and support. The son's gratitude is conducive to the mother's comfort and happiness.

In common parlance, the phrase "to render service" means "to do some good to another." But in the language of the Patthāna, it includes bad service as well. Thus, when a wicked son causes a mother's suffering, he still relates himself to her by way of paccaya.

We have shown that both terms—patthāna and paccaya—imply the idea of a causal relation. Elsewhere we have also shown that this relation between two variable terms cannot possibly be constant. That which is constant is the general concept of it. And because of this constancy, we are enabled to state the relation in a general proposition in the form of a causal law, called the paccayanaya ("naya" literally meaning a rule). This causal law receives a further epithet of Ananta-naya, because of its applicability to an "infinite" number of particular things (attha) as expressed by general terms (sadda). It is not customary to call it samantanaya, or "universal law." But the Great Book itself is styled Anantanaya-samanta-patthāna, because in it all principal causes, drawn from "all

1 Part I., supra. Russell maintains that the relation between two variable objects is constant in a causal law (Lowell Lectures, 1914, p. 214). What takes part in a causal law, which is but a general statement in the form of a proposition, is, however, not the inconstant, particular relation, which is as real, and at the same time as variable, as the objects themselves, but the mere concept of relation between two concepts as expressed by general terms. Also cf. p. 231, ibid.—Tr.

2 Cf. "Moreover, since the causal law is general, and capable of applying to many cases, the given particular from which we infer must follow the inference in virtue of some general characteristic, not in virtue of its being just the particular that it is" (Lowell Lectures, p. 214).—Tr.
directions,” meet in the form of causal laws of “infinite” applicability.¹

So much for our brief theoretic treatment of the causal law.

3.

We shall now attempt to show its importance in its application to particular facts of existence.

With the sole exception of Nibbāna, which is absolute, all factors of conscious or unconscious existence are relative —i.e., are not independent of relations.

First take mind. Mind is simply the consciousness of an object. No mental properties, such as “contact,” feeling, perception, etc., can possibly be independent of this simple fact of consciousness. This necessary dependence of the former on the latter is stated in the first verse of the Dhammapada. Consciousness, in turn, is correlated with the physical bases of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and “heart.”² These subtle bases are so inseparably connected with the sentient that they are described as sensitive organs. Visual consciousness proceeds from the physical base of eye, without which there can be no sight, and so for the rest of the senses. The physical bases are, again, the products of the four primary qualities of body—viz., extension, cohesion, heat and motion, all born of karma. In fact, they are but the specialized manifestations of these four essentials, or elements, for special functions.

The four essentials of matter depend for their sustenance and support upon the two material qualities of physical life and nutrition. The destruction of this vital force, or the non-assimilation of food, brings about the destruction of the essentials. Further, these essentials in a conscious being are never independent of his (reproductive) karma in a past existence.

Material qualities, born of mind, heat or food, are in

¹ Cf. “If the inference from cause to effect is to be indubitable, it seems that the cause can hardly stop short of the whole universe” (Lowell Lectures, p. 226; also cf. p. 221, ibid.).—Tr.

² On the heart-basis theory see Compendium, p. 277 f.
themselves not endowed with vitality, and therefore depend for their existence upon the karma-born material qualities which are so endowed, and which constitute the essential subjective organism. The former undergo different stages of decomposition so soon as the latter are destroyed.

But the vital force itself which preserves karma-born qualities from decay is but a derivative of the four essentials born also of karma. Therefore it is destroyed as soon as the latter are destroyed. No wonder that the Buddha likened life to a dewdrop on grass. In short, there is not a single mental or corporeal quality in a human being that is absolutely independent of relations to something—nay, not even in the Devas or Brahmās, who attain their respective status through the force of their past karma, but are still subject to birth and death, from which no being is exempt. Take the case of spiritual beings of the Arūpa plane of existence. One would think that their mind is independent of physical basis. But in reality it is not. Just as an arrow, shot from a bow, travels in its trajectory through the force applied to the bow-string, so is their mind, projected, as it were, from their previous physical constituents by the force of culture (bhāvanā) in the past existence, maintained in its course through the Arūpa plane, so long as that force has not spent itself.

Coming now to the consideration of inanimate physical objects—the earth, the sun, the moon, the planets and the stars—all are composed of the four essentials or elementals named above.

The element of extension is, so to speak, the substratum of matter, in which other elements inhere. Without it, bodies cannot occupy space. It gives rise to our idea of "hardness" or impenetrability of matter. Hardness implies softness and admits of various degrees. Even the soft rays of light possess this element of extension.

The element of cohesion pervades the entire mass of the hardest substance known. It gives rise to our idea of "body" by combining extended particles of matter. The smallest of these particles may be so minute and subtle
that we are compelled to describe them as a mere condition
or mode (ākāra), action (kriyā) or state (bhava), or call
them by any other names\(^1\) in worldly technology (loka-
vohāra). Thus atoms or corpuscles (anumrū), ions or
electrons (paramānumrū), are possible only by reason of
this element of cohesion. When solid bodies are melted,
this element is even more pronounced in the resulting
liquid.\(^2\) When bodies are reduced to powder, the same
element is still existent in the smallest particle. When
cohesion ceases to exist, extension also disappears with it.
The one cannot exist without the other. Cohesion and
extension are therefore interdependent upon each other.
Nothing that is subject to condition can independently
exist by itself.

The element of heat means the temperature of bodies,
of which there are various degrees. We call the lower
degrees cold in ordinary parlance, but in philosophy or
science cold (sīta-tejo) is not recognized as a separate
power apart from heat. Both heat and cold, then, have the
same function of maturing bodies. To mature is to sharpen
the powers. That is to say, heat makes its coexistent
elements more powerful.

Both heat and cold burn, the former swiftly and the latter
slowly. Heat depends upon the element of extension as its
combustible matter. But just as fuel is consumed by fire,
so is the element of extension, along with its other coexistent
element, consumed by heat.

Thus all material qualities of bodies first come into being,
then develop or mature, and finally decay through the same
element of heat. This same element, considered as one of
the four causes of matter, is also called utu, from “udati,”
“to produce,” because heat is capable of generating and
regenerating material qualities in physical phenomena.

\(^1\) E.g., ether-whirls, ether-rings, ether-vortices, ether-twists or ether-
strains.—Tr.

\(^2\) According to scientists, cohesion is strongest in solids. But the
Buddhist idea is that it is stronger in liquids, because their particles
tend to coalesce even after separation, which is not the case in solids
once broken up.—Tr.
If we closely observe a flame we may see its flickering
ever renewing itself and presenting a continuous light.
 Movements that are imperceptible to the eye may be felt.
 Even the cold mass of a mountain is undergoing a process
 of unperceived regeneration.

All physical phenomena, such as evaporation, cloud,
 rain and vegetation, are due to heat.

Ordinarily we speak of vibration with reference to
 single object, as when we say that this or that body vibrates.
 But in scientific philosophy, each wave-motion\textsuperscript{1} is con-
sidered as a separate, distinct phenomenon. A variety of
 motions gives rise to different phenomena. But if they
 occur in one and the same series, they give rise to a change
 from the old to the new. Thus when you see objects
 vibrating with energy, pulsating with life, you may be
 sure that they are undergoing momentary deaths.

So much for the influence of heat, or \textit{utu}, on the physical
 order of things.

The element of motion is inseparably connected with
 heat. Motion is the force of heat. In this sense it is its off-
spring. But it also assists heat in determining its intensity.\textsuperscript{2}

We have said that a variety of motions gives rise to
 various phenomena generated by the physical cause of \textit{utu}.
 Motion and heat in the physical domain are respectively
 analogous to mind and karma in the spiritual. The
 Buddha said that the creative evolution of animate things
 by mind is marvellous. But the evolution of inanimate
 objects by the latter is no less wonderful.

Now, we have shown that the essentials of matter are
 mutually dependent upon one another, and that the
 secondary qualities of body are dependent upon the
 primaries. Thus neither mind nor matter can be indepen-
dent of relation.

We shall now inquire whether relations are real or

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Kiriyā}, in this compound, literally means action or activity, and
 includes motion.—Tr.

\textsuperscript{2} It looks as if the Buddhists were feeling out for the vibratory
 theory of heat.—Tr.
merely conceptual, and then go on to indicate the points of resemblance and difference among the twenty-four modes of relation.

III.

In the foregoing we have explained the verbal import or logical definition of the term paccaya as a cause by which an effect comes to be. For example, the seed, the soil, the rain-water, the solar heat, and the air are all causes by which a tree is produced and is made to grow. Here the function of the seed is to germinate, and those of the remaining causes are to assist the process of germination of the plant and to favour the growth of the tree. But it is the seed that determines its specific type. Hence a mango tree cannot be produced out of a tamarind seed. From this example we can see that no conditioned things whatsoever can exist without their respective causes.

We have further explained the meaning intended to be conveyed by that term—namely, that the function of a cause consists in "rendering service" to its effect. For example, the seed does a service to the tree by the function or process of germination. The root draws water, which constitutes the principal food of plants from the soil sustaining it. Further, the plant requires a free access of light and air for its growth. The root, the water, the soil, the air, and the light all render services to the tree, each by its own function.

Cause, as defined above, implies some power, energy, or force (satti) through which its function (kicca) operates in a causal relation. And we have shown in our opening remarks on relations that this power, energy, or force is physical, mental, conceptual, or Nibbānic, according as the cause at work is matter, mind, concept, or Nibbāna. It is therefore obvious that the force itself is ultimately real (paramatthadhamma).\(^1\)

\(^1\) The learned writer seems to infer the reality of the force from the reality of the causal terms. But he has omitted to explain why the force exerted by a concept, which is unreal, should be real. I therefore venture to offer my own explanation. A concept which enters into a
Now, there are twenty-four modes of principal causal relations treated of in Buddhist philosophy.

1. Hetu.

The first causal relation is one by way of "root"-conditions, or hetu's. The term hetu denotes six mental factors—namely, greed, illwill, and ignorance, and their opposites. It connotes their function as root conditions. How? Just as a tree is firmly fixed to the ground by its root, so are certain correlated effects firmly established on objects by these root-conditions. Greed, for example, more or less, firmly fixes its coexistent mental or physical properties on an agreeable object coveted by it. Through its influence the whole self for the time being clings to the object which it grasps. For a time it cannot give it up. Greed, then, is the root-cause (hetupaccaya), A, which relates itself to B—i.e., the rest of the mental factors and their coexistent physical actions—as its effects (hetupaccayuppanna). And so for other root-causes.

For details readers are referred to our Patthānudesadīpanī. But briefly put, illwill also more or less firmly establishes itself and its correlates on an object of hate by way of aversion or antipathy, and ignorance does no less so by way of lack of knowledge. The opposite of greed is apparent in renunciation and in Jhāna exercises; the opposite of illwill is apparent in good conduct or higher ethics (brahmavihāra); and the opposite of ignorance, in analytic philosophical knowledge (Abhidhamma) and in intuitive or penetrative knowledge of reality (saccadhamma).

We have already observed that these correspond to the root of a tree in their function. As the growth of a tree depends upon the condition of its root, so does the evolution of the whole universe depend on these six roots and on them alone. The functions of a root are various. It

causal relation is a particular, as Mr. Russell, too, would say. It is an idea actually conceived at the moment, and therefore possesses a kind of reality belonging to a sense-datum. Its force is therefore real. Cf. Lowell Lectures, 1914, p. 213.—Tr.
firmly establishes the tree on earth; it draws up from the soil the food for the plant; and it further enables the tree to stand against the forces of wind and water. As long as the root is in a sound condition, so long the tree can subsist, grow, and thrive. No other conditions will avail should the root fail. Hence the root is the principal condition of a tree's growth. The six mental factors named act like roots of the trees of human actions in this world. In fact, all our actions, in deed, word, or thought, proceed from these primary sources. Some of our bad acts proceed from greed, some from illwill, and some from ignorance. All our good acts are due to their absence.

The entire question of the Why and Wherefore of good and bad comes under this causal relation.

LITERATURE. — Anguttara-Nikāya; Tika-nipāta, Third Vagga, chap. iii. (vol. i., 134 f.) ; the Mūlayamaka of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka (Yam. i., 1 f.).

2. Ārammaṇa.

The next relation is that of an object to a subject, mind, matter, Nibbāna, and concepts constituting the causal terms. In fact, there is nothing in the universe that cannot function as an object of consciousness. But the subject is restricted to mind alone. Matter, Nibbāna, or a concept, not being subjective, cannot enter into relation with an object.¹ Men seek wealth because they cannot get on in this world without it. Similarly mind seeks its objects, for it cannot exist without them.

There are six classes of objects: five of sense and one of thought. A present visible thing causally relates itself to visual consciousness by way of an object. And so for the rest of external senses. But all the six classes of objects can act on the inner sense or mind by entering into causal relations either in presentative or representative conscious-

¹ In other words, the relation of, say, matter, A, as object to mind, B, is asymmetrical; that is, B does not bear the same relation to A as A does to B. The relation of a mental object to a mental subject is merely non-symmetrical. I am indebted to Mr. Russell for the terms "asymmetrical" and "non-symmetrical."—TR.
ness. And there are several classes of consciousness (as
detailed in Part I. of the Compendium) to which an object
can relate itself. Past and future objects can likewise act
on present mind. There is no object but can relate itself
to the omniscience of a Buddha.

3. Adhipati.

(a) Sahajatādhipati.

In the causal relation of the dominant to the dominated,
certain mental factors, namely, intention or desire-to-do
(chanda), energy or effort (viriya), mind or will (citta), and
reason or intellect (rūmāyā), may be dominant over their
respective coexistent properties. By “dominant” we
mean “peerless.” When any of these four has acquired
such a sufficient force as to dominate the rest, nothing else
can resist its influence, in the same way as no animals can
withstand the power of the lion, king of beasts. These
four factors form the bases of the accomplishment of great
things. A sufficiently powerful intention will, sooner or
later, achieve its object, however great, whether that be
meritorious or otherwise. An equally supreme effort which
surmounts all obstacles and difficulties in labour and hard-
ship will certainly carry its object through. A sufficiently
strong will is equally bound to effect its object. Intellectual
reason which gets the upper hand cannot fail to accomplish
its ends, either in the acquisition of knowledge or in the
solution of intricate problems. Each of these four mental,
then, may causally relate itself to coexistent properties,
mental or physical, by way of dominance.

(b) Ārammanādhipati.

In this causal relation, certain objects of great regard
may dominate the percipient mind, as when a person who

1 Citta in this connection always refers to the javana-cittuppāda, or
apperceptional state of consciousness, in which the will asserts itself
over its coexistent properties; therefore the whole state may be said
to dominate other things coexistent with it.
seeks gold is possessed and obsessed by the dominant idea of that precious metal. When so dominated, he cannot possibly give up or get rid of it, notwithstanding the troubles and hardships to which he is put by his desire to get gold. In fact, all agreeable objects may, more or less, dominate the mind in this way.

LITERATURE.—The Mahāvagga-Iddhipāda-Saṅyutta of the Suttanta (S. v., 254 f.), and the Iddhipādāvibhanga of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka (Vibh. 216 f.).

4. Anantara.

In the causal relation of one mental to another which is contiguous to it in time, each preceding state of consciousness causally relates itself to its immediate successor in a process of thought. For each individual the series is uninterrupted till existence is completed on finally passing away, as in the case of an Arahant. There is a not a mere sequence or succession in time, without any causal connection between the two correlated terms. But it is the temporal relation which is necessarily taken account of by the causal law. In function, therefore, each predecessor towards its successor is like a parent towards its offspring. The only difference is that, whereas the parent lives when the child is born, the predecessor in the mental sequence expires before its successor appears. Just as an heir normally inherits the property of his deceased parent, so does a succeeding unit of consciousness inherit all the energy, all the functions, and all the impressions of the expired unit.

5. Samanantara.

But because the two states blend themselves in such a way as to present one continuous mind,1 the same temporal relation is also spoken of as one of immediate contiguity in time. This continuity of members of the

1 We may say one continuous spectrum of mind where one colour shades off into another, so that it is difficult to say where one ends and where the other begins.—Tr.
series has led to the theory of immortality being usually applied to mind, as soul, rather than to body.

22, 23. Natthi; Vigata.

We have observed that a predecessor expires when its successor makes its appearance. For this reason, the same causal relation in mental sequence is also spoken of as one of absence (*Natthipaccayā*) and sometimes as one of abeyance (*Vigatapaccayā*).\(^1\)

12. Āsevana.

The causal relation by way of habitual recurrence is a species of the foregoing. But it is limited to the sequence of similar states of consciousness during apperceptional moments in a process of thought. Mind is most active during these moments. All our moral and immoral acts proceed from these apperceptional states, as also all our movements in action and speech. Now, to make an habitual use of a thing (*āsevati*) is to cultivate it, and to cultivate is to practise repeatedly for many times. If, for example, in reading a lesson many times, each new reading is more improved than the previous by repetition of the process, the improvement so effected is called proficiency.\(^2\) Such proficiency is culture (*bhāvanā*), and culture is āsevana, which is thus the recurrence of an improved state of affairs by habitual repetition of similar circumstances. Thus when each previous state has power to effect an improvement in its immediate successor of the same kind in this way, the former is said to relate itself causally to the latter by way of habituation. Apperceptional states of consciousness of the world of sense-desires can recur only seven times at the very outside in a process of thought. A

\(^1\) *Vigata*: lit. gone away.

\(^2\) An unconscious plagiarism of the following passage from Russell, *Lowell Lectures*, p. 280: "If, for example, I read a certain poem many times, my experience on each occasion is modified by the previous readings, and my emotions are never repeated exactly." *Pāgūṇabhāva* is the same as *pāgūṇatā* of the *Compendium*.—Tr.
gradual improvement is effected up to the fourth moment in this series, when it begins to decline till the process of repetition ceases at the seventh moment.¹ This causal relation by way of habituation is apparent in the world as practice, and is useful in the acquisition of the knowledge of sciences and arts. We have observed that the power of improvement is appropriated by the apperceptional states in a process of thought. But the exercise of that power may be repeated in several thousands of similar processes in a single day. This process of repetition may be carried on for many days, months, years, or for many lives. Since practice makes a man perfect, the ten Perfections of the Bodhisats were brought about in this way. Some persons may have sufficient power to exert themselves so as to attain Jhāna, Super-knowledge, the Path and the Fruit in this very existence. Āsevana is to be understood in such phrases as "to cultivate right views," etc. But in the Great Book, according to its title of Patṭhāna, the causal relation under discussion is restricted to one which obtains between two states of consciousness, during apperceptional moments in a process of thought, because it is the principal relation of the kind. It is to be understood that the first apperceptional state causally relates itself to the second but not to the third, and the second to the third but not to the fourth, and so on, by way of immediate contiguity in time. But we may add, that the first causally relates itself to the third, fourth, etc., by way of sufficing condition. Further, the two terms of this relation must be necessarily similar—e.g., both must be appetitives or aversives. That is, an appetitive cannot causally relate itself to an aversive in this way.

LITERATURE.—The Mahāvagga Saṅyutta of the Suttanta Piṭaka (S. v.).

¹ The rise and fall of the power of thought may be represented by a wave of thought in which the fourth moment forms the crest. Cf. the translator’s article on "The Forces of Character" in Buddhism (Rangoon, 1908).—Tr.

We now come to the consideration of the causal relation of coexistence in time. Just as a flame is accompanied by heat and light, and sometimes by a peculiar odour of its own, certain things or events have the power of bringing about their effects simultaneously with them.

There are four different relations of this kind, namely the relation of—

(a) A mental to a mental;
(b) A mental to a physical;
(c) A physical to a physical; and
(d) A physical to a mental.

All mentals coexistent in a state of consciousness, forming any one of the thirty-three modes of grouping dealt with in Part II. of the *Compendium of Philosophy* (*Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*), are related to one another under (a). Here the relation is symmetrical. That is, the relation between the two terms A and B holds good as between B and A.

Under (b) we have (i.) the relation of reborn mentals to karma-born material qualities of body at the moment of conception; (ii.) the correlation of mind with physical organism in life after conception. In the former case both the mentals and physicals spring into being simultaneously.

Under (c) any one of the four primary qualities of body causally relates itself to (i.) any one of the remaining three and (ii.) to their derivatives, in each of the twenty-one groups, or *kalāpa’s*, dealt with in Part VI. of the *Compendium*. It must be remembered that the derivatives cannot attain the status of a cause or *paccaya*. That is, the relation between the primaries, A, and the secondaries, B, is asymmetrical. In other words, the relation of A to B cannot be reciprocally borne by B to A.

Under (d) may be instanced the correlation of the basis of "heart" to mentals at the moment of conception.

In Part II. of this paper we pointed out how material qualities give rise to our ideas of "bodies" from the tiniest particle to the biggest mass. But in the Great
Book, true to its title of *Pathṭhāna*, only relations of material qualities within any one *kalāpa* are principally intended as illustrations of the causal law embodying the relations of physicals to physicals by way of coexistence.

This relation of (i.) coexistence includes the following varieties:

(ii.) Dependence-in-coexistence (*8a. Sahajātanissaya*);
(iii.) Co-presence (*21a. Sahajātatthi*); and
(iv.) Inseparableness-in-coexistence (*24a. Sahajāta-avigata*).

Coexistence is not mere juxtaposition in space and time without any real connection between the two correlated terms A and B. A may serve as the basis of B, if the latter depends for its existence on the former, or A may be inseparably connected with B, if A be indispensable for B's coexistence. In either case, both terms must be co-present.

These four form the genus of the relation of coexistence. The following are its species:

(v.) The relation of reciprocity (*7. Aññamaññapaccaya*);
(vi.) The mutual relation of results-to-results in fruition (*14. Vipākapaccaya*);
(vii.) The relation of association (*19. Sampayuttapaccaya*); and
(viii.) The relation of dissociation (*20. Vippayuttapaccaya*).

We have seen that both terms, A and B, may be either physical or mental. If A and B be both mentals, or both primary qualities of body, or if A be the physical basis of mind, B, at the moment of conception, then the relation of reciprocity obtains.

1 When A and B are both mentals or primaries, the relation of reciprocity is symmetrical. The correlation of *heart* with mind at conception is a special case of reciprocity. Physical bases of mind at other times in life are dealt with under the relation of pre-existence, because they spring into being earlier than consciousness, which depends upon them for existence.—Tr.
We think a word of explanation is needed to show what is meant by the relation of fruition. Just as a ripe fruit is soft, so are the mature results of moral or immoral karmas. That is, these mental results are inactive and quiescent. Witness such results in the form of the vital continuum of a person who is either absent-minded or asleep. When we are free from cares and anxieties, all our physical comforts are due to the quieting qualities of results. In this relation A is always mental, but B may be either mental or physical.

We now pass on to the discussion of the relation of association. When waters flowing from different springs combine in a big river, they are no longer distinguishable by their sources. There is a thorough fusion. In the same way, when both A and B are mentals, their coalescence in coexistence is spoken of as the relation of association. But just as quicksilver refuses to mix with water, so a mental and a physical dissociate from each other in coexistence. In the relation of dissociation, then, A is mental when B is physical, or vice versa.

Now, if A be mental, it may be (ix.) a root-condition (hetu), (x.) a mental dominant factor, (xi.) a karma, (xii.) a mental food, (xiii.) a mental control, (xiv.) a Jhāna-constituent, or (xv.) a Path-constituent.

We have already explained root-conditions and mental dominants under (1) and (3) above. It only remains here to observe that the relations of root-condition and mental dominance are minor species of coexistence.

13a. Kamma.

We now come to the consideration of the Karmic relation of coexistence. Karma is ultimately reduced to the psychological factor of volition. And volition is the unique determination of will. Will-exercise is power over its coexistent mental properties and physical qualities. In fact, all our activities in deed, word, or thought are due to its influence. But here we are not concerned with the aspect
of will in its relation to effects in after-life. We will advert to it later.

There remain four other minor species of coexistence to be briefly discussed.

15. Āhāra.

Just as material food supports body, so do mental foods support mind. Mental "contact" or reaction nourishes concomitant properties, especially feeling; will serves its concomitant properties in the execution of deed, word, or thought; and consciousness also serves as the support of concomitant properties in thinking about an object. These three mental foods in nourishing the mind also affect the body. Strictly speaking, material food is to be excluded from consideration under this causal relation of coexistence, because it begins to act only when it reaches its own static stage of metabolic development. But since it bears the relation from that moment, it may be included under this head.

Literature.—The Seventh Vagga of the Nidāna-Saṅyutta (S. ii., 94-128).

16. Indriya.

We pass on to the causal relation of control in coexistence. Psychic life, consciousness, feeling, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentrative power of thought, and intuition, are called Controls, because they exercise control over their coexistent mental and physical properties, in their respective departments. Life controls them in the matter of their prolongation by continuity; mind, in the matter of thinking about an object; pleasure, in causing comfort to body, and pain, in causing discomfort to it; joy, in happiness, and grief, in distress; and equanimity, in indifference. Faith controls its concomitants in religious convictions; energy, in supreme efforts; mindfulness, in contemplative exercises; concentrative power of thought, in the attainment of Jhāna; and intuition, in penetrating the real.

The difference between the relation of dominance and that of control is this: in the former the dominant factor is
supreme like an Emperor, whereas in the latter the controls have compeers, like Kings under the suzerain power, or ministers under a King. No two dominant factors, each exercising the paramount authority, can exist side by side, but many controls may co-operate with one another at the same time. Physical life does not exercise its influence over a karma-born group of material qualities till it reaches its own static stage of development. But it may be included under this relation, as in the case of material food.

Self-control practised by Bhikkhus is an instance of this relation.

LITERATURE. — The Indriya-Saṅyutta of the Mahāvagga of the Suttanta (S. v., 193 f.), and the Indriya-Yamaka of the Abhidhamma (Yam. ii., 61 f.).

17. Jhāna.

Jhāna means a close observation and contemplation of an object. It is a straight and steady aim at the objective like that of a hunter with his arrow. Vitakka, or the initial application of the mind, is a factor of this process consisting in the direction of its concomitant properties towards the object; Vicāra, or the sustained application of the mind, is the hovering, so to speak, of its concomitants over the object; Piti, or interest, is the satisfaction with it; Sukha, or happiness, is the experience of it; and Ekaggatā, or the individuality of the object to mind, is the steadiness of mind on object. It is through the influence of one or other of these factors in its causal relation to its coexistent properties that in all our actions we are enabled to carry out our object, to attain the end in view. Without this influence a hunter would not be able to take a steady aim at his game. Without it, we should not be able to observe any distinctions in forms. Without it, we should not be able to make or take even a single right step. A man may aim eastward, but he will swerve southward, and fall westward. During this wavering step, his mind may wander to another object and become forgetful of the first. In such a state of mental distraction, he would not be able to repeat even the easiest lesson. The
mind's movement from object to object is very rapid. In fact, the mind is like a wild bull-calf, and the Jhāna factor is like a tether by which it is roped to a stake. It acts on both mind and body. It is absent in the external senses—that is, at the moment of sensing in a process of presentative consciousness.

_Literature._—The Jhānavibhaṅga of the Abhidhamma (Vibh. 244 f.).

18. Magga.

Path-factors include (a) intuition (or paññā), (b) aim (vitakka), (c) right speech, (d) right act, (e) right life, (f) energy, (g) mindfulness, (h) individualizing power of mind (ekaggatā), and (i) opinion (dīttīhi).

Aim, energy, and individuality are common to both good and bad. But opinion (that is, erroneous view or mīcchā-dīttīhi) pertains to bad only, and the other five to good only.

Wrong speech, wrong act, wrong life, and wrong mindfulness are included under the term "immoral thought" (akusala-cīta), and are therefore not distinctively set forth in Buddhist philosophy as factors of the wrong path.

Now, Magga or Path means a road. The advantages of roads as means of reaching different destinations in all directions from one's place are evident. Carts, boats, ships, carriages, etc., are factors of journey on a road. Erroneous view is a straight road to evil destiny, and wrong aim, wrong effort, wrong mindfulness, and wrong concentration are like vehicles plying on that road. Intuition or penetrative understanding, which is but another name for right view, is, on the other hand, a main road leading to happy destiny, aye, to Nibbāna, and right aim, right speech, right act, right life, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration are vehicular means of journey on it. The remaining mental properties are like travellers, each on his own business. We may go further and say that all conscious beings are travellers.

These path-factors may act on both mind and body. This causal relation follows so closely on the wake of that
of root-condition that it is possible to find the former in seventy-one states of consciousness accompanied by root-conditions.

LITERATURE.—The Mahāvagga-Saṃyutta (S. v.), and the Atṭhakaniṇīpāta, as well as the Navaniṇīpāta of the Anguttara-Nikāya (A. iv., 150 to end); the Maggavibhaṅga of the Abhidhamma (Viś. 283 ff.).

19. Purvātā.

The term “pre-existent” (purvātā) must not be understood to mean a wholly antecedent¹ state which has expired before a consequence arises, but a thing, event, or process which partly precedes, and partly overlaps with, a later event, or thing, or process to which the earlier causally relates itself. Such pre-existent things may be either physical bases or objects of consciousness. Both invariably take part in a process of external presentative consciousness. How? Just as a reverberation of notes takes place when a lyre-string is struck once, even so, when a pre-existent object strikes an equally pre-existent basis, the vibration of the continuum, set up by the impact, gives rise to a series of consciousness with the same object in a presentative process of thought.

This series terminates only when the object completes its life-cycle of seventeen mental moments. In a process of sight, the physical basis of eye partly precedes the visual consciousness to which it causally relates itself, and the object also partly precedes the series of consciousness to which it severally relates in turn.

So, too, for the other external senses.

In the case of the internal sense, each state of consciousness that takes part in a process of thought invariably depends upon the heart-basis, which springs into being at the next previous moment.

This causal relation is the function of only eighteen kinds of predetermined qualities of body, having a normal life-

¹ The terms “antecedent” and “consequent,” adopted in the Compendium, are somewhat misleading.—Tr.
cycle of seventeen moments and overlapping with the present. In other words, pre-existent things must continue to be present if they were to enter into this causal relation. When the mind attends to past or future objects, concepts, Nibbāna, or material qualities other than the aforesaid eighteen, this causal relation does not obtain.

The relation of prior or pre-existing physical basis to mind is one of dependence (Nissaya), because the latter depends for its existence upon the former as its basis; or one of dissociation (Vippayutta), because mind and matter refuse to coalesce; or one of co-presence or in-separableness (Atthi or Avigata), because the physical basis is inseparably present along with the mind; or one of control (Indriya), because the five physical bases control the external senses.

Similarly, objects which partly precede consciousness are latterly co-present and inseparable from their respective subjects. If such objects be extremely desirable and much coveted, they may dominate the mind. In that case the relation of dominance also obtains. Or if they be sufficiently strong to act on the mind at any later time, the relation of sufficing condition would obtain.

Literature.—The Āyatana-Saṅyutta of the Suttanta (S. iv., 1 f.); the Āyatanaśāstra (Vībh. 70 f.); and the Āyatana-Yamaka of the Abhidhamma (Yam. i., 52 f.).

11. Pacchājāta.

The causal relation of post-existence (pacchājāta) may also be one of dissociation, co-presence, or inseparable connection by continuance (avigata).

All posterior mentals that spring into being after the moment of conception are said to be post-existent, because they are partly preceded by their physical correlates. That is, the former come into existence only when the latter reach the static stage of their own development.

Just as middle and final rains are beneficial to a crop grown at the beginning of the rains, so later mentals
render service to earlier corporeal qualities born of karma, mind, heat, or food. In this causal relation of mentals to physicals by way of post-existence, the terms, though co-present and inseparably connected by continuance, necessarily dissociate one from the other. Physical life which controls the body, animal temperature which is but the primary quality of blood-heat born of karma, and consciousness which is post-existent, constitute the tripod of conscious existence as treated of in the Mahāvedalla-Sutta of the Fifth Vagga of the Mūlapaṅnāsa in the Majjhima Nikāya (M. i., 292).

13b. Kamma.

We have hitherto discussed only one aspect of karma in its causal relation by way of coexistence under (6).

We have seen that karma is will, and that will determines itself. This determination first consists in causing its co-existent properties to perform their respective functions. The functioning of the entire mind through its influence produces (mental) "results," and karma-born qualities of body after it ceases to act. Therefore karma differs in time from its effects. Hence it is asynchronous. It may work them out, either in the very present existence, or in the immediate next rebirth, or in any one life of the subsequent series, until existence is completed. The act of volition at the first apperceptional moment, if sufficiently strong, is capable of effecting its results almost immediately in the same life; that at the seventh moment, its results in the next existence; and those at the five intermediate moments, in any life of the series from the third rebirth onward till Nibbāna is reached, as an opportunity for fruition presents itself. But should they fail to mature results within the time limit allotted to each kind for any reason or other, they become inoperative for ever by being time-barred.

This fact is very briefly dealt with in Part V. of the Compendium. Asynchronous karma is important in that the entire sentient evolution in different planes of
existence is directly, and that of the physical world is indirectly, due to it. Just as plants grow from their respective seeds, so beings evolve from their karmas. Those who deny this causal relation of asynchronous karma fall into all sorts of erroneous views.

LITERATURE.—The Sāleyyaka Sutta, the Verañjaka-Sutta, the Cūḷadhammasamādāna and Mahādhammasamādāna-Suttas of the Fifth Vagga in Mūlapaṇṇasa, Majjhima-Nikāya (M. i., 285, 290, 305, 309); the Bālapaṇḍita-Sutta, Second Vagga, the Devadūta-Sutta, Third Vagga, the Cūḷakammavibhaṅga and Mahākammavibhaṅga-Suttas (M. iii., 163, 178, 202, 207); the Fourth Vagga in Uparipaṭṭasāsa (M. ii., 243); the Apādāna, the Vimāṇavatthu, the Petavatthu of the Khuddaka Nikāya.


By Upanissaya or sufficing condition is meant a powerful thing or event on which an effect depends for existence. A dominant object, i.e., an object of great interest, an immediately expired mental state or any other cause-in-nature, adequate to produce its own effect, may act as a sufficing condition.

We have explained the first two of these under (3) and (4) respectively. We said in our Patṭhānuddesadiṇī that all causes necessarily taken account of by (pākato: lit. means evident to) natural philosophers (lokapākatiya paṇḍita) are sufficient or adequate to produce their own effects. In fact, all natural causes (both physical and spiritual) are adequate. A natural cause may be defined as thing, event, or action in nature on which its effect largely depends for existence. Suppose you treated a friend very kindly and hospitably when he visited you, he would be a pākata (or a person to whom) something was done in the past. As such, he may be well depended upon, when you return his visit, according to his means, position or status in life. Of course, the extent to which you may look to him for hospitality depends upon the degree of attention you paid to him.

If a man were to build a house well, it would be a pākata or a thing done well. It would afford protection to himself
and his successors. If a cultivator cleared land for cultivation, that land would be a pākata, and would be a means of subsistence for him and his posterity. A student learns his lessons thoroughly. His learning would stand him in good stead. All our higher karmas (sublime and spiritual) are instances of sufficing conditions. So also are our principal transgressions. By a sufficing condition is meant one that cannot be effaced—e.g., the five serious crimes of matricide, parricide, etc.

This causal relation by way of sufficient condition may be classified into that of—

(a) A present to a present;
(b) A past to a present;
(c) A future to a present; and
(d) A timeless to a present.

Association, environments, and all our physical surroundings may be instanced under (a). All our ancestors and all our past acts or karmas illustrate (b). All our expectations and anticipations, all our hopes and ideas, come under (c). No being is ever without these. In fact, all of us are, more or less, governed by our hopes. We are led onward by our ideals. We are stimulated to present efforts by them as our goals. We are regulated in all our actions by hopes of future reward or dread of future punishment. All our present efforts, when maturing their fruits in future, become past sufficing conditions, and the fruits themselves become the present effects, to which those past efforts causally relate themselves as sufficing conditions.

Now, why are Nibbāna and concepts described as timeless, or out of time (kālavimutta)? Because they are not subject to the two principal events of birth and death which occur in time. Nibbāna is a great sufficing condition for the wise to cultivate all good and perfections—e.g., charity, virtue, etc., as well as all purities and factors of enlightenment. Even our relative exemption from all dangers in this world is longed for by us. Therefore Nibbāna-peace which we long for is a sufficient condition.
Again, just as space is a sufficient condition for birds to fly and for all other creatures to move about, so all our concepts are sufficient conditions for our intellects to move about and increase our knowledge.

Or we may classify this causal relation under that of—

(a) A moral to a moral;
(b) A moral to an immoral;
(c) A moral to an immoral;
(d) (c) and (f) An immoral to a moral, immoral, or unmoral;
(e) (h) and (i) An immoral to a moral, immoral, or unmoral;

(a) Faith, virtue, experience, etc., may lead to ethically good acts.
(b) But they may also give rise to pride or conceit.
(c) Men like our Bodhisats, in doing good acts, undergo a great deal of physical discomfort and trouble. Now, physical pain is a thing unmoral, and good acts are moral. Again, anyone who fears to undergo the ordeal and trial is far from achieving any good. But others reap the fruits of their labour or good acts according to the degree of exertion—*e.g.*, as Buddhhas Supreme, Buddhhas Special (*pacceka*), Disciples, and so forth. All our happy results so achieved are unmoral.
(d) But just as patients seek medicine, or persons in dread of fire seek water, or nations desirous of immunity from attack by enemies seek armed peace, so persons who wish to get rid of bad seek its opposite. A murderer practises virtue, etc., through repentance. In this case murder is in causal relation to virtue. And so for other forms of evil.
(e) Self-love and self-interest lead to commission of evil deeds of murder, theft, etc.
(f) A wicked man sometimes gets on in this world. His corruptions stand in causal relation to his
prosperity, which is as unmoral as adversity he generally meets with.

(9) (h) Our physical organs give rise to good and bad acts.

(i) Our organs are means of enjoyment, or the reverse. Some are loved for good features and a sweet voice; others are hated for the opposites. Some animals are killed for flesh, some for plumage, some for skins, some for bones, and some for oil. Here flesh, plumage, etc., which are unmoral, are in causal relation to danger or death.

All our wealth, possession, and prosperity are unmorals, yielding happiness or misery, which are equally unmoral.

To sum up. All causes in nature, other than the remaining twenty-three causes or paccayas, specially treated of in the Great Book, with the exception of dominant objects, immediately expired mental states, and karmas capable of effecting results at some future time, are sufficing conditions.

Recapitulation.

A cause which implies some real power, energy, or force, is adequate to produce its effects. In short it is always (i.) a sufficing condition (upaniṣṣayapaccaya). It may be past, present, future, or out of time, e.g., as (ii.) an object of consciousness (ārammaṇa-paccaya). This object is to the mind like early rains to certain reptiles hibernating in earthy burrows, or to certain amphibious animals confined to small collections of water. Now, the causal law which expresses the relation between two terms necessarily takes account of temporal relations of (iii.) coexistence (sahajatā) and succession.

Coexistent causes are always indispensably present (atthi and avigata). But (iv. and v.) some of them may have occurred earlier or later than their effects, with which they partly overlap (pūrejāta and pacchājāta).

In succession, causes need not always be earlier than their
effects. But expired mental states and (vi.) asynchronous karmas which wholly precede their effects are always past. Further (vii.), expired mental states are contiguous in time to their successors (anantarapaccaya).

But in Part VIII. of the Compendium a different classification of relations into six groups was adopted, according to the two terms of a relation, in the stanza beginning with the line: "Mind may to mind sixfold relation bear."¹

¹ Compendium, p. 192. In this summary the writer reduces the twenty-four relations to seven principal relations, instead of the classical four (Compendium, Section 12, p. 197). But in either case sufficing condition indicates the nature of a cause, and object is but a species of this cause. The rest are intended to show the temporal relations of coexistence, or simultaneity, and sequence, or succession. Cf. Russell generally on "The Notion of Cause" in Lowell Lectures, 1914.—Tr.
III

Aggarāmaya,
Ambalangoda,
July 9, 1914.

To the Editor JPTS.

Sotthi bhavatu,
Nāmarūpaparicchedassa Maramma-nissayo (athavā
atthavaṇṇanā) mayā ito katipayadivasānam upari laddhā.
Sā pi sabbaso na parisuddhā; tathāpi amhākaṭ potthake
yāni asuddhapāṭhāni, tāni samoloketvā likhitvā iminā
sahā pesemi. Yadi sakka suddhipatṭaṭ yojetuṭ, tathā
karotu. Atha ca pana muddita-potthakena saṃsandetvā
imaṭ paṭṭaṭ oloketabbaṭ . . .

tumhākaṭ vissāsiko,
A. P. Buddhadatta.

ERRATA IN NĀMARŪPAPARICCHEDA, JPTS 1913-14.

gāthā. pada.

41 . 2 for catudhammā read cha tu dhammā.
68 . 2 for sampattā read samattā.
68 . 4 read vohārabhoga-bheditā.
88 . 1 read asammosā sabhāvesu.
95 . 3 read aparipphandana-rasā.
120 . 1 for salakkhaṇaṭ read salakkhaṇe.
120 . 2 for lakkhaṇaṭ read kevalaṭ.
125 . 2 for vanassāsavaraso read vanassāvaraso B.
137 . 1 for  thāni read  bandhena B.
177 . 1 for  ucca read  uddhacca).
240 . 1 for nimitta read nimittaṭ.
246 . 2 for  vatthukā read  vatthunā.
278 . 3 read sāsavā  vajjapākāni.
299 . 3 for paṇcadvāre read paṇcavāre.
gāthā. pada.

383. 2 for karādito read garaḍito.
409. 3 for bhāvanāphala° read bhāvanābala°.
429. 2 for kammajāti read kammajāni.
482. 2 for °no bhavā read °ko bhavo.
479. 1 for satthā yañ read yatthāyañ.
548. 4 for sada read yadā.
551. 2 for purakkhattena read pūrakattena.
581. 1 for kamma° read kammañ.
627. 1 for parāmāsā read parāmatthā.
628. 2 for ca vipissiyā read cāvipissiyā.
657. 4 for kārakā read khādakā.
658. 1 for anattā c'ahitā read anatthāvahitā.
661. 1 for citt'edan read cintentañ.
671. 2 for °ka-pasadato read °kam asārato.
700. 3 for dhammānañ read dhammesu.
701. 4 for durammukhā read rudammukhā.
754. 1 for vuttā yā read vuttāyañ.
758. 2 for °nupassitā read °nusayitā.
768. 1 for bhavopapatti° read sā vopapatti°.
808. 1 for javā-paguna° read javā paguna°.
820. 4 for nāmarūpānam read nāmañ rūpānam.
859. 4 read attahacchāyāvabhāsini.
866. 4 read rājaputto 'tujaṇiko.
867. 3 for °vattā° read 'vatthā°.
873. 4 for jānanañ read cetasañ.
878. 3 for ullopa° read ullāpa°.
909. 1 for dvāra° read dāru°.
929. 1 for ajjhitthā read āvitthā.
935. 1 for jumbhanti read jumbhantā.
992. 2 for parañ read padagañ.
1107. 3 for mariyādāya read mariyādo 'yam.
1145. 4 read sobheti jinasāsanañ (?).
1155. 4 read avanānamala-vajjanañ.
1220. 1 for accantarāya° read bhavantarāya (?)
1283-1284 insert between these numbers:

1283a appaṇāy' opacārena, tam evātha samādahāñ,
yogi samādahāñ cittañ, sikkhatiti pavuccati.
gāthā. pada.

1313. 2 for mando read anto.
1325. 2 for vipanna° read vipphanda°.
1351. 1 for vimosāya read vihesāya.
1376. 1 for sampanna° read pasanna°.
1468. 3 read kasiṅapagamākāsaṅ.
1485. 1 read bahubhāvād'adhiṭṭhānaṅ.
1502. 1 for cetoparaṅ lakkhanaṅ read cetomalakkhālanaṅ.
1565. 3 for panā' hetu read alābhe tu.
1587. 2 for appavattānam read asamatthānam.
1592. 1 read janakappaccayānaṅ hi.
1674. 3 for tathābhāve read vātābhāve.
1682. 2 for kummaggā° read kummaggā.
1724. 4 read dukkhāyūhana-tapparaṅ.
1734. 3 for cārakā read cāraka.
1792. 2 for karissati read kariyati.
1812. 1 for saddhāya read saddhā ca.
1817. 3 for saddhānubbhāvaya read saddhānugā tassa.
1845. 3 for guṇe ṭhitattā read guṇoditattā.
1848. 1 for °paramatthā read °padatthā.
### Issues of the Pali Text Society.

#### I.—ARRANGEMENT BY YEARS.

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| 1911. | 1. Dhammapada Commentary, Vol. II.  
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| 1913. | 1. Sutta-Nipāta.  
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Total, 35 years; 59 texts; 82 volumes; approx. 22,886 pages.
II.—INDEX TO TEXTS.

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III.—INDEX TO AUTHORS.

Alwis, James; Lectures on Pali and Buddhism (1883).
Anesaki, M.; The Sutta-Nipāta in Chinese (1907).
Bell, H. C. P.; List of MSS. in the Oriental Library, Kandy, 1882.
Bendall, Cecil; On the Mahāvagga (1883).
Benson, A. C.; Buddha, a sonnet (1883).
Carpenter, J. E.; ed. of Dīgha and Sumangala-Vilāsini.
Chalmers, R.; ed. of Majjhima, vols. 2 and 3.
Clauson, G. L. M.; A New Kammaṇṇācā (1907).
Dé, Harinath; Notes and Translations (1907).
Dhammārāma, P.; ed. of Nāmarūpasamāsa.
Edmunds, A. J.; A Buddhist Bibliography (1903).
Feer, Léon; ed. of Saṅyutta, 5 vols.; and of Pañca-gati Dīpana.
List of MSS. in the Bibliothèque Nationale (1882).
Frankfurter, Otto; List of MSS. in the Bodleian Library, Oxford (1882).
Geiger, W.; ed. of Mahāvaṃsa; transl. of Mahāvaṃsa (1912).
III.—INDEX TO AUTHORS—Continued.


Hardy, Edmund; ed. of Anguttara, vols. 3-5, Peta-Vatthu, Peta-Vatthu Commentary, Vimāna-Vatthu Commentary, and Netti-Pakaraṇa.

On some stanzas in eulogy of the Buddha (1901). On the enlarged text of the Mahāvaṃsa (1903).

Hoerning, Dr.; List of Pali MSS. in the British Museum (1883 and 1888).

Hunt, Mabel; Index to the Paṭisambhidā (1908); to the Anguttara (1910). Transcription and Collation of the Khuddakapāṭha Commentary.

Jacobi, H.; ed. of Āyāranga.

Konow, Sten; Pali words beginning with “H” (1907); with “S” (1909).

Landsberg, G.; Puggala-Paññatti Commentary.


Minayeff, J. P.; ed. of Sandesa-Kathā (1885), Cha-kesa-dhātu-vaṃsa (1885), Anāgata-vaṃsa (1886), Gandha-Vaṃsa (1886), Simā Vivāda (1887), and Kathā-Vatthu Commentary (1889).

Moore, Justin H.; Collation of the Iti-vuttaka (1907).


Notes and Queries (1884, 1885, 1886, 1887, 1889, and 1891).

Müller, F. Max; On Kenjur Kasawara (1889).


Norman, H. C.; Commentary on the Dhammapada.

Oldenberg, Hermann; ed. of Therī-gāthā.

List of MSS. in the India Office Library (1882). The Era of Kaniṣka; the Ākhyāna Type and the Jātakas (1912).
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Schrader, F. Otto; Nirvana (1905).
Silva, W. A., de; Pali Books printed in Ceylon (1912).
Steinthal, P.; ed. of Udāna.
Strong, S. A.; ed. of Mahā-Bodhivāya.
Sumangala, Rev. Sūriyagoda; The Dhammapada, new edition (1914).
Suzuki, Daisetz T.; The Zen Sect of Buddhism (1907).
Tailang, L. S.: Dhammapada Commentary Indexes (1915).
Takakusu, J.; Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins (1905).
Trenckner, V.; ed. of Majjhima, vol. 1.
III.—INDEX TO AUTHORS—Continued.


Wenzel, H.; Nāgārjuna’s “Friendly Epistle” (1886). Index to verses in the Divyāvadāna (1896).


Zoysa, Louis de; List of MSS. in Colombo Museum (1882).

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